University of Florida

International Review

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Flora is a senior in Economics with a minor in Chinese language and a certificate in International Relations. During her time at UF she has been proactive in creating opportunities for herself from co-founding a Miami-based non-profit called RivMan Initiative and Charities, interning at the headquarter of the Everglades National Park, serving as a Campaign Fellow for the Hillary Clinton 2016 Campaign, participating in a study abroad trip at the renowned Tsinghua University, and various other activities. After graduation, she will be interning at two locations as a data analyst at a political consultation firm. She has interests varying from international relations to environmental conservation and uses economic analysis as a medium to combine them. In her free time, she enjoys a hot cup of tea, fresh air, an idea to sketch, and origami.

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Paul is a rising junior Political Science student pursuing a minor in Portuguese and two certificates in International Relations and European Union studies. Having won the University Scholars Award, he is currently conducting research with Dr. Selden on a project titled "Can Economic Interdependence Predict Support Among EU-Member States for Sanctions Against Russia?". In a statewide competition he won a $500 "Best Poster Award" and presented his research at the Florida Network for Global Studies Conference at the University of Central Florida. In addition to his University Scholars Program research, Paul is currently working on a project called "The European Security Implications of Brexit". Having won $6,000 from the Center for Undergraduate Research and the University of Florida International Center, he will spend June through August 2018 at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels and will conduct interviews with EU, NATO, and European defense policymakers to determine the short and long-term changes in EU Grand Strategy as a result of Brexit. Additionally, he maintains a perfect 4.0 GPA and is an active member of Pi Sigma Alpha and College Democrats. He seeks to pursue a doctoral degree in Political Science at a top-tier Political Science doctoral program. In his free time, he enjoys playing soccer, watching any type of sport, reading, and cooking.

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Isamar is a senior in Political Science with a minor in French and Francophone Studies and a certificate in International Relations. She has an interest in diplomatic relations and is passionate about the world. Her dream is to work for the United Nations. Specifically, she is a strong advocate of women's right and equality. Currently she is working on her senior honors thesis about the country she was born, Venezuela. Her favorite hobby is to study languages. She is a native Spanish speaker, fluent in English and French, and is a beginner in Portuguese.

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Hector is a junior student at the University of Florida. He previously attended Broward College and transferred to UF to complete his double major in International Studies and Economics as well as a minor in mathematics. At Broward College he served as president of the Honors Student Committee and as staff writer for the College's newspaper. He has also been a top Model UN competitor at the local, regional and national level. Correa aspires to go to Law School and pursue a career in international business or human rights law. He discovered his passion for the law when he attended the FSU Law School Donald J. Weidner Summer for Undergraduates program. Correa has done research on the relation between GDP growth and the reduction of income inequality, and on the effectiveness of Peace Treaties to build peaceful and cohesive societies.

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Riley is a current third-year student pursuing a double major in Economics and Russian. During his time at the University of Florida, he has assisted two separate professors on UF sponsored research trips; one in Senegal concerning the impacts of technology on migrant networks and the other in Hungary concerning integration efforts. Riley is continuing to develop his experience in academic research with his participation in the 2018-2019 University Scholars Program. For his USP research project he will be examining the development and dynamics of Signals Intelligence in the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Riley has studied abroad with UF at Moscow State University this summer and plans on spending further time abroad honing his Russian language skills. Riley also enjoys regularly performing community service with his involvement in Alpha Phi Omega. His interests range from international relations to Russian and Central Asian culture and history. Riley is most comfortable deep in nature, appreciating its beauty and getting connected.

Adam Clark

Adam is a fourth-year undergraduate student at the University of Florida pursuing a dual major in Political Science and Spanish. After transferring to UF from the Ogden Honors College at Louisiana State University in 2016, he turned his focus to United States foreign and domestic policy with a particular interest in U.S. interactions with foreign powers. He intends to seek a certificate in International Relations. In the 2017 fall semester, Adam, working under doctoral candidate Asli Baysal, conducted research on the European Union. Their areas of focus, among others, were Supranationalism and Electoral Accountability. His research with ABD Baysal led to one of his two publications in the International Review. He is involved in several on-campus organizations, including: Tau Sigma NHS, the Student Advisory Council for Undergraduate Affairs, and the UF Trial Team Liti-Gators, which competed at the 2018 American Mock Trial Association National Championships. Following his graduation in May 2019, Adam will enroll in law school and potentially go on to conduct graduate-level research on American public and foreign policy.

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Zachary Selden

Zachary Selden is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. He was previously the Deputy Secretary General for Policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly based in Brussels, Belgium from 2008-2011. He was the Director of the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO PA from 2003-2007. Prior to that posting, he was the International Affairs Analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office (1999-2003) and the Director for Emerging Threats at Business Executives for National Security (1996-1999). His most recent publication is Alignment, Alliance and American Grand Strategy (University of Michigan Press, 2016).

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Introduction

This edition of begins a trend in our evolution as a journal by taking a more refined focus on International Relations. Our previous edition in the Fall casted a broad overview of topics and subjects, this submission contains a focus centered across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This moves away from the familiar developed Western world and dives into the state interactions and growth that is normally not a center point of American media. The history of most of states of the world and their path to transition under the aging rule of the United States hegemony, globalization, resource degradation, and social advancement is an anecdote still filled with a wealth of knowledge to be heard and studied. The future of international relations may not be in the West, but the dynamic progress of the East.

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Superpowers, State Actors, and Institutional Considerations of the Middle East

The Middle East spans North Africa and Southwest Asia. It is composed of twenty-two states that lie on an economic, cultural, and sociopolitical spectrum so diverse that each entity demands academic attention and defies generalization. This is a region that has become a storm center of IR study and key proving grounds of international foreign policy and diplomacy. It is a grand understatement to say that to attempt to fully understand every intricacy of the Middle East and its constituents would take far more than a single issue of this journal. Why is it, then, that "The Middle East" has become an amorphous, catchall term with a connotation of intimidating foreignness? Why have these twenty plus states and their individual cultures and complexities been distilled to a geographical allusion? How did this region of the world come to attract the scrutiny of scholars and the ire of xenophobes alike? And of course, how do the world's most powerful state actors approach the Middle East, and when and why do they do so? Following analyses of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, public opinions, and mass media rhetoric by Aaron Klein and Daimiris Garcia, these questions and more will be given careful consideration and the beginnings of resolution.

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Authors

Aaron Klein

Born and raised in Florida, Aaron Klein graduated with honors from the University of Florida in the Spring of 2018 with a bachelor's degree in Political Science and History, and minors in Communications Studies and Philosophy. During his time at UF, Aaron worked as a desk assistant for the university's housing department, a tutor for the University Athletic Association, and proudly served as vice president of UF's Speech and Debate Society and as captain of the Individual Events team, where he finished as the 14th ranked speaker in the nation at the 2018 AFA-NIET National Tournament. Aaron will return to UF in the fall of 2018 to pursue an M.A. in Political Science specializing in Public Affairs, to teach Introduction to Public Speaking in the Dial Center for Oral and Written Communications, and to coach for the Individual Events team. Aaron's focuses include understanding effective policy design and government affairs. Using his background in communication studies, Aaron analyzes the Washington Post's rhetorical framing of Israeli and Palestinian affairs, with a special focus on how representations and language can construct different meanings for different audiences. Aaron dedicates this paper to his parents, both long-time journalists, who have dedicated their careers to an ethical and honest pursuit of the truth. He believes that in 2018, their work, and the work of all journalists, is more important than ever.

Daimiris Garcia

Daimiris is the current summer Development and Outreach intern at the Human Rights Watch in Miami, FL, a non-profit organization dedicated to uncovering human rights abuses internationally. She received her B.A. in Political Science with a minor in French at the University of Florida in 2018. During her undergraduate career, she undertook an exchange year abroad in L'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences-Po Paris) where she focused on Middle Eastern politics and counterinsurgency strategy. She undertook an internship in the office of U.S. Senator Marco Rubio where she conducted research for the Senator on foreign relations, particularly for the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. She undertook another internship in the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands in the office of the Registrar where she was involved in the non-judicial administration of the Court. Her primary tasks were to organize seminars related to Court communication with civil society and reformation of legal aid. Since then Daimiris' interest into the Middle East, law, and international institutions has grown rapidly. She has been awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to pursue a Master's degree in Conflict Resolution and Mediation (Public Policy) from Tel Aviv University for the 2018-2019 academic year. She will be studying the interdisciplinary nature of conflict and the role of policy in international resolutions. She hopes to specialize in the areas of conflict resolution related to international law and security. After her M.A., Daimiris plans on applying to law school and pursuing a career in the U.S. government. Her plans are to become a legal foreign policy advisor and specialize in Middle Eastern affairs.

"Covering 'The Special Relationship': Scrutinizing the Washington Post's rhetoric towards Israeli politics"
By Aaron Klein

Palestinian Scholar Edward Said articulates a trend within Western News coverage of Islam: "Only when there is a bomb in Saudi Arabia or the threat of violence against the United States in Iran has "Islam" seemed worthy of general comment."(Said, 1981). If this is the trend for the Western world's (and for the last two decades, the United States') perspective towards its primary historical "other", then what should we expect to see in its perspective towards its friends? To answer, we need not look any further than Israel. Israeli politics have undergone tremendous upheaval since the start of the new year. In less than six months, Israel's prime minister has become mired in a deepening corruption scandal, the United States has accelerated a controversial decision to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem, Israel's government has moved to deport thousands of East African refugees, and its military has pulled the country closer to a multi-nation war than it has been in four decades. Despite the unique complexities within Israeli politics, United States media outlets often struggle to extricate their own American biases from Israel-related coverage. To examine this further, I have chosen six articles by the Washington Post, all published within the past six months, whose coverage concerns a multitude of topics, including Israeli political scandals, foreign policy, immigration, and diplomatic issues between the United States and Israel. I will argue that the Washington Post consistently distinguishes its representation of Jewish, Israeli political figures and their affairs, from non-Jewish and non-Israeli "others" in two ways: by representing Israeli political issues with rhetoric that is culturally salient for American and other Western readers, and by falling back on monolithic characterizations of non-Jewish, non-Israeli peoples and their affairs. This analysis may seem abstract, but understanding, analyzing, and critiquing journalism, especially in the realm of international relations, has never been more vital.

Dr. Ido Oren, of the University of Florida, discusses the often-porous distinctions between the study of a nation or a group's culture, and the national security considerations of the scholar tasked with studying it. His analysis is bolstered by the fact that many of the cultural scholars he analyzes were in fact directly or indirectly employed by the United States government. He makes an important point about the often-unnoticed connections we rhetorically make between our view of another countries' 'culture', and our country's' diplomatic relationship with that country (Oren, 2000). Living in the United States, our perspective is significantly shaped by American ideological values, such as secularism and capitalism, which we view as normatively positive characteristics. These values influence how we rhetorically "otherize" some groups as "different" or "undeveloped" and legitimize others as "like us". This is the first way the Washington Post distinguishes its representation of Jewish, Israeli political figures and their affairs, (us) from non-Jewish and non-Israeli (others): by representing Israeli political issues with rhetoric that is culturally salient to American and other Western readers. This dynamic is most obviously evident in comparisons between the executive (and decidedly "in group") heads of state for each respective country: President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In an article published on March 5, 2018, Post writers Ruth Eglash and Anne Gearan write about a visit Netanyahu made to Washington D.C: "The two leaders, who have formed a personal bond closer than any Trump has with other world leaders,

gave no sign that the corruption allegations, which Netanyahu denies, were coloring their meeting. Trump has a cloud over his own administration as special counsel Robert S. Mueller III investigates his aides and others as part of an inquiry into Russian interference in the 2016 election"(Eglash and Gearan, 2018). To be clear, the explicit purpose of Netanyahu's visit was to speak at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual policy conference, which the article alludes to in its thirty seventh paragraph. Yet the article dedicates its seventh paragraph to comparing the foreign collusion scandal plaguing President Trump, with the corruption scandal dogging Prime Minister Netanyahu, and to stating that the two men have a "personal bond". This rhetoric is culturally salient to an American audience, and not only reinforces the view that Israel is the United States' closest geopolitical ally in the Middle East, but also closely links the President of the United States with a leading figure in Israel's conservative, hardline government. By drawing an unmistakable parallel between Trump and Netanyahu, the article rhetorically legitimizes both actors as members of the "us" group in the eyes of American readers. This dynamic occurs in even more subtle ways.

An article written by Loveday Morris on March 5, 2018 concerns the fate of 60,000 East African refugees and migrants in Israel, who Netanyahu's government is attempting to deport back to their home countries. She writes: "For hundreds like Godin, who have graduated from the Israeli education system, speak Hebrew and know little of their home countries, a deportation order could turn their lives upside down. They are Israel's "dreamers"(Morris, 2018) Her comparison has obvious flaws: there exists no congressional legislation to forcibly deport the more than 700000 DACA recipients in the United States (the program is currently in legal limbo) and DACA recipients are much more geographically diverse than the African migrants in Israel, who primarily hail from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan. However, the parallel highlights the desire for American media outlets to draw parallels between American policies and Israeli policies. Though many today are critical of the way DACA recipients are being treated by the Trump Administration, much of the American public is supportive of providing DACA recipients with the means to reside in the U.S., outside of the shadows of society. There is no similar program in Israel; quite the contrary, the Israeli government denies that African migrants have any legitimate claim to asylum and are literally forcing them to leave the country. Morris's generous comparison portrays the Israeli government as magnanimous towards refugees. Her portrayal of a country struggling to abide by its oath to take in "huddled masses, yearning to be free" is extremely salient to American readers, even though Netanyahu's government is not living up to that portrayal. American journalists abroad mirror this pattern. In her August 2017 article in The Guardian, journalist Suzy Hansen describes her inability to separate her own Americanized normative values from her coverage of Turkish and Greek society: "No matter how well I knew the predatory aspects of capitalism, I still perceived Turkey's and Greece's economic advances as progress, a kind of maturation"(Hansen, 2017). Hansen's inability to separate her own positive associations with capitalism interfered with her ability to objectively depict non-American societies, creating an "us" (those aligned with values of capitalism) and a "them" (those who are not).

No issue challenges how we view the character of Israel's government more than that of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Loveday Morris writes on February 13, 2018 about a blockbuster trial in Israel concerning a young Palestinian girl arrested for assaulting two Israeli soldiers in the occupied West Bank. She writes: "Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and a White House they see as favoring Israel more than ever, has fueled frustration among Palestinians. Regular clashes have broken out in the West Bank between demonstrators and

Israeli forces, which, although not large after 50 years of occupation, have been persistent" (Morris, 2018). Though the start of Ahed Tamimi's trial does coincide with the current debate over Trump's decision to relocate the U.S. embassy in Israel, the reporter fails to mention in this passage that this incident had nothing to do with the controversy over the embassy, Israeli occupation forces have been in the West Bank for decades, and Tamimi has been a vocal agitator for West Bank Palestinians since 2012 (the article briefly mentions her previous history later in the article). This passage inextricably links a symbolic decision by the President of the United States and the general stance of the Trump Administration to this separate issue. In doing so, Morris creates a clear "us" (the United States and the Israeli government) and a "them" (the Palestinians that are reacting to our foreign policy decisions). To be clear, this dichotomous representation isn't novel. Stephen Greenblatt argues in his book Marvelous Possessions that upon first encountering inhabitants of the New World, Christopher Columbus' writings demonstrate his constant desire to see something familiar in the language of the Native Americans he encountered, to "find what he expects to find"(Greenblatt, 1992). The Washington Post demonstrates a similar desire in their constant parallels between the United States and Israel: to portray Israeli issues in a way that is salient to American readers. In doing so however, they link American readers to only one subset of Israeli society: the predominantly Jewish, conservative ruling class, and thus "otherize" everyone else in the country.

Columbus writes on his first voyage: "In all these islands, I saw no great diversity in the appearance of the people or in their manners and language. On the contrary, they all understand one another, which is a very curious thing…." It would be ludicrous to believe that Columbus, being from Italy and employed by Spain, could have had any real understanding of the diversity of the peoples he encountered the first time he met them. But this inclination to paint "all these islands" with a monolithic brush did not die with Columbus. It is a fundamental part of "otherizing" one group and legitimizing another in one's own image: portraying the other in monolithic, almost caricature like terms. This is the second way the Washington Post distinguishes its representation of Jewish, Israeli political figures from non-Jewish and non-Israeli "others": by falling back on monolithic characterizations of non-Jewish, non-Israeli peoples and their affairs. To locate this dynamic, look no further than terms Post writers apply to Palestinians, themselves an extremely diverse group. In Eglash and Gearan's article concerning Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Washington D.C, the two reporters write: "Palestinians disagree, saying the embassy decision spoils chances for peace, by appearing to write off their claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of a future state" (Eglash and Gearan, 2018) "Palestinians" at no point provided a unified vote in favor or against the decision to relocate the embassy. How could they, given that there are 9.6 million Palestinians, living in Jordan, Jerusalem, the United States, Brazil, Greece, and numerous other countries(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016)? Despite millions of Palestinians not aligning themselves with the Palestinian Authority, the author uses this shorthand to apply to all of them. By representing the Palestinian Diaspora with such monolithic terminology, the writers imply that they have a unified set of political beliefs in opposition to the white Israeli state (and the Trump Administration). Political scientist Naeem Inayatullah discusses this rhetorical simplification in his analysis of imperialist themes in Star Trek, The Next Generation. In speaking of how themes from the show mirror depictions of Native Americans by European colonists in the 16th century, he writes: "A binary response to the other's language is the product of an ontology that denies difference." In regards to Indian languages, the Europeans either "acknowledge it as a language but refuse to believe it is different [which we have represented with a 1]; or … acknowledge its difference but refuse to admit it is a

language" (Inayatullah, 2003). We can further see this simplification in an article written by Ruth Eglash on March 1, 2018, concerning a dispute between secular and orthodox Jews over a ban on shopping on the Sabbath. She writes: "According to data published by the Pew Research Center in 2016, about one-quarter of Israeli Jews are ultra-Orthodox or otherwise religious, while the rest consider themselves secular or traditional. (Slightly more than one-fifth of Israelis are Arabs, and Saturday business is legal in their towns.)"(Eglash, 2018). Note the use of a parenthetical in reference to Arab Israelis, whose population apparently does not merit more inclusion in this discussion. Further, the writer does note that Saturday business is legal in Arab Israeli towns but fails to expand on why their views on the matter would differ from secular or orthodox Jews, who she analyzes much more thoroughly. This representation mirrors a classic element of outgroup-homogeneity: that there is no need to understand the complexities of Arab Israeli beliefs: they are all vaguely the same. Contrast this monolithic representation of the "other" with a much more individualized representation of a member of the "in group": Yair Netanyahu, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's son. Cleve R. Wootson Jr. writes on January 9th, 2018 about a brewing scandal concerning the younger Netanyahu's misogynistic and corruption referencing statements made while he was under the influence. The article quotes Yair Netanyahu's apology, the apology of a family spokesman, and an accusation by the Prime Minister that the unflattering recording was released to harm him politically. This is objective journalism done correctly: it fairly accounts for both sides of the controversy. Which begs the question: what about Yair Netanyahu grants him a fair and balanced profile, while Arab Israelis and Palestinians receive a parenthetical and a broad one sentence description? The answer is right in front of us: the former represents the in-group. The latter represents the other.

After demonstrating the extensive foreign policy considerations that influenced cultural studies throughout the Cold War, Dr. Oren elaborates a critical implication for cultural scholarship moving forward. He considers the example of Thomas Risse-Kappen, who concluded that NATO survived because it "consists of liberal democracies who are likely to form pacific federations" (Oren, 2000). However, as Oren explains Risse-Kappen himself worked in agencies allied with NATO's interests and values. He states: "To the extent that his explanation of NATO's endurance corresponds to Allied government's official justifications of the alliance, is Risse-Kappen merely a detached analyst of the effect of norms? Does he not become, however indirectly, engaged himself in the reproduction of the norms he analyzes, norms that happen to be promoted by national security establishments?" These are the types of questions we must ask when analyzing how American media outlets cover countries like Israel. I have argued that the Washington Post consistently distinguishes its representation of Jewish, Israeli political figures and their affairs, from non-Jewish and non-Israeli "others" in two ways: by representing Israeli political issues (especially those perpetuated by Israel's government) with rhetoric that is culturally salient to American and other Western readers, and by falling back on monolithic characterizations of non-Jewish, non-Israeli peoples and their affairs. In no way does this analysis mean that the Washington Post is not useful: I read their international coverage every morning and find it on the whole extremely rich and balanced. However, we must be cognizant of the subtle ways their coverage aligns powerful segments of Israeli society with American values, and powerless segments the values of the other, to truly understand the reality of Israeli society and affairs.

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"China's Pivot West to Middle East: Implications on International Security and Counter Terrorism"
By Daimiris Garcia

In March 2017, Daesh propaganda targeted China directly for the first time after showing Chinese President Xi Jinping turning into flames over a Chinese flag (Taylor, Washington Times). This terrorist organization has recently announced calls to move into Central and Southeast Asia after losing ground in the Middle East (ME). China's increasing economic cooperation with the ME has led to a post-Cold War evolution of its foreign policy as a more responsible actor in terms of international security. The moral appeal and political influence of China in the region have protected its own vital economic interests for the longevity of the regime. Will a change in power politics remove the United States (US) as the hegemonic security enforcer in the ME? Will China become the new international policeman? These questions must be analyzed through the Chinese lens and the basic pillars of Chinese foreign policy that its leaders have been burgeoning since Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, one must ultimately ask: to what extent does the need for international security and counterterrorism measures question the longstanding non-intervention Chinese foreign policy in the ME?

The analysis of the economic, political, and social ties between China and the ME offers insights into China's peace-making diplomacy in the region, its role in international security, and its use of soft power to influence geopolitics.

Economic, Political, and Social Approximation

The Beijing Consensus, as one of the basic pillars of Chinese foreign policy, encourages innovation-based development in foreign countries through investment cooperation (Wang 71). This development model coupled with China's Open Door Policy in 1978 tripled trade and investment ties with Middle Eastern nations (Horesh 6). Since 2013, China became the world's largest oil importer and is heavily investing in oil fields around the world- 157.5 billion USD between 2005 and 2014 alone, and over 50% of those oil imports come from the ME (78). China also invests heavily in rich minerals and establishes cooperation agreements for Chinese goods (37). One of the most important ties between China and the ME is Xi Jinping's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) plan (37). This project to construct a trans-Eurasian corridor that connects China to Europe through a series of rail links and highways requires economic cooperation with the ME (35). An overland silk road will ensure regime survival, and concurrently the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for meeting the country's energy demands (36).

The security afforded by the concept of "eurasianism" and the integration of the Silk Road, increasingly attracts political alliances to China (31). The pragmatic approach of the economic development model alludes to theories on commercial liberalism- bilateral economic interactions between states should lead to amiable political relationships (He 163). China's effort to develop political relationships with the ME stems from its intent to preserve the One China Policy in a diplomatic wager against Taiwan and Tibet's Dalai Lama (Nathan and Scobell 34). These positive relations are afforded through an increasingly valuable cultural diplomacy. China's intentions to portray itself as a Muslim-friendly country have gradually improved bilateral economic and political cooperation- even if China does not have ideological assets in the region to protect (59). However, according to some scholars, the focuses of Chinese think tanks on western societies limit the expansion of Chinese interest in the ME (Degang 369).

China's role in conflict resolution is beleaguered due to a lack of academic research into the OBOR countries (369). Thus, think tanks in China can be foreign policy actors to some extent. As a result, China has increased academic exchanges with countries in the ME and organized festivals and cultural exhibitions; such as the "China Cultural Week in the Gulf", which sought to bridge inter-state dialogue and mutual interaction (Jianwei, Astana Times). Befriending countries in the ME assures secure access to oil and gas, but also demonstrates Chinese willingness to play a positive role in the region (Horesh 217).

<u>Chinese Peace-Making Diplomacy in the Middle East</u>

This "positive role" stems from another basic pillar of Chinese foreign policy: the term New Diplomacy. After the 1990's, Chinese diplomacy coddled the idea of peace and shared prosperity in the international environment for China's domestic development and security (Fei 2). China's pragmatic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an indicator of China's use of soft power as a regional mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts (Degang 367). It is in China's strategic interests to play the role of peacemaker because peace and stability in the region facilitate access to oil, fuel the Chinese economy, and allow for the exploitation of new markets-especially with investments in the sophisticated technology market in Israel (Horesh 71). During close-door talks, China agreed to organise a trilateral dialogue mechanism through an Israeli-Palestinian peace symposium, according to the vice minister of foreign affairs Zhang Ming in a recently published article in the Times of Israel ("China says it will host"). According to Pan Guang, a professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, it is unknown "if this will be an official dialogue or an unofficial one" as there is "doubt if Israel would want any official involvement" (Zhou, South China Morning Post). However, China is a firm supporter of the two-state solution, despite Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu condemnation of the rise of Palestinian organizations seeking to build an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinians skepticism of foreign promises (Horesh 224).

However, according to Wu Sike, the former Chinese envoy to the Middle East, the US void in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict single-handedly should invigorate other countries (like China) to join the peace-making efforts (225). The unprecedented growing skepticism towards the US has led Israel to pivot to the East economically, with the hopes of political ties in the future (71). The unprecedented interest of both Palestine and Israel for cooperation with China develops a possibility for changing the face of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the years to come. China must avoid bolstering one side more than the other and must maintain a neutral role to ensure collaboration. Overall, President Xi "believes that strong economic ties [will] help diplomacy" (225).

China's economic diplomacy in the ME also applies to the US-Iran nuclear proliferation conflict. Beijing has long supplied arms to and imported oil from Tehran due to common interests, but China has also refrained from antagonizing their strategic partnership with the US (181). Iran's decision to pursue nuclear weapons, from a Chinese point of view, results from the US presence in the Gulf and the use of nuclear power to run its economy (182). However, China's cooperation is separate from its status as a signed member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement, according to the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Cheng Jingye (193). China's 2006 'White Paper' outlining the country's national defense policy, highlights a firm commitment to international arms control and nuclear disarmament (Bolt et al. 36). Therefore, China has continuously urged a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, explicitly through diplomatic forces and not militarily (Horesh 196).

China has maintained a relatively "pro-US" and "pro-Iran" stance, which has led Iran to look at it as a sympathetic friend while giving China a formal excuse to uphold the Non-Proliferation Agreement (190) (See Appendix A). If China can achieve a settlement about nuclear weapons, it will not only protect its relationship with the two countries, but also lend China the reputation of being a peacemaker (192). According to an article in the Times of Israel, Jinping warned Trump that the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement "should not be affected by any changes in the domestic situations of the countries concerned," ("China Warns Trump"). This demonstrates a continued commitment for a peace agreement in the Iran nuclear proliferation conflict, since it is a common agenda for China and the US in a future multipolar global system.

China as a Player in International Security

The Open Door Policy, New Diplomacy, the Development Model, and numerous other pillars of Chinese foreign policy are vulnerable to international security threats given China's globalized interdependence. According to scholars Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China's political stability and territorial integrity are threatened by foreign actors and forces in four concentric rings: its actual territory; its borders with 14 adjacent countries; its surrounding regions like Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia; and the world far beyond (34). China's security interests in a stable backyard, without the diffusion of violence into different rings, increases the demand for Chinese global governance (39).

Non-Intervention Policy in International Law

Interestingly, in the face of threats to national security, China upholds a strict non-intervention policy in foreign affairs. This policy distinguishes China from other countries and embodies the idea of territorial integrity pragmatically. According to Sherif A. Elgebeily from the South China Morning Post, China follows the Five Principles of Coexistence, which includes concepts like mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. According to Michael Wood, a Princeton scholar, the element of coercion is principal in illegal non-military intervention based on article 2.4 of the UN charter and jurisprudence by the Nicaragua v. United States (1986) and DRC V. Uganda (2005). The Encyclopaedia of the New American Nation defines coercive intervention as occurring both economically, such as offering or withdrawing loans and investments, and politically, such as granting recognition to one acceptable government to bolster its power. This definition of intervention; however, has no legal consensus because of a lack of an overriding norm between pure cooperation and intervention ("Prohibition of Intervention"). There is no categorical line between the state's legal right to conduct its affairs as it pleases and the unwarranted interference into the affairs of other states ("Prohibition of Intervention").

Is it through this legal discrepancy that China conducts most of its foreign policy, especially in the ME and Africa. Despite this, the importance of security has gotten so high that Chinese economic relations and protection of its citizens abroad have been challenged (Dugard, United Nations). As China delves into the "world far beyond" according to the Four Rings, it has used the diplomatic protection of international law to invoke the responsibility of foreign states to protect the rights of Chinese citizens and to justify the use of the military to protect Chinese nationals abroad (Dugard, United Nations). After Qadhafi's coup d'état in Libya, China conducted a military extraction of about 36,000 of its nationals (Horesh 172). Similarly, in Yemen in 2014, China left behind assets and contracts (169). The use of this international customary law is increasing due to the increasing terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals overseas

(Bolt et al. 13). This also demonstrates another key shaper of Chinese foreign policy: nationalism. Nationalism is used as an instrument to drive public opinion on certain military actions, if they are in the interest of the state (Wang 79). To defend the regime and ensure longevity, China pursues diplomatic protection law to extract citizens from international security threats.

The UN is another vehicle China exploits for international security, under the Four Ring Model and international law (Degang 360). In order to uphold its interests and grow as a responsible power; Beijing has exercised its veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (SC), deployed peacekeeping troops instead of its own military, and adopted resolutions to resolve certain conflicts (360). The war in Syria is a controversial topic for China since it has used its veto power four times in three years to reject UN resolutions for involvement in the Syrian crisis (Horesh 173). However, these actions can be interpreted either as support for the Syrian president, or support of a stable government in the region, certain solidarity with Russia, and the non-intervention principle (Horesh 173). China even invited the National Dialogue Coalition from the Syrian opposition party to visit Beijing and proposed a 'five points' system to resolve the Syrian crisis (Degang 362).

Counterterrorism

The Syrian crisis has bred more terrorist violence than ever before and China, since 2012, has put counterterrorism under the spotlight of Chinese foreign policy according to the 'White Papers' (Bolt et al. 12). The illegal activities of terrorist organizations, from money laundering to narcotics and physical attacks, are a threat to social stability in the Four Rings (12). China's increased antiterrorism effort is a result of ethnic conflict and nationalist separatists' movements stemming from ME terrorist organizations and the Uyghur Muslim minority in the North-Eastern Xinjiang province in China (Horesh 48). The Han colonization and marginalization of the Muslims from society created violent backlashes by the minority group (48). The Uyghur separatists have maintained close affiliations with religious extremist groups in the ME and have financial links and training from the Taliban, Daesh, and al-Qaeda (60). The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) threatens to expand the battle zone into China and radicalize the 20 million Muslims in China in connection with jihadists groups in the ME (38). In 2016, Uyghurs attacked the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan and in 2014 a bombing in a street market in Xinjiang province killed 31 people (Taylor, Washington Times).

The Uyghur predicament in Xinjiang is a core interest for China because separatism and instability in the First Ring jeopardizes China's territorial integrity. The violence endangers Jinping's OBOR project and the social image of China vis-à-vis the protection of its citizens (Horesh 39). Xinjiang is also one of the sites for the Chinese nuclear arsenal known as Lop Nur, which leaves the area vulnerable for jihadist access to China's nuclear weapons (39). Therefore, the Uyghur predicament imperils all facets of domestic stability in China, marking the state's increased efforts against terrorism within the framework of the UN, multilateralism, and international law (Bolt et al. 13).

The Uyghur issue is even a sour point in the Sino-Turkish relationship (Horesh 22). Turkey provides shelter and sympathy for Uyghur activists and denounces Chinese "counterterrorism" strategies as a pretext for eliminating a minority opposition group within its First Ring (22). However, the Uyghur issue is difficult for Turkey to sustain given its own separatist threats from the Kurds (23). China has used this fact when wielding soft power on Turkey. Turkey agreed to restrain the activities of the Uyghurs within their territory in return for

improved economic relations with China for the OBOR initiative (22). According to a released statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in 2016, "Turkey will take all necessary steps to strengthen bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation, combat illegal immigration, fight ETIM, continue to emphasize China's security concerns and not allow anyone in Turkey to engage in activities that harm China's security" (Martina, Reuters).

But in terms of the Chinese confrontations with jihadists in the ME, China is generally coy in fighting ISIS and has repeatedly refused to join the US-led coalition against terror (Tiezzi, The Diplomat). It has not shown an inclination for military support as it has done through peacekeeping troops in Sudan, for example. The US as a security protector, with its 5th fleet in the region, has ensured energy security and removed China's willingness to directly engage (Horesh 220). In the foreseeable future, there are no indications that China is disposed or adroit to challenge US hegemony as the principal security guarantor in the ME (116). However, terrorist attacks have continued. The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) group attacked Chinese workers and infrastructure projects in Algeria in 2009 and peacekeepers have been killed or injured in the past, most recently in 2016 in Mali (Branigan, the Guardian). Also, Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Daesh, named China first on a list of 20 countries proposed as jihadist battlegrounds, and menaced to occupy Xinjiang to extend its global terror network (Horesh 224). But, as the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry Hong Lei told reporters in 2014: "China has been fighting terrorism and has been providing support and assistance… in our own way, and will continue to do so within the best of our capabilities," (Tiezzi, The Diplomat).

China sees the root cause of terrorism to be poverty (Bolt et al. 98). The economic element is the main cause of social injustice, and religious extremism (98). Thus, a large portion of the fight against terrorism is economic development (98). The Group of Eight (G8) Summit in 2006, actually established economic investments to improve the pliability of energy infrastructure from terrorist threats and political instability (Bolt et al. 53). China encouraged the development of a strong multinational communicative approach to dealing with energy security to prevent the spread of the "China threat" (54). Also, China joined the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) to suppress the financing of terrorism through multilateral financial institutions (15). By being a proponent to counterterrorism measures, China is appeasing the fear of its rise in power and ensuring economic development for the promulgation of international security.

With the extension of Daesh and al-Qaeda into Africa, China might have a renewed push into counterterrorism in the ME given the stakes for African and Middle Eastern industrial investments (Jakobson 405). However, China's umbrella security protection from the US coupled with its pillars of multilateral foreign policy pose a case for non-military intervention and soft power exploitation.

International Security Organizations

Another form of soft power exploitation is China's leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, composed of Russia and Central Asian countries (Horesh 122). The organizations aims to cooperate on counterterrorism, boost communication between armed forces, and conduct joint-training military exercises to combat threats to the Four Rings (Bolt et al. 14). The exercises are code-named Peace Mission and composed of the armed forces of each member country - the latest being in 2016 (14). The purpose was to attack assumed terrorists with heavy firepower and practice using air-to-air missiles in mountainous terrain (14). China

also partakes in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA), which is an intergovernmental defense consultation mechanism to promote security and stability in Asia that includes most countries in the ME (Horesh 122). CICA opened the security dialogue of China and other states to more modern security- a multifaceted approach including economic, cultural, information, environmental and military-political components (Jianwei, Astana Times). With all of CICA's success in an Asian security system, it is limited by the ability or will of members to respond collectively and effectively to all challenges and threats of the future (Jianwei, Astana Times). Since most of Chinese military engagements have been through security organizations, there remains little to no evidence for a foreseeable unilateral Chinese military intervention. Instead, other pillars of foreign policy progressively bolster the dynamic role China is developing in global governance for the stability of its regime against international threats.

Conclusion

In summation, Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy are heavily connected. Domestic drivers, in turn, have a role in China's global governance and enforcement of international security. China has developed a pragmatic balance between soft power, peacemaking, and international law to legitimize selective foreign intervention. China's ability to influence other states politically, militarily, and economically without upsetting the international order or threatening the US hegemony in the ME has protected the legitimacy of the Chinese state and warded off security threats within the Four Rings. Even though there are dim prospects of China increasing its involvement in the region, evidence suggests that China will not retreat any time soon and will continue to encourage a multipolar approach to international security. China has a continuous dependence on energy security, an interest to be seen as a responsible world power, and advantages through the use of soft power in the geopolitics of the ME. In this sense, China appears to have struck a most commodious – and deft – balance between selective, legitimate foreign intervention and its use of soft power, counterterrorism, and peacemaking- while, at the same time, maintaining the veto power in the SC to use as it sees fit and thwart reproaches of its domestic policies. China's continuously adjusting participation in the ME, for a restructured system of international security, enriches the connotation between theory and practice in China's foreign policy and international diplomacy.

Appendix A/Works Cited

Table 11.1 Balancing of "Pro-US" and "Pro-IRI" elements of China's UN position, 2003–2011

"Pro-U.S."	"Pre-IRI"
oppose IRI possession of nuclear weapons and uphold the NPT; demand IRI	support IRI "right to peaceful use" of nuclear energy
fulfill its commitments and obligations under NPT	accept at face value IRI professions of non-military intention
approve 4 Security Council resolutions threatening or applying sanctions	oppose and delay IAEA "referral" to Security Council
Resolutions include demand that IRI suspend uranium enrichment	considerably water-down sanctions
agree to "report" issue to Security Council	oppose and long delay application of sanctions
agree to include reference to Article 7 U.N. Charter	eliminate threatening language
press IR/I to be flexible and genuinely seek solution	insist on negotiated solution and oppose threat or use of military force
	Reject as illegitimate unilateral or extra-UN sanctions
	reject as illegitimate intelligence gathered by "national means"

(Horesh, 2015, p. 190)

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China's State of Conflict

There is a large literature about rising powers in International Relations. The two papers in this section represent a timely contribution to the literature. Ongoing structural power shifts from the West to the East and from the North to the South have made rising powers, including China much more relevant to Great Power Politics. Diversionary war theory argues that heads of government will initiate wars in order to distract their populaces from domestic issues. The first paper in this section examines internal Chinese stability, the salience of Chinese nationalism, and changes in defense spending rates as predictors of Chinese Foreign Policy and concludes that the available literature on diversionary war theory, nationalism, and defense spending levels does a poor job predicting the aggressiveness of Chinese Foreign Policy. Through examining the possible implications of a US-China trade war, the second paper complements the first paper's examination of domestic stability within China. A US-China trade war has the potential to create mutual loses and should be in neither state's interest. However, frequently International Relations scholars must look beyond mere assumptions of "national interests" and open the black-box. These two papers achieve that task.

graphic by Lindsey Burrows

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"An Analysis of Contentious Chinese Overseas Territorial Disputes and Implications for Chinese Foreign Policy"
By Jacob Auer

The People's Republic of China has been, since its inception, a unique state in terms of the formation and implementation of its foreign policy. As it is has been referred to as a rising world superpower, the international community, including the world's only current superpower, the United States, must pay special attention to its rise, specifically in how it conducts itself in matters of international relations. With particular consideration to its involvement in interstate conflict, the Chinese government stands at an altogether perplexing and unique state of being. Although the PRC considers itself a relatively peaceful nation, its pattern of war and militarized interstate dispute is undoubtedly a distinct anomaly in a broader analysis of the international system. Beyond this, the most consistently present problem posed to the Chinese government involves its myriad territorial disputes across the mainland and in its overseas territories beyond. The existence of lacunae in such Chinese studies research, particularly in the unique autocratic form the Chinese government maintains today, necessitates further inquiry into the factors that drive Chinese foreign policy. In particular, these holes in the literature extend to issues of Chinese territorial disputes.[1] For this reason, it has become exceedingly difficult for international relations scholars to predict with any degree of certainty the role that China will continue to play in East Asian relations, as well as to craft effective policy in counterbalancing its rise and diminishing the threats it may pose to states and territories in East and Southeast Asia. In recent history, several notable theories have emerged in an effort to explain this trend, and each provide a distinct logic that offers much in the way of explanation for this topic. However, the presence of a consistent explanatory variable (or variables) has yet to be determined.

In the aforementioned case studies published, empirical evidence often suggests contradicting and often perplexing explanations for the observed phenomena in territorial disputes. In particular, in explaining why China has been so unique in its mostly peaceful resolution of its territorial disputes. Across a wide variety of global cases, explanatory variables include the presence of alliance, prior militarized interstate dispute, regime type, or diversionary behavior. However, as these are correlational variables, there must exist a deeper phenomenon at the heart of Chinese politics that is able to synthesize these variables, while simultaneously explaining the uniquely Chinese approach to such disputes. After all, the rise of China and its associated territorial disputes is without precedent or comparison. For this reason, this paper will seek to examine the sociopolitical factors (chiefly, Communism, nationalism, and domestic norms) that emerged in China during the Chinese Civil War and extrapolate how these factors impact the Chinese sociopolitical landscape since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, with regards to its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, in particular.

Because these variables are nigh impossible to measure directly, I will employ specific indicators to analyze specific dimensions of each variable, and their strength at any given time throughout Chinese history. Logically, correspondence between intensity of one or all variables should correlate with successful territorial dispute resolution or perpetuation. The first variable, Communism, will be correlated with China's authoritarian regime type, as the Chinese government is based around this economic principle. In essence, Communism for China means *capitalist authoritarianism,* and thus must be measured according to a metric like one presented

by the Polity IV index. China has consistently scored around a -7 on the Polity IV scale since 1976 (the period known as 改革开放, gǎigékāifàng, *Reformation and Opening Up*).[2] This score indicates a near fully authoritarian regime type, consistent with the style of government held by China since 1976. Beyond this, specific instances of Chinese communist values of manifest destiny in East Asia and reclamation of lost territory will be examined, especially with regards to the sense of "pride" encountered uniquely in China.

Figure 1: Polity IV Index of Chinese Regime Type, 1945-2015

The second independent variable, nationalism, will be operationalized as the measure of public support for Chinese government practices using available survey inventory of Chinese perceptions of the government, specifically whether Chinese citizens hold a favorable or unfavorable view of government action or policy. Because of limited data, as the Chinese government itself does not collect this sort of information en-masse, and lack of available data published in English, I anticipate this to be one of the weakest explanatory variables. However, there is a significant tide of nationalism that has existed in China since the 1970's, therefore I intend to extrapolate this phenomena to Chinese territorial disputes after this period.

The final explanatory variable, power disparity, is an equally confounding variable, but presents a roundabout way of being measured. Through analysis of Chinese military and economic capabilities, I will establish the competence and strength of the Chinese military and present the argument that, while China is an exceptional military power, its mostly peaceful

resolution of territorial disputes is due to its desire to maintain peace in its region so that its rise is unimpeded. Additionally, its lack of willingness to reveal the true capability of its military might is an angle I shall explore. Specifically, I will argue that the Chinese government indeed possesses the military capacity to quickly and easily end territorial conflicts but is hesitant to do so as this would reveal potentially classified intelligence regarding its military capabilities to its only global threat, the United States.

Literature Review

   M. Taylor Fravel's analysis of *China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes* presents the perfect springboard for this research question. His examination of the Chinese government's response to international dispute, in particular his causal mechanism (consisting of escalation, delaying, or cooperation) is an excellent metric to measure Chinese responses to territorial disputes and predict with some degree of certainty their future responses to such disputes. In particular, his specific attention to the factors that make China a unique case for study in resolution of such disputes is worthy of inclusion, as it may indicate possible explanations of some of the variables I have identified thus far. In addition, Fravel does an excellent job at limiting extraneous variables that could interfere with data collection for this particular case, specifically with regards to regime type, but also with revolutionary behavior and diversionary war, which I will expand on in associated literature later in this review.

   With regards to China's authoritarian regime type, Fravel notes that "China's willingness to compromise in territorial disputes carries several implications for international relations theory".[3] In contemporary IR literature, studies of regime type often concentrate on the specific behavioral patterns of democratic states in similarly democratic dyads, while authoritarian regimes are included as outliers or, in some cases, not considered at all. Although such specific considerations of democracy as an indicator for the motivator of behavior have no outright need to consider autocratic regimes, China, in spite of its purported regime type, behaves quite unlike a standard autocracy, and often behaves more similarly to democratic regimes, like the United States.

   Fravel's focus on *compromises* in territorial disputes opens the door to explore those instances in which China does not compromise in such matters, and to examine whether the same patterns of behavior that exist in such disputes that lead to compromise indeed exist in those disputes that do not. However, it is worth examining his causal logics to identify specific examples of communist, nationalist, or power disparity that influence compromise.

   Fravel's first causal logic, regime insecurity, explains why leaders may choose the often trickier and costlier path of compromise over offensive conflict in matters of territorial dispute. He identifies three specific strategies; delaying, escalation, or cooperation, that leaders may initiate at any point in a dispute and generally succeed in the signing of a bilateral agreement. Each strategy increases in risk, respectively, where delaying is a low-cost, low-risk maneuver that effectively maintains the status quo through declarations of maintained claims on contested territory. [4] Escalation is riskier, with an increased likelihood of armed conflict due to perceived threats and flexing of military might, while cooperation may result in failure on the part of the political leader in charge, and could end in political death. In matters of internal territorial

disputes within China, specifically with regards to minorities in China's periphery, China has consistently pursued a strategy of compromise, otherwise, it chooses to delay. Regime insecurity, he argues, is the specific causal mechanism that is logically and causally linked to patterns of Chinese peaceful settlement of its territorial disputes. Political disputes seem to be a significant motivating factor for Chinese insistence on such resolution. Fravel spend less time examining external territorial disputes, but his findings are noteworthy for the purposes of this assessment.

With regards to offshore territorial dispute, Fravel identifies the policy of the Chinese government to delay, consistently, and to never compromise. However, in many of these cases, there has not existed a significant threat to the internal stability of the Chinese regime. Fravel's analysis was excellent; however, the reasoning for China's actions in such disputes is equally as inward as regime instability.

With regards to the influence of China's revolutionary government on contentious territorial disputes, the existing literature suggests there is a causal relationship. Colgan (2010) finds that "states with revolutionary governments are associated with considerably more [MIDs] than states [without]…" . [5] Although Colgan was also measuring the effect of petrostate (states whose GDP is comprised of 10% or greater oil exports), China would be included in this data without consideration for its oil exports. The Chinese Civil War was a revolution that fundamentally transformed the democratic Republic of China into the PRC we know today, and its pattern of MID initiation, especially in light of the internal instability that existed after the civil war, corroborates Fravel's findings and begins to address the role of communism in China's actions regarding its territorial disputes in overseas territories.

A final theory in the literature worth noting is in diversionary behavior. In Mitchell et al. (2010), it was determined that states with specific contentious issue claims, such as borders or maritime disputes, have s a significantly higher prospect for MID initiation than in states without. These states are even more likely to initiate MID if they are facing domestic turmoil, like inflation, popular uprising, or revolt. [6] They do this in order to divert popular attention from the leader's performance in addressing the concerns of the populace in such instances, and redirect it to a common, unifying issue. Territorial issues often are such a scapegoat. These findings echo the data found by Fravel, and thus allow us to see a clearer picture of how states behave in offshore territorial conflict.

The current literature available on the topic thus suggests three major motivators for why states pursue territorial claims: whether there is regime instability, whether the state is a revolutionary government, and whether they do so as a coy method of diversionary behavior. All of these findings are tangentially related, yet there are no consistent underlying mechanisms that explain why China has been so unique in its pursuit of territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. For this reason, there must be an examination of specific instances of territorial dispute in these locations, and whether China's actions in such disputes indeed have the unifying aforementioned themes of communism, nationalism, and power disparity.

Case Studies

In order to analyze the specific causal variables I have previously outlined, I will consult three specific instances of territorial conflict in China that persist to this day. In my examination, I will analyze the history of the dispute, including whether any armed conflict over the contested territory occurred and, if so, to what extent. In particular, I will examine cases of territorial conflict that occurred in the South China Sea– the nine-dash line China created to assert salience of territorial claims. The same will be done with regards to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands dispute

in the East China Sea, which is a dispute held predominately between China and Japan (and Taiwan, but for the sake of brevity Taiwan's claims to these islands will not be considered in this analysis). In both instances, China's actions will take chief priority in my examination, while I submit an evaluation for the underlying causal mechanisms after.

The Nine-Dash Line

The nine-dash line refers to the vague method of demarcation employed by the Chinese government in assessing claims of territorial possession in the South China Sea. In 1947, the Republic of China originally proposed an 11-dashed line to constitute claims of territoriality in the region. In 1949, Premier Zhou Enlai revised this claim to 9 lines, which the present day PRC maintains. Interestingly, the present Taiwanese government asserts control over the same 9-dashed line, and conflicts between China and Taiwan over who really has claims to the region have existed since 1949. In any case, the territory encompassed by this nine dashed line boasts rich fisheries, expedient shipping lanes, and, perhaps most importantly, rich oil and natural gas resources. According to the US Energy Administration, the South China Sea represents one of the richest locations of undiscovered oil and natural gas resources globally, with about 200 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered natural gas and an estimated 10 billion barrels worth of undiscovered oil. [8] For this reason, there can be no doubting the strategic and economic benefits of possessing such territory in the South China Sea, and China as Asia's only regional hegemon is set on utilizing such resources.

Unsurprisingly, China asserts that the historical record reflects a pattern of ownership of territory within the nine-dash line dating as far back as the 5th century CE. Chinese knowledge of the existence of such territory was recorded as far back as the 5th century BCE. In the 20th century, the Republic of China was interested in producing a map of distinctly Chinese territorial claims in the region, and recalled on the recorded history of Chinese ownership of such territory as the basis for creating their aforementioned 11-dash line. To this day, the contemporary communist government of China maintains that the territory in question is distinctly Chinese as it was thousands of years ago. The logic here is highly questionable and irreparably flawed, yet the communist government's insistence is a reflection of their immense pride and Communist values. According to the Chinese government's 1998 Law on the Economic Exclusion Zone, Article 14 stipulates that the provisions of the law "do not prejudice 'historic rights' enjoyed by China." Clearly, this is a gross fabrication, and only serves to posture China as an unbiased third party.

After the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese government has been observed to possess a new fervor in addressing their territorial disputes, with patterns of nationalism reflecting this change. Johnson (2016) notes patterns of nationalism in China following the year 2000, as observed through surveys taken amongst Chinese citizens that focus on several measures of nationalistic trend: whether they would prefer to live in China or another country, whether China is perceived to be a better country than most, and whether respondents believe they should support their government, even when it is believed to be wrong. His findings suggest that, in the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese nationalism saw an upward trend that peaked around 2008, the time of the Summer Olympics in Beijing.[9] In the period between 2009-2013, trends in nationalism saw a downward decline, however in the time since, Chinese nationalistic trends have been increasing. Interestingly, this pattern mirrors patterns observed in contentious South China Sea debates and conflict.

In May of 2009, the Chinese government submitted a map indicating their purported nine-dash line to the United Nations; resulting in near instant protests from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, who had very little power to oppose the state in UN proceedings. Johnson's analysis indicate that at this point of time, Chinese nationalistic fervor was at a decade-long high, with Chinese approval of the government still soaring following the 2008 Olympic games. In this sense, there can be no questioning that the Chinese government had a renewed ambition to pursue such claims with such tremendous wide-spread support and approval from their own citizens. Four years later, in 2013, China proposed a new map indicating a tenth dash to the United Nations, a dash which existed to the East of Taiwan. Although this newly proposed territorial position existed outside of the South China Sea, its proposal at a time when Chinese nationalistic trends were on the beginning of an upswing is worthy of note, as the Chinese government was relatively quiet in terms of South China Sea issues in the period between 2009-2013.

One caveat to the aforementioned data is that there seems to be a trend observed in nationalism decreasing when the Chinese economy took a hit following the 2008 fiscal crisis. In a world where financial instability was the norm, it is interesting that the Chinese government did not take a more aggressive approach to claiming territory in the South China Sea, where many states that were allies of the United States were experiencing a similar economic slow. This paper will not address possibly reasons for such a trend, however it is worthy of note for future research.

With regards to power disparity in the region, there can be no questioning that China is the region's dominant power and that no military in the region can, alone or allied with another, stand up to its might. When the United States is brought into the picture the problem becomes tremendously more difficult to analyze, as US power projection in the region confounds any efforts on the part of the Chinese to make drastic territorial claims. In addition to this, the United States, as the reigning global hegemon, has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in China, as well as passing the buck of curbing Chinese military influence in the region to its two closest allies, Japan and South Korea. Beyond this, the United States has repeatedly stressed its desire to maintain peace and stability in the region, and to make sure that no state (China specifically) maintains such a strong hold on the region. Although the United States is steadfast and resolute in these claims, many nations with which China is engaged in such contentious territorial disputes in the region are *not* as closely aligned with the United States, including Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei.

Many of these nations comprise the entity known as ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and each nation and the conglomerate as a whole have vocally opposed Chinese territorial pursuits in the region. In particular, talks with the US, ASEAN, and China have yielded few productive results. Moreover, ASEAN as a whole does not have a sufficient amount of bargaining power to grapple with China, even unified, without the backing (tacit or otherwise) of the United States. Eaton (2006) theorizes that ASEAN holds a "regional resilience" to cope with regional instability and complex, broad regional issues, including salient territorial and economic tension. [10] However, Eaton's analysis also suggests that ASEAN as it stands is not yet able to competently organize and face many of the threats it currently does, including the economic and military powerhouse that is China. Moreover, it is difficult to determine with certainty whether ASEAN can be considered a truly powerful conglomerate, and thus its true military potential cannot be identified, and must be viewed with regards to its member states. Nevertheless, there does not exist a single country in ASEAN that even comes close to matching

the military capacity of China. In the South China Sea, such power politics means China is free to continue implementing measures like their nine (or ten) line system for demarcating territory, and nations in Southeast Asia are, on their own, powerless to stop it.

The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute

Perhaps one of the most well-documented cases of territorial dispute is the Senkaku (or Diaoyu, in Chinese) islands dispute that is centered around a group of islands to the North of Taiwan, Southwest of Japan, and Southeast of China. Historical records suggest Chinese knowledge and use of the islands as a navigational center as early as the 15th century CE, while Japanese occupation of the island occurred beginning in the late 19th century. After the end of World War II, the United States gained occupational control of the islands until 1972, when they were returned to Japanese control. Shortly after this cession of territory to Japan, the PRC and RoC began to issue their own territorial claims of the island chain, and thus a dispute that would last decades saw its inception. Although the islands are currently officially under Japanese control, Japanese law prevents habitation or survey of the islands. Moreover, the Japanese government formally purchased the island from the family who had owned it in 2012, angering the Chinese government and renewing tensions in the region. This, coupled with the knowledge of the presence of considerable oil reserves in the region, has created a tense environment surrounding sovereignty of the chain, and has pushed the Chinese government to take several unique measures to assert their authority over the territory.

In examining the role Communist policy played in escalation of the territorial conflicts in 2012, it is important to first determine the underlying political climate at the time. In 2012, the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called an election to determine the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, a process which created a great deal of sociopolitical instability in China. This climate of political instability is perhaps one of the reasons that China decided to engage in provoking this territorial dispute – as a means of diversionary behavior. The specific role of Communism here, is in the ineptitudes created in this process of governmental transition. The turmoil it begot in terms of uncertainty over new governmental leaders necessitated a significant unifying rallying cause, and this was found in pursuing such territorial disputes.

Coincidentally, such patterns of instability can be reflected through trends in nationalism around the same period. Kim et al. (2016) corroborate this claim, noting that similar patterns of instability occurred in Japan and most notably in China as a direct result of contentious internal turmoil. In addition to this, a process of unfavorable bilateral political cooperation saw an emergence in 2010. Unfortunately, this process was very poorly received by Chinese citizens, who began a series of anti-Japanese protests around China starting in 2010, specifically focused on the Senkaku Islands dispute. [11] These tensions boiled into the 2012 election, where the dispute was a major cause of frustration for the Communist Party, who needed to figure out a way to concentrate the anger of the people onto the target of Japan, and not the party itself. In this sense, nationalism was a tool employed by the Chinese government to effectively divert Chinese domestic frustration into a comprehensive foreign policy, aimed at escalating tensions in the region. This process was effective, and in late 2012, the Chinese government began sending surveillance ships into the territory. Tensions from the previous protests and escalation measures exploded into a new series of anti-Japanese demonstrations at the end of 2012. At this time, Chinese nationalistic fervor over the dispute was at an all-time high. This process has created a

vicious cycle of self-perpetuation of escalation on the part of the Chinese government, and renewed Chinese nationalistic trends that continue to this day.

In terms of military capacity, Kim et al. observe that the Chinese government has increased its military expenditures nearly six fold over the past decade, with specific attention paid to increasing naval capabilities. To this end, China has seen the construction of its first aircraft carrier, as well as anti-ship ballistae and stealth aircraft capable of taking out US aircraft carriers. [12] This is especially worthy of note when considering that Japan is relegated to a Self-Defense Force as a result of its post-war constitution, and that the United States and NATO are its military muscle, as the US is legally obligated to defend Japan in case of foreign attack. The power disparity becomes even more evident when considering the economic capabilities of both China and Japan. China's rise is evident through its astounding growth as observed in GDP increase. China's GDP officially eclipsed Japan's in 2010, and since then its phenomenal rise has occurred concurrently with Japan's considerable fall. In any case, Japan is ill-equipped to deal with an aggressive China, and should China choose to escalate the conflict further to the point of MID or war, the consequences for stability in the region, as well as the fates of the USA, China, and Japan, could prove catastrophic.

Conclusion

There is no arguing that China's rise is remarkable, and quite unlike anything the world has ever seen. In response to their rising might, China has seen an increased pattern of ambition and boldness in their region, actively engaging in territorial acquisition through methods that are often perplexing and bellicose, yet rarely resorting to violent means. It is especially interesting to note that China's pattern of peaceful resolution of their territorial disputes thus far has defied much of contemporary IR literature's estimations of what action *should* have occurred. Moreover, in contentious issues of overseas territorial disputes, China has neither engaged in military action nor peaceful resolution, opting for strategies of escalation that have yielded few positive results. Instead, the environment of the South China Sea and East China Sea is one marked by tension, uncertainty, and instability. It is the inability of these states or scholars to predict what China's next move will be that necessitates further studies into such contentious issues.

In examining these cases, one can reasonably expect patterns of Chinese Communist ideology, nationalism, and power imbalance to identify whether China will opt for peaceful resolution of its salient territorial disputes or for military action. However, its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, including disputes centered around its controversial nine-dash line, as well as disputes in the East China Sea, most famously the Senkaku Islands dispute, exist to this day. China's repeated patterns of escalation and increasingly dauntless behavior in defiance of the international community represent a fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy. It also presents a tremendous difficulty for theorizing what China's next steps will be. Such indicators of Chinese action or motivation are salient in analyzing certain territorial disputes, but are ineffective in the aforementioned disputes – issues which persist to this day.

China's unique style of Communism means the government will use otherwise damaging periods of internal instability to divert popular attention from the government towards unifying causes of territorial possession. Beyond this, China has consistently proven effective in using periods of heightened nationalism to further its overseas territorial ambitions, and there is a distinct and observable pattern of escalation of territorial dispute during times of heightened Chinese nationalism. Finally, the growth of the Chinese military alongside its GDP (as a result of

its "rise") have correlated precisely with patterns of increased escalation, as the majority of escalation has occurred in the 21st century, just as China's economy has seen its most significant boom.

      Should one or any of these indicators persist, scholars can reasonably conclude that China will continue in a similar pattern of escalation of its territorial conflicts. In the future, it will be especially important to observe China in periods of internal instability, heightened nationalism, or increased military spending. Although the existing literature concludes that China is unlikely to escalate these conflicts to the point of military offense, China's recent history has proven that it is anything but predictable, and thus more research is demanded on such contentious issues.

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"A Tariff for a Tariff: Trump's Crusade Against China, Two Decades in the Making"
By Gregory Barber

The international trade headlines of the past two months have been dominated by the ever-increasing tensions between the United States and China. With the first salvo of tariffs launched personally by President Donald Trump, China's Commerce Ministry has responded in kind. As the situation currently stands, the United States and China are negotiating the implementation of potentially $250 billion worth of tariffs. Regarding China as an antagonist is a relatively recent development in U.S. foreign policy, and that status has progressed as part of the ripple effect from China joining the World Trade Organization barely eighteen years ago. To understand President Trump's personal commitment to this cause requires an analysis of China's own trade history, and the toll its record-breaking rise took on American manufacturing. This paper will argue that the Trump Administration trade policies, while largely rooted in political appeal and overshadowed by unpredictable consequences in foreign relations, ultimately seek to revive a vapid American manufacturing industry and offset unemployment within that sector.

In 1948, the United States became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One of the provisions of the GATT was to extend Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to all GATT member countries. This designation was given to member countries with the intention of promoting free trade between them. MFN countries enjoyed all trade benefits that other MFN countries enjoyed, primarily lowered tariffs (Pregelj). However, a country was exempt from providing MFN status to a nation if that nation could not meet certain standards. Multiple GATT member countries, including the United States, took advantage of this provision.

During the Cold War, for example, Communist countries were among the many nations that were denied MFN status, principally the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 provided a way around this restriction. The Act allowed countries to acquire MFN status if the president deemed it beneficial to the United States. However, affording MFN status to these ostracized countries required congressional approval and yearly renewal of the given nation's status. Through the Act, China gained MFN status. Yet importantly, because its MFN status was conditionally provided year-to-year, China was ineligible for permanent membership in the GATT.

In the years that followed, the GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the designation of MFN evolved to permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). In 1999, President Bill Clinton spearheaded a piece of legislation that would grant China MFN/PNTR status permanently. The subsequent resolution was passed and signed into law on October 10, 2000 (Dreir). In 2001, China was able to secure membership in the WTO. In 2004, three years after China's induction into the WTO, the United States had a trade deficit of $130 billion dollars with China. For reference, the second-largest trade deficit the U.S. had at the time was a $50 billion-dollar deficit with Japan (Johnson and Noguera). This figure represents Chinese economic influence on U.S. economics as a whole, but the impact is not restricted to the overall deficit. China's WTO membership and PNTR status has had significant socioeconomic implications for many regions and sectors across the United States.

Between 2000 and 2004, U.S. employment in manufacturing dropped from 12,400,080 to 10,128,200, a decrease of 2,271,880 employees, a loss of 18.3%. By comparison, from 1979 until 2000 (the decades prior to China's PNTR status) employment in that sector had only

decreased by 12% (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Since the establishment of China's PNTR status, U.S. industries began to experience substantial reductions in manufacturing with scores of firms downsizing and closing; these losses were not recouped by the industry. These losses were not only felt at the individual level with workers, but also at a more macro level with local economies beginning to suffer. Workers in all occupations located in those counties experienced earnings declines. These income losses were concentrated among low education workers (Pierce and Schott).

The drawbacks brought on by increased trade with China can be outweighed by the positives. Recent literature has shown that China's entry into the WTO allowed the country to lower their prices by reducing tariffs on imported inputs, causing a new market price of certain manufactured goods to emerge. The firms who left the market could not remain competitive at these lower prices, which accounts for the sharp decrease in manufacturing employment. The overall loss of wages for manufacturing communities is smaller than the overall gain for all U.S. consumers from these lowered prices (Amiti, Dai and Feenstra). Additionally, the manufacturing sector is empirically just as strong as it was in the past. U.S. manufacturing productivity has continued along the same upward trend since 1990, maintaining even through the significant decrease during the recession of 2008. This continual increase in productivity alongside a dramatic decrease in employment can be explained by manufacturing firms substituting capital for labor (Pierce and Schott). The U.S. Department of Labor shows that in the manufacturing sector, gross job losses have outperformed gross job gains in almost every year since 2000, and in years when gains outweigh losses, it is only by a margin of ~20,000 jobs nationally. Charts 1 and 2 show these values (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Mass media outlets typically attributed the employment losses over the sixteen-year period to outsourcing. These dramatic shifts in employment infamously caused public dissatisfaction and outcry, observable in the results of the recent 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Chart 1: Gross Job Loss In Manufacturing Over Time

Chart 2: Gross Job Gains in Manufacturing Over Time

This labor market displacement is one of the many factors that influenced Donald Trump's presidential campaign. Using employment data from the National Association of Manufacturers (the nation's largest manufacturing trade association) the five states with the highest share of manufacturing employees as a percentage of the national total were Indiana (17.3%), Wisconsin (16.4%), Michigan (13.8%), Iowa (13.8%), and Alabama (13.2%). Together, these states are home to 74.3% of manufacturing employees (National Association of Manufacturers). In the 2012 U.S. presidential election, two of these states – Indiana and Alabama – gave their twenty electoral votes to Mitt Romney, and the remaining three states – Wisconsin, Michigan, and Iowa – gave their thirty-two electoral votes to Barack Obama. In the 2016 election, all five states gave their combined fifty-two electoral votes to Donald Trump (Federal Elections Commission). These manufacturing states were drawn to one of then-candidate Trump's many controversial campaign pillars: restricting trade with China.

Recently, his foreign policy trade goals that were alluring to these voters have come to fruition. On March 1, 2018, Mr. Trump announced the planned installment of a 25% tariff on steel imports and a 10% tariff on aluminum imports. To implement this, President Trump is operating under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Act gives the president powers to implement trade restrictions on "an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security" (White House Press Office). Initially planned as a universal tariff on all imports, fierce negotiations led to temporary exemptions being awarded to the European Union, Mexico, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina. The tariffs have not been executed, for which the administration has cited ongoing negotiations with these currently exempted countries. The presently planned date of implementation is June 1, 2018 (White House Press Office). Mr. Trump's move to install tariffs on imports was met with widespread support from high-ranking U.S. steel manufacturers. Nonetheless, these first declarations carefully avoided directly naming the intended target – China.

After the significant slowdown of the steel tariffs, President Trump moved forward with a separate set of tariffs specifically targeting China. This second wave of tariffs has been on the

"offensive" side of what many analysts have deemed a budding trade war. These proposed tariffs were ordered by Mr. Trump who cited a seven-month investigation (known as a Section 301 investigation) authorized under the eponymous section of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 301 allows the President to take "all appropriate action, even retaliation to obtain the removal of any… practice of a foreign government." Such an aggressive trade policy was challenged in 1999 by the WTO, since the organization maintains open trade between member countries as a qualification for membership. However, the objection was removed after an investigation by a WTO panel (WTO Investigation Panel).

The Trump Administration has announced the new tariffs would target a wide range of Chinese products (roughly 1,300) and the total cost of the new restrictions would reach a target amount of $50 billion. In addition to these product tariffs, new foreign direct investment restrictions would be put in place against Chinese investment. The investigators justified these burdensome regulations on the basis that "China has forced U.S. companies to share technology and intellectual property as a condition of doing business in China" (Worland). If the proposed tariffs are implemented by the Trump Administration, China's ability to interact with the U.S. economy would be almost entirely restricted. The moves by Mr. Trump have been met with opposition from various U.S. representatives and senators, but these moves are under the authority of the executive branch, thus limiting Congress' ability to intervene. Unsurprisingly, China has not accepted these tariffs silently. China's Commerce Ministry constructed a set of tariffs targeting 128 U.S.-manufactured products. 120 products, ranging from dried fruits to steel pipes, are targeted with a 15% tariff. Eight products, including pork products and aluminum, are targeted with a 25% tariff. Moreover, the Commerce Ministry stated it would pursue a legal case with the WTO. In the Ministry's words, "China does not want a trade war, but China is not afraid of a trade war. We are confident in our capability to face up to any challenge" (Shane).

In the most recent stage of the ongoing negotiations, a trade delegation arrived in Beijing. As of May 3, 2018, the Trump Administration has a new end goal: a $200 billion reduction of the U.S.-Chinese trade deficit by 2020. In 2017, the deficit was $275 billion. To help accomplish this goal, China offered to lower the current 25% tariff on U.S.-made cars, but in return demanded that President Trump remove the specter of the Section 301 tariffs. One Chinese economist summarized the talks, stating bluntly "My impression was that they didn't go very well" (Lawder and Wong).

For the past two months, the Trump Administration has worked diligently to fulfill its campaign promise to lock down Chinese trade. But in the life of the average American, where will the ripples of these actions be felt? The widely utilized Ricardian model of trade shows that restrictions on free trade harm the citizens of both countries. This traditional school of thought reminds observers that heavy tariffs will raise prices beyond what consumers would be truly willing to pay. Undeniably, the presence of 25% tariffs on thousands of goods travelling between China and the U.S. would raise prices for the average consumer in both countries. President Trump, though, chooses to focus on the social costs rather than the economic costs. This focus is precisely what drove his anti-trade, pro-manufacturer campaign rhetoric.

Had there been well-defined trade regulation on manufactured goods eighteen years ago, perhaps tens of millions of American manufacturing workers would still be employed, and perhaps some of the manufacturing firms would never have dissolved. Of course, a downside of this hypothetical is that prices of such manufactured goods would be higher. For many observers and actors, these tariffs represent the clear negative that Ricardo saw in trade restriction: higher costs in exchange for a smaller set of choices. But Donald Trump views his endgame differently:

increased prices for Americans in exchange for higher employment. Mr. Trump's endgame is not to solely harm China, but to adjust the American economy to a state that he personally believes will benefit his chosen beneficiaries: unemployed manufacturing workers. His aggressive and undiplomatic method will ultimately prove harmful for foreign relations, but his motivations are guided by the same attempt at self-preservation that guided many of his unemployed voters. The sentiment of "If we remove China from the market, I could have my old job back" represents the significant appeal Mr. Trump's course of action offers to his base.

If the Trump tariffs survive international scrutiny, or if they succeed in bringing back manufacturing employment, still remains to be seen. For the time being, Trump's battle exposes the American economy to retaliation from the WTO and other similarly opposed countries, while the way of life he seeks to reinstate may be gone forever.

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Counter-Terrorism

After 9/11, the United States declared a war against terrorism. Ever since then, the country has work on their strategies against terror to protect the citizens. Moreover, they have been working on their counterterrorism responses, which are military and political actions to prevent terrorism. This issue is not limited to America. Europe has been struggling with terrorist activities in all the past attempts. The intelligence in Europe has to be cautious due to the interconnectedness and proximity of the countries. In this section of the review, we will expose a recommendation on how to improve the current intelligence technique. Furthermore, it will be examined how can all-source intelligence analyst improve their techniques and analysis with a combination of cognitive and technical filters of information. Also, the section will cover the strategies used by the EUROPOL as it becomes a more proactive force against the threat of terrorism.

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Alison Bowlby is a rising fourth-year Political Science student with minors in Spanish and Latin American Studies. She takes great interest in law, government, and national security, aspiring to attend law school after graduation. Her ultimate goal is to work for the United States Government or as an attorney. At her time at the University of Florida, she has been judiciously involved in Student Government, Florida Blue Key, UF RecSports as a Group Fitness Instructor, and is currently serving as the President of her sorority, Kappa Kappa Gamma. She has also held internships with the 15th Judicial Circuit, and the United States Department of Justice, two institutions that she is very grateful to for helping to shape her future career aspirations.
While writing her paper entitled, "The European Police's (EUROPOL) Switch from Reactive to Proactive Terrorist Threat Mitigation," she wanted to highlight the European community's acknowledged need for active efforts to combat terrorist threats before they occur in our ever-changing international landscape. As transnational terrorism is a growing threat, terrorism in the modern-age utilizes various forms of technology and creative measures to influence others, as information is more largely accessible within the European Union due to the free movement of people within the region. This paper will discuss Europol's creation, its strategies, and how it proactively mitigates the terrorist threat in the modern era. Apart from providing deep insight, it will also address alternative beliefs that diversify the analyses. Upon completion of Alison's analysis, those interested in engaging in further research and discovery can read the European Police's yearly publication of the European Terrorism Situation and Threat Report, in which law enforcement officers, European policymakers, and public civilians look at various facts and figures related to the terrorist threat in the EU. Alison would like to thank her phenomenal professors for inspiring her to research topics out of her comfort zone and her loving parents for wholeheartedly supporting her throughout her journey at the University of Florida. Go Gators!

Alex Montero

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"The European Police's (Europol) Switch from Reactive to Proactive Terrorist Threat Mitigation"
By Alison Bowlby

Transnational terrorism is a growing threat that continually changes course, spreading specific groups' radical ideologies by appealing to at-risk individuals and inflicting harm on innocent civilians. Terrorism in the modern-age utilizes various forms of technology and creative measures to influence others, making the terrorist threat very hard to assess and combat. The spread of terrorist groups such as ISIS, Hezbollah, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram, affects nearly every continent, heavily directing their efforts to the European region. These terrorist efforts include but are not limited to recruiting young European individuals to join their cause, infiltrating European infrastructures and intelligence operations, and fostering civil unrest in the name of their deity or ideology. Apart from localized efforts, terrorist groups have very recently attacked major European cities in the past three years. The 2015 attack on Paris was a series of coordinated attacks, demonstrating the complexity and multinational integration required in the bombings that resulted in the death of 130 people, injuring over another 400 more. The 2016 attack on Brussels killed another 32 people and injured 300 more, creating waves of fear within the European community. The damage that has been committed and the potential future threat that terrorism poses within the European Union (EU) makes it crucial for scholars to analyze and assess the efforts taken by police forces to proactively prevent future attacks. One specific transnational police force, the European Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), has made large efforts to decrease transnational terrorism in the European region. As the terrorist threat within the EU has increased over recent years, the Europol has shifted its reaction-based mission to develop proactive cross-border cooperation, preemptive operational analysis, as well as construct various regional task forces to combat terrorism in and surrounding the European continent. This paper will discuss Europol's creation, its strategies, and how it proactively mitigates the terrorist threat in the modern era. Apart from providing deep insight, it will also address some limitations of Europol's policy reforms.

Origin and Institutional Introduction to Europol

The European Union's foundation laid the foundation for a single currency, the euro, and largely increased transnational cooperation. It also created the legality of European Citizenship, common foreign and security policies, as well as cooperation among the judiciary and criminal policing. The commonality of criminal policing addressed the need for a transnational police force, thus creating Europol in 1992 with very limited powers to combat drug trafficking (Deflem, 337). In 1998, the Council of European Ministers widened Europol's scope to include counter-terrorism efforts due to the newly evolving influx of criminal enterprises (Deflem, 337). Headquartered with over 1,065 staff in The Hague, Netherlands and working with a budget of over 116 million euros, Europol fights illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime, intellectual property crime, counterfeiting, and terrorism in addition to exchanging intelligence information and drafting threat assessments ("European Police Office (Europol)"). Interestingly, although Europol is an emerging power within the Union's greater landscape, it does not have any executive authority powers; in other words, Europol officers cannot perform arrests or search warrants without receiving approval from the respective member state.

Europol is organized under the leadership of a Directorate which is appointed by the European Justice and Home Affairs Council in addition to a Europol Management Board that is

comprised of representatives from each member state and the European Commission. Each representative receives exactly one vote when making decisions, meeting twice a year two approve the budget and collaborate on strategy. For the 2016-2020 strategy cycle, Europol has resolved to most heavily address cybercrime, organized crime, and terrorism ("European Police Office (Europol)"), further enforcing the notion that transnational terrorism is a rapidly growing threat. Current terrorism trends have shaped how criminal police forces view and assess their targets in a multi-faceted context. In the post 9/11 modern era, scholars have argued that the European Union has evolved their understanding of threat definition in three distinguishable phases (Monar, 211).

The Evolution of Europol's Counter-Terrorism Policy

The first phase of revamping the threat definition, included viewing terrorism in a more universal sense due to globalization factors. The same threats that the United States faced on 9/11 have the capacity to affect all "open and democratic societies" (Monar, 211). Therefore, Middle Eastern radical groups and threats posed to other Western states are no longer looked at as being purely external—similar attacks could occur internally. (Unfortunately, these attacks have occurred in both France and Belgium as previously stated.) European leaders drafted the *Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism* in 2002 to officially denounce all acts of terrorism and newly identify it as "one of the most serious violations of the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms" (Monar, 211). This new emphasis on the seriousness of the capability of terrorist groups to destroy political, physical, and social structures within a nation marks the first tangible change from a reaction-based mission to a more proactive one.

The second phase involved developing the *European Security Strategy* in 2003 to highlight the specific "key threats" that terrorism poses. Notable points include the declaration that terrorism undermines community tolerance and often furthers the development of weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons have the capacity to cause mass fatalities, further adding to this new threat definition. The *European Security Strategy* also recognizes the dual nature of both the internal and external threat, rather than single handedly addressing terrorism as a global entity (Monar, 212). Domestic terrorism is often "home-grown" and can affect the stability of the state. In centuries past, many forms of domestic terrorism (i.e. ethnic racial supremacists, radical political groups, people who have been inspired by other terrorist groups remotely, etc.) have even led to state failure if they can overthrow the current government. This tragedy creates implicit instability and disrupts the democratic process.

The final third phase emerged after there were attacks in London on July 7, 2005. Commonly known as "7/7," the bombings on London bridges killed many and injured hundreds more, prompting the European Council to develop the current *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, implemented by Europol (Monar, 213). This third phase reaffirms previous statements but addresses modern recruitment efforts by discussing radicalization processes where terrorist groups appeal to individuals online. Terrorist groups then command the new recruits to commit domestic terrorist attacks, hence the rise in suicide bombings such as the London attack. It more specifically highlights EU vulnerabilities that are unique to the European region. Since the EU allows for community citizenship through the Schengen Agreement and has a single market, terrorists have ample access to numerous member states, their resources, and their infrastructure which creates a high potential for harm. New technologies and an increasingly

"open" European Union pose numerous challenges for Europol: "It took several years to develop an overall European counterterrorism strategy; and even after its formal adoption in 2005, large chunks of counterterrorism endeavors in Europe remain principally within the confines of national-decision making" (Coolsaet, 858).

Europol's Development of Counter-Terrorist Institutions

These new challenges for law enforcement emerged as the European Union does not have its own transnational military force. To become even more proactive, Europol has collaborated with various local member state police forces to adopt the four practices, "PREVENT" (radicalization and recruitment), "PROTECT" (citizens and infrastructure), "PURSUE" (terrorists across borders), and "RESPOND" (to the consequences of terrorist attacks) (Monar, 216). These platforms explicitly outlined initiatives that have been communicated to all EU law enforcement agencies to establish consistent procedures in very different individual nation's climates and educate their national leadership. The revamping of Europol's threat definition and collaborative efforts to consistently educate other nations altered "event-driven counterterrorism" (Coolsaet, 858) in which Europol would purely respond to crises, opened a window of opportunity to further harmonize national laws within the European community.

One of the largest initiatives that Europol has undertaken to decrease transnational terrorism was the establishment of the European Counterterrorism Center (ECTC). The ECTC was recently funded in January 2016 as a large part of the 116 million annual euro budget. It is a two-fold establishment that serves as both an integrative operation center as well as a hub that recruits regional experts to foster new proactive strategy development ("European Counterterrorism Center-ECTC"). This center is revolutionary as Europol is making tremendous strides to effectively respond to the threat of terrorism. The ECTC primarily focuses on sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing, tackling foreign fighters, tracking illegal arms trafficking, tackling foreign fighters, and promoting international cooperation among other counterterrorism agencies ("European Counterterrorism Center-ECTC"). These efforts have allowed Europol to essentially track and monitor the movements of terrorist forces, preemptively mitigating the threat by intervening before physical attacks or fraudulent movements. The ability for the ECTC to share intelligence regarding terrorist financing stems from the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), an institutional body found within the ECTC. The TFTP is an agreement between the European Union and the United States in which financial information for suspects of terrorism can be freely exchanged in open investigations, while simultaneously protecting privacy by calling for due process to release information ("European Counterterrorism Center-ECTC"). Through this agreement, Europol can transfer financial data and monitor the spending of terrorist groups to help path their migration patterns and the types of individuals they are currently targeting. The European Commission oversees all TFTP progress to confirm that Europol consistently respects all personal privacy rights.

Another ECTC body is the EU Internet Referral Service which has instilled a "coherent and coordinated European prevention approach" ("European Internet Referral Unit to Combat Terrorist and Violent Extremist Propaganda"). Highly-trained specialists work to identify points of concern and then inform internet service providers and web-site owners that terrorist groups have been trying to infiltrate their platforms to either recruit supporters or perpetrate financial schemes. These strategic analysts preemptively strive to reduce the cyber impact/overwhelming footprint that terrorist groups have through data analytics. In conjunction with these efforts, Europol analysts have also been able to improve secure internet pathways, and employ

confidential sources to share information to relevant, open cases ("European Internet Referral Unit to Combat Terrorist and Violent Extremist Propaganda").

Intra- and Extra-EU Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Sharing

The move from reactive, "event-based" counterterrorism ploys to proactive structural analysis and threat mitigation is also vastly demonstrated in Europol's efforts to connect with other transnational law enforcement bodies as well as with EU member states. Many of these preemptive integration efforts have been made with the United States (US), a leading law enforcement partner. In past decades Europe was viewed as "soft on terrorism" while the United States was known within the international landscape for having "a hardline stance" (Hoffman, 63). US-EU collaboration has diminished these pretenses: "since 9/11, we have seen unparalleled growth among the transatlantic intelligence communities" (Aldrich, 125). Since Europol is a transnational group, it primarily integrates with large US national agencies including the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the US Central Intelligence, the US Defense Intelligence Agency, and the US Department of Defense. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) expansion of Legal Attaché offices across Europe has allowed Europol officers to sit directly next to US FBI agents and analysts to create a fully-integrated environment where multiple groups can investigate the same terrorist organizations side-by-side. This one of a kind collaboration allows Europol to report directly back to their European Counterterrorism Center, where other Europol officers can communicate this new intelligence to their respective task forces (Aldrich, 130). These efforts have been very effective in the European region and a continued increase of integration among different agencies expresses great potential for additional growth.

The operational analysis prong of preemptive targeting is stemmed from Europol intertwinement with the European intelligence community. The European intelligence community and Europol analysts have created the *European Terrorism Situation and Threat Report* annually since 2007 ("EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: TE-SAT"). The *European Terrorism Situation and Threat Report* is "a top priority for the EU and for Europol" ("EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: TE-SAT") in which law enforcement officers, European policymakers, and public civilians can look at various facts and figures related to the terrorist threat in the EU. Some of these facts and figures include newly developing trends each year as well as identifying the size of the presence of jihadist terrorism (radical Islamic terrorism), ethno-nationalist terrorism, anarchist terrorism, fascist terrorism, and terrorism single handedly related to one issue ("EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: TE-SAT"). The *2017 Situation and Trend Report* focused primarily on the expansion of jihadist terrorism in which a greater number of individuals are using "IEDs" or independent explosive devices that contain readily available products such as gasoline, alcohol, fertilizer, propane, etc. Each annual publication has educated and informed concerned European citizens, where citizens have been instructed to alert Europol authorities if they view suspicious actors purchasing the above products at home improvement stores. When the citizenry is more aware of the local presence of the threat, they are able aid defense agencies by serving as informants, allowing these agencies to prescreen individuals.

Ongoing Challenges to Europol's Counter-Terrorist Policy

The *European Terrorism Situation and Threat Report* as well as other publications circulated by the European Counterterrorism Center have been played an intricate role in

fostering preparedness in the event of an attack, but despite these great strides, there are still immense challenges for Europol. In today's society, there is little debate that many of the terrorist groups have been radical Islamic terrorists. Due to this reality and large Islamic population within the European Union, there must be a balance between combating terrorism while maintaining equal rights for all citizens. Anti-Islamic sentiment has been growing throughout much of the region in a phenomenon known as "islamophobia" (Ahmed); 27 of the 28 countries within the European Union have reported an increase in violence and discrimination targeted against Muslims:

> "European Muslims, on the whole, would appear to represent no exception. Thus, survey evidence indicates that they have as much or more confidence in European democratic institutions as non-Muslims….the European Muslims most likely entertain, abet, or commit terrorism are persons who feel alienated from and mistreated by the very European societies in which they make their homes" (O'Brien, 202).

O'Brien argues that overall European Muslims believe in the power and potential of a democratic society and those who do commit these heinous crimes are isolated from mainstream society. Another EU scholar, Steve Peers, argues that maintaining human rights is a primary principle discussed in the *Framework Decision*. Article 1(2) specifies that:

> "the *Framework Decision* 'shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6' of the EU Treaty, which states that the EU respects human rights as defined in the ECHR and national constitutions as general principles of community law" (Peers, 236).

Prejudices against European Muslims threaten the democratic ideals that the European Union promotes as well as safety for all individuals that Europol protects. Europol must balance effectively mitigating the threat while facing the grave challenge of not linking all terrorist acts to the Muslim faith.

Apart from the challenges that Europol is faced with in terms of fostering equality, others would argue that Europol is not efficiently moving its reactive-based mission to a proactive one. Europol has not successfully lobbied EU lawmakers to gain the power to arrest. Since Europol officers cannot perform arrests or search warrants without receiving approval from the respective member state, many argue that they are unable to preemptively conduct investigations on specific individuals, sincerely retracting from their research abilities. An additional counter-argument is that the ability to measure Europol's overall effectiveness is rather unclear:

> "Issues of cooperation and trust are similarly murky at this stage of Europol's existence, leading to fears that criminal and terrorist groups are already exploiting the move toward greater European integration by establishing cross-border networks, while complementary law enforcement—and for that matter, counterterrorism—efforts lag behind" (Hoffman, 92).

Hoffman's case establishes an area of discernment; Europol has reportedly made immense strides to increase the EU counterterrorism effort, but it is often difficult to measure whether these efforts have been overwhelmingly effective. Terrorist groups may appear to be diminishing on the surface, but their efforts could have just been moved underground. To affirm that Europol

is an effective transnational law enforcement agency, analysts must develop a more clear and specific manner to assess their work.

Conclusion: Europol's Strides and the Unpredictable Nature of the Terrorist Threat

        To conclude, the threat of transnational terrorism is highly difficult to chart as new technologies and ideological movements change their course. In other words, their ability to influence others and mobilize them to inflict harm on others is now more largely accessible within the European Union due to internet platforms and the free movement of people within the region. Attacks in Europe have created a call of action for Europol, the EU's transnational police force, to alter their previous reactive-based capabilities to encompass greater proactive cross-border cooperation and preemptive operational analysis. Together, these proactive efforts combat terrorism in and surrounding the European continent. Europol has engaged with international partners and has increased its collaboration with EU leadership to rebrand the threat definition, which defines terrorism in the EU's unique context, identifying key threats to prepare for potential future travesties. Other initiatives include establishing the European Counterterrorism Center (ECTC), which allows Europol to monitor the movements of terrorist forces, intervening before travesty, as well as releasing the *European Terrorism Situation and Threat Report* to member states to encourage domestic improvement. Europol's efforts to proactively alter their policy to diminish the presence of terrorism within the European Union simultaneously educates citizens and mitigates the threat, creating a community with greater safety and stability.

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"How can all-source intelligence analysts improve their techniques and analysis with a combination of cognitive and technical filters of information? Integrating Cognitive and Technical Analysis"
By Alex Montero

The future of our national security depends on an intelligence community constantly on the cutting edge of analytical thinking and processes. As of 2018 the intelligence community seems to be struggling to adopt common training and techniques recommended since 1999 (Heuer, 1999). As technology continues to improve, the all-source intelligence analyst of any expertise will have to be well trained in creating structured, data-driven analytical insights. Intelligence analysis has become a combination of cognitive and technical analysis with analysts and technology capable of compensating for each other's strengths and weaknesses. Intelligence analysis requires critical thinking and an ability to perceive complex environments through rigorous methods, but it increasingly requires technical competence in interacting with an artificial teammate – the computer – to organize big data. By understanding the importance of cognitive and technical techniques both can be applied more effectively to improve techniques and methods before catastrophes occur. This paper provides a framework to understand the urgency of improving analytical techniques, how an adoption of common training could benefit the intelligence community, and ultimately why this has not happened.

Intelligence Analysis Overview

In the following, a background of current intelligence techniques and methods is provided to explore the necessity of having the intelligence community improve analytical techniques and processes. First, an overview of the organization and standards of the intelligence community. Second, an exploration of several cases to illustrate how the intelligence community can improve from where it is today. This background is important to understand where the intelligence community is today, and how processes have improved or may still be improved on using a combination of cognitive and technical filters of information. Finally, the importance of implementing improved analytical techniques will be shown.

The Modern Intelligence Enterprise

The current understanding of all-source intelligence analysis as defined by the Department of the Army is "the integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations" (2012). The all-source intelligence analyst executes the intelligence cycle consisting of "planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback" (Johnston and Johnston, 2013). There is also single-source intelligence which relies on information from only one of the intelligence disciplines of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Counterintelligence (CI), Human intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), Open-source intelligence (OSINT), Signals intelligence (SIGINT), and Technical intelligence (TECHINT) (Department of the Army, 2012). The primary difference is that all-source intelligence collects information from all of the disciplines for analysis and relies on sources from more than one discipline to make confident assessments.

These varying disciplines each play a role in the intelligence enterprise, intelligence cycle, and in the institutional intelligence processes all-source analysts are part of and use. The intelligence enterprise is composed of a national intelligence leadership structure mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The IRTPA laid out an organizational and analytic transformation of the intelligence community. This bill was the culmination of about half a decade of the intelligence community adapting to world events, and scientific advances in technical capabilities and psychological understanding (Coulhart, 2016). The IRTPA created an intelligence enterprise composed of multiple intelligence departments and agencies all answering to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) which is meant to oversee the intelligence community (see Fig. 1) (Cong., House, 2004; JP 2-0, 2012). In the IRTPA the analytic transformation created for analysts was a mandate that analysts be trained in, and use, alternative analysis methods. The purpose of reorganizing the intelligence community and mandating the use of alternative analysis methods or Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) was to address the major issues of information sharing, synchronization, information overload, and confirmation bias which contributed to an international security failure of predicting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Coulhart, 2016). These issues also contributed to the critical national security failure of 9/11 (Coulhart, 2016).

In the same year the IRTPA was enacted, Congress mandated a reform to address the advancing technical capabilities, which led to information overload by some analysts, and information overload is still a significant risk-factor today in a world of big data (Lim, 2015). At the same time, IRTPA was addressing the lack of information sharing by creating an ODNI and addressing the delayed sharing of information in the intelligence community. By creating the National Counterterrorism Center, the IRTPA also addressed the lack of synchronization among intelligence agencies, which led to the incomplete dissemination of information leading to an inaccurate assessment regarding the presence of WMDs in Iraq (Cong., House, 2004; Cong., Senate, 2004).

This rapid succession of intelligence failures was explored in depth prior to and after enactment of the IRTPA (Cong., Senate, 2004; Negroponte and Wittenstein, 2009). The history of such a major reorganization matters because it took significant failures to influence the passing of those reforms in the first place. These failures led to the loss of thousands of American lives and over 1.1 trillion in expenses in Iraq alone (Crawford, 2016). Improvements to techniques and methods should be constant. This paper aims to promote that through an understanding of past cases, understanding current capabilities, and proposing future training. Moving forward the intelligence community has had worthwhile cases that illustrate the dependence of our intelligence community on cognitive and technical capabilities.

Post 9/11 Cases in Intelligence: Intelligence Still Matters

This paper will analyze two cases. This paper acknowledges that it is unknown how much tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have improved due to these events since review of institutional TTPs are considered too sensitive for this paper. It can be argued that the intelligence community does not take major steps to improve on standards until major catastrophic events (Cong., Senate, 2004; Marchio, 2010). The very nature of the intelligence community prohibits detailed public insight into ongoing analytical mission sets, but certain assumptions and suggestions can be made from how recent events occurred or continue to occur. Even if SATs have been used as prescribed they were insufficient or incomplete in the following cases. The uses of technical capabilities were also insufficient or incomplete. This means there is a possibility for improvement. These cases are deliberately taken at least half a decade after the

IRTPA passed. Two cases are explored; one is a tactical case of an airstrike in Afghanistan in 2010 while the other is the strategic case of the Arab Spring in 2011.

The first case in 2010 culminated to a cognitive failure, and it is focused on the consequences of intelligence failures due to information overload, which can be attributed to high operational demands with low human resources. The next case, the Arab Spring starting in 2011, was a combination of cognitive and technical failures, and it is focused on the incapability of even advanced data gathering technology to create empathetic perceptions of complex human and societal events. Both cases highlight that cognitive and technical capabilities are inseparable in modern intelligence analysis, and when one capability is an insufficient filter the other capability may provide the additional layer necessary to compensate.

The airstrike in Afghanistan in 2010 had over 23 civilian deaths, and it is one of many cases of failures that occur on the battlefield. It should be the responsibility of the intelligence community to learn from small and large failures alike to improve (Filkins, 2010; Shanker and Richtel, 2011). This case alone led to the unintentional killing of women and children (Shanker and Richtel, 2011). In this tactical case General Stanley McChrystal took appropriate steps and setup training to prevent future mistakes (Shanker and Richtel, 2011). The Center for Army Lessons Learned has also published handbooks like the Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention handbook to prevent these cases from occurring again (CALL, 2012). The missing component in these solutions is the persistence of these failures due to data overload, and a clear way to solve it.

The training setup by General McChrystal was not made public as this falls under the sensitivity of TTPs so an assessment cannot be made on the sufficiency of this training. Future research by the U.S Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine has reinforced the psychological failures identified by reporters and senior military officers in this case (Prince et al., 2011). The failures identified in this case had "the people steering and spotting the targets [sitting] at a console in Creech Air Force Base in Nevada" while "intelligence analysts who were monitoring the drone's video feed sent computer messages twice, warning the drone operators and ground command posts that children were visible." (Filkins, 2010). The success here is in intelligence analysts monitoring the feed sending warnings. The failure was on drone operators overwhelmed and perhaps burnt out by the constant influx of information on this surveillance feed, and the same issues have been found of intelligence analysts using the distributed common ground system (DCGS) (Filkins, 2010; Prince et al, 2011).

If the collectors and analysts are facing these issues, and these issues continue to happen, a piece of the intelligence cycle is broken. The issue of these lethal military strikes due to faulty cognitive or technical mistakes may not happen often, but as recently as 2017 in Syria the United States has been accused of mistakes such as these leading to over 200 dead (Revesz, 2017). This shows a case in Afghanistan from 2010 is neither alone nor isolated. These failures occur due to preventable conditions, and instead of criticizing media reporting we should be scrutinizing our intelligence techniques (Prince et al., 2011). To address occupational stressors and information overload, some recommendations include adequate rest, medical provision of mental healthcare, and training in recognizing signs of exhaustion among personnel (Prince et al., 2011). These recommendations could improve the cognitive filtration of information on the battlefield to improve actionable intelligence (Prince et al, 2011). As operators of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets suffer from human cognitive liabilities like burnout and information overload, and analysts monitoring the ISR are also prone to the same failures, then there should be a solution established beyond the human checks and balances.

To expand the need for improvements of analytical techniques to strategic cases the Arab Spring is analyzed. The Arab Spring was a strategic event that U.S policy arguably intended and caused (Mearsheimer, 2011). The intelligence community did not or was incapable of reacting to this event in a timely manner (Mearsheimer, 2011; Marchio, 2014). The final strategic decision involved limited intervention from the United States in favor of avoiding getting entangled in new conflicts (Mearsheimer, 2011). Whether this was the right decision is not the purpose of this paper, but the critique of policy makers on the intelligence community should be explored. Those who criticized the intelligence community for their assessments during the Arab Spring went as high as President Barack Obama (Marchio, 2014).

Creating an accurate perception and then assessment of complex and abstract schemata (such as cultural and religious motives in political revolution) is something only a human analyst is capable of doing (Coulhart, 2016). This shows the need for properly developed cognitive techniques in sync with technical analysis. Predictive analytics may predict the movement of people, even the likelihood of violence, but it cannot predict the context of rapidly shifting societal factors within norms (McCue, 2015). An example may be a collapsing central government now making some legal norms less applicable while cultural norms stay in place, and that event may either favor or deter U.S involvement.

The Arab Spring was a major international opportunity for regional and global powers alike to exert and expand influence, and these major strategic events require human analysis. That human analysis creates assessments that assist policy makers in deciding courses of action toward each actor involved. Increasingly – and more complicated – is the involvement of non-state actors. Fragmented groups such as tribal alliances become local authorities, which become more common in the chaos of revolution, and which shifts too often to constantly input into algorithms and predict new courses of action (McCue, 2015). An anomaly of cooperation between some groups one day can quickly become a norm during a revolution (Lacher, 2016). There is a use for human intelligence analysts on the battlefield to fulfill requests for information from the strategic level on events including socio-political interactions in a way they did not in the past, and there is a use for strategic analysts to decipher that qualitative information for decision-makers quickly (Flynn, 2010).

As criticized by President Barack Obama and General Michael Flynn, there is a disconnect in the intelligence community between the rapid collection of information on relevant local dynamics at the tactical level and the ability to provide analysis that can help decision-making at the strategic level (Flynn, 2010; Fischhoff, and Chauvin, 2011; Marchio, 2014). These are not two people known to agree, but their opinions are mutually confirmed from the limited U.S response during the Arab Spring (Miller and Goldman, 2014). Local subject-matter experts already provide assessments on cultural information based on their understanding of the local socio-political cultural contexts, but according to General Flynn they are often not receiving sufficient information from the tactical level (2010). This means decision-makers are not receiving answers to questions that could facilitate an end to conflict, or in the case of the Arab Spring facilitate American influence (Mearsheimer, 2010). Among questions decision-makers may need answered based on tactical interactions are whether to provide financial support to a group, the effect on allegiances providing infrastructure development would have, or how the local population may react to more or less direct action (Flynn, 2010).

The ambiguity of complex environments with constantly changing power dynamics hold varying levels of legitimacy, and actual authority is difficult for intelligence analysis to overcome during a revolutionary event like the Arab Spring. A critique of human analysts is that

experts of a specific area, language, or culture tend to create patterns of perception that are hard to overcome in the face of changing norms to their areas of expertise (Heuer, 1999). Yet, unlike a computer an experienced analyst using the proper SATs is capable of changing their perceptions, identifying new information, and adjusting this new information faster than a computer algorithm… which must be written by a human as well (Kahnemann, 1978; McCue, 2015). This allows for the expertise of the right analyst to, at a minimum, provide context within a newly changing environment. If there is an analyst in the room who knows the different groups and how they operate within the political, military, economic, religious, cultural, and social structures of an area they can provide context to other analysts. Without this context of cultural intelligence filtering information in the way only the human mind can relate to other human cultures, then misinterpretations of cultural events are likely. Such misrepresentations can lead to implausible predictions of what the enemy will do next, and decisions may be made that cost the United States an opportunity to enhance national security and international influence. At worst these misunderstandings cause a massive loss of lives and national resources. We have to improve.

The Case for Improving Techniques

The recent literature on structured analytic techniques has concerning findings. As recently as 2016 some key findings on the value of SATs in the intelligence community were that the community does not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of SATs either qualitatively or quantitatively, but a minority of the intelligence community that does use SAT's addressed a broader range of potential outcomes and implications than other analyses (Artner et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2017). It has also been noted that implementing these techniques as mandated by the IRTPA requires training and evidence that the techniques will improve analysis (Coulhart, 2016). Both studies concluded a need to assess the value of these techniques if they were going to be more widely used (Artner et al., 2016; Coulhart, 2016). There is a qualitative and quantitative case to be made of the value in improving analytical techniques.

Humans can only consider 5-9 factors of information at once, but by improving analytic techniques such as analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH) a matrix can be incorporated into a predictive model to address this cognitive weakness (Heuer, 1999). An improved analytic methodology would allow for a step to use technical capabilities as necessary to conduct predictive analytic processing of relevant data. By using predictive analytics to generate possible hypothesis the brainstorming capacity of factors to consider can be significantly increased. Once the models have run their analysis of the data and generated their predictions analysts can then continue the methodology of attempting to disprove each hypothesis. In the meantime, the technical filter would have already completed the steps of demonstrating likelihood of the hypothesis it has generated as requested in intelligence community directive 203 for analytic standards (DNI, 2015). Analysts who are experts can then discern the context of their mission and determine their own likelihood of events to address technical weaknesses lacking consideration of individuals, cultures, economics, or sociopolitical circumstances (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). This brings forth the strengths of both cognitive and technical capabilities.

In continuation, video analytics and the increasing mass of data associated must be taken into consideration for improving SAT methodology. Most imagery is never even viewed by analysts, as the rate of collection goes beyond the human capability of intelligence organizations (Lim, 2015). The primary technical weakness of video analytics, or even single imagery, is the size and complexity. One image can be equivalent to 2000 pages of text for one second of video (Vashisht and Gupta, 2015). The way an analyst interprets this information and stores their

interpretation of video or imagery on a computer could play a role in "when to use" a technique such as devil's advocacy to combat weaknesses in cognitive filters and improve collection rates by demanding greater specificity when highlighting the information necessary to an analyst. More importantly, improving these analytical techniques could stop the intelligence community from wasting resources and never analyzing collected data in the first place. Demonstrating this efficiency is the first step in beginning to adopt SATs, which are only used by a minority of the intelligence community (Artner et al., 2016). This is either from lack of knowledge of SATs or a lack of understanding of how to apply these techniques efficiently (Artner et al., 2016). As it stands, 95% of collected data goes without analysis, and the problem will only get worse as the rate of collection exponentially increases (Haider, 2015; Lim, 2015).

Technical filters that would also be explicitly added to improved analytic techniques to improve the techniques' efficiency through data management or "core" analytic techniques of text, audio, and visual analytics as well as quantitative methods for presentation and evaluation. By allowing analysts the flexibility to use techniques that create or disprove multiple hypotheses out of the filtered information, they can save time, but analysts must know how to use those techniques to drive their data requirements. With an understanding of when and how to use these technical capabilities, more exact requests for data can be made, and collection assets can be utilized more efficiently. The weakness of SATs can also be displayed throughout this paper, and even these proposed solutions must be verified through qualitative or quantitative examinations and review of SATs or improved SATs (Chang et al., 2017).

There is a need to improve these techniques and use them to address increasing cognitive and technical challenges. The ODNI should be making these techniques common to meet their analytic standards after issuing directives on what those standards are (DNI, 2015). This would improve analysis and collection alike while preserving human and technological resources.

The Cognitive Capability

There are inherent strengths and weaknesses to the way the human mind filters information, and over time analytical tradecraft methods have been developed to improve on strengths and hinder weaknesses. The cognitive processes an analyst uses will be explored to determine what cognitive filters information must go through before an analyst composes information into intelligence. I call these processes filters, not only addressing cognitive heuristics and bias, but also the flow and capacity of information in perception and memory. Each of these filters of information have useful purposes, but they are weaknesses when analyzing large amounts of information, particularly disadvantaging the analyst when analyzing large amounts of complex and ambiguous information that may involve deception (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Girgerenzer, 1991; Heuer, 1999). The field of psychology has already done the groundwork in understanding these filters, which the intelligence community can and has used to develop and improve their tradecraft methods (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Heuer, 1999; U.S Government, 2009). More recently the field of human-computer interaction and psychology has emerged, along with methods for managing large amounts of complex datasets.

Cognitive Filters

As described by Richards Heuer the primary limitations in the cognition of intelligence analysts are perception, bias, and memory (1999). These filters are important to an analyst because a "cognitive filter" is essentially the main function of an analyst for decision-makers. These filters are not all of the identifiable components of cognition, but they are the most relevant to filtering information (Styles, 2005). Richards Heuer's work is of notable importance as many of the case studies, investigations, and reports, which constantly inform the literature

around intelligence failures, mention the same psychological failures outlined by Heuer. Heuer has defined these failures prior to the failures repeating themselves, thus showing both consensus and redundancy in this research (with the most significant being the 9/11 commission report) (Heuer, 1999; Wastell, 2010; Mellers et al., 2015). This paper will not repeat those redundancies. This paper will outline these filters, explain their strengths and weaknesses, and then explore how they may better be integrated with technical filters.

        Perception, bias, and memory all filter information for our understanding. Throughout the literature on cognition, perception is referred to as mindsets, frames, or mental-models, which are flawed and necessary to understanding the world around us (U.S Government, 2009). Natural cognitive filters (otherwise known as biases) come from effortless "natural reasoning," but deliberate and rigorous reasoning which applies tradecraft is "systemic reasoning;" the latter limits biases (Wastell, 2010). The cognitive filter of memory also establishes reasoning for the reality of events to our own personal recollection with every passing second (Heuer, 1999; Wastell, 2010).

        Perception is the cognitive process of how the mind interprets the data of the world around us to then conduct 'sensemaking' (Weick, 2010; Wong, 2014). This is the cognitive filter where writers reading their own paper may overlook the the repetition of a word or the reader may overlook repetition of a word like "the" earlier in this sentence. These are heuristics, psychological shortcuts, and they show an example of resistance to change in mindsets as the mind filters redundant information for what it expects to see rather than what is actually there (Kahneman and Tversky 1974; Heuer, 1999). With patterns of perception new information assimilates into existing information, but there is persistence of established information and assumptions. Initial exposure to ambiguous stimuli interferes with accurate perception after more and better information becomes available (Heuer, 1999). Incremental analysis is usually done through these filters of perception with quick natural reasoning rather than systemic reasoning of accumulated evidence. These flaws in perception and lack of systemic reasoning leads to inaccurate intelligence assessments (Kahneman, 1986; Heuer, 1999; Cook and Smallman, 2008). We know there is a price to pay for this lazy reasoning, and it should be fixed.

        Bias is another type of cognitive filter that effects the assessments of an analyst. As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky wrote, the difference between a bias and a heuristic is that a bias is a systematic error that results from flawed reasoning, and a heuristic is a shortcut for perception (1974). These biases are varied, but one of the most prominent in intelligence analysis is confirmation bias (Cook and Smallman, 2008). An analyst may create a hypothesis and inadvertently seek information to confirm their hypothesis as their cognition filters out information that does not confirm the hypothesis (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Heuer, 1999; Cook and Smallman, 2008). The views on perception and bias proposed by Kahneman are widely accepted, but others have argued these heuristics to perception and biases are not inherently flawed as they do have useful applications in social situations (Girgenzer, 1991). It should still be understood that for intelligence analysts, skewed perception and filters of bias through quick and unrefined reasoning causes unacceptable risks (Heuer, 1999; U.S Government, 2009; Wong, 2014).

        The final filter of cognition is memory, which exists in at least three forms: sensory information storage, short-term memory, and long-term memory (Heuer, 1999). Memory is stored for seconds or a lifetime to create working memory as a function of attention (Heuer, 1999). This is an especially important filter when considering that it establishes the capacity of information an analyst can filter. As mentioned it has been found a human analyst cannot

maintain more than seven "plus or minus two" factors being recalled and actively considered in working memory for problem-solving (Heuer,1999). In order to filter information memory establishes schema, which are patterns that trigger other memories related to a person, place, or thing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Heuer, 1999). Memory also establishes schemata, which link multiple elements and relationships to distinguish abstract concepts such as "culture." Experienced analysts can considerably beat assessments of chance by recalling complex information to assist them in their assessments (Wastell, 2010; Mellers, et al., 2015). Memory also limits exactly how much data an analyst can filter. This makes accurate assessments more difficult when too much unnecessary data is available, in turn leading to data overload. Old schemata can also have intelligence analysts make inaccurate assessments to the current situation, which is notable in U.S decision-making (Woods et al., 1998; Heuer, 1999; Pfautz et al., 2006; U.S Government, 2009).

The list and effects of perception, memory, and bias have, for decades, warranted entire books being written, specifically on how the brain processes information from the senses to create understanding (Dember, 1963; Grondin, 2016). Every heuristic is a filter meant to provide the human analyst with some sort of natural advantage to quickly decipher information, and they may be useful for daily life (Girgenzer, 1991). Understanding the way these filters work and the rational decisions likely to come from them, such as understanding confirmation bias, can explain how seemingly irrational decisions are possible (Girgenzer, 1991; Heuer, 1999). The counter-point is that these filters to quickly decipher information are limitations. We can fall victim to these heuristics as errors in thinking, and there needs to be a check or additional aids to ensure these errors are minimized (Heuer, 1999). Each cognitive filter is integrated with the others and there are mental limitations analysts face. Understanding these limitations sets the basis for improving techniques to address cognitive strengths and weaknesses (Styles, 2005).

Cognitive Basis of SATs

To improve analytical methods, it is necessary to explore why there is a cognitive basis to the SATs, and how the SATs are used today. The cognitive basis can address how SATs are useful in addressing cognitive strengths and weaknesses. There is an inherent necessity today of also incorporating considerations of technical capabilities to manage quantitative and qualitative analysis. Overall, the way SATs developed is useful, and the current SATs should continue being used as the basis of improvement.

In the 1970s the CIA made an attempt to address newly emerging quantitative methods in political science (Heuer, 1978). The CIA moved away from this approach, as it was believed the basis of good analysis was qualitative (Heuer, 1978; Heuer, 1999; Heuer and Pherson, 2014; Coulhart, 2016). The result was structured analytic techniques that took into consideration the cognitive filters addressed above and that were mostly dependent on qualitative analysis (Heuer, 1999; Heuer and Pherson, 2014). Structured analytic techniques evolved using qualitative methods at a time when the dissolution of the Soviet Union expanded the focus of analysis away from a primary adversary to many near-peer and ambiguous actors (Treverton, 2003). This meant that instead of solving analytical puzzles there were more complex "mysteries" to be solved, such as the intentions of a foreign adversary. Unlike analytical puzzles such mysteries could not be solved using quantitative methods (Treverton, 2003; Coulhart, 2016).

Some SATs specifically meant to address cognitive weaknesses are (1) key assumptions check, (2) devil's advocacy, and (3) alternative futures analysis (U.S Government, 2009). These three SATs were chosen for this portion of the paper because they each fall under one of three categories as organized in the CIA Tradecraft Primer of diagnostic, contrarian, or imaginative

thinking techniques, respectively (2009). The primer provides useful sections of "when to use" and methodology for each SAT (U.S Government, 2009). According to the CIA Tradecraft Primer the primer is meant to "assist analysts in dealing with the perennial problems of intelligence: the complexity of international developments, incomplete and ambiguous information, and the inherent limitations of the human mind" (U.S Government, 2009). Analyzing each of these will show the concentration of SATs across a range of categories are meant to address qualitative analysis and cognitive limitations, but to improve them they should be expanded to take into consideration the technical capabilities of computers.

The first SAT worth reviewing is the key assumptions check. Key assumptions check seems to primarily address weaknesses in cognitive filters relating to perception and bias. This technique is meant for use at the beginning of an analytic project. A key assumption is an assumption that analysts have accepted to be true, which forms the basis of an assessment (U.S Government, 2009). For example, if a country has funded terrorism the assumption is that they may not be reliable allies. The method for this technique involves reviewing the current analytic line and writing it down, articulating both stated and unstated premises, challenging each assumption, and refining the list of key assumptions to see what information or conditions are vital to holding up the assumption (U.S Government, 2009). If the ruling family members of an allied country funds a terrorist group it may be due to internal familial disagreements, but the head of state may be a very reliable ally. Understanding these things may address heuristics such as anchoring, which is to be biased toward an initial assumption and the assessment it leads to (although new information changes the initial assumption, and thus the overall assessment) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). In the example the most vital new information, which may change the reliability of the ally, is if the head of state becomes someone who supports funding terrorist groups. The methodology also addresses memory limitations by having the analysts write down the assumptions. In the methodology there is no mention of consideration of technical parameters, technical assistance, or quantitative research methods.

The next SAT of devil's advocacy, a contrarian technique, follows the same focus on qualitative analysis by seeking to correct cognitive limitations of perception and bias. In the case of devil's advocacy there is a check on validity, on major gaps of evidence, and a check on deception (U.S Government, 2009). Devil's advocacy has a promising feature in separating human-computer analysis, and that is to explicitly identify "Devil's Advocate" projects as they will have their own weaknesses and they will not be the official view – similar to computer-generated predictions (U.S Government, 2009). If a "Devil's Advocate" or computer generates the prediction that a country will use nuclear weapons imminently, analysts should clearly label that is not the official view or assessment of what is likely to happen. This methodology does not take into consideration technical parameters, assistance, or quantitative research methods.

Alternative futures analysis, an imaginative thinking technique, also follows the same qualitative focus to correct cognitive limitations. Like ACH this technique shows promise when used with the predictive analysis of artificial intelligence (Heuer, 1999; McCue, 2015). The methodology for this technique focuses on an issue, creates a focus on critical forces, and creates endpoints for those forces such as "fast" and "slow" economic growth. It is followed by creating a matrix of these forces with quadrants crossing over between the endpoints creating the basis for alternative futures, and finally generating stories of how these futures could occur (U.S Government, 2009). This technique essentially gathers information from experts and creates predictive analysis of multiple futures with the forces those experts deem critical (U.S Government, 2009). In economic growth it may be "fast" or "slow" due to economic stimulus

and education. In an uncertain world full of complex "mysteries" as described by Treverton in 2003, it is clear why this technique is used to address qualitative issues. Yet, even a decade ago when the Tradecraft Primer was written, an industry publication had the following to say: "predictive analytics can be particularly useful where the underlying scientific principles are complex and difficult to model precisely." "Complex and difficult to model precisely" is exactly the kind of environment the intelligence community operates in. Using the right technical techniques, we can improve alternative futures analysis (or a like SAT) to calculate many matrix models at once (Stone, 2007 pp.1).

The manual evaluation of key assumptions, devil's advocacy, and alternative futures without the technical capability of computers to assist in these techniques shows that SATs are outdated. Forty years since the exploration of quantitative methods at the CIA led to sparingly used qualitative SATs, it can be calculated that the focus on qualitative techniques occurred at a time when technology was not far enough along to begin replacing the predictive capacity of human analysts (Heuer, 1978; McCue, 2015). The time has come to incorporate the work of psychology in intelligence analysis to the technology in intelligence analysis in order to create more synergistic analytical products. The improved SATs should explicitly take into consideration technical capabilities, data management techniques, and quantitative research methods. SATs must explicitly take into consideration and incorporate technical analysis, assistance, and quantitative research methods.

The Technical Capability

The use of computers for military calculation and analysis was the original purpose of computers by the U.S Government (Goldstine, 1980). Today the application of computers allows the collection of large amounts of data, sorting data, and processing data for analysts to then condense into information that ultimately becomes intelligence (Clark, 2011; Administration White Paper, 2013). Increasingly computers are members of the analytical team capable of predicting where enemies may travel and attack, like the first computer could predict the same for artillery rounds (Goldstine, 1980).

The inherent weakness to the analysis made by circuits and networks is managing the data, creating valid and reliable correlation and predictions, and the impersonal and inhuman inferences made of the very complex personal and human nature of the adversaries of the United States (Gandomi and Haider, 2015; Lim, 2015; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012). These adversaries have specific cultural considerations all-source intelligence analysts and even soldiers alike must be capable of understanding to supplement, and correct, predictive analytics to create wholesome assessments with clear effects on national security (Flynn, 2010). Other issues of technical analysis are spurious correlation and big data management (Gandomi and Haider, 2015). If the newest member of the analytical team can be recognized and methods developed which actively utilize technical capabilities there is significant potential for improvement. To develop these methods, analysts must learn and employ SATs based on technical and cognitive understanding of themselves, their technical capabilities, operational methods, and areas of operation (Department of the Army, 2012; Heuer, 1999).

Technical Filters

Technical filtration involves data management and analytics where data is extracted, stored, filtered by a computer, analyzed by a computer and human, and disseminated (Gandomi and Haider, 2015; U.S Government, 2015). The process requires data management as the collection of data on what is considered massive levels makes all of the unstructured data

difficult to handle (Bamford, 2017; Young, 2013). Big data collection undergoes an extraction whereby an agency makes a court order request to have telecommunications companies provide their telephony data while taking into consideration the issue of privacy (Administration White Paper, 2013). Big data collection also involves the massive storage of information to be filtered and queried in the future by analysts as necessary (U.S Government, 2015). After the data management process, predictive analytics allows a machine to take all of the processed data and dissect it to show how patterns may change or stay the same (Gandomi and Haider, 2015; McCue, 2015). The nature of collection shows that large amounts of information require the filtration of available useful information from useless information considered noise and unstructured data (Gandomi and Haider, 2015).

One use of big data or metadata extraction allows for intelligence analysts to acquire information en masse to observe conversational patterns of suspected terrorists, but which does not always acquire the full context or content of the conversations as there is no active recording of this bulk metadata (Administration White Paper, 2013). The technical filtering process has to sort through available data to provide analysis and useable information to the analyst. This is first done through automated machine filtering to determine whether the information is relevant (Fischoff et al., 2015). Relevant information then passes on to an analyst to condense into reports through queries of a machine's stored information. In the case of signals information, the analyst can begin with a "seed" of a known identifier such as a specific email or phone number connected with terrorist activities and then make networks of the communications made by that identifier to another phone number (U.S Government, 2015). Researching the origins of the other emails or phone numbers in this example by querying machine information narrows down suspects the way an academic may narrow down a relevant source.

There are technical and cognitive weaknesses involved in this process. In an abundance of noise an analyst may find a suspected terrorist's phone number making many irrelevant communications such as ordering pizza (U.S Government, 2015). There would be no better way to narrow down the information except to research origins such as the listing of the pizza business' phone number to understand the information is irrelevant. It may be possible to improve data structuring and artificial intelligence to better understand the data and save this effort from analysts, allowing for analysts to focus on their cognitive strengths of human understanding (Gandomi and Haider, 2015; U.S Government, 2015). The inherent cognitive weaknesses are data overload and overconfidence (Heuer, 1999). This shows that technical filters are themselves not flawless and require human evaluation, which should also use proper techniques.

The future of intelligence analysis has the predictive portion of the collection and analysis process become increasingly powerful. This is shown by machines becoming an intelligence team member by creating useable intelligence for the analyst through gathering relevant information and modeling it to create indicators or possible scenarios (Chen, 2012; McCue, 2015). The government has openly revealed programs such as XDATA and CINDER which are meant to conduct big data analysis and threat prediction based on patterns from collected data by learning trends (Executive Office of the President, 2012). Once these trends and analyses are provided to analysts there will be a degree of overconfidence. This is due to the facts that cognitive research shows analysis which is backed up by statistics, numbers, or complex solutions are more likely to be assumed correct (Heuer, 1999).

The advantages of automated filtering and predictive analytics to handle massive amounts of information are clear, but so are some inherent weaknesses and improvements to be

made. There has been continued research into improving big data analytics and technical filters, and as demonstrated by cognitive filters the human mind can only process so much information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Heuer, 1999; U.S Government, 2015). Nonetheless, the advantage of the human mind is invaluable in understanding information within cultural contexts and with nuances a machine could not currently understand. Analyzing technical techniques and how they should be integrated with current SATs can provide the basis for integrated analytical techniques that intelligence analysts can use to handle these massive and varied sources of information.

Technical Techniques

To improve analytical techniques, all-source analysts should incorporate technical techniques such as data management, quantitative research, and predictive analytics to manage and analyze data. The entirety of all of these techniques and methods is too extensive for this paper to cover, but some especially useful techniques to improve intelligence analysis within these areas will be explored. These techniques are extensive, but sparingly used (Artner et al., 2016). Understanding these technical techniques can foster insight as to how they may be integrated with the methodology of SATs, which have a qualitative and cognitive basis but are missing explicit consideration of technical capabilities and quantitative research. This would address concerns of intelligence experts like Robert Steele to create an improved analytic model with the effect of improving the efficiency of the intelligence enterprise. As of 2015 it was estimated the NSA is processing no more than five percent of the massive amounts of data they extract in SIGINT and GEOINT (Lim, 2015). This does not mean all-source intelligence analysts should all become data scientists and programmers, but that the IC should explicitly integrate technical techniques into the methodology of SATs to create better-informed requirements and improve the efficiency of intelligence.

Text and audio analytics are used by the IC, as identified earlier, either through direct interception of signals information or through bulk collection. With these techniques, unstructured text or audio can be processed to organize information into predefined categories such as persons, locations, date and organizations through entity recognition. The capability of a computer to store that information and process it rapidly is a strength that force multiplies analytic capability (Lim, 2015). Through relationship extraction these techniques also allow for relationships between entities to be identified in the semantics (Gandomi and Haider, 2014; Vashisht and Gupta, 2015). This has a possibility of mistakes as the computer may confuse the linguistics and identify spurious relationships. The role of the analyst should be a capacity to check for these mistakes, pair the appropriate technical analysis technique with the appropriate SAT, then ultimately to create an intelligence assessment from the resulting information. These data management techniques require more vigilance with imagery.

The integration of quantitative research methods into SATs should be done to allow all-source analysts flexibility in their analysis and presentation. According to the Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security "The committee concludes that basic (not expert) data analytic and statistical familiarity should be a requirement for any intelligence analyst" (Fischoff eds., 2011). This means an all-source intelligence analyst should know how to organize and display data, calculate descriptive measures of central tendency and variability, construct simple point and interval estimates, perform simple statistical hypothesis tests, and search for relationships among variables (Fischoff eds., 2011). The lack of improvement in analytical techniques may also come from lack of

institutional progress in the intelligence enterprise since the recommendations on improving them have been presented.

Improving these quantitative techniques would be useful in answering "puzzle" questions, such as the rate of consumption of troops compared to their rate of resupply. As shown most SATs focus on a qualitative basis, but SATs should be expanded to take into consideration quantitative methods. This would be a powerful technique when determining whether an assumption is qualitative or quantitative, and if quantitative using technical filters to run the statistical analysis necessary to check the validity and reliability of the assumption, yet there is no clear mention of this in the key assumptions check methodology (U.S Government, 2009). The use of quantitative research methods is essentially a more personal and manual evaluation of calculable variables than predictive analytics.

Predictive analytics shows that integrated analytical techniques are already being used without explicit consensus, training, or explanation to intelligence analysts. Predictive analytics differs from other forms of data management analytics, which focus on "analyzing a current or past state" and instead "are used to determine the probable future outcome of an event or the likelihood of a current state where it is unknown" (IDC, 2004). With the advancement of technology capable of producing scenarios through models, basic (not expert) familiarity with predictive analytics should also be a requirement for any intelligence analyst (McCue, 2015). Predictive analytics can be employed to characterize historical information and then predict the nature and likelihood of future events or occurrences (McCue, 2015). It connects the massive amounts of data and estimates the likelihood of an event occurring from that data according to the algorithm of the model; an intelligence analyst should then evaluate the result for refinement as technical filters and cognitive filters become integrated. This has inherent technical weaknesses, including the weakness of a computer to empathize with human emotion, cultural context, rapidly changing levels of authority or affiliation, and other complex perceptual tasks, which may not be routine, but are likely (Fischoff eds., 2011; Fischoff and Chauvin, 2011; McCue, 2015).

Furthermore, incorporating predictive analytics with game theory is a powerful tool that can create thousands of scenarios to quickly meet most of the methodological suggestions imaginative SATs – like brainstorming and alternative futures analysis – propose (U.S Government, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita, 2011; Fischoff eds., 2011; McCue, 2015). The use of game theory by experts like Bruce Bueno de Mesquita to create models that predict policy decisions based on the rational actions of actors shows the capacity of technical capabilities to consider a wide range of scenarios, and with good chance create likely alternative futures (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). The accuracy of game theory and other models should undergo their own regular, rigorous evaluation. Analysts must be able to differentiate and request expertise of game theorists from data scientists depending on their mission and the information they are considering. Understanding these techniques are possible and knowing when to incorporate them will benefit intelligence analysts.

To improve analytical techniques, they should integrate technical techniques into their methodology along with a description of "when to use" cognitive or technical techniques to create economy of analysis and preserve analytical capacity. This is the same way economy of force is used to preserve combat power. An understanding of data management and how to use technical capabilities to conduct qualitative and quantitative presentation is also an important part of improving analytic techniques. Advances in predictive analytics allow various possible futures to be predicted and evaluated by intelligence analysts, and this valuable capability is an

exemplification of integrated analytical capabilities. There must be an understanding of how and when to use certain forms of analysis and collection that matches analytical capacity in quantitative data or rich-data such as imagery. Without these improvements a lot of unnecessary noise and spending occurs in the analytical process leading to issues identified in earlier cases such as deadly airstrikes on the wrong targets, or slow analysis of strategic events.

Integrated Analytical Techniques

When referring to SATs they are generally good frameworks to understand and interpret information. As the cognitive and technical processes of the intelligence community are explored, some of these SATs are especially promising for improvement and continued use among human-computer analytical interaction. This portion of the paper is devoted to proposing that SATs are improved by integrating consideration of technical capabilities (U.S Government, 2009; Department of the Army, 2012). An integrated approach to ACH will be explored and a recommendation to create techniques that close the gap of machines' impersonal analysis with human supplementation and corrections will be provided. These improved techniques can be called Integrated Analytical Techniques. This proposal shows that improving the methodology through more explicitly involving quantitative presentation and technical techniques is feasible, but it will require improved training and coordination from the intelligence community.
Integrated Analysis of Competing Hypothesis

The SAT which seems to have the most forethought and relevance to current issues of cognitive and technical capabilities is Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH). Richards Heuer created this technique from over forty years of experience in the intelligence community and still advocates for its use (Heuer and Pherson, 2014). This SAT has been shown to improve analytical performance even among untrained college students taking into consideration data coming through a software application, and the CIA Tradecraft Primer specifically advocates using it when taking into consideration large amounts of data (U.S Government, 2009; Xahaianu and Dobre, 2017). Perhaps it was his prior work in quantitative methods paired with a strong understanding of the psychology involved in intelligence analysis that allowed Heuer to create this technique. ACH is capable of anticipating and handling the issues of data overload associated with using technology, but it also works against weaknesses in human cognition such as confirmation bias. This technique may be improved by having technology take into consideration those cognitive weaknesses as well, but it seems to be an exemplary model for evolving SATs (Heuer, 1999; Heuer, 2014 Coulhart, 2016).

Integrated Analysis of Competing Hypothesis would make slight adjustments to take into consideration the power of current data management and predictive analytic techniques Heuer may not have anticipated. The recommendation of when to use this technique as suggested by Richards Heuer nearly twenty years ago, and the "when to use" portion of the Tradecraft Primer seems right (Heuer, 1999; U.S Government, 2009). It is best to use this technique when handling large amounts of data by creating multiple hypotheses from the evidence, which should be disproven rather than seeking to confirm a hypothesis (Heuer, 1999; U.S Government, 2009). This combats cognitive weaknesses such as overconfidence, confirmation bias, and information overload. Using technical techniques, ACH is a powerful tool to create analytical assessments. The methodology shown is adjusted from the Tradecraft Primer to incorporate technical considerations.

Brainstorm among analysts and conduct data management, quantitative modeling, or predictive analytics as possible with different perspectives to identify all possible hypotheses and organize the data.

List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all the hypotheses.

Create a model to analyze how sensitive the ACH results are to a few critical items of evidence through technical and cognitive evaluation; should those pieces prove to be wrong, misleading, or subject to deception, how would it impact an explanation's validity?

Ask what evidence is not being seen, but would be expected for a given hypothesis to be true. Where is denial and deception a possibility?

Report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available. Identify and monitor indicators through core, predictive, and human analysis of information that would be both consistent and inconsistent with the full set of hypotheses. Allow subject matter experts to explore what could account for inconsistent data or technical mistakes through consideration of local factors.

Establish the relative likelihood for the hypotheses, with clear differentiation in technical predictions of likelihood from human predictions of likelihood and report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available.

Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and each piece of evidence on the side. Determine whether each piece of evidence is consistent, inconsistent, or not applicable to each hypothesis. Allow technical warnings to come up on the matrix if a piece of evidence on the side is being disproven with incoming data and allow that warning to affect all cells that are based on that evidence (i.e. In the way a faulty Microsoft Excel cell reliant on a formula from another cell may give a warning).

Refine the matrix and reconsider the hypotheses—in some cases, analysts will need to add new hypotheses and re-examine the information available. Focus on disproving hypotheses rather than proving one.

Tally the pieces of evidence that are inconsistent and consistent with each hypothesis to see which explanations are the weakest and strongest. Present where the evidence was derived from in both qualitative and quantitative measures to demonstrate how and why the most likely hypothesis is the strongest against evidence to the contrary, and the most dangerous hypothesis is feasible.

The Future Analyst

All-source intelligence analysts should receive realistic training on integrated analytical techniques, the intelligence cycle, and only then, institutional TTPs. This training should be conducted through integration of the intelligence cycle with the all-source analyst's role to process, analyze, and disseminate information. Information should be provided in a way that requires the all-source analyst, working in a team, to determine which analytic technique they will apply to create an assessment with operational methods as presentation tools to convey their analytical reasoning. This should supplement and correct core and predictive analytics in an area of operation while also using technical tools to avoid common pitfalls such as information overload and confirmation bias. Overall, the intelligence analyst should be prepared to enter a complex and chaotic environment with an understanding of the importance of regional knowledge, analytic techniques, and their artificial teammate while also being capable of

operating without this teammate. This proposes a possible outline for that training, but also questions why common training has not been established.

Common Training

The Intelligence Enterprise must create a standardized joint-training curriculum of analytic techniques that analysts across organizations and agencies can commonly refer to when working together (Fischoff eds., 2011). This effort should be led by the ODNI which already has coursework in analytical techniques (Fischoff eds., 2011). The training can be spread from organizations and agencies ranging from all DoD departments to the FBI, CIA, and lesser known yet vital agencies like the NGA. The Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security has repeatedly made this recommendation since 2011, and since 2004 the IRTPA has mandated the use of alternative analysis methods that are not widely used (Cong., House, 2004; Fischoff eds., 2011). Operational TTPs can be learned during operations when there is often not enough expertise or enough time to introduce analysts to analytic techniques rather the focus is on creating a product. A product being fabricated without proper and common techniques for its creation will lead to lack of uniformity, misunderstanding, and ultimately lack of coordination from tactical to strategic levels (Flynn, 2010; Revesz, 2017).

Due to the high operational demands and the need for analysts who are from diverse backgrounds, the need for common methods of conducting work and recognizing weaknesses in their own and others analysis is even more vital (Fischoff and Chauvin, 2011; Prince et al, 2011). One of the ways to improve analysis and avoid tactical mistakes is to train intelligence managers in recognizing fatigue, and then allowing analysts to rest. This fatigue often comes due to the high operational demands of analysts monitoring or processing the massive amounts of data through text, audio, or video (Prince et al., 2011). This is a problem that can be addressed through improving analytical techniques and training analysts in the cognitive and technical filters involved in these techniques.

Foremost, intelligence analysts should be trained in using integrated analytical techniques to reduce operational demands, identify cognitive weaknesses and fatigue, improve personnel rotations or assistance as necessary, if operational demands are high the reasons should be identified as to why, and if outside expertise may improve cognitive or technical techniques it should be possible to request it or receive strong clear communications from outside analysts in an emergency. Integrated analytical techniques could address issues such as the massive information overload some agencies face if improved organizational structures allow analysts to drive collection rather than collect data that exceeds human analytical needs or capacity. In exhausting environments in which they must process large amounts of information, analysts' intelligence managers (as recommended by the U.S Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine) should be trained to identify why operational demands may be high and how they can be relieved (Prince et al., 2011). Technical capabilities should also provide training in options to communicate information, request outside expertise, and provide strong warnings that can cover a feed of data if important information has been missed and assistance is necessary. This requires a common basis of training in realistic environments.

The fact that there has been a law establishing analytic standards, multiple congressional reports, at least two national academies studies, and recommendations from prominent intelligence community veterans addressing these issues and proposing solutions through these techniques there is no common training on them. Before achieving the future analyst the

intelligence community will have to achieve a common understanding. This may be because each member of the intelligence enterprise has different institutional missions and want to maintain institutional independence, and ultimately the ODNI has no legal power from the IRTPA to direct budgets or tell the other agencies what to do (Cong., House, 2004; Cong., Senate, 2004).

Training Scenario

The training scenario provided to analysts may differ from organization to organization, so as to better adapt to their operational environments, and it is acknowledged that while analytical training should be given oversight by the ODNI each member of the intelligence enterprise has different demands of their all-source intelligence analysts. This provides a simple proposal of the common basis of the training scenario and standards to also allow evaluation of current SATs and improved SATs through training environments. Analysts should be capable of passing a standardized form of examination on the intelligence enterprise, cognitive and technical strengths and weaknesses, and cognitive and technical techniques.

To begin training analysts should be introduced to the intelligence enterprise, intelligence cycle, all intelligence disciplines, and their role within each. The intelligence enterprise should be introduced with a focus on the role of their organization within the overarching intelligence enterprise. The intelligence cycle should form the basis of training with the scenario reflecting all steps of the cycle being reiterated as necessary to create complete products for dissemination. All intelligence disciplines should be introduced and if possible, training programs should integrate other intelligence disciplines and requests to collectors being met with information from collectors who are in a field-training environment. The introduction of regional specific cultural and sociopolitical information for the realistic mission-training scenario should begin here. The role of the all-source intelligence analyst should be understood within the context of each by the end of this portion of training.

Training should move on to focus on cognitive and technical filters with the possible strengths and weaknesses of each from actual successes and failures of the organization demonstrating these strengths and weaknesses. This portion of training should allow the analyst to be exposed to their perceptual biases and heuristics leading them to analytical failures. It should be made rigorous enough that not employing SATs and technical techniques will lead to faulty assessments, but this exposure should also be limited to avoid developing bad habits. With each exposure a possible analytic technique, which could have prevented their failure, should be introduced.

The analyst should begin learning technical tools but be given analytical results that could be easily misinterpreted without the relevant region-specific knowledge, such as linguistic misinterpretations from idioms. This portion of training should also expose analysts to numerical information that they should begin to understand through training in quantitative research. The purpose of this portion of training should be to allow analysts to understand the tools they can use, to expose them to the very real weaknesses of both cognitive and technical filters, and to prepare them to use analytical techniques that can mitigate those weaknesses.

Finally, training should begin on all analytical techniques deemed critical by the ODNI and a realistic analytical mission set should be conducted employing these critical analytical techniques. The use of outside experts should be allowed through instructor guidance and remote-assistance once operational demands escalate and fatigue begins impacting analytical performance. Personnel rotations should be managed transparently with instructors showing how

to respond to emergency situations in which information is missed and casualties are possible without analysts notifying ground forces through common channels of communication. This should culminate in multiple presentations of qualitative and quantitative information with local cultural and socio-political knowledge backing up technical analytic analysis of data in support of analytical lines of reasoning.

Conclusion

      This paper backs up recommendations by multiple national academy studies, an administration white paper, intelligence officers, congressional commissions, intelligence professionals with decades of experience, and the former president acting as the ultimate decision-maker over intelligence products at the time cases were illustrated (Heuer, 1999; Cong., Senate, 2004; Fischoff eds., 2011; Fischoff and Chauvin, 2011; Executive Office of the President, 2012; Administration White Paper, 2013; U.S Government, 2015). Just as there was a need to create an ODNI to integrate the intelligence enterprise information-sharing there is a need to empower the ODNI to integrate the techniques of the intelligence community. These recommendations continue being improved, but analytical techniques cannot improve as long as there is a lack of centralized empowerment and common training. The intelligence community has a necessity to create more widespread initial training on SATs, there is a lag in the adoption of these techniques, and this is turning into a lag in the advancement of these techniques in relation to the technological advancements analysts must cope with.

      This paper agrees with authors like Kevjn Lim who argue for a tripartite integration of big data, human subject-matter expertise, and predictive analytics to create a framework in which the intelligence endeavor is significantly enriched (2015). The subject-matter expert, the all-source intelligence analyst themselves, must intersect technical and cognitive capabilities as they intersect all intelligence disciplines. There must be a hub that can drive future requirements from big data analysts, single source intelligence sources, game theorists, and where the information from all sources can come together to create holistic analysis. That hub is the all-source intelligence analyst.

      Ultimately, regardless of how profoundly techniques are improved as long as there is a lag to adopt these techniques the intelligence community cannot improve as recommended through congressional hearings, established law, and various authors with decades of experience in the intelligence community. This causes a dangerous national security situation in which collection outpaces analytical capacity, and if technical techniques are not integrated into structured analytical techniques, the problem will only continue to grow worse as technological advancements improve. This lag in adoption may be due to institutional rigidity, culture, or the differing goals of each intelligence enterprise member. As long as the ODNI has a lack of authority to effectively implement the recommendations provided for intelligence analysis the recommendations to improve these techniques sits on another paper unfortunately waiting, but hoping against, another national catastrophe.

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Natural Resources and Developing Nations

 We live in an era where the international community is paying increasing attention to practices of governance that strike the right balance between economic growth and the preservation and proper usage of natural resources. Such balance is not natural and requires the breaking of long standing social and economic paradigms such as the evil cycle of the resource curse, or the inequality of patriarchies. Perhaps more importantly, it requires a different approach in the articulation of the institutional apparatus. It requires an articulation that has specific goals that point in the direction of sustainable development. These goals are provided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that the United Nations adopted in 2015. Some of the goals seem more concerned with social progress, such as achieving gender equality and promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, and others seem more concerned with fundamental standards of living such as ending hunger and ending poverty. Nevertheless, these goals are interconnected and of equal importance and the recognition of their interconnectedness is crucial for achieving sustainable development: there is no equality without strong institutions which provide for effective government programs, and there is no peace without the appropriate distribution of the wealth generated from production. Thus studying the appropriate ways in which such interconnectedness must be embedded in governmental politics seems to be the biggest challenge for scholars of sustainable development in the years to come. This section aims at providing advances in the matter by taking the reader into the world of developing nations and shedding light in not only their monumental challenges they face in developing in a sustainable way, but also on some practices that have proven effective in overcoming such challenges.

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"The Feminization of Agriculture: Exploring the Power of Women to Achieve Food Security"
By Payal Majmundar

Global food insecurity, evidenced by the fact that over 795 million people in the world live undernourished, hinders economic and sustainable development in developing nations. Despite the achievements of the United Nations' Zero Hunger Challenge, progress still needs to be made in rural areas and in nations with high rural populations. Out of the different regions of the world, South Asia faces higher levels of food insecurity due to its large population of approximately two billion people. In these nations with high rural populations, the main obstacle for achieving the economic development necessary for reducing food insecurity, is gender inequalities. Addressing gender inequalities by providing women and girls accessible resources for agricultural productivity is vital in order to reduce food insecurity in South Asia, specifically in India.

The root causes of global food insecurity vary by region. However, the key drivers that stay consistent throughout the world are gender inequalities, high poverty rates, environmental degradation, civil unrest and conflict, natural disasters, and corruption (FSIN, 2017). Specifically, in India, gender inequalities, poverty, environmental degradation, and corruption, are the main forces behind its high levels of food insecurity.

Recognizing its drastic food insecurity, India's government began implementing programs and initiatives to help its agricultural sector. By increasing food grain production by nearly 200 million tons within 64 years, India has shifted from being dependent on food aid, to being a net food exporter (UN India, 2016). In 2016, India's government launched programs to reduce food insecurity and increase farmers´ income by 2022 (UN India, 2016). These programs include the National Food Security Mission, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY), and the Integrated Schemes on Oilseeds, Pulses, Palm oil and Maize (ISOPOM) (UN India, 2016). In addition to these programs, the government has also focused on fighting malnutrition in children because of the detrimental effects malnutrition can have on development and school performance.

Launched in 2007, the National Food Security Mission had the goal of increasing grain production by 20 million tons by the end of 2012; these grains include rice, wheat, and pulses (UN India, 2016). The main objectives of this program included: "increasing production of rice, wheat, pulses, and coarse cereals through area expansion and productivity enhancement in a sustainable manner in the identified districts of the country; restoring soil fertility and productivity at the individual farm level; and enhancing farm level economy to restore confidence amongst the farmers" (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, 2007). In order to achieve such objectives, the government adopted strategies that focused on low productivity districts with high potential for agriculture, implementing cropping system centric interventions, and using agricultural technology for soil enhancements (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, 2007). After these strategies were implemented, quarterly progress reports were used to evaluate whether or not the mission and strategies were working. Having achieved the Mission goals for 2012, the Mission is being continued with new goals of increasing production by an extra 5 million tons, focusing on rice, wheat, pulses, and coarse cereals.

India's largest food-based safety net, the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), is a government initiative launched in 1997 that has also made progress in reducing food insecurity.

This program was established by India's national government and is being managed by their state governments who are the ones responsible for its implementation. This program works to feed approximately 67 percent of the Indian population (800 million people) by distributing food, mainly wheat, rice, sugar, and kerosene, to the impoverished (WFP, 2017). Despite how large this food network is, current distributions of subsidized food are not enough to meet consumption needs in India. Out of the current population, women and children are being affected the most by malnutrition and lack of sufficient resources. "Nearly 47 million or 4 out of 10 children in India are not meeting their full human potential because of chronic malnutrition or stunting" (UN, 2016). Specifically for women and children, India's government launched the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program to assist pregnant and nursing women, as well as children below 6 years of age, to reach their nutritional needs. As another way to help these children, India's government introduced the Mid-Day Meal Scheme (MDMS), which provides mid-day meals at schools for about 120 million children from ages 6-14 (WFP, 2017). These three programs are under India's National Food Security Act, which establishes the right to access food and provides government support to the malnourished poverty.

However, the food programs that India's government has been implementing for the past twenty years have done very little for women and children due to the inefficiency in their delivery systems and the failure to meet consumption needs for nutritional adequacy. The government currently has a wide range of food security programs, but the implementation of such programs has contributed to exclusions where females are disadvantaged (UN India, 2016). In order to properly address this exclusion, international institutions have been focusing on reducing food insecurity in South Asia and in India on top of the programs and initiatives launched by India's government.

Because gender inequalities in the agricultural sector contributes to food insecurity, in order to effectively address food insecurity, gender sensitive agricultural and rural development policies must be articulated and adopted. A case study on Gujarat, a state in India, "estimated that reducing to one hour a day the time spent fetching water by women would allow the women to increase their incomes by $100 yearly using the time saved" (UN, 2016). In addition to time efficiency, if women's unpaid work were to be financed, the extra labor would constitute 182 percent of India's total tax revenue (FAO, 2013). Because of the economic and development benefits that will arise through gender equality, recognizing women's unpaid work is crucial for developing nations and international organizations in understanding how to meet the needs of female food producers in South Asia.

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), and U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) have all identified the need to alleviate the gender gap in the agricultural sectors of rural areas. With the UN, the Millennium Development Goals served as their framework until 2015 for this issue. The Millennium Development Goals proposed three ways to move forward in addressing food insecurity through gender sensitive policies: improve access to education for women, improve access to employment for women, and improve political representation for women (FAO, 2013). By improving access to education, women and girls learn and gain the skills necessary to not only increase agricultural productivity, but also be competitive with men in employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. The labor work of women exceeds that of men given that labor work of female farmers includes agricultural responsibilities and unpaid responsibilities such as educating their children, retrieving water, purchasing and preparing food, cleaning, and caring for the elderly. Compared

to men, women hold a greater burden in labor work and are often paid less than men for the same work. This imbalance in rural areas and developing nations, is recognized by the UN as they strive to reduce the gender gap.

After 2015, the UN adopted Sustainable Development Goals, one of which is trying to end hunger, achieve food security, and promote sustainable agriculture through the Zero Hunger Challenge. By 2030, the UNs wants to "double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, including through secure and equal access of land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment" (UN, 2015). In 2014, India's government accepted the UN's Zero Hunger Challenge and has since worked with institutional organizations to implement safety net programs (UN, 2015).

Ensuring equal access of land is an essential resource in agricultural productivity, as land currently symbolizes social status and power in patriarchal societies, such as India. In patriarchal, agricultural societies, gender is the only determinant of who controls the land and thus who has greater access to resources (Villarreal, 2013). "Women lack statutory rights over land and have less authority over family labor compared to their husband and male siblings" (FAO, 2011). This lack of access to land forces women to be dependent on men for work and access to food resources. Because men are more likely to have access to larger land plots and land with better soil, women are left with very few options to earn income given the insufficient agricultural output that they can extract from their poor lands. According to a study conducted by U.S. Department of State, "the children of women who own land are twice as likely to be adequately nourished than children in households where women work on family land they do not own or children growing up in landless households. Mothers who own land are better able to provide more nutritious food to their children and ensure their health and well-being" (Bureau of Public Affairs, & U.S. Department of State, 2011). Statutory laws in developing nations, including India, make it difficult for women to acquire land, even after their husbands and male siblings have passed away (FAO, 2002). Provisions do exist that grant indirect access to land to women through kinship relations, however, these provisions fail to offer enough land security for food production and income. Through increasing rates of divorce and male deaths, more women in India are becoming head of households and also becoming prominent in the decision making process of food production, income, and sustainable livelihoods. Despite this shift in trends, current lack of access to land provides disadvantages for women in this decision making process. Women in patriarchal societies, like India, are usually left at the wills of their male relatives and can become dependent upon other family members if the wills do not provide much (FAO, 2002). These few options pose challenges for women as they now have to find another way to earn income and feed their children. Ensuring equal access to land allows women to contribute to food production even after their husbands or male relatives face death or move to urban areas.

Providing financial services to women also plays a role in increasing food production. Because women face domestic responsibilities as well, women are less able to participate in economic opportunities compared to men (FAO, 2011). Specifically, in India, women are responsible for household chores, taking care of children, taking care of the husband, taking care of the elderly, and contributing to agricultural productivity for family income. As an example, "girls do significantly more work in household chores and on the farm compared to boys in Himachal Pradesh, India" (FAO, 2011). A majority of these responsibilities requires unpaid work, limiting economic opportunities for women and the ability to earn income. In addition to

this unpaid work, household chores and domestic responsibilities force women to stay near homes, limiting their mobility to find paid work in urban areas.

As a way to confront these income-earning restrictions, the UN and India's government focuses on implementing programs of rural finance and microcredit to help women purchase agricultural inputs in India. Credit is especially necessary to purchase the fertilizers and seeds needed for agricultural output. In India, a program called Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (RMK) has been successful in providing credit to poor women, helping them sustain livelihoods and earn an income (UN India, 2016). "An estimated 1.9 million women are beneficiaries of schemes run by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development and Rashtriya Mahila Kosh with 27.16 billion crores having been disbursed to them" (UN Women Watch). Without financial services like microcredit programs, "women are greatly limited in their ability to independently secure land and inputs for agricultural activities to boost overall production" (Villarreal, 2013).

In addition to land and financial resources, access to education is also a key ingredient in improving agricultural productivity. Men and women don't have equal access to education in rural, patriarchal societies like India. Over 200 million women are illiterate and don't have access to any level of education or schooling. This lack of education is a major obstacle for reducing food insecurity and achieving zero hunger in India because it prevents women from understanding and using agricultural technologies that would increase agricultural output through sustainable practices. In fact, there is a positive correlation between elementary school education and farm efficiency in modern agricultural productivity because human capital is the motivating factor in food productivity (FAO, 2011). Increasing access to education for women allows women to gain a better understanding on how to use agricultural technology, make informative decisions about how to increase food production, incorporate new techniques on sustainable agricultural practices, and gain transferable skills that can be used in various career paths outside of the farm fields. In 2015, the UN brought their Global "Education First" Initiative (GEFI) to India, to invest in women in children (UN India, 2016). Led by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Global "Education First" Initiative spreads the message "Sustainable Development Begins with Education" (UN, 2015). GEFI has three main priorities which include putting every child in school, improving the quality of learning, and fostering global citizenship (UNESCO, 2016). This collaboration between India's government, UNICEF, and UNESCO is an important program to reduce food insecurity because education has a profound impact on social, economic, and political progress (UNESCO, 2016). Through various literacy programs in India, "the female literacy rate increased from 39% in 1991 to 54% in 2001. There has [thus] been a decline in absolute number of female illiterates from 200 million in 1999 to 189.6 million in 2001" (UN Women Watch). As literacy rates increase, women and children are able to think critically about the surrounding world. Because resource inputs, technology, education, and knowledge are crucial to alleviating food insecurity by increasing agricultural productivity, the implementation of more education programs will make a huge difference in India.

Since women in India also hold household and domestic responsibilities, the Non-Formal Education (NFE) program was created by the Indian government in 1979 to include women and working children who were unable to participate in day to day school programs, and this program is still being funded (International Programs Center, 1998). "Classes are held at times that are convenient for the students, and the curriculum is adapted to their needs. The teacher is a local person who has been trained to run the NFE center and the classes are held either in the

teacher's home or after hours in already-existing schools" (International Programs Center, 1998). This flexible learning program has the benefits of reaching women and providing a primary education to them; however, the quality of education in this program varies from region to region within the country (International Programs Center, 1998). Despite the government's efforts to reduce the gender gap in education between men and women, NFE has done very little because the quality of education women receive is not the same as the quality of education men receive. This is a challenge in attaining food productivity because the knowledge of what sustainable practices are and how to incorporate those practices in the farm is necessary to increase food yields.

A more fundamental problem with food insecurity in India is the inability to feed 800 million people. However, given that, by 2030, global population is projected to increase to 8.5 billion people, and India's population to increase to 1.5 billion people, population growth is a driving force behind food insecurity (UN, 2015). With approximately 200 million more mouths to feed, another solution to this problem is to focus on reproductive health. Traditionally, farming households have more children in order to have increased labor in the farm field. This, however, only contributes to the food insecurity problem.

Effective family planning programs help alleviate food insecurity because it decreases population growth, which decreases the demand for food and the pressure India faces to feed the growing population. As one of the pillars for Hinduism, a primary religion in India, the concept of dharma asserts that Hindus have a duty to grow a family during the householder stage of life, thus Hindu women are less likely to use any form of contraceptives. For the past century; however, India began to use female sterilization as the primary means for contraception to reduce population growth. In 2016, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi began introducing injectable contraceptives provided by the government for Indian women as an alternative for female sterilization (Barry & Dugger, 2016). In accordance to this decision, the WHO recommends the use of such injectable contraceptives as a new birth control option for women (Barry & Dugger, 2016). Similarly, U.S. AID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation also advocates for these birth control options in developing nations.

Family planning could thus be the multidimensional solution to the problem of food insecurity. According to a study conducted by U.S. AID, "food security depends on four pillars: food availability, access, use or consumption, and stability" (U.S. AID, 2015). This study provides evidence for the impacts of family planning on food security as family planning programs impacts all four pillars of food security. The first pillar of food availability refers to the quantities of food produced and population size affects food availability, because it affects the quantity of food needed (U.S. AID, 2015). A greater focus on family planning programs and contraceptives improves this pillar of food availability by reducing overall demand for food, while also empowering women in the economic development process. The second pillar of food access is correlated with poverty (U.S. AID, 2015). Larger family sizes require a larger household income; however, in rural areas of India, households struggle to earn the income needed for the bare minimum standard of living. Lack of income and money not only contribute to poverty and economic challenges, but also food insecurity because families simply cannot afford to purchase food. "Childbearing can affect food access via women's labor force participation and wages" (U.S. AID, 2015). This is because women have to spend a greater proportion of their income on feeding their children. Family planning and contraceptives allows women to allocate a greater proportion of income to feeding children, reducing the hardships in affording food. The third pillar of food use and consumption often refers to the nutritional needs

of pregnant women (U.S. AID, 2015). "Pregnant and breastfeeding women require 300 to 500 more calories each day than other women and also have greater needs for proteins, vitamins, and minerals" (U.S. AID, 2015). Family planning and contraceptives allow women to satisfy their own nutritional requirements without becoming malnourished. The consumption in the third pillar refers back to population growth, where lower populations require lower demands for food. Lastly, the fourth pillar of food stability is based on India's resilience and ability to adapt to change (U.S. AID, 2015). This pillar is especially important given the growing global issue of climate change, because climate change has started to have profound effects on agricultural productivity. With climate change, temperatures will change affecting, how crops grow, which crops will grow, how much of arable land is available for food production, how much soil is eroded, and how much do the chances of natural disasters increase (tsunamis and earthquakes in India), etc. The combined consequences of climate change will test India's resilience and profoundly impact its food stability as climate change worsens. With women making up half of global population, gender inequalities in various areas of land, financial services, education, decision making, and childbearing will reduce India's ability to effectively respond to such changes. Family planning and contraceptives affect every area of food security and should be deemed a priority by the Indian government and international organizations to achieve food security.

Achieving agricultural productivity to reduce food insecurity requires the proper resources of land, capital, and labor to increase food production. When the state fails to properly provide these resources due to gender inequalities, poverty, environmental degradation, and corruption, women are forced to find alternative ways and strategies because they face constraints in their activities (McOmber, 2015). These constraints that gender inequalities impose on Indian society maintain the current status of women and render current contributions to food production unrecognizable. FAO estimates "that if women had the same access to productive resources as men, they could increase yields on their farms by 20-30 percent" (Bureau of Public Affairs, & U.S. Department of State, 2011). By increasing yields by 20-30 percent, agricultural output in developing nations could be raised by 2-4 percent, feeding an additional 150 million people (Bureau of Public Affairs, & U.S. Department of State, 2011).

There is also an unavoidable cultural dimension in food insecurity ."At the most basic level, women are concerned with earning enough money to support their families and send their children to school" (McOmber, 2015). Social norms regarding the role of women are deeply rooted in Indian culture, as women are seen to be inferior to men and hold more domestic responsibilities. These domestic responsibilities coupled with the work women do in the fields producing food severely limits the ability for women to contribute economically and agriculturally. There are currently multiple programs that have been enacted and implemented in India by the international institutions UN, FAO, WHO, and U.S. AID to increase food production by empowering women. The focus of these programs are to alleviate the gender gap to reduce hunger by ensuring equal access to land, financial services, education, introduction of agricultural technologies for women, family planning programs and contraceptives. All these programs have the common goal to increase food production through agricultural productivity; however, these programs also have weaknesses. The role of women in India is rooted within Indian culture and has manifested into a challenge India faces in modern economic development. The programs being implemented by the UN, FAO, WHO and U.S. AID provide temporary resources to women for land access, financial services, education, and family planning, but none of these programs tackle the cause of the problem. The cause of gender inequalities has been

created by Indian society centuries ago, and the Indian government still aligns with its cultural norms in modern society. Unless the Indian government and Indian society can address the problem by shifting away from these cultural norms regarding the social role of women, gender inequalities will continue to persist and hinder agricultural productivity.

Another issue with these programs by international organizations is with the evidence itself. Some evidence found by these organizations on the impacts of feminization of agriculture, or the measurable increase of women's participation in agriculture, to reduce food insecurity specifically is based on current outcomes with the UN's Zero Hunger Challenge, but most evidence is conceptual. As an example, with U.S. AID and its family planning programs, "few programs measure both family planning and food security results and the time period for measuring family planning impacts is often longer than food security programs or studies" (US AID, 2015). Despite the positive benefits empirical evidence shows from the current time period of results, there is a need for more evidence on this issue through longer case studies because the issue of gender inequalities in the agricultural sector goes beyond the role of women. This issue also encompasses religion, culture, the type of government, demographics, environment, available resources, etc. where all these factors contribute to food insecurity.

Despite other factors that contribute to food insecurity, feminization of agriculture is important for developing nations to recognize. The problem is not how to get women more involved in agriculture. Women are already involved in agriculture. The problem is that nations and international organizations need to recognize that feminization of agriculture is happening and then decide how to address food insecurity based off that recognition. Female farmers have different needs than men and also hold different responsibilities of men. In order to effectively address how feminization of agriculture can increase food production, current international organizations and institutions that are trying to implement such programs in India, should work with the Indian government to set out clear, detailed, and feasible goals regarding this issue, how to implement these goals, and how to monitor and evaluate such programs. With the current international institutional work, each institution has different goals that vary from the Indian government's goals and tend to overlap with each other. With excessive international aid and overlap, it's difficult to monitor whether or not these programs are working and serves as a weakness rather than a strength.

Regardless of these weaknesses, India has been able to increase food grain production by nearly 200 million tons within 64 years (UN India, 2016). The Indian programs of National Food Security Mission, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY), the Integrated Schemes on Oilseeds, Pulses, Palm oil and Maize (ISOPOM), and mid-day meals have all helped reduce the severity of this problem (UN India, 2016). In addition to these national programs, international organizations have been working together to provide Indian women access to land, financial services, education, family planning programs and contraceptives to increase the role of women in the agricultural sector. Even though these programs by India's government and various international institutions have helped reduce food insecurity, there is still a long way until India achieves zero hunger. Poverty, environmental degradation, corruption, climate change, and population growth still stand as serious challenges to overcome. As part of India's journey in this challenge, it is vital to address gender inequalities by providing women and girls accessible resources for agricultural productivity and meeting the needs of female farmers in order to reduce food insecurity in South Asia, specifically in India.

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"The Role of Institutions and Stable Democracies in Preventing the Resource Curse: A Look at the Success of Botswana and Its Lessons for Libya's Future"
By Megan Schroder

The extent of the power of institutions and good governance can be seen when studying their roles in resource curse prevention. An example of this kind of success in a developing nation is Botswana, a leading diamond exporter. This research paper will examine how economic institutions in Botswana prevented the country from falling into the natural resource trap, and also how these institutions were created and maintained. The success of Botswana will be compared to the failures in Libya, a country will large amounts of oil but weak institutions.

Oxymoronically, nations in Africa with vast stores of natural resources are often the ones with the greatest concentration of problems that inhibit their development. Countries with large deposits of oil and minerals (i.e. diamonds) have been historically plagued by poverty, depravity, underdevelopment, and little to no economic growth. This curse, also known as the paradox of plenty, has notoriously afflicted countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Libya, and Nigeria. These countries face the adverse effects of this curse because of their over-reliance on their resources. An African Development Fund Economic Brief found that "Resource abundant economies tend to suffer from Dutch disease; insufficient economic diversification; rent seeking and conflicts; corruption and undermined political institutions as well as loose economic policies."[1] The trend of resource-poor countries outperforming resource-rich countries has been ongoing since the 1970s. Between 1960 and 1990, the GDP per capita of resource-poor countries increased by approximately 2.5%-3.5%. The GDP per capita of resource-rich countries only increased by an average of 1.7%.[2] The resource curse theory does not state that the large mineral or oil deposits are the cause of a stagnant economy in a developing country. The deposits incite poor leadership and resource management, which then results in a bad economy. A study done in 1997 by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner stated that, "The indirect effect of resource intensity operating through the quality of legal and government institutions is not large."[3] Thus, Sach and Warner are stating that the perpetuation of the resource curse is not largely impacted by the types of institutions in a nation. However, studies and literature will be referenced in this paper that will directly contrast with this conclusion.

To begin to understand the role of institutions on a nation, it is important to note the difference between inclusive and exclusive institutions and the roles they play in everyday life. Inclusive economic institutions encourage economic development and activity; equal opportunity exists and private property is protected, which leads to innovation and further growth. Exclusive economic institutions hinder economic growth because of the lack of opportunity afforded to those of lower status than the ruling class. Private property is not protected, making people less

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[1] Paula Ximena Meijia and Vincent Castel, *Could Oil Shine like Diamonds?,* (African Development Bank, 2012).

[2] Ibid,. 2.

[3] Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, *Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,* (Harvard Institute For International Development, 1997).

willing to use their talents and skills.[4] Examples of the drastic difference that the two different types of institutions can have are seen in Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Mexico.[5] In the book *Why Nations Fail,* Acemoglu and Robinson detail the stark differences between these two towns of the same name, separated only by a fence and an international border. In Nogales, Arizona, most adults have health insurance, a high school education, and have an average household income of $30,000. Crime is relatively low and they live in a fully functional democracy. Across the border, in Nogales, Mexico, many adults do not have a secondary education, infant mortality and disease rates are high, and the average household income is $10,000. Crime is high, and many public officials require bribes and favors in order to accomplish anything. The austerity of Nogales, Mexico is a direct result of the type of institutions its government contains. Its exclusive institutions create little incentive for people to expand the economy by opening up businesses. The citizens fear robbery and indifference by law enforcement as a result of a lack of private property rights. The prosperity of Nogales, Arizona is a result of the inclusive institutions of the United States. The citizens are able to obtain an education easily and can utilize their developed skills to contribute to society. This example of the two Nogales demonstrates a micro-scale example of the effects of inclusive and exclusive economic institutions.[6] In order to see the role of institutions applied at a larger scale, one must look to the success story of Botswana.

In 1967, after the British left Botswana, the newly independent country only had seven miles of paved road; one hundred citizens had a secondary education and only twenty-two had a University degree. These degrees, however, did not even come from Botswana, as there were no Universities in the country at the time.[7] Nevertheless, against all odds, Botswana was able to successfully manage its natural mineral wealth and prevent an onset of the resource curse.

Botswana is now one of the world's leading producers of diamonds and one of the most developed countries in Africa.[8] After gaining independence from Great Britain, it was among the poorest countries in the world. Soon after its independence, large diamond mines were discovered and the nation's economy began to flourish.[9] Unlike other African nations who gained independence, only to fall prey to the resource curse, Botswana managed to escape and thrive, "Botswana has become renowned for its ability to manage its mineral wealth effectively and escape the resource curse."[10] Botswana negated the effects of the resource curse by adopting sound economic policies and building inclusive, high quality institutions. It is important to understand the role of institutions in Botswana adopting good economic policies and to see how institutions failed Libya, a country with a large endowment of oil.

In a study conducted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, it was found that, "Changes in institutions can close as much as ¾ of the income gap between the nations with the best institutions and worst institutions."[11] Using this information, they state that Botswana is wealthy because of its good institutions. Through a historical analysis of the political past of Botswana,

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[4] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,* (Crown Publishers, 2012).

[5] Ibid,. 18.

[6] Ibid,. 20.

[7] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, *An African Success Story: Botswana,* (MIT Department of Economics, 2001).

[8] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, *An African Success Story: Botswana,* 3 .

[9] Joe Nocera, *Diamonds Are Forever in Botswana,* (New York Times, 2008).

[10] Meijia and Castel, *Could Oil Shine Like Diamonds?*, 6.

[11] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, *An African Success Story: Botswana,* 8.

the importance of investment can be seen. After independence, diamond, coal, copper, and nickel deposits were found. Although there are instances of corruption in Botswana, the majority of the resource rents were invested, thus spurring the growth of the economy.

The importance of integrative institutions and the course that they set a nation's economy upon is highlighted in the tribal history of Botswana. Issues among the tribes of the Tswana and the Sotho were discussed in public assemblies. Citizens could attend these assemblies, contribute to the discussions, and even criticize the actions of the chiefs.[12] This involvement of citizens in political matters set limits on the powers of the ruling class and set a precedent for inclusive institutions. In looking at the continuance of institutions in Botswana, it is important to note that, "Institutions are ultimately the endogenous creation of individuals."[13] This principle can be seen in the early implementation on private property laws in Botswana after its independence. Due to the agrarian nature of the economy of the 1960s, and the large number of cattle owners, it was important to the citizens to establish laws to protect their livestock and livelihood. Thus, a crucial step in ensuring the establishment of good political institutions was achieved. The rapid influx of wealth from diamonds in the 1970s not only reaffirmed the institutions that had been forming, but also strengthened them. Additionally, the sound policy adopted which called for investing the diamond revenue into the national economy prevented large scale violence, which could have led to the destruction of inclusive institutions.

A study released by *The Economic Journal* also affirms the powerful role of preventing the resource curse through inclusive economic institutions, and thus presents empirical evidence that directly contrasts the work of Jeffrey Sachsand Andrew Warner.[14] This study examined the resource curse in countries with two categories of institutions, "producer friendly" and "grabber friendly." Producer friendly is the equivalent to inclusive economic and political institutions while grabber friendly is the equivalent to exclusive economic and political institutions. The direct results of the study concluded that resource-rich nations that housed producer friendly institutions were more likely to fully utilize the potential of their wealth and experience economic growth.

The strong institutions in place in Botswana allowed for progressive economic policies to be adopted in order to further the growth of the nation. Rent investment not only allowed the economy to grow, but also helped to prevent violence. Additionally, Botswana strategically sought economic diversification in order to lessen its reliance on the diamond market. In order to pursue diversification, Botswana created an environment that was business friendly and stabilized the financial sector of the country.[15] Botswana was able to achieve these policies through inclusive institutions because of the integrated nature of its past forms of tribal governance. In order to achieve sustainable economic policies, the government of Botswana established The Pula Fund, an intergenerational equity fund, in 1993.[16] This fund is used to help pay for deficits by using the surpluses of previous years. Additionally, the fund ensures that the resource from revenue is invested in order to benefit future generations.

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[12] Ibid,. 12.

[13] Ibid,. 23.

[14] Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, *Institutions and the Resource Curse,* (The Economic Journal, 2006).

[15] Meijia and Castel, *Could Oil Shine Like Diamonds?*, 7.

[16] Ibid,. 10.

Today, "Botswana, is one of Africa's most stable countries, is the continent's longest continuous multi-party democracy."[17] Botswana's parliamentarian democratic republic has allowed for the continuance and the strengthening of its institutions in order to further enable the nation to prosper. In *Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,* Mancur Olson discusses how democracies protect the private property rights of citizens.[18] Stable democracies, such as Botswana, allow for capital to be retained in a nation because of promised security. Botswana's Pula Fund provides fiscal stability, however, it is vulnerable to corrupt politicians who could syphon cash from it. The stable and transparent government of Botswana and its adherence to its strict fiscal policy rules is the reason that the fund has been successful since 1993. Good governance is essential to economic growth and staving off the resource curse in a developing country.

Conversely, volatile dictatorships or autocracies result in little trust that privacy rights, inclusive institutions, and progressive economic policy will be maintained. A country thought to have escaped the resource curse was Libya. However, after a ravaging civil war in 2011, the country fell into disarray and has been subjected to the effects of the resource curse. An examination of the types of institutions that Libya has reveals how the large oil wealth of the nation was mismanaged, leading to violence and poverty.

Libya has one of the largest oil reserves on the continent of Africa and is one of the leading producers of oil.[19] Oil was discovered in the 1950s and, until 2011, Libya had a growing economy as a result of its oil revenues. According to one study, "The country outperformed regional standards by achieving a real GDP growth rate of more than 5% over the last decade."[20] With a high literacy rate and an average household income of $14,000, Libya appeared prosperous while its oil-rich neighbors of Nigeria and Angola faced slow economic growth. However, a look below the surface, at the institutions, reveals just how volatile that nation really was.

There were large wealth disparities and imbalances between classes in Libya. Additionally, levels of unemployment and inflation continued to rise. Economic policies in Libya lacked strong institutional foundations and therefore were insufficient in managing the resource wealth of the nation. Unlike the Botswana economy, Libya's was not diverse and relied heavily on oil revenue despite the fact oil revenue only created 5% of employment.[21] The Libyan government operates under the principle of clientelism, the practice of providing goods for political support in a quid pro quo.[22] Thus, in this kind of state system, power is centralized and individual voices and concerns are not heard by the ruling class. The over-dependence on oil meant that when revenues were not high, government accountability suffered due to leaders' inability to provide what they had promised in order to gain the submission of citizens.

The occurrence of distrust in economic institutions is a direct contrast from the types of institutions in Botswana and the environment that they create. Since 2011, Libya has faced large amounts of political instability. In 2011, a violent civil war, backed by NATO, broke out and deposed the Gaddafi regime, which had ruled the nation since the 1960s. The regime that took its

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[17] *Botswana Country Profile,* (BBC News, 2018).

[18] Mancur Olson, *Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,* (American Political Science Review, 1993).

[19] *Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries*, 2018.

[20] Meijia and Castel, *Could Oil Shine Like Diamonds?*, 4.

[21] Ibid,. 5.

[22] Ibid,. 5.

place, the General National Congress, was elected. However, this congress failed to meet the needs of the people and in 2014 the Council of Deputies was elected. Shortly after the election of the Council, another civil war broke out. Libya is still locked in this war between the supporters of the Council of Deputies and supporters of the General National Congress.[23] The instability of the government, and the decreased oil revenues because of large scale conflict, have worked to further the effects of the resource curse.

Nearly 6.4 million Libyans live below the poverty line, and oil revenue benefits are largely confined to the ruling class.[24] Due to the lack of stability and trusted institutions, progressive economic policy has not been adopted. Little to no economic diversification exists in Libya as a result of the stunting of growth in the private sector. While Botswana sought to obtain stability in its financial sector, the practices of the Libyan fiefdom have discouraged entrepreneurship and the retention of capital. According to an African Development Bank study, "Libya's private sector has been historically stifled by a number of issues including limited sources of financing to SMEs, the inconsistent application of property rights, and the focus of most of the economy's resources on the oil sector."[25] These examples of poor wealth management demonstrate how the resource curse will persist in the absence of a stable democracy and inclusive economic institutions.

Botswana has been able to practice sustainable fiscal policy and resource management because of its good governance and the institutions it has maintained. The success of Botswana provides several implications for the future policy and institution establishment of Libya. Although Botswana and Libya do not share the same integrative past that has encouraged the involvement of all citizens in political affairs, Libya may soon experience relief from its current civil war. The UN envoy in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, and nations such as Egypt and France, have called for elections in Libya by the end of 2018[26]. If the country were to emerge from its civil war as a result of the elections, the new government would have the opportunity to develop pivotal and crucial governance, institutions, and consequently policies, in order to save the nation from the resource curse. In order to do so effectively and sustainability, the government should be democratic in nature and focus on maintaining stability and battling potential corruption.

The International Monetary Fund says that is it important to establish clear regulations regarding the natural resource revenues.[27] The IMF states that, "While revenue objectives are important, other factors—such as generating employment in related activities and environmental and social effects of the industries—must also be weighed.-"[28] In order to prevent rent-seeking by future leaders, the new government must establish a stabilization fund with the goal of investing the resource revenue back into the nation's economy. In order to establish trust in the government and create a business friendly environment, the government must be democratically transparent in nature and publicly commit to practicing smart wealth management. This will create government accountability, a key part of Botswana's success. In addition to establishing trust, the government must adhere to its promises and protect the private property rights of its citizens. To prevent over-centralization, and thus possible corruption from the creation of the

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[23] Amber Pariona, *Political Environment of Libya,* (World Atlas, 2017).

[24] *Poverty Persists in Libya Despite Oil Riches,* (The National, 2011).

[25] Meijia and Castel, *Could Oil Shine Like Diamonds?*, 5.

[26] *War Torn Libya Plans an Election,* (The Economist, 2018).

[27] Phillip Daniel, Sanjeev Gupta, and Todd Mattina, *Extracting Resource Revenue,* (International Monetary Fund, 2013).

[28] Ibid.

stabilization fund, a portion of oil revenue should be transferred to local governments to be managed. In the power vacuum left by the fall of the Gaddafi regime, local governments were strengthened and have remained relatively stable.[29] Violence is prevented in Botswana by an investment in the people, and a transference of funds to local governments in Libya would serve the same purpose. A Foreign Policy Magazine analysis states that, "Putting oil profits directly into the pockets of citizens will reduce social and economic exclusion and demonstrate that democracy really can deliver material benefits."[30] Fuel subsidies should be avoided by the new democratic government. Fuel subsidies can misconstrue an economy, foster corruption, and can take money from important social programs such as health care and education.[31] They were used by the Gaddafi regime and they benefited the elite far more than they the aided the average citizen, let alone the many that lived below the poverty line. Thus, the practice of giving oil revenue directly to the people of Libya through direct dividends would have better results in raising the standard of living for all Libyans and furthering economic growth. By fostering an environment that encourages entrepreneurship and innovation, the economy of Libya could be diversified in order to lessen its dependence on the performance of the oil market.

Although Botswana's economy did not have to overcome the challenges associated with managing natural resource revenue after recently emerging from a civil war, another African nation did. Liberia, prior to its two civil wars, was a leading world exporter of iron ore. In 2009, several years after the end of the Second Liberian Civil War, the government passed the Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act which required, "the disclosure of revenues, payments, and contracts from all government agencies and companies involved in natural resources."[32] Liberia also became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).[33] The EITI is a group of companies, 51 countries, and international groups that seek to ensure accountability among the extraction of oil, gas, and other natural resources through public monitoring and transparency initiatives. Libya should follow the example of Liberia, join the EITI, and pass transparency acts directed at its extractive industries.

Botswana's economic trajectory has been an exception to the resource curse that plagues many developing nations. Botswana successfully maintained good governance and sound economic policies through the building of a stable democracy and inclusive institutions. Libya's corruption-based regimes and exclusive economic and political institutions have caused the country to be greatly affected by the resource curse. In order to raise the standard of living and achieve economy growth, Libya must end its civil war, and establish a democratic government. This government must create integrative institutions by directly putting oil revenue into the hands of the people and investing in the nation's economy. The cycle of corruption must be ended through policies of transparency and membership to a third party accountability group, such as the EITI. Botswana has demonstrated that the resource curse is not an integral part of resource-rich underdeveloped nations. Lessons from the nation's success should be utilized in order to grow the economies of impoverished nations suffering from the natural resource trap.

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[29] Terra Lawson-Remer, *Undoing the Resource Curse: How Oil Can Save Libyan Democracy,* (Foreign Policy, 2014).

[30] Ibid.

[31] *Price Squeeze,* (The Economist, 2014).

[32] Terra Lawson-Remer, *Undoing the Resource Curse: How Oil Can Save Libyan Democracy,* (Foreign Policy, 2014).

[33] *Who We Are,* (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2018).

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"The Nigerian Civil War: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Oil Wealth and Separatist Conflict"
By Andrew Salyer

In January of 1970, the idea of an independent Biafran state was crushed after the military forces of the Federal government of Nigeria overran the rebel territories; thus, resulting in the end of an over 3-year civil war which resulted in the deaths of roughly a million people(Chibuke, 111, 2008). The civil war was sparked by conflict over the distribution of resources, which had marred Nigerian politics since independence in 1960. Specifically, revenues collected from oil exports were a leading factor in the separatist conflict (Fenske and Zurimendi, 8, 2015). Oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria are concentrated in the eastern part of the country focused on the Niger Delta. The emergence of commercial oil production in this region in 1958 and thereafter raised stakes generated a heated power struggle by the indigenes for control over oil resources; particularly, the power struggle between the Federal government controlled by the Hausa/Fulani in the north and the Ibo in the east, where many of Nigeria's oil resources were located (Ikelegbe, 214, 2005). In this paper, I will seek to discover whether there is a connection between state oil wealth and separatist conflicts. I utilized and merged data from Fearon and Laitin and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data sets to produce my results. Oil wealth or oil, is defined by Fearon and Laitin in their data set as "oil", "…[states] deriving at least one-third of export revenues from fossil fuels…"(Fearon and Latin, 85, 2003). Similarly, I utilized the EPR data set using the "secethonset" variable to gauge the occurrence of a secessionist conflict in any country during the years the data were gathered for (1946-2005). The Nigerian Civil War is a prime example in the explanation of how oil wealth plays a role in secessionist conflict discussed in the literature and the subsequent sections of this paper.

Oil wealth in stupendous amounts, as typical in a resource curse situation, is negatively correlated with development, state legitimacy, and governance. Furthermore, the resource course has shown to precipitate armed conflicts that both endanger citizens and hinders state development (Osaghae, 109, 2015). According to Fearon and Laitin, oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses because power holders have less of a need to raise state revenues through taxes and other socially intrusive institutions. More importantly, oil revenues raise the value of the "prize" of holding state power (Fearon and Laitin, 81, 2015; Ross, 2003). In controlling the revenues created by natural resources through the central government, the ruling group can allocate this wealth to wherever they desire. If groups living in oil rich regions of a country are excluded from the central government, tensions may begin to rise over where resource and rent payments are going. This greatly heightens perceptions of marginalization in oil-producing states, especially if they aren't returning payments to the region of origin (Osaghae, 112, 2015). By increasing the perception of marginalization, group-level grievances and frustrations over resource exploitation may grow to the point where secession from the state is a preferable option when compared to remaining a part of it. The mechanisms of oil-based separatist conflict are outlined clearly by Ross as: Before a resource was exploited, people in these regions had a distinct ethnic or religious identity that set them apart from the population and they held a belief that the central government was unfairly appropriating the wealth which belonged to them and, that by creating a separate state, they would be richer. Furthermore, environmental damage and expropriation of the land itself can be a cause for conflict, especially

when groups being exploited feel that they are not receiving the correct amount of compensation for damage dealt (Ross, 7, 2003). Other factors that play a keen role in resource-driven secessionist conflicts include desire for increased political and social valuation by the rest of the country of the marginalized group, along with increased economic prosperity and a better life for all including education, public works, etc. (Osaghae, 118, 015). An example of this kind of conflict can be found in Aceh province, Indonesia. Aceh in Indonesia seemed an unlikely location for a separatist conflict. Yet in 1976, a secessionist movement was formed just as a large natural gas facility began operations in Aceh. Citizens living there felt that the revenues from the natural gas plant were not being adequately shared with the people of Aceh. GAM propaganda exaggerated the effect oil revenues would have on the wealth of the Acehnese if they won independence, comparing Aceh to the tiny oil-rich sultanate of Brunei (Ross, 7-8, 2003). Similarly, a major incentive in the mobilization of Nigerian groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta region were promises of becoming oil-made millionaires if their struggle for independence succeeded (Osaghae, 114, 2015). Based on the literature discussed thus far, there does appear to be a link in the goals or grievances of secessionist groups and their relationship to oil wealth. This relationship can be better explored through the lens of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) as I will discuss in the next section.

In 1958, oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Eastern part of Nigeria. Up until 1958, 100% of revenues collected from natural resource exploitation went back to the region in which they were collected. Seeing that this discovery could hinder the control of the central government and lead to regional dominance the revenue collection formula changed. The Raisman Report (1958) effectively changed the revenue collection formula so that only 50% of the revenue gained from resource exploitation returned to the region resources were collected from. The rest remained with the central government (Uche, 115-116, 2008). This dilution of power in regional autonomy, in terms of resource revenue collection, marked the beginning of the struggle for national wealth. Furthermore, the struggle maximizes specifically over who controlled the center since the traditional system of regional dominance was no longer in place. Commercial extraction of oil in Nigeria began in 1958 and by 1964, replaced cocoa as the country's primary revenue earner. The federal government collected the rent and royalties from the rising oil industry (Okwudiba, 125, 1995). The tension building up to the civil war which began in 1967 was fueled by political competition between two of the country's major ethnic groups: The Hausa in the North who dominated the central government, and the Ibo in the Southeast who lived in the region where most of Nigeria's oil was located (Ross, 12, 2003). The conflict of control over the central government came in January 1966 when a group of army commanders under Major Nzeogwu, a southerner, staged a military coup to wrest power from politicians who were generally seen as corrupt. Following the coup, General Ironsi, a southerner took command of the central government. In May, Ironsi passed legislation dissolving the federal regions and uniting the civil service which was met with great backlash in the North. By July 1966, Northern military officers had deposed of Ironsi in a revenge coup and took command of the central government which was now headed by General Gowon, a Northerner (Uche, 117-119, 2008). The oil revenue issue reached a tipping point when Gowon announced the division of the country into twelve states on 27 May 1967. The Eastern Region became split into three states which effectively excised the main oil-producing areas from the core Ibo state. Refusing to cede control of the oil rich and Ibo dominated region over to the central government, on 30 May 1967, Southerner, Major Ojukwu declared independence and renamed the entire Eastern Region 'the Republic of Biafra'(Uche, 123, 2008). Given the influence of oil in secession and its potential

for sustaining it, it isn't very surprising that one of the first decrees of the Biafran leadership was the Revenue Collection (No. 2) Decree of 1967(Uche, 2008). The Decree made it possible for Biafra to demand oil royalties directly from all oil-producing firms in the territory of Biafra. Biafra's leaders banked heavily on the East's oil wells to generate great amounts of foreign exchange to sustain the country and purchase military hardware. For the same reason, the Federals chose oil producing sites in Biafra as primary military targets in 1967. Furthermore, in June of 1967, Ojukwu demanded Shell-BP to pay their royalties to Biafra (Oyeweso, 157, 1992). Without a positive response, the Biafran government asked Shell-BP to cease all operations in Biafra and took over for 'protection' of the company's instillations and other properties in its territories(Uche, 126, 2011). From this evidence, we can see a case where a separatist state, Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War, sought independence in part due to oil wealth and the prospect of the riches it would generate for the citizens of Biafra. Sovereignty was attractive because it raised the prospect of controlling and utilizing the entire oil revenue in the region as opposed to giving it to the central government for reallocation of resources and earnings to the Northern-controlled central government (Oyeweso, 125, 1992).

My hypothesis on the global relationship between oil and secessionist conflict is that countries that had experienced at least one year of oil contributing to greater than 1/3 of their export revenues have greater odds of experiencing secessionist conflict. This relationship is found in Nigeria where oil played a role in the manifestation of a separate, independent state known as Biafra (subsequently defeated and reabsorbed into Nigeria in 1970) (Ross, 12, 2003). The data I will present in the section below was generated using the Fearon and Laitin and EPR datasets. In the creation of my data, I utilized both datasets using the "oil" variable in the Fearon and Laitin dataset (repdata.) and the "secethonset" variable found in the EPR dataset. The combined sample includes 157 countries excluding Bosnia because it was not generated in both datasets. The following are the results generated utilizing an odds ratio.

Table 1	n = 157
Oil vs. Secessionist Conflict	**n(%) of Sample**
Countries with oil as >1/3 of exports	33 (21.1)
Experienced secessionist conflict	14 (42.2)
Did not experience secessionist conflict	19 (57.6)
Countries with oil as <1/3 of exports	124 (79.0)
Experience secessionist conflict	37 (29.8)
Did not experience secessionist conflict	87 (70.2)
OR = 1.7326	

Figure 1

Global proportions of oil significance and experience of seccesionist civil war.

Of 157 countries in the sample, I found that 87 (55%) countries had never experienced oil wealth or a secessionist conflict. Moreover, 37 (24%) countries that had never experienced oil wealth had experienced a secessionist conflict. Also, 14 (9%) countries that experienced oil wealth had also experienced a secessionist conflict. Lastly, 19 (12%) countries that experienced oil wealth had not experienced a secessionist conflict. In this presentation, Nigeria would fall under the category "Countries with oil that have experienced a secessionist conflict." Through my observation, I found that, globally, 32% of all countries have experienced a secessionist conflict. If we were to assume that oil does *not* have an impact on secessionist conflict, then we could conclude that 32% of all oil-rich countries would have experienced a secessionist conflict. However, in our research we have found that 42% of all oil-rich countries have experienced a secessionist conflict. Therefore, we can conclude that oil *does* have an impact on secessionist conflict. To investigate this hypothesis further, I utilized an odd ratio. As displayed in Table 1, I calculated an odds ratio of 1.7326. This means is that countries with at least one year where a third of the country's revenue was derived from oil wealth were 1.7326 times more likely to experience a secessionist conflict than those which did not derive more than a third of their exported wealth from oil.

By using the Nigerian Civil War as a case study, I sought to determine whether oil wealth is related to secessionist conflict. After analyzing the civil war and then placing it in a larger data set, I discovered by using an odds ratio that oil wealth does have an impact on secessionist conflict by increasing the odds of one occurring (1.7326 times more likely) in countries that are oil rich compared to countries that are not oil rich (>1/3 of export revenue derived from fossil fuels).

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Indirect Conflict: War by Different Means

Direct conflicts between states, polities, and other entities in the international arena are fairly easy to recognize. Indirect conflicts, on the other hand, are open to discussions and differing views concerning its classification as such. From economic policies designed to target specific states and groups, like sanctions, to material and logistical support to entities in open conflict with a specific entity or state; indirect conflict appears as an attractive alternative for states and entities who want to combat perceived adversaries without incurring the costs and responsibilities of direct conflict. The conversation surrounding indirect conflict has increased in the past few years alongside the perceived increased use of its measures by states and other actors. The use of sanctions against Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea has illustrated that economic policies are still considered to be in the arsenal of states when indirectly combating other states and entities in the case of conflicting interests. Perhaps the most glaring examples of current indirect conflicts exist in the ongoing wars and instability in the Middle East. The conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq are increasingly being described as proxy wars and conflicts as states and actors without direct involvement increase their influence and support for various involved stakeholders in hopes of competing with their perceived adversaries. Thus, this section of the review explores proxy warfare as a form of indirect conflict through the case study of Libya's indirect involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict.

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"Muammar Gaddafi's Proxy War through the Provisional Irish Republican Army against England"
By Eric Cruz

According to the Oxford Dictionary, a proxy war is defined as "a war instigated by a major power which does not itself become involved."(Oxford, 2018). Ultimately, this study argues that the former Prime Minister of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, waged a proxy war with the United Kingdom through the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) by shipping the group hundreds of tons of state of the art military weaponry, munitions, and explosives. In order to do this, this study begins by briefly explaining the partition of Ireland and the origins of the Irish Republican Army. Thereafter, this study examines the Troubles that engulfed Northern Ireland and the origins of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Subsequently, this paper briefly details Muammar Gaddafi's rise to power and his eventual support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The bulk of this research paper specifies the known arms shipments sent from the Libyan government to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Finally, this paper details the use of these munitions, the legacy of Gaddafi's shipments, and briefly outlines the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Briefly: The Partition of Ireland

The partition of Ireland has a long and complicated history dating back to the Anglo-Norman Invasions of Ireland in the 12th century. For the purposes of this study, I will begin in 1920. The fourth Home Rule Bill was drafted by the British Parliament in 1920 and became the *Government of Ireland Act.* This act, becoming law on December 23, 1920, partitioning Ireland's 36 counties into two regions, Northern and Southern Ireland. The act established two separate legislative bodies for each region in Belfast and Dublin respectively. Southern Ireland was made up of twenty-six counties while Northern Ireland consisted of six. The majority of the population in four of the six counties of Northern Ireland are of Scottish and British descent. The bulk of the population in the remaining two counties is ethnically Irish (McEvoy, 23-26, 2008).

The Origins of the Irish Republican Army

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed in 1919, as a paramilitary organization dedicated to the creation of a free Irish Republic. The organization, in its attempt to expel British forces from Ireland in the Irish War for Independence (1919-1921), utilized guerrilla warfare including ambushes, raids, assassinations, and sabotage. On December 6, 1921, after two years of bloody war, separatist forces and the British government signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The treaty sanctioned Irish independence for the twenty-six counties of Southern Ireland creating the Irish Free State. However, the Irish Free State was granted dominion status, requiring the State to swear allegiance to the British flag. A clause written in the treaty retained British control of the six counties of Northern Ireland. In the months after ratification, a civil war ensued splitting the Irish people over the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The Irish were divided over whether to ratify the treaty or assert full independence from British rule. On May 24, 1923, after more than a year of fighting, pro-treaty forces crushed anti-treaty resistance and the Irish Free State was reaffirmed(McEvoy, 23-28, 2008). In the years following the Irish Civil War, the British government would maintain control of Northern Ireland. In the following decades, conflict

within Northern Ireland was relatively insignificant despite a 40% ethnic Irish (and Catholic) population which favored independence from Great Britain (McAllister, 2009).

The Troubles and Origins of the Provisional Irish Republican Army

In the decades after partition, discriminatory policies and practices in favor of the ethnically Anglo and Protestant population were implemented. These policies were largely at the expense of the ethnically Irish and Catholic population. In January of 1967 tensions over these practices manifested themselves in the Republican movement for civil rights (McAllister, 2009). The movement drew its inspiration from the United States civil rights movement under Martin Luther King Jr.

According to the BBC, the Republican minority demanded:

> equal voting rights in local government elections; a fairer system for the allocation of public housing; an end to 'gerrymandering' (the manipulation of electoral boundaries to give one community an electoral advantage); an end to discrimination in employment; the disbandment of the 'B-Specials' (an all-Protestant auxiliary police force); and the repeal of the Special Powers Act (which allowed for internment of suspects without trial) (BBC, 2018).

By 1968, the civil rights movement began to pick up momentum and support within the United Kingdom. However, Loyalist forces within Northern Ireland maintained control of the legislature and were slow to act on the demands for civil rights. In response, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) organized a peaceful march for October 5, 1968, through a predominantly Unionist area of the country in Londonderry. The Apprentice Boys, a Unionist and Protestant fraternal society, planned a march on the same day at the same time with an identical route. Following these request, Northern Ireland's Minister of Home Affairs issued an order banning all marches on October 5, 1968, within the requested route. Despite this declaration, the NICRA carried on with its planned march. On October 5, 1968, several hundred unarmed civil rights protestors were met by police and security forces wielding batons and water cannons. Law enforcement officers clashed with protesters using their batons and water cannons to disperse the march. This incident garnered international media coverage sparking subsequent riots, marches, and violence throughout the following decades this period would be known as the Troubles(BBC, 2018).

In the following years, law and order deteriorated as Loyalist, who fought to retain the status quo and remain a part of Britain, and nationalist forces, who wanted to break away from Britain and join the Republic of Ireland, clashed. Violence progressively intensified throughout Northern Ireland leaving hundreds wounded in riots and skirmishes. On August 15, 1969, the deteriorating condition prompted the British government to deploy troops into Northern Ireland. Known as Operation Banner, these troops were tasked with reinstituting law and order, reinforcing existing security forces and to patrol the streets. Republican forces viewed Operation Banner as an extension of British control and further intensified disdain for British rule among the Republican minority. In 1969, as violence escalated, a small sect of progressively more militant members of the Irish Republican Army broke away forming the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Initially, the Provisional IRA conducted small-scale bombings and assassinations. The PIRA's methods were considered by many within Northern Ireland to be far

too extreme and the organization garnered very little public support, however, this would soon change.

On January 30, 1972, British troops, as part of Operation Banner, opened fire on unarmed, peaceful protestors marching for civil rights in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Fourteen protesters were shot dead, and another 15 were injured in what would be known as Bloody Sunday. The massacre shocked and horrified nationalist in Northern Ireland. Additionally, the incident would amass international media attention (Gregory, 2010). Immediately after the massacre, public support for the more militant PIRA would increase exponentially. Reportedly, there were queues to join the PIRA. In retaliation for Bloody Sunday, the PIRA increased its bombing campaigns, culminating on July 21, 1972, when 22 bombs were detonated around Belfast in the span of seventy-five minutes. The attack, nicknamed Bloody Friday, killed 9 people and injured an estimated 130(Melaugh, 2018). Despite these attacks, explosive materials and small arms were scarce and hard to acquire in Northern Ireland. The PIRA's increase in violence and the organization's increase in public support caught the eye of a newly installed leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi (Maltby, 2011).

Muammar Gaddafi's Rise to Power and the Provisional Irish Republican Army

Muammar al-Gaddafi was born in Sirte, Libya on June 7, 1942. In 1961, he attended a military college in Benghazi and spent four months studying abroad in the United Kingdom. A charismatic and intelligent individual, he quickly rose through the ranks of the Libyan military. Gaddafi joined a group of disgruntled military officers who were dissatisfied with the ruler of Libya, King Idris. King Idris, amongst other things, opened up Libya to the Western world allowing for the United States and the United Kingdom to build military bases on Libyan territory. Gaddafi rose to lead this group of officers and became its de-facto leader. While King Idris sought medical treatment in Turkey, Gadhafi initiated a military coup to overthrow the King. On September 1, 1969, Gadhafi became commander in chief of the armed forces and ruler of Libya's ruling body(Biography, 2017).

As leader of Libya Gaddafi took a hard stance against Western imperialism. He closed American and British military bases in Libya, instituted an Islamic calendar and demanded a greater share of revenue from foreign oil companies operating in Libya. In 1970, Gaddafi eradicated the last vestiges of Western imperialism by expelling all Italians from Libya (Libya was a colony of Italy until 1947). Over the initial years of his rule, he attempted to orient Libya away from the West and toward the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, in 1970 he published the first volume of his *Green Book* series that criticized liberal democracy and capitalism. Gaddafi was a staunch critic of imperialism and supported revolutionary groups in Western countries throughout his reign. In 1972, shortly after the attacks on Bloody Friday, senior officials in the PIRA were accepted into Libya and met with Gaddafi. Gaddafi viewed the PIRA's struggle to rid the British from Northern Ireland as a fight against British imperialism. At these meetings, PIRA officials went to great lengths to create robust arms smuggling networks by air and sea. Over the next three years, Gaddafi gave the PIRA more than 4.8 million dollars as well as tons of military hardware and munitions(Maltby, 2011).

Gaddafi's Military Support for the PIRA

The dates and contents of the first shipments are unknown and unverifiable given the nature of the operations. However, former PIRA operative turned British informant (in the 1990s) Sean O'Callaghan claims to have assisted in unloading the first arms shipments.

O'Callaghan asserts that these shipments arrived via airplane to Shannon International Airport. O'Callaghan and several other PIRA operatives secretly unloaded hundreds of small arms weapons including rocket launchers, rifles, and handguns. The British government discovered the Gadhafi and PIRA connection in 1973 when the Irish Navy intercepted an IRA gun-running ship named the *Claudia* off the coast of Ireland. The *Claudia* was carrying a total of five tons of small arms weapons including AK-47 rifles, sniper rifles, and handguns from the Libyan government(Obeidat, 2015). Presumably more shipments throughout the 1970s reached Northern Ireland, however, their contents cannot be accurately determined. During the mid-1970s, the PIRA carried out dozens of bombings and attacks throughout Belfast and the United Kingdom. For example, PIRA operatives planted a bomb, estimated to have been between 20 and 25 pounds, on a coach carrying British soldiers and their families in Northern England. The bomb detonated at midnight on the M62 motorway and ultimately killed 12 people. The attack later coined the "M62 Coach Bombing" sparked massive outrage throughout Great Britain. Ties between the Gaddafi regime and the republican dissidents in Northern Ireland were reportedly severed in 1976, despite this, bombings and attacks continued(Rayment, 2011). In 1985, Gaddafi sanctioned a few minor arms shipments, the first of which on a British registered yacht named the *Casamara.* The yacht sailed to Ireland on August 6, 1985, transporting 300 boxes of weapons including Ak-47 rifles, Brazilian made automatic pistols, seven Rocket Propelled Grenade explosive systems (RPG-7), and two heavy Russian made machine guns(Harnden, 2011).

In 1986, major military support for the PIRA was reinstated by Gaddafi after the United States launched bombing campaigns in Libya from British military bases in Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, England(Rodrigo, 2015). The United States bombing campaign was conducted in response to Libyan support for terrorist groups (including the PIRA) around the world and their subsequent targeting and killing of American and British service members. The American's targeted Gadhafi's home in Tripoli and reportedly killed his adopted infant daughter Hanna Gaddafi(History, 2018). In response, Gaddafi aggressively increased his shipments of arms to the PIRA. Three more arms shipments (through the notorious gun runner Adrian Hopkins) were sent by boat to the shores of Ireland. These ships carried an estimated total of 30 tons of weaponry(Boyne, 1996). However, a massive 80-ton shipment of arms arrived on the shores near Clogga Strand, Ireland. This shipment was ferried on an old converted Swedish oil rig replenisher named *Villa.* It took thirty Libyan soldiers two nights in October 1986 to load *Villa* and the cargo included 7 RPG-7s, 10 surface-to-air missile systems, tons of ammunition, and one ton of Semtex-H plastic explosive(Harnden, 2011). Semtex would come to be the most dangerous and effective weapon at the PIRA's disposal. Semtex is an odorless plastic explosive that is remarkably stable. Transporting and storing the material as well as working with it was substantially safer than traditional PIRA explosive materials. The explosive, being plastic, is light and easily malleable. The PIRA coupled Semtex with existing explosive components to boost the explosive yield of traditional bombs(BBC, 2009).

Plans were made by the Libyan government to transport the biggest shipment of arms to the PIRA. A massive 237-ton freighter named *Eksund* was loaded in Tripoli with 120 tons of weaponry. It took fifty Libyan soldiers, using a crane, two days to load the ship. The *Eksund* was scheduled to deliver the shipment to Ireland on October 30, 1987. On October 29, 1987, off of the coast of Brittany, the ship was seized by French and British security authorities. French authorities seized two tons of Semtex, 1,000 Romanian AK-47 rifles, 1,000 mortar shells, 600 Soviet-made F1 grenades, 120 RPG-7 missile systems, 20 Surface to Air missile systems (SAM-

7), 10 Russian made heavy machine guns, 2,000 electric detonators, 4,700 fuses, and more than 1 million rounds of ammunition. French authorities arrested and convicted the four PIRA men on board of the ship on charges of gun-running(Harnden, 2011). This seizure sent shockwaves throughout the British intelligence community. French and British authorities interrogated the captain of the freighter and discovered that at least four other large shipments with an equal quantity of munitions made it to Ireland. The *Eksund* was the last (known) shipment of arms from Libya to the PIRA. By the end of 1986, the PIRA was equipped to sustain their insurgency well into the future(Frankel, 1989).

The Legacy of the Troubles

Libyan munitions, especially Semtex, were shared between the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Real Irish Republican Army from their introduction in Ireland to the Peace process in 1996(Maltby, 2011). Virtually every bomb created by the IRA and PIRA after 1986 incorporated Libyan Semtex (Maltby, 2011). With Gaddafi's Semtex and munitions, attacks by the PIRA became more audacious and deadly. For example, on September 22, 1989, PIRA forces detonated a bomb in the Royal Marines School of Music in Deal, England. This bomb killed 11 Royal Marines and injured more than 20(BBC, 2014). PIRA forces began to increase attacks on political targets throughout England; moreover, on February 7, 1991, the PIRA launched a mortar strike on 10 Downing Street in London. PIRA operatives targeted the official residence of the Prime Minister of England, John Major. Three shells were launched injuring four people, nevertheless, the Prime Minister was uninjured as his residency was reinforced against explosives(Whtiney, 1991). Furthermore, the PIRA detonated a bomb that destroyed the Baltic Exchange building on April 10, 1992 (BBC, 2014). The bomb killed three people and cost British taxpayers nearly 900 million dollars (USD) (Dillinger, 2015). On April 24, 1993, PIRA forces detonated a bomb in London's financial district killing one and wounding 40 others. The bomb decimated the 52 story NatWest Tower, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The bomb sent a mushroom cloud over the district causing one billion pounds (1.37 billion USD) worth of damage (Kareem, 2018). Notoriously, on June 15, 1996, PIRA forces detonated a massive 3,300-pound truck bomb on Corporation Street in the commercial center of Manchester, England. This bomb was the largest to have been detonated in Britain since World War II. The economic cost of the bomb was reported at 700 million pounds or close to one billion dollars with current exchange rates(Taylor, 2017). Notably, these are only a handful of attacks involving Libyan supplied Semtex. The reality is that the PIRA and the IRA launched dozens of attacks in Britain and Ireland each year (until the peace agreements in 1996) against political targets and economic centers.

The Good Friday Accords & The Decommissioning of the PIRA's Arsenal

After months of negotiations, violence finally ended on April 10, 1998, with the Good Friday Peace Agreement. The agreement was signed by representatives of most of Northern Ireland's political parties and the Irish and British governments. The peace agreement created a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland between Nationalist and Unionist forces. In addition, normalization of cross-community relations was a driving factor in the agreement which sanctioned the decommissioning of the PIRA's weapons arsenal(Crowell-Meyers and Arthur, 2017). The majority of the fighting and bombings by the PIRA and Unionist forces ended in the decades since the peace accords.

The weapons shipments from the Libyan government to the PIRA gave the organization the capacity to continue their war to end British control of Northern Ireland for decades. The decommissioning process required the PIRA to hand over its weapons to an international watchdog agency lead by Canadian General John de Chastelain. The PIRA was estimated to have (in the 1990s) 1,000 rifles (mostly AK-47s), 2 tons of Semtex, 20-30 heavy machine guns, 7 surface-to-air missiles, 7 flamethrowers, 1,200 detonators, 11 RPG-7s, 90 handguns, and more than 100 grenades. De Chastelain and his associates claimed that the number of weapons and munitions they received and subsequently decommissioned were consistent with the estimates made by intelligence officials. Officials have reportedly collected a plethora of ammunition, some of which was still sealed by the manufacturer indicating years of storage. The commission also received explosive caps and Russian made mortar systems. The majority of the weapons decommissioned were not improvised, however, the commission did receive materials to make improvised explosives(BBC, 2005).

Additionally, the commission received a plethora of World War II-era weapons. The commission claims that the condition of the weaponry leads them to believe that they were stored for a long time(BBC, 2005). One can safely assume that the PIRA has more hidden weapon depots that may not have been decommissioned. Those tasked with managing some depots may have died and other locations may have been forgotten.

Conclusion

Muammar Gaddafi carried out a decade-long proxy war by supplying the Provisional Irish Republican Army with state of the art weaponry and explosives. Gaddafi viewed the PIRA and their struggle to sever British control of Northern Ireland as a fight against Western imperialism. Ultimately, Libyan shipments of arms and explosive materials made up the bulk of the PIRA's munitions(Boyne, 1996). The introduction of Semtex to the PIRA's arsenal dramatically increased the organizations capacity for violence. While exact numbers are elusive, the Provisional Irish Republican Army's insurgency cost the British government and British taxpayers billions of pounds a year in property loss, property damage, forgone economic opportunities (tourism, tax revenue from the purchase of goods/services, etc.), economic development, transportation and quartering of security forces, interment of prisoners, building and staffing of new prisons, insurance payouts, etc.. Muammar Gaddafi was not able to strike the United Kingdom directly or militarily, instead, he skillfully used the PIRA to strike at the pocketbook of the British Crown. Without Libyan Semtex, it is highly unlikely that the PIRA could have waged such a devastating and costly insurgency. Gaddafi's support of the PIRA slowly withered the British capacity and resolve to sustain the conflict.

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