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EDITORIAL STAFF

Chief Editor

Flora Haberkorn

Flora is a senior in Economics with a minor in Chinese language and a certificate in International Relations. During her time at UF she has been proactive in creating opportunities for herself from co-founding a Miami-based non-profit called RivMan Initiative and Charities, interning at the headquarter of the Everglades National Park, serving as a Campaign Fellow for the Hillary Clinton 2016 Campaign, participating in a study abroad trip at the renowned Tsinghua University, and various other activities. She has interests varying from international relations to environmental conservation and uses economic analysis as a medium to combine them. In her free time, she enjoys a hot cup of tea, fresh air, an idea to sketch, and learning something new.

Associate Editors

Danielle Flanagan

Danielle is a senior Economics and Political Science double major seeking a minor in French and Francophone Studies. With interests in international law, human rights, and migration studies, she has harnessed many opportunities—ranging from working in Paris asylum-reception centers with Sciences Po Refugee Help during the European migrant crisis, interning in the U.S. House of Representatives, serving as a Campaign Fellow for the Hillary Clinton 2016 Campaign, and co-founding the humanitarian student organization HeforShe UN Women, among other activities—to pursue them. During her time at the University of Florida, she participated in both a European Union Studies Program in Salzburg, Austria as well as in an Exchange Program at one of the world's leading social science institutions, L'Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). Upon graduation, she will be continuing her studies at Georgetown University Law Center with the objective of beginning a career in international law.

Paola Fiku

Paola is a graduating senior double majoring in Political Science and Criminology and Law. During her time at UF she has conducted scholarly research in the field of criminal justice specifically predicting the effects of gender differences in fear of crime. She has also conducted independent research on economic growth in developing countries and has synthesized the findings of her research in various research papers. Along with editing for the *International Review*, Paola has experience on a variety of political campaigns, is an active member of Pi Sigma Alpha and College Democrats. Her interests include international relations as well as global political economy. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a master's degree in international business.

Paul Silva

Paul Silva is a second year Political Science student pursuing a minor in Portuguese and two certificates in International Relations and European Union studies. Having won the University Scholars Award, he is currently conducting research with Dr. Selden. He is examining the effects of economic interdependence on the imposition of economic sanctions. In a state-wide competition he won a \$500 "Best Poster Award" and presented his research at the Florida Network for Global Studies Conference at the University of Central Florida. This summer he plans to conduct research abroad at NATO's Parliamentary Assembly or conduct research at Harvard University, Yale University or at the University of Chicago as part of the Leadership Alliance Summer Research Early Identification Program. Additionally, he maintains a perfect 4.0 GPA and is an active member of Pi Sigma Alpha and College Democrats. He seeks to pursue a doctoral degree in Political Science at a top-tier Political Science doctoral program. In his free time, he enjoys playing soccer, watch any type of sports, read, and cook.

Alex Montero

Born in Queens, NY and moving to the Fort Lauderdale area at 10. He likes the city and a good beach. He is a graduating Senior majoring in Political Science with minors in business administration and geography. He is in UF Army ROTC preparing to commission as an Army Officer upon his graduation from UF. During his time at UF he has participated in marketing for Hispanic Heritage month, as a caucus chair for the UF College Democrats, and director of outreach for the Dominican Student Association. His studies are focused on international relations. He has worked under the intelligence section of the largest sustainment command in the U.S Army for the last 2 years. With his academic and professional experience, he is now working on a thesis regarding the cognitive and technical analytical techniques of intelligence analysts. Alex enjoys playing chess, reading, and gaming in his spare time with random hits to his news and social media addictions throughout the day.

Faculty Advisor

Zachary Selden

Zachary Selden is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. He was previously the Deputy Secretary General for Policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly based in Brussels, Belgium from 2008-2011. He was the Director of the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO PA from 2003-2007. Prior to that posting, he was the International Affairs Analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office (1999-2003) and the Director for Emerging Threats at Business Executives for National Security (1996-1999). His most recent publication is *Alignment, Alliance and American Grand Strategy* (University of Michigan Press, 2016).

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

International Aid: It Matters

<i>1. For the Love of Oil: Venezuela and the Oil Curse</i> By Mary Clare Futch.....	9
<i>2. Remittances and their Effect on India's Economic Development</i> By Luke Morris.....	15
<i>3. Gender Disparities Following Natural Disasters: A Call for Global Organizations to Reform Disaster Response Procedures</i> By Mia Arnold.....	22
<i>4. How has the securitization of U.S. foreign aid affected Middle-Eastern and African countries post the September 11th attacks?</i> By Antonia Mangiola.....	28
<i>5. Palestinian Water Crisis</i> By Yousef Alghawi.....	34

Middle East Conflict: Effects on Everyone

<i>6. The Impact of the Arab Spring on Global Politics</i> By Payal Majmundar.....	41
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European Union: The Grand Ole' Institution

<i>7. Powering Supranationalism: Why Energy Union, Why Now?</i> By Adam Clark.....	48
<i>8. Popular or national sovereignty? – Biased prioritization in the EU</i> By Ricardo Rauseo.....	59

Superpower Relations: New Dynamics

<i>9. The Politics of EU and NATO Foreign Policy: The Russian-Ukraine Crisis</i> By Hailey Becker.....	68
<i>10. One Year in: How the U.S-China Relationship is Evolving under President Trump</i> By Dov Levin.....	79

Introduction

International relations is an important part of political science. It involves the interactions between all the countries of the world, and the outcomes of those interactions. Today, it is only becoming more apparent how important it is to be informed and to hold an educated stance on international matters. The domestic politics of more countries are now becoming part of the business of the world, instead of just the country itself. It is affecting the governments of other countries and the daily lives of individuals as shown through the connected effects of stock markets. Especially in the United States, as the power dynamics of a once powerful hegemony has come question after the results of the 2016 elections that no one expected to happen. In this edition of the UF International Review, we present four topics with various papers outlining the broadness of international relations and exploring the repercussions from the global stage.



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International Aid: It Matters

International aid entails the transfer of resources from one country to another in an effort to combat poverty and promote development. This type of voluntary assistance has become more necessary than ever in a world where the gap between the rich and poor countries is constantly increasing. Countries that receive the highest international aid in the world include primarily Middle Eastern and African countries since lower standards of wealth and underdeveloped infrastructure characterize them. Foreign aid can be multilateral meaning it is sourced from multiple countries or organization, or bilateral where it is transferred directly from one nation to another. In this section of the review, the concept of international aid is examined from several perspectives including the way it affects countries who suffer from the resource curse, its impact on Middle-Eastern and African countries post the September 11th attacks, and the overall influence on the economic development of poor countries.



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Authors In this Section

MARY CLARE FUTCH

Mary Clare Futch received her Political Science degree from the University of Florida. She has a special interest in the field of International Relations as well as writing research papers which examine various issues that plague developing countries. In her paper “Venezuela and the Oil Curse”, she discusses governmental corruption, economic downfall, and decreasing social welfare in Venezuela which have resulted from the oil curse.

LUKE MORRIS

I am currently a second-year student studying Political Science and Criminology, with a minor in International Development and Humanitarian Assistance, at the University of Florida. The passion I have for the law has continued during my time at UF, where I compete on UF’s competitive mock trial team. Through my internships at the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, the State Attorney’s Office, and the Legal Aid Society in West Palm Beach, I have spent many hours shadowing lawyers and judges, researching law and policy, and learning how the courtroom operates. After working with children who were either emotionally, developmentally, or physically challenged, I realized that I wanted my career to be protecting human and civil rights. In my spare time you can find me at the local library or Barnes and Noble with a crime novel. I also enjoy cooking, spending time outdoors, and playing volleyball or tennis.

MIA ARNOLD

Mia is a senior from Tallahassee, Florida majoring in international studies and minoring in Spanish and NGO leadership. During her time at UF, she has participated in two study abroad programs, one of which to the Dominican Republic where she participated in a service-learning project with low-income elementary schools. She also studied in Madrid, Spain, while working as a Finance and Fundraising Intern for a European NGO known as Serve the City. Additionally, she has held internships with Children Beyond Our Borders, Peaceful Paths, and the U.S. House of Representatives. Following graduation, she hopes to work for an international NGO assisting with program coordination, and later pursue a Master’s program in international development.

ANTONINA MANGIOLA

Antonina Mangiola is a fourth year Political Science major, specializing in International Relations with a minor in International Development and Humanitarian Assistance. Thus far, she has interned for the West Palm Beach State Attorney’s Office, the Federation des Entreprises Romandes in Geneva, The Borgen Project, and currently working for a State Senator’s Office in Tallahassee. She is an aspiring law student who wishes to utilize her passion for international relations and humanitarian issues to specialize in International and Human Rights law.

YUSEF ALGHAWI

I am a senior at the University of Florida, majoring in Political Science and English. My interests lie in using academia, critical theory, literature and film to explore improvements that can be made in the realm of cultural studies. As such, my passions intertwine with the plight of the Palestinian people in more than just sharing a heritage--academia is crucial in raising awareness of the Palestinian crisis. My goals after undergrad is in attending Graduate School for critical theory, where I hope to study in areas related to film, social justice, and cultural studies. I would like to thank the Political Science department for allowing me the opportunity to share a message that has enormous consequences for both the international and interpersonal realm. These last four years have been wondrous in enabling my understanding of relations and connections must bigger than myself and I owe both the UF's Political Science and English departments for that. I would also like to thank, from the bottom of my heart, my family and Elizabeth—without which, none of this would be possible.

Venezuela and the Oil Curse

By Mary Clare Futch

Resource driven markets allow for depletion of the state on many levels. Particularly, resource “booms” can harm resource dependent countries’ economies (Sarraf 17). Still, it is a popular belief that the finding of a large natural resource in a state is nothing but beneficial. However, many scholars regard that the exploitation of natural reserves can cause a state to fall under the “resource curse” also known as “the paradox of plenty.” Venezuela is a state that can be described as a victim of the paradox of plenty. In order to determine the effects of the “resource curse” on Venezuela, it is helpful to examine the increased government corruption rates, slowed economic growth, and the significant decrease in citizens’ welfare ever since the state has discovered and exploited its oil reserves. Understanding the process of how Venezuela has gotten to the current critical state is essential when it comes to applying these conditions to better understand in a world view.

The resource curse is important to recognize because it has become a pattern for many other states. The effects of the resource curse can be seen in the economy and throughout the several levels of the state, starting with the people and going all the way up to the ruling class of elites. Scholars attempt to understand why many countries continue to exploit their reserves in large amounts disregarding the long-term effects on the state which allow the “curse” to control their economy and governmental fate. In order to combat the negative effects of the curse, we must examine the small and large effects of the resource curse on these states, and why they have become so common during the modern era.

The resource curse is more likely to affect small economy states, that lack manufacturing diversity. Hammond states, that oil revenues encourage mismanagement of funds, because of the complexity of international trade, which leads to an imbalance in funds for other sectors (348). However, economies still pursue petroleum reserves and oil trade, overlooking that idea that one particular product can lead to an imbalance in the market and policy. Ross claims, that the resource curse is actually the curse of minerals, such as petroleum (1). He states, “Petroleum and its by-products made up 14.2 percent of the world’s commodity trade” (Ross 1). This is a clear example of why these countries focus all of their efforts on oil-wealth. These states suffer from all the effects that the curse brings. Oil rich countries are 50 percent more likely to suffer from authoritarian rule and have civil wars compared to non-oil rich countries (Sarraf 15).

Decreasing democracy in Venezuela is visible through their government’s ownership over the largest oil company PDVSA. The countries choose to exploit their natural resources, because of the attractiveness of foreign trade and increased investment, which leads to higher production of oil. These are examples of the effects of a short-term growth in an economy. Due to the ruling elite class being intertwined in oil wealth, the petroleum market drives the economy’s decision makers. States are so attracted to oil because it fulfills many vital needs to the international economy for energy consumption as electrical power, fuel for cars, and heat (Hammond 350). Also, Hammond points out that, “it does not need to be produced, merely extracted.” In contrast, there are many long term effects of petroleum on the environment, in addition to, lack of market diversity (350).

The Middle East is often cited as a regional example of the paradox of plenty. The Middle East contains several states that are vital to the oil industry, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. This region holds half of the world’s oil reserves and has experienced decades of civil war. The Middle East also, “Lags far behind the rest of the world in progress toward democracy, gender equality, and economic reforms” (Ross 2). Middle Eastern states lack economic diversity that allows them to compete with the global economy in any other sector,

other than oil. Development for technology and education lacks in this region for both genders, but especially women. Women have extremely limited access to education in some states which does not allow them to advance in society or hold any political power. Considering that the Middle East holds large amounts of the oil reserves, their unstable governments and states have a large influence on the constant fluctuating price of oil.

Particularly in Venezuela, the oil industry has amplified the amount of corruption in the state's government, another trending effect of the resource curse. Both the private and public sectors are at high levels of corruption, and the government fails to correctly combat the problems with the necessary policies. Such high levels corruption allows for misused information to flourish, because when government and private business corruption is tangled there is an overall lack of reliable information throughout the whole state. Government and business leaders must rely on close relationships for information, which leads to people doubting the ability of the state (Perez Perdomo 559). In Venezuela, oil and government have a direct relationship because the government administers laws and regulations regarding the industry, and also the amount of distribution of the oil-wealth. It is also suggested that the root of the problem is not necessarily the abundance of the resource itself, but the incorrect political policies that are used to manage it (Sarraf 3). When applying these aspects to Venezuela it is important to remember that the government under Hugo Chavez's rule, has abused his power and the rights of the citizens on many levels. Since 1998, when Chavez became head of Venezuela, the executive branch attempted to control power over the other branches of the government, to gain personal interest and "isolate the national assembly." These factors reflect the theory that the "curse" on the state tends to have less democracy, and a more authoritarian regime (Alarcón, Alvarez and Hidalgo). The political economy of Venezuela allows for loop-holes and misuse of power to thrive. Hugo Chavez's announcement of the integration of modern socialism as a goal of the state worsens the citizen's dependency on the state (Purcell 147). The citizens of the state are less democratic than before and there has been an increase in poverty, drug trade and violence.

Chavez served as a symbol of the accumulation of corruption for Venezuela, but many other people and policies are to blame too. Unfortunately, Venezuelans' lack of knowledge of the actions by the state, and inability to express disposition is an example of the various forms as well as different levels of corruption. Both the government's actions and inactions over the past few years have made the situation of the state far worse. Chavez failed to assess the oil dependency of the state, where oil generates about 80 percent of the total export revenue and one-third of Venezuela's GDP (Alvarez and Hanson). The alarming factor of these statistics is that the energy sector is unpredictable, and fluctuates daily. The author states that, instability of oil revenues is a result of the global market having a problem of "secrecy" within the state. When the state participates in the international trading of oil, they tend to "conceal their transactions" and "hide both revenues and expenditures" (Ross 6). Countries that possess political instability typically fail to administer laws and policies to combat the corruption within the levels of government due to a lack of understanding within the general assembly (Leite and Weidmann 7). In order for the state's economy to thrive it must redistribute the oil wealth to other networks (Purcell 149). Post-soviet Russia is another historical example of this phenomenon. Authoritarian government remains in power due to the lack of accountability by the people and because of the failure of protect democracy within the country (Ross 12).

Since oil has captured the Venezuelan market, all aspects of the economy have been focused on exportation, which has led to oil controlling their exports and imports. Before oil became the center of the economy, from the years 1830-1920 Venezuela had a strong agricultural sector. Their primary commodities included coffee and cacao which were about 57 percent of the GDP (Purcell 150). During the following years 1920-1930 the market failed to

protect agriculture when “oil went from 2.5 percent of GDP to 39 percent” in this same year agriculture’s percent of total GDP plummeted to 12.2 percent (Purcell 150). Since 1976, PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela , S.A), the state’s privatized oil company has been running independently with minimal regulation, which has allowed it to accumulate wealth, and redistribute minimal amounts to the rest of the state (Alvarez and Hanson). States similar to Venezuela that have small economies lack room and economic support for development because of the less diversified market. Therefore, accumulation of currency by the oil sector is another chilling factor of the state of Venezuela. Non-oil sectors in Venezuela and many citizens suffer from lack of currency. Trade between neighbors has become minimal which consequentially does not allow their communities to grow. It should also be recognized that when states extract petroleum in large quantities, it causes the manufacturing and agricultural industry to shrink thus eliminating many economic opportunities for women (Ross 6). The Venezuelan government took control of the oil sector in 2006, thus nationalizing the industry by making all foreign companies into government shares. In 2014, the states GDP fell by 4 percent, which means that Venezuela is now in possibly the worst socioeconomic decline in history (Alarcon, Alavrez and Hildago). This nationalization directly increases the government’s interest in the oil sector, because it accounts for almost half the state’s income. However, Chavez issued policy requiring that expenditures must account for 10 percent of its yearly investment on social programs of the state.

The spiraling economy is at the point of runaway- inflation and low economic growth. In 2015, the oil export income dropped 40 percent and has increased the shortage of currency throughout the state (Alvarez, and Hanson). Perhaps a remedy to the economic inefficiency is to protect the oil sector from governmental control (Hammond 349). Still, resource curse of oil is a difficult obstacle for developing countries to overcome because the lack of technology and widespread knowledge to not allow the industry to fall into the wrong hands. Many times developing states are closely focused on growing in international economy in the fastest way possible which allows for corruption to cultivate since details are overlooked.

The policy change of the state to a “twenty-first century socialist” movement within the government has increased spending on social welfare services such as, healthcare, education etc. but this was a result of a suffering population with majority having little-to-no income. These social policies are beneficial for the time-being, because it combats the economic and social slump that the people are experiencing. However, it has deepened the population’s dependency on the state, instead of their participation in the private sector. The majority of the population of Venezuela is unsatisfied with the current policies of the state due to the lack of transparency. In addition, because the of lack of privatization in the oil sector, the common people feel left behind and do not participate in decision-making procedures. This is dangerous to the welfare and sovereignty of the state because when citizens do not participate, the state becomes more divided. Hammond claims, the only way for Venezuela to defeat the curse is for a major political and social revolution to take place which can better serve the interest of the people (348). A typical trend for heads of the state is that they fail to promote education and health programs, which decreases the welfare of the population and allows the ruler to maintain control (Hammond 352).

Oppression is another important characteristic of the decreased citizen’s welfare in Venezuela. The rich, ruling elite class of the state has diminished the democratization process. The citizens have been deprived of their power and economic liberties. All these factors have allowed for the violation of human rights as well as increased state corruption and drug trade (Alarcón, B. & Álvarez, E. & Hidalgo). Sarraf, and Moortaza explain that when a state is solely focused on a manufacturing sector, in this case oil, it can lead to a reduction in overall education, and an increase for skills sets focused only on the investment of a particular favored good. This

also decreases the overall specialization of labor in the state, thus negatively impacting education, literature, arts and leisure activities which allow people to grow intellectually (5).

Another social development aspect that is neglected in Venezuela is infrastructure and environment. Oil and gas companies have invested profit into building roadways, pipelines and production facilities therefore causing environmental degradation and worsening the ecological footprint. Habitat fragmentation, land degradation, loss of wildlife and pollution is a short list of the effects of extracting and consumption of oil on the environment. These factors are all visible in Venezuela's heavy oil belt (HOB), the area comprising its four largest reserves (Baynard). For example, growing deforestation in an effort to build necessary infrastructure for the oil industry is directly related to the increase in poverty. Land that was once used for housing, substance farming, or agriculture production for the market becomes urbanized with very inflexible use.

Scholars have noted that the exploitation of oil is not exclusively harmful in all aspects of a state's development. Venezuela has experienced progression in some aspects of the economy and development because of the oil industry. In the years before the oil boom in Venezuela, primary commodities were the main products for the state's foreign trade sector. These agricultural primary commodities are difficult to abundantly produce without advanced technology, are volatile to weather and disease, and allow for the economy to be easily manipulated. Moreover, these products have enabled Venezuela to participate in foreign markets, but do not allow for much advancement in the global market due to a lack of competition. Nationalism allowed for governments to strengthen their oil industry and gain greater control of their national assets. Compared to when oil was controlled by foreign companies within the state, the national oil companies generated revenue for the state (Ross 6). Under Chavez's rule, he promoted discounted oil prices to neighboring Latin American countries, which strengthened the relationship throughout the region, and combatted other foreign influences (Resource curse 366) Another benefit of oil production for developing states is that it allows for these small states that were once overlooked to be seen as powerful, which grants them influence on the global market that was once solely ran by the super power states.

In comparison to the oil industry impacts on Venezuela, there are many developed countries with large oil reserves that do not heavily suffer from the resource curse. For example, the United States is one of the world's largest oil producers and consumers while still maintaining a strong non-oil market. Also, the US remains strongly democratic and has and upholds strong social welfare of citizens. Does this mean that the resource curse does not exist? The difference between the US and Venezuela is the diversity within the US market, which allows for flexibility for economic investment and other non-oil sectors to thrive. However, the United States population is 317 million, compared to Venezuela's mere 31 million total population, illustrating that there is more social opportunity for US to have a larger economy (countrymeters.info).

When analyzing global economies, it is imperative to track the influence of exported resource that dominates the economy of the particular state. Scholars have studied the patterns that have reappeared over decades which explain the impact that exploitation of resources has on resource abundant states. Many scholars have concluded that, more specifically, developing countries have weaker, less complex infrastructure with large natural resource deposits for energy such as coal and petroleum, suffer from greater influence of the resource curse. "Very little happens in Venezuela that does not have to do, directly or indirectly with oil" (Hammond 362). Throughout this paper, it has been illustrated that the welfare of the state is very much intertwined with the production of oil. Venezuela has suffered largely in governmental corruption, economic downfall and decreasing social welfare of the state, all for the love of oil.

Unfortunately, it is very hard to escape the curse because it controls many sectors within the country. Combatting the curse is a complex issue that must be individually addressed depending on the particular state and its situation. In the case of Venezuela, transparency of policies is a good starting place to combat its current economic, and political condition. Implementing economic laws that will wean the country off of oil dependence is one issue that must be addressed. Changing rule to ensure that the state is allowing for the democratization to flourish is a vital step for the government to take to combat the curse. The resource curse does not diminish all hope for the rebuilding of the state. Instead, a state that finds itself under the curse conditions should use it as an alarming device to change the direction of the progression of the country.

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Remittances and their Effect on India's Economic Development


By Luke Morris

Introduction

A remittance is a sum of money that is sent from an expatriate to another person in his or her country of origin. These transfers are very significant to the economies of the countries that receive them. India currently holds the position of the world's largest remittance recipient. To understand the economic situation of India, one must understand how the billions of dollars that are being poured into the country are aiding the development of one of the biggest and most complex economies in the world. This literary review analyzes the general effect of remittances in developing countries, the history of remittances in India, and the relationship between remittances and economic development in India.

Remittances and Developing Countries

To fully realize the impact of remittances on India, we first must understand how remittances affect the economies of countries on a global scale. Everyday, millions of migrant workers send funds, usually through money transfer offices, back to their native countries. The countries that tend to receive the payments are developing countries. These countries are still transitioning because of a need to promote economic growth and improve domestic initiatives such as healthcare and education. International migrant remittances to developing countries were estimated to have reached \$427 billion in 2014 (WBG, 2015).



For a developing country to grow, it needs to obtain high savings, development of human capital, technology, and trade (Singh, 2015). Empirical studies suggest that remittances can have the potential to positively affect a country's economic growth (Lubambu, 2014). Remittances generate an inflow of capital that a country otherwise would not have, putting money in the hands of consumers and allowing them to use that money in their economy. In developing countries this is especially important since countries cannot begin to create a successful economy if their citizens do not have money.

According to the World Bank, “remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries are equivalent to more than three times the size of official development assistance” (World Bank, 2018). Foreign aid is labeled as a crucial element to developing countries, however remittances are completely overtaking official development assistance. This signifies how important remittances are becoming to developing countries economies. Bettin et al. states that remittances may help overcome the financing constraints of households living in countries with less efficient financial institutions(Bettin et al., 2014).

People living in these types of countries migrate to essentially mitigate the risks of living in their current situation because of many factors, such as a lack of freedom, malnutrition, and/or violence, which is usually caused by the poor governance and lack of resources in a country. Many countries depend on international help to remedy these issues. It is interesting to note that remittances in India exceeds foreign direct investment (FDI) and development assistance (Lorier, 2010). Usually, official development assistance comes in the form of developing countries borrowing money from intergovernmental organizations like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. By receiving a high amount of remittances, States would be able to borrow more from these organizations, and could potentially promote national economic growth (Lubambu, 2014).

However, remittances can be considered to be a detriment to developing countries as well. According to the United Nations Regional Information Center (UNRIC), a large amount of remittances does not appear in any official statistics. There is a plethora of reasons for this lack of data. If remittances are not sent through an authorized money transfer, they are usually not kept track of. Collecting this type of information is important because it allows economists and other officials to record accurate statistics, which is how the amount of foreign aid a country receives is calculated. Singh points this out in her publication by arguing that the countries where remittances matter the most are, more likely than not, the ones with the least data(Singh, 2015). India has a lot of data about remittances, but many countries which are not as developed as India have nothing. A proposed solution by Guha is to create a network between local and central governments where data is collected and then transferred to the central level to bridge the disconnect of information. Another reason remittances can harm a country is that a significant portion of remittances are lost to intermediaries, such as Western Union and MoneyGram, that deduct a transaction charge from the wages sent overseas. This stifles economic growth because millions of dollars are taken away from the developing countries, causing them to have less funds circulating throughout their economy. Other economic issues with remittances include losing the money, money laundering, and organized crime (UNRIC, 2014).

Even though there are some downsides to remittances, the effect they are having on developing countries indicates a positive global trend. Lubambu’s report concurs with Bettin et al.’s paper by recognizing positive effects remittances have on developing countries’ economies. By stimulating consumption and investment, remittances have the possibility to diminish the size of a recession in certain countries and to boost the local economy (Lubambu, 2014). Bettin et al. takes a similar stance by further arguing that “remittances can indeed play a significant role in stabilizing output during downturns, smoothing consumption, and mitigating the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries”(Bettin et al., 2014). Developing countries must reform and enact new policy in regards to these wages before remittances can be utilized to their full potential, but once the logistics are figured out, funds sent from overseas have a promising future in promoting economic growth.

Remittances in India


India supports the second largest population in the world, currently boasting 1.252 billion residents. With such a large population comes many internal complications. India is still considered a developing country and struggles with both economic and social problems. As a result of these problems, many Indians migrate to other countries in the hope to live a better life. In 2011, Indian diaspora reached a total of about 27 million people (Mehra and Singh, 2014). Lorier discusses how the migration of Indian workers contributed to the increased amount of remittances sent back to India in his report. The high skills of Indian workers made them desirable abroad, especially in the growing IT field (Lorier, 2010). With Indian workers leaving India to work abroad, more money was being sent back into the country.

Gupta furthers Lorier's idea in his thesis by stating the incentives behind remittances. Depending on the migrant, the remittance back to India fell under one of two categories: remittances to family in India or remittances to investment. Remittances to family relied on factors like the family's income level or the economic conditions of India – workers were more likely to send money back to India when the family's income was low. Determinants for investment included domestic interest rates, interest rates abroad, the stock market, the risk of default, geopolitical conditions, or rating downgrades (Gupta, 2010).

Economic activity in India directly impacts the amount of remittances sent back to India. Remittances sent to India go through formal channels, which is unusual compared to the rest of the world. The UNRIC states that “most remittances are done outside the traditional banking system.” Many countries do not trust banks because of the corruption that is usually associated with them. In India, though, Guha illustrates how this country is different, in his paper, when he discusses the how total international remittances, referred to as private transfers, are calculated in the Reserve Bank of India's balance of payment account.

The most important transfer comprising total remittances is family-level remittance transfers. These are the most common type of remittance transfer and occur when workers directly transfer money overseas to their families through official banking channels or other money organizations. In addition, private transfers also include local redemption/withdrawal of non-resident Indian deposits, gifts or donations, and currency brought into the country. (Guha, 2011). Remittance transfers through these types of formal channels are more popular in India versus other countries because reforms in India's economic policy created incentives to send

money via formal channels and increased competition between money agencies resulted in



Source: Author's calculation

Figure 6: Average Composition of Private Transfers in India (Official Channels)

transactions costing less (Lorier, 2010).

Effect of Remittances on India's Economic Development

India has been the world's largest remittance recipient since 2003. The World Bank estimates that remittances to India, during the period of 2000 through 2010, have increased by almost 300%. Most recently, calculated remittances in 2015 added up to \$69 billion (PTI, 2016). The wages India generates through these oversea transfers account for over 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Needless to say, remittances play an important role in India's economy.

There are many perspectives about whether remittances promote economic growth in India. "Remittances create the problem of lopsided development rather than sustainable development and also encourages the others to migrate illegally", is an argument proposed by Mehra and Singh that contradicts the claim that remittances develop the economy (Mehra and Singh, 2014). Remittances can also pose a problem if they cause recipients to become dependent on the money, instead of working, or to increase private consumption of goods, instead of investing into domestic finances (Lubambu, 2014). While these are both possible effects of remittances, there are many conclusions that support the idea that remittances are a great addition to the economy. In Tumbe's abstract, he concludes that these wages that are being sent to India are an important portion of financial development and, through the growth of remittances, eventually economic dependency (Tumbe, 2011).

Remittances are commonly spent on basic necessities or investment. There is evidence that remittances help improve emigrant housing, amenities, and education. Both ways benefit the economy, one in the immediate term and the other in next year. In the short term, when consumers in India spend money they received from other countries, they are putting money in their economy and they are also improving their quality of life because now they are able to afford more items (Lorier, 2010). This is considered a short term benefit because one a good is bought, the revenue generated from the purchase is automatically included in India's GDP. People usually invest money for a long period of time and remittances that are used on investments help the country in the long term. Both Lorier and Lubambu agree that investments can promote economic development. Lorier states that if recipients of remittances save them

rather than spend the money, then it could promote economic growth if the money is used to finance productive investments. Lubambu suggests that, “remittances can promote access to self-employment and increase the likelihood of recipients investing in small business, contributing in turn to the development of financial systems in the country of origin”(Lubambu, 2014). Consumption and investment are ways in which remittances are utilized in India to stimulate the economy. For example, in the Kerala region of India, 86% of remittances were used to buy consumption necessities. The reason this helps the economy is because of the multiplier effect. Spending the remittance money increases consumption in the country and, in turn, creates more demand for goods, which is a step in the right direction towards further development.

Once more money is getting put into an economy, people are able to worry less about what they are going to eat for their next meal and, instead, focus on important issues for economic growth like education. In the research done by Tumble, recent studies have illustrated that remittances have not only created wealth in India, but has also increased teen schooling attendance(Tumble, 2011). Essentially, children and young adults now have the ability to be replaced by remittances. More children are free to go to school as a result of their families having more money to support themselves. The labor force in the Kerala part of India is a prime example of this. The labor force was reduced because this section of India is mainly supported by remittances, so there was less incentive of the people in this region to work (Lorier, 2010). This can potentially be a detriment to economic development since India’s workforce is decreasing, however, this situation was dependent on this particular area and does not reflect the entire continent of India.

Cyclical sources of income fluctuate widely depending on the events that are surrounding a country. Remittances that are sent to India are opposite of this. Lorier, Gupta, and Mehra and Singh all agree remittances are a countercyclical source of income. They all also take similar positions on the issue, essentially noting that remittances are a relatively stable source of income for India. Remittances are considered countercyclical since remittances usually increase to India during low periods of economic growth.

Variables, such as interest rates, depreciation, or political uncertainty, that affect other sources of income do not seem to influence how much remittances are sent to India (Gupta, 2005). This sentiment is agreed upon by Mehra and Singh, who argue that when the global economy is in a recession, remittances decrease at a much slower pace than other finances. This is proof that these wages are less volatile than other capital flows (Mehra and Singh, 2014). This is extremely important because remittances are a very important part of India’s economic development. Lorier adopts a macroeconomic lense to analyze how remittances are (a)cyclical. Remittances are able to remedy the effect of macroeconomic shocks and for any economy, especially a developing economy like India’s, this is crucial because these shocks can cause major financial problems for a country (Lorier, 2010).

Continuing with the macroeconomic trend, there are certain macroeconomic determinants of remittances in India that are specific to its economic development. Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) are the migrants who are leaving the country to remit money back, so the more NRIs there are, the larger the amount of remittances are being transferred to India (Lorier, 2010). The economic situation of the countries where workers migrate to are is also very important. Studies undertaken by Gupta have found that remittances are higher to India when the economy in the host country is stable. Both, how many NRIs and how volatile host country economies, are will affect remittances back to India and can either stifle or stimulate India’s economy. Mehra and Singh discuss how studies have shown that, on macroeconomic level, remittances help take poorer people out of debt and have increased the amount of private investment in India because people have more money spend.

The political realm is another area that affects remittances. Lorier concludes that “institutions play an important role in how remittances affect economic growth”(Lorier, 2010). In this situation, since the bank is one of the major avenues that migrant workers use to distribute money back into India, if India’s government enacted measures to strengthen money transfer protections or to lessen the fee associated with sending remittances, that would be how a political entity influences remittances to then further develop economic growth. Those measures would increase the amount of remittances that would go into India’s economy, therefore stimulating development by adding capital. Governments are hesitant to enact policy necessarily addressing remittances. This is because, although remittances effect economies, like in India, the overall effect that remittances have on the total economy is usually less than other components of a country’s economy. The government in India should promote the use of remittances as something that is helping the economy, along with creating a stable socio-economic climate, strengthening migration policy and infrastructure, and ensuring coherence of these policies to make remittances more prominent and increase the economic development of the country.

Conclusion

Remittances constitute a significant amount of capital that circulates throughout international economies. Specifically, in India, the wages that are sent back by migrant workers constitute a critical component of its economy. As a developing country, India still has major strides to take in terms of economic development. Through this literature review, it is very apparent that remittances have had, and will continually have, a significant impact on India’s financial progress. Developing countries need sources of income to grow and prosper. Financial, social, political, environmental, and religious issues are all different examples of categories that impede these countries from reaching their full potential. However, India is a prime example of a country that can combat these changes by using their dominance of remittances.

The study of remittances is still a relatively new field. Many countries do not record or keep track of the remittance information. This leaves room for error when analyzing whether remittances are boosting a countries economic growth. However, more people are starting to cognize the importance of recording these types of data and many of the sources used in this review directly addressed how there needs to be more information collected. Fortunately, the studies that have been conducted about India show very strongly and clearly that remittances are doing a great deal to assist in the development of this nation. The amount of money India receives from remittances is increasing almost every year. As long as migrants keep working to support the families they are leaving behind and the people of India strive to maintain and improve their remittance policies, then India’s economy will continue to improve. Countries will begin to realize these wages that are beings sent overseas can have a significant effect on a country’s economic development and could potentially become an internationally recognized flow of capital.

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Gender Disparities Following Natural Disasters: A Call for Global Organizations to Reform Disaster Response Procedures

By Mia R. Arnold

Introduction

As the changing climate is sparking unprecedented extreme weather, severe social, economic, and health issues are rising globally (IPCC, 2012). The United Nations reported that natural disasters between 2003 and 2013 affected approximately 2 billion people, killing over 1.1 million and resulting in economic damages of over USD 1.5 trillion (FAO, 2015, 14). This devastation, however, does not affect populations proportionally. Research overwhelmingly shows that the poorest in developing countries are most susceptible to devastation from extreme weather, and women in particular experience the highest rates of extreme impact and death (DFID, 2004). Women are the most socially, economically and politically constrained population worldwide (IPCC, 2012). Thus, they are the most vulnerable to natural disasters.

While some international humanitarian and development organizations have taken steps to design programs addressing this, most disaster plans overlook fundamental needs for women. For global organizations to implement successful natural disaster rescue and prevention policies, they must approach their strategies from a gender-based perspective.

This paper will examine how global organizations can direct their disaster management programs to address this disparity, saving and empowering women at every stage of the disaster process—while establishing preventative programs, providing emergency, short-term services immediately following a disaster, and addressing long-term recovery issues in the years to come.

Examining Education as a Preventive Measure

Before relief organizations arrive following a natural disaster, women are the chief first responders in most instances (IPCC, 2012). They commonly assume the responsibility of caring for children and family members and scavenging for basic supplies, primarily food and water. These are the standard duties expected of most women in developing countries under usual circumstances, but post-disaster conditions indicate women have to endure further dangerous extremes to obtain the necessities. A study in Jolpur, Bangladesh, analyzed how women were affected when extreme flooding occurs in the community. Researchers found that the majority of women waded through chest-high, contaminated water in order to reach fresh water pumps. Local women reported doing this often to provide clean water for their family, many noting that their husbands remained idle (as this is not suitable “work for men”), or abandoned the family altogether (Nasreen, 2000, 316).

The constraint of such traditional social norms proves to be detrimental for women when disasters strike. A 2007 study found strong evidence that a larger gap of socio-economic rights between the genders will inevitably result in more female deaths as a result of natural disasters (Neumayar, Plümer, 2007). Thus, there is a pressing need for more educational resources to teach women life-saving precautions that will prevent them from having to endanger themselves in the aftermath conditions. Even in the case of disaster-prone nations that have some emergency plans in place, women are rarely a part of the prevention conversation or training (Bradshaw, 2013). When women are excluded from preparedness discussions and workshops, they do not know how to respond to disasters or even disaster warning systems.

Some international organizations have put more inclusive preparedness programs into practice, and have seen success. The International Federation of the Red Cross started their Community Based Disaster Preparedness Program in 1996 as a response to the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh. Most women who were killed immediately by this cyclone were unaware it was approaching or, upon hearing warning sirens, waited in their homes for their husbands to return so that they may grant them consent to seek an emergency shelter. The program addressed this by separating the communities into “micro groups” of both men and women who received monthly disaster training workshops (IFRC, 2012). This has been one of the few programs in which there has been the opportunity to survey the direct results of the initiative, as another cyclone of similar magnitude hit the same area in 2007. This time, the male to female death ratio was 1:5, compared to a ratio of 1:14 after the cyclone in 1991. The program’s services are estimated to have reached about 90,000 men and women (Ahamd, 2012, 18). This illustrates that ensuring women have access to educational disaster-prevention resources can greatly diminish women’s vulnerability to natural disasters.

Restructuring Emergency Shelters

When global organizations arrive in the aftermath of a natural disaster to provide shelters and resources, chaos can indubitably overshadow gender perspectives. Shelters tend to be assembled in an anarchic frenzy, as emergency responders are desperate to begin processing and assisting disaster victims. In most instances in which a natural disaster strikes a developing nation, the majority of the affected population seeks shelter services and resources; one study reported this is typically 75 percent of victims (Alam, 2014, 70).

While camps are ideally meant to act as a refuge for those affected by disasters, women residing there are commonly positioned in a cramped area comprised of further severe risk. One review of shelter conditions in the coastal villages of Bangladesh found that females of six years or more were 3.5 times more likely to die than their male counterparts in refugee and aid camps (Toole, 1997, 15). Likewise, women in post-earthquake Haiti were 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually abused (Bradshaw, 2013, 16). While there are many external factors beyond the organizations’ control that contribute to this phenomenon, including the health conditions of women upon arrival to the shelter, the literature reflects that women from varying countries and disasters experience similar gender-specific challenges. Incorporating gender needs in camp structures and services might be a nuisance and additional work for the organizations’ staff, but it will ultimately keep women safer and reduce female mortality rates.

In the aftermath of almost any disaster, sexual violence rates skyrocket due to the lack of basic law and order, particularly in developing nations that have high levels of violence against women and little government intervention even during times of normalcy (Fisher, 2010). Sexual violence is particularly prevalent in emergency shelters, as they tend to be overcrowded with little personal space or privacy. Some solutions are as simple as providing more sources of light around the facilities. Many camps in Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami received frequent reports of sexual assault, with most of the attacks occurring in the toilet stalls, which had no lighting after nightfall (Oxfam, 2005). In Bangladesh, an analysis of shelters after cyclone Aila (2009) and Sidr (2007) reported that only 16.67 percent of rescue facilities had adequate lighting, while over 20 percent of women were sexually harassed. In addition, the same study noted that only 11.67 percent of shelters ensured restroom facilities were divided by sex (Islam, 2010). The research supports that providing separate latrines and showers by gender that are clearly labeled (and well lit) would eliminate many opportunities for harassment and sexual assault to occur.

These facility improvements would also help women feel less hesitant to use the facilities due to social taboos. The World Health Organization reports that women who are menstruating are much more likely not to use coed facilities, as it is not appropriate to clean sanitary clothes in the presence of men. Thus, women go for long periods of time using the same sanitary napkin, making them extremely susceptible to urinary tract infections and other maladies. In the aftermath of the 1998 Bangladesh floods, women and young girls reported urinary tract infections and severe rashes due to not having a private place to wash or hang dry clothes. In a handful of cases of pregnant women facing this problem, harm was inflicted upon the fetus (WHO, 2002).

In addition to adjusting the physical layout of temporary camps, there is a lack of essential female services offered during the emergency aid stages of natural disasters. In the struggle to prevent sexual assault and harassment, an imperative necessity includes camp security. Some organizations have outsourced this duty to local government authorities (as in the case of India following the tsunami), however many governments are not able or are unwilling to work with organizations to do this (Fisher, 2010). A potential approach for shelters is to appoint community leaders representing differing portions of the camp. In many shelters for victims of civil conflict and violence, such individuals were asked to assist with improving camp security (Banford, 2015). This method can be applied to shelters in post-natural disaster areas as well.

In addition to sexual harassment, increased security could also contribute to the prevention of domestic abuse, which also increases tremendously following a natural disaster. The most common situation of abuse cited includes husbands blaming their wives for the loss or injuries of children during the disaster. Witnesses in a temporary camp in Sri Lanka recounted to researchers vivid, horrendous memories including: a man striking his wife's leg with a shovel until it was unsalvageable, a woman being set on fire by her husband, and another man publicly stripping his wife naked and assaulting her with a broken bottle (Fischer, 2004). These examples prove that there is a larger problem of disregard for women's rights, which will require years of methodical, sustaining programs to promote significant change. However, camps can nonetheless provide support and services for women who are or have been victimized. Their emotional and mental health is a vital investment, particularly as many domestic abuse cases result in suicide or attempted suicide (Fischer, 2004).

Another method organizations might pursue to address female abuse is establishing women-specific medical services. Since sexual assault has been proven to be quite prevalent in these emergency shelters, global organizations at a minimum need to provide medical services to provide appropriate treatment for women following the attack. This should entail having female doctors treating severe physical wounds, pregnancy testing, options for pregnancy prevention, as well as testing for potential sexually transmitted infections.

Providing these services, however, would have little effect if aid workers were not properly qualified. The World Health Organization and UN Woman argue that organizations should properly train emergency aid workers to identify signs of domestic violence and sexual assault (UNHR, 2015). Because of the taboo that accompanies sexual abuse, particularly in many developing areas, it is not always the case that women will independently seek medical attention (WHO, 2005). Thus, doctors and staff must be capable of identifying women who might need an examination or treatment, and refer them to group support programs, if established. Confidentiality will be especially important so workers can develop a trusting relationship with the aid recipient, and to help protect the patient from further physical or psychological abuse from her abuser or other community members. Only about one-third of women in need of medical care will visit a medical professional in an emergency relief camp, while over 40 percent will only have access to a local, rural doctor who is very unlikely to treat a woman for sexual

assault or domestic abuse injuries, or even meet her basic needs (Islam, 2010, 164). This contributes to the essential need for global organizations to see that this service is ingrained, as it is the sole source of specialized treatment most women will have.

Addressing Long-term Aftermaths

While these proposed practices would play a large role in protecting women during immediate relief stages of a disaster, they are short-lived solutions to prodigious, complex problems. What is to come of women in poverty-stricken, post-disaster communities with traditional, constraining social gender views when the emergency organizations shift to the next pressing disaster? Over 83 percent of women suffer from traumatic situations that accompany extensive mental, psychological and physical health consequences for years following natural disasters (Islam, 2010, 163). Global organizations that specialize in establishing lasting reliance need to concern themselves with gender policy as well.

Health care services that are accessible and cater to women's needs must prevail in the months and years following a disaster, whether organizations provide this service, or in scarce cases, are successful in pressuring the government to do so (Oxfam, 2005). It is not uncommon for widowed or abandoned women to be denied access to health care services for themselves or their children because their insurance is registered in their husband's name (Dominelli, 2015). Even as communities begin to rebuild and emergency camps begin to disperse, sexual violence and domestic abuse persist, sparking a continued need for female medical facilities. In post-tsunami Sri Lanka, marital tension and sexual harassment continued to steadily increase for three years following the disaster (Branford, Froude, 2015).

In addition to addressing prolonged physical health issues, organizations should invest in programs to address women's psychological trauma. A study of Hurricane Mitch victims in El Salvador and Nicaragua asked people if they felt any "emotional impact" because of the disaster. About 50 percent of people responded that they experienced long-term psychological effects, with 74 percent of whom were women. Many organizations around the world focus their efforts on the implementation of support groups for women who have endured traumatic experiences and abuse, equipping them with empowering resources (Branford, Froude, 2015). There is a critical need for similar programs for women in post-disaster areas. When possible, global organizations should attempt to support existing, local organizations that run such programs. Working with community leaders in this way would more likely provide an effective approach to assess the specific needs of local women, and strengthen programs so that they may continue after the international organizations vacate the area. The UN encourages organizations to take this approach, referring to it as "bottom-up innovation" (UNHCR, 2015).

Acknowledging Feasibility

Global organizations may agree that it is not realistic to implement any gender-based policies during any phase of the disaster relief process. There will certainly be financial and logistical obstacles, as can be expected anytime there is a large shift in relief procedure. Critics could also point out that post-disaster gender practices might seem effective in theory, but that there is very little research supporting the proposition that it significantly saves women or improves their quality of life (Bradshaw, 2013). While there certainly is little in the literature regarding measurable achievements of such programs and protocols, there is overwhelming evidence exhibiting a need for the international community to prioritize female needs in developing areas. There is no question that women are the population most vulnerable to the

consequences of natural disasters (Neimayar, Plümper, 2008), and global organizations have an obligation to restructure their services accordingly, even if there is no existing roadmap to follow.

Conclusion

As global organizations acknowledge and integrate gender concerns into their natural disaster platforms, their programs and services will be better equipped to serve the population that experiences the most detrimental effects of natural disasters. Even as aid organizations have varying approaches and specialties within disaster response, there are small steps each can execute according to their specialty, such as those initiatives or programs proposed in this work. The severe problems that women face throughout each stage of the relief process need to be addressed. Prominent global organizations with strong donor bases especially have a responsibility to lead this transition, as they usually run operations on a large-scale, and set the example for disaster relief field. Ultimately, framing policies while looking through a gender lens is essential to combating these issues, and is a crucial step in strengthening natural disaster response.

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How has the securitization of U.S. foreign aid affected Middle-Eastern and African countries post the September 11th attacks?

By Antonina Mangiola

The dismantling of bipolarity in the post-Cold War international system has led to the rise of intra-state conflicts and non-state actors which have posed a threat to the U.S.'s national security. Consequentially, U.S. foreign aid has shifted its focus to pursue security objectives rather than to promote effective development in developing countries. After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, there has been a change in both development and national security policy language. The war on terror marked the beginning of a U.S. foreign policy shift that linked development operations directly to national security interests. Moreover, counter-terrorism objectives began to dictate aid, and stabilization operations became an integral part of U.S. military operations. Developing countries, like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, that were deemed to harbor terrorist activities were targeted by these operations. In many African countries, like Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, the securitization of aid gave military support to authoritarian leaders who enacted violence on surrounding African countries and to certain ethnic and political groups within their populations. In Middle Eastern countries, the U.S.'s military and development assistance enabled mismanagement and coordination failure which ultimately undermined previous humanitarian work. Furthermore, it has maintained authoritarian regimes that led these concerning developing countries into instability. Therefore, the securitization of US foreign aid has proven to be very ineffective and counterproductive to its purpose of stabilization.

Change In U.S. Foreign Policy Language And Development Goals

In order to respond to rising threats from non-state actors, counterinsurgency was viewed as a potent stabilization method that would diminish this national security threat. The strategy entailed establishing a military presence in the threatening states while building up the development in order to promote stability. Key U.S. policymakers were beginning to shift the language of U.S. foreign aid by linking development directly with security imperatives. These policymakers assumed that by creating a military presence and prompting up development, developing countries would be less susceptible to unstable conditions and insurgency recruitment. This notion became clear in the US National Security Strategy of 2002 which proposed the use of the three Ds - the collaboration of development, diplomacy, and defense (Howell et al, 2009, pg. 1,282). Former Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice, coined this shift as "transformational diplomacy" (Howell et al, 2009, pg. 1,285). During her speech at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee she stated "it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in today's world" (Howell et al, 2009, pg. 1,285). By 2006, the six out of the top aid-recipient countries who were receiving assistance were fragile states in key "frontline areas" such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Pakistan (Howell et al, 2009, pg. 1,285). In fact, the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) had developed multiple new sectors in collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD). These sectors included the Office of Military Affairs, the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian assistance (Howell et al, 2009, pg. 1,285-6). Humanitarian aid is supposed to embody principles of neutrality and impartiality to all those whose security and basic human rights are endangered or completely lacking. Due to a shift in policy and a clear target on weak, failing states, it became clear that foreign humanitarian aid was not going to be a long-term, impartial initiative. With constant ever-rising security concerns

and a new-found alliance between the USAID and the DoD, it became clear that foreign aid was going to be paired alongside national security concerns.

In addition, the change in development policy and emphasis on U.S. military involvement spurred a lot of skepticism and resentment in frontlines states. In the 1990's, various aid agencies were openly able to distribute aid either by authorization from political or military leaders in Somalia (Grünwald, 2012, pg. 114). However, after the launch of U.S. pre-emptive "war on terror" attacks, western aid organizations were associated with these initiatives and seen as potential enemies (Grünwald, 2012, pg. 114). As a result, only four agencies were permitted in the region (Grünwald, 2012, pg. 114). The change in rhetoric appeared to prompt resentment and distrust in the Somalian population, and as a result inhibited the effect that aid organizations could have had on the suffering population.

Ineffectiveness of Aid In Afghanistan

The policy shift that created an alliance among military and humanitarian imperatives soon became prevalent in all stages of U.S. foreign aid allocation. During Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. created the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a military personnel team that focused on both security and reconstruction (Shannon, 2009, pg. 16). The PRT was meant to conduct merged missions with NGOs in Afghanistan on the ground level. This collaboration severely undermined the NGO's previous work and compromised the NGOs' neutrality. Despite these implications, the presence of the PRT was highly prioritized, as the U.S. established 23 PRTs branches in 34 provinces (Shannon, 2009, pg. 22). The lack of coordination and defined mission goals caused by the PRT's presence became the source of increased instability in Afghanistan. Additionally, the presence of multiple NGOs and international organizations exacerbated the security issues. A UN informant described the dire situation of Afghanistan by stating that "there is no one monitoring the constitution, legislature, and judiciary... Planning is weak and linkages between the local and national levels is weak" (Shannon, 2009, pg. 23). There were too many military-based operations and private security companies that dominated the security sector of Afghanistan (Shannon, 2009, pg. 23). The U.S. severely undermined Afghanistan's political reach and its credibility by bringing in foreign security forces and dispersing them throughout the country. Moreover, the NGOs were committed to representing certain strategic interests because they accepted a large amount of funds from large US companies funded by USAID (Shannon, 2009, pg. 26). This controversial investment not only assured the securitization of aid, but it completely contradicted the impartiality principle that embodies humanitarian assistance.

In addition, collaboration between NGOs and international organizations caused many coordination failures that lead to mismanagement of aid funds. In 2006, \$796 million were disbursed for human capital projects (Shannon, 2009, pg. 26). Although many NGOs focus on human capital projects, they were only able to acquire \$200 million for their own use (Shannon, 2009, pg. 26). This demonstrates how the NGOs were utilized in part to pursue the interests of larger international organizations and U.S. government agencies, instead of being granted ample opportunity to act on their own. The increased number of NGOs and international actors in Afghanistan by the U.S. created a major coordination and instability issue. Instead, it might have been more effective for the U.S. to have brought in policymakers to help stabilize the central government of Afghanistan. The U.S. could have also allocated its aid disbursements towards re-stabilizing certain economic sectors and improving upon the central government's capacity. The implications of the U.S.'s strategy and their involvement of multiple agencies in Afghanistan emphasizes their commitment to their own national security interests. Furthermore, it

demonstrates the U.S.'s persistence to pursue these interests despite the apparent coordination failures and mismanagement of aid funds in Afghanistan.

However, the U.S. had to deal with the presence of the Taliban and a vulnerable, demoralized population (Colucci, 2007, pg. 38). Although it is reasonable for there to be a U.S. military presence to deter the Taliban's resurgence, it should not undermine equally important developmental efforts. Yet, reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) were largely underfunded in comparison to defensive measures. President Bush's administration decided to allocate \$10.6 billion in aid to Afghanistan during the two-year span from 2007 and 2009 (Colucci, 2007, pg. 38). Of these \$10.6 billion, \$8.6 billion went towards training and equipping, while only \$2 billion went towards reconstruction (Colucci, 2007, pg. 90). The amount of aid allocated for reconstruction initiatives is not sufficient to create any substantial change in stability or development. Although this military assistance aid was necessary, it simply was too slow-moving to alleviate the Afghan army, who were constantly battling with the Taliban. Moreover, the R&S budget remained insufficient despite the fact that only 13% of the Afghan population had access to safe water, 12% percent to adequate sanitation, 6% electricity (Colucci, 2007, pg.92). There is also an astonishing difference between post-conflict foreign aid in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It was analyzed that the U.S. and their allies had allocated "25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita into post conflict Kosovo than into post conflict Afghanistan" (Colucci, 2007, pg. 93). The same was found for U.S. assistance given to Germany, Japan, and Bosnia (Colucci, 2007, pg. 93). These mentioned countries were able to make a quicker recovery due to the large of amount of resources and prolonged assistance that was allocated. True nation-building and stabilization takes time and efficient resources. Aside from the majority of the population lacking access to basic resources, the people of Afghanistan were also subjected to violence. More importantly, civilians suffered casualties from the U.S. and NATO's preemptive drone attacks on the Taliban. It was stated that "the number of civilian casualties from violence has been so great that NATO's top commander, U.S. General James L. Jones, apologized for the deaths caused by fighting between NATO and the Taliban" (Colucci, 2007, pg. 91-92). Moreover, in 2006, NATO forces bombed a civilian village believed to be housing Taliban forces and were believed to have killed 12 to 85 civilians (Colucci, 2007, pg. 92). The ongoing operation against the Taliban seemed to contribute to the unstable environment. It is also important to note that the U.S. is the main contributor to NATO, along with other Western states. Therefore, the support for the U.S. was very low considering they were unable to provide the population with adequate sources and were exposing the civilians to extremely violent circumstances. Moreover, when the humanitarian and military operations are so close and intermingled, the civilians have a hard time trusting the workers. With the risk of U.S. or NATO forces bombing their families, and inefficient measures of in aid distribution, it is safe to presume that the U.S. failed in their strategy to win the "hearts and minds of the population" (Wilder, 2010, pg. 5,407).

The Underfunding of The Millennium Challenge Account

In addition to their underfunded Afghanistan reconstruction and stabilization efforts, during the war on terror period, the U.S. also significantly decreased their multilateral aid contributions. By 2004, the amount of U.S. funds that were directed to multilateral institutions had dropped by 5%, while their bilateral aid increased (Woods, 2005, pg. 399). Clearly this was clearly in response to war on terror; the U.S. could more easily and directly pursue their national security interests through bilateral aid than by channeling aid through larger, multilateral institutions. However, in 2002, President Bush created the Millennium Challenge Account

(MCA), which assisted developing countries that already had established economic policies and demonstrated good governance (Woods, 2005, pg. 398). This was a direct initiative to give aid to developing countries who were not typically considered for aid, due to their lack of U.S. strategic interest, but who showed potential in becoming an economically sufficient and democratic country. Moreover, developing countries who were given aid through the MCA had to demonstrate “commitments to just and democratic governance, economic freedom, and investing in their people” (Woods, 2005, pg. 398). However, for the first two years, the U.S. did not fund the MCA due to their primary focus on front-line states (Woods, 2005, pg. 398). It was only until 2004 that the U.S. allotted the MCA with \$2.5 billion, which was meant to be distributed among multiple developing countries (Woods, 2005, pg. 398).

However, in that same year, the U.S. spent \$2 billion solely to provide private security contractors in order to protect US contractors already working on projects in Iraq (Woods, 2005, pg. 398-399). Although the Bush administration initially established this institution to support economic development and stability in developing countries, it is clearly demonstrated that the amount of support was not proportionally allocated in comparison to key frontline states. In addition to this vast difference between aid distribution, the effectiveness of the aid given in Iraq can be brought into question. In 2004, the Bush administration authorized \$18.6 billion to Iraq, but only \$2.4 billion was being monitored by the USAID (Woods, 2005, pg. 399). Instead, a newly created institution, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), was controlling the majority of the aid (Woods, 2005, pg. 399). This enabled spending on quick-hitting projects that were devoted to capital intensive projects managed by U.S. contractors, instead of labor-intensive projects that could help create jobs for Iraqi civilians (Woods, 2005, pg. 399). Furthermore, the US was also utilizing \$2.5 billion in Iraqi oil revenue to further fund these quick-hitting projects (Woods, 2005, pg. 399-400). Consequently, inefficiency led to apparent corruption in the U.S.-Iraqi contracting and developmental sector. The U.S. allowed the PCO, an agency with self-interest in promoting various contracting projects, to control the majority of this aid. By permitting this control, the U.S. enabled corruption and inefficiency. More importantly, the PCO utilized Iraqi resources as a means to continue funding their projects. While these quick-hitting projects failed to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi population, the U.S. and PCO also inhibited the likelihood of Iraq’s future self-sufficiency. Instead, the U.S. created an endless dependence for their own hired contractors. If the U.S. and the PCO had included the Iraqi citizens in this sector, it would have stimulated self-sufficient revenue and growth in the country. Instead, the U.S. failed to stabilize the country with their monopolization of reconstruction programs and Iraqi oil revenue.

The Effects of Aid Securitization in Africa

The U.S. has increased military presence and cooperation with military leaders in Africa through various peacekeeping programs and the creation of AFRICOM (Fisher et al, 2015, pg. 132). Since 2006, “Section 1206 funding”, the U.S. has given \$2 billion every year to fund training and equipping programs in Africa (Fisher et al, 2015, pg. 135). As previously mentioned, this was about the same amount the U.S. has invested in the Millennium Challenge Corporation that was supposed to be divided amongst multiple middle-developing countries. Thus, the Section 1206 funding was a substantial amount of money that has permitted various authoritarian leaders with the means to maintain their regimes. For example, France and U.S. aid, through the \$100 million Pan-Sahel Initiative and Section 1206 funding has equipped Déby with the power to exhort violence on his internal opponents and enough force to maintain his regime in Chad (Fisher et al, 2015, pg. 137). The U.S. had multiple military operations and training

programs in Africa, but the most prevalent military force was the Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA). The JTF-HOA has backed Uganda’s attack against the Lord’s Resistance Army, Ethiopia’s fight against Islamic militants in Somalia, and two regime oppositions fighting against Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir (Fisher et al, 2015, pg. 138). Although it may be argued that these African countries dealing with both intra and inter state conflict cannot move towards development and prosperity without first stabilizing their countries, receiving military aid and assistance will not mend these conflicts. Moreover, the U.S. is providing assistance to authoritarian regimes that have exhibited violence against political opponents and ethnical groups within their own countries. The U.S. is not interested in mending any conflicts, as their actions demonstrate that they are primarily interested in deterring terrorist-harboring threats in key states, like Somalia. This is also prevalent while analyzing the difference between the amount of aid given for military assistance in comparison to the aid that was given for development assistance in Africa. The majority of the military assistance provided to Africa was allocated through the Economic Support Fund, which had increased by over 50% in 2004, while the Development Assistance account had only increased 14% (Fisher et al, 2015, pg. 136). The U.S. cannot aspire to deter threats from insurgency groups without first acknowledging developmental concerns. Boko Haram, a Nigerian insurgency group, utilized local grievances as a recruitment strategy. They offer young recruits “money, jobs and networks, and [address] their profound grievances related to failed governance, corruption, absence of the future aspirations...” (DIIS Report, 2015, pg. 24). Without supplying development aid that will give stability and hope to these conflict-stricken populations, they will continue being susceptible to insurgency recruitment. It is not surprising that in 2013, the Co-Chairs of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition Admiral James M. Loy and General Michael W. Hagee, along with about 120 three or four-star retired generals advocated for an increase to the international affairs budget for that fiscal year of 2014. These experienced, retired generals urged Congress that “American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines cannot effectively reform a government, revive a shattered economy, or redress deep-seated political grievances” (Written Testimony to Congress, 2013, pg. 3). In their testimony to Congress, they emphasized a need for specialized experts in certain fields such as development, agriculture, governance (Written Testimony to Congress, 2013, pg. 4). However, they noted that “those resources were insufficient because the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development were not sufficiently funded, staffed, and organized to play this role” (Written Testimony to Congress, 2013, pg. 4). Many prominent past and present U.S. military leaders recognize the undervalued importance of the goal-oriented, poverty-alleviating humanitarian assistance. However, the U.S. continues to provide military training and equipment to these African countries without appropriating an adequate amount of development assistance, which appears to be prolonging the conflict.

Conclusion

It is important to consider that despite these mentioned failures, there have been some vast advancements in developing countries as a result of foreign aid. However, the majority of improvements can be attributed to the work of larger multilateral agencies, not strategically-driven bilateral aid. The UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) have resulted in ground-breaking humanitarian relief in the last decade. However, the UN has achieved this because they separated their goals according to specific, defined humanitarian concerns that directly affect populations of developing countries. Furthermore, the UN divided these MDGs into separate categories: extreme poverty, primary education, promoting gender equality, child mortality, improving maternal health, combatting HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensuring environmental

sustainability, and developing global partnerships for development (The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2015, pgs. 4-7). Then they appointed the following goals to certain expert groups and partnering agencies that were best able to address them. With the use of tailored, relevant collaboration, the UN was able to improve conditions of nearly every goal. In contrast, bilateral aid has diverted attention from necessary humanitarian concerns in order to fulfill the U.S. and other rich nation's national security interests. The securitization of aid has led to increasing unstable conditions, decreasing population support, and ineffective developmental improvement for African and Middle Eastern countries. We cannot ignore the implications of the changes in U.S. foreign policy language and how it has altered the allocation of ground-level humanitarian aid. We have found that since the September 11 attacks, the U.S.'s foreign aid and stabilization efforts have been largely ineffective both in their mission and execution due to their alliance with military assistance. It would be much more beneficial to developing countries if the United States would fully fund long-term development programs based on immediate humanitarian needs and separate from military operations. However, if U.S. foreign aid continues being allocated in correspondence with national security concerns, it will continue to remain short-term, volatile, and underfunded.

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The Palestinian Water Crisis

By Yousef Alghawi

*"It was a river with two banks
and a heavenly mother who nursed it on drops from the clouds
But they kidnapped its mother
so it ran short of water
and died, slowly, of thirst."*

The words of the former National Poet of Palestine, Mahmoud Darwish, tragically encapsulate the fears and anxieties felt by the citizens of Palestine regarding their main source of water: the Jordan River¹. Water distribution between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Palestine) is an internationally contentious argument featuring the Jordan River as a center of hydropolitical tension. The history of proprietorship regarding this body of water has been the focus of decades of intense dispute, resulting in claims of a potentially inevitable era of "water wars." As Palestine continues to remain reliant on Israeli allocation and dispersion of potable and non-potable water, the infrastructure of the Palestinian community faces a perpetual shortage of agricultural and safe drinking water, a situation known as the Palestinian Water Crisis. With Israel responsible for both maintaining and rationing water supplies, it is important to note that attempts by Palestinians to create their own aquifers and water systems have resulted in health problems that further serve as a disincentive to the creation of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. The Palestinian Water Crisis has been the result of water inequality, a crumbling infrastructure, and pollution that continues to contaminate and discourage the development of an autonomous Palestine.

One responsibility a state owes its people is the ability to provide basic human needs; a state unable to satisfy these needs often leads to catastrophic health consequences and a loss of state autonomy. Palestine's inability to disperse something as important as water is a largely artificial creation brought upon by Israeli actions. Perpetual warfare between the two areas inevitably leaves Palestine (especially the Gaza Strip) in a state of disarray as important institutions find themselves unprotected. "Bombardments have targeted water infrastructure, from the main power stations to its wastewater treatment plants and water networks. The military actions left mains, water, sewage, and other wastewater treatment capacity crippled,"—actions such as these have resulted in damages totaling as high as \$44 million; a price that finds the Palestinian community unable to conduct complete and safe repairs due to the staggering cost.² Thus, much of Palestinians' time and effort goes to constantly rebuilding what will inevitably be leveled once again—incentivizing the hasty building of shoddy, temporary replacements.

It does not make fiscal sense for Palestine to continuously expend resources reconstructing or modernizing the highly flawed water system infrastructure—systems that have a probable chance of facing destruction. As such, "some 180,000 – 200,000 Palestinians living in rural communities have no access to running water and even in towns and villages which are connected to the water network, the taps often run dry... receiving piped water only one day

¹ Boast, H. "'A River without Water': Hydropolitics and the River Jordan in Palestinian Literature." *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 51.2 (2016): 275-86.

² Dajani, Muna. "Drying Palestine: Israel's Systemic Water War." *Al-Shabaka. The Palestinian Policy Network*, 4 Sept. 2014.

every week or every few weeks,” which is especially prevalent in the Gaza Strip³. During these turbulent periods, water must be physically collected from springs or ration areas; however, these supplies have proven insufficient in covering basic demand.⁴ Many Palestinians have even chose to utilize an external storage container to save water during tough times as, “Palestinian supplies of piped water are intermittent and the population is often forced to survive on tanked supplies for periods of several months⁵”. These water cisterns, which have been used since the early days of the Romans, are usually placed on the roof of homes and are meant to collect rainwater and store whatever water may be left over. However, often times in lands surrounding Israeli settlements, the patrolling Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers have been known to forcibly dismantle these cisterns, “on the grounds that they were constructed without permits.”⁶ What these acts show, is that even saddening, desperate, attempts at reclaiming what little water Palestinians are able to harness independently from Israeli allocation and rationing is vilified and targeted. The Palestinian water crisis is not simply an effect of Palestinian incompetence or incomprehension on how a water network infrastructure works, but rather of a forced systematic shutdown and destruction of systems both professionally constructed pipes and makeshift cisterns.

Israel's practice of monopolizing water allocation is not only evident in the crumbling infrastructure of the Palestinian water system, but also in the actual lack of volume rationed out. It is the tragic, yet fundamental truth, that Palestinians have what amounts to essentially no autonomy in their ability to provide for themselves. With Israel in charge of the distribution of these resources, even in areas such as the Jordan River, which is inarguably located within Palestinian confines, the chances of unequal practices and distribution has become a major problem. This obvious inequality is shown in a system where “an advanced infrastructure allows Israel and its settlements to be supplied with good quality fresh water, [whereas] Palestinians in the Territories face severe water problems.”⁷ The Middle East has historically been cursed with droughts and an extremely harsh environment where temperatures often rise to the triple digits during the day. As mentioned, a country's potential for success is dependent on the ability of its government to provide this basic resource to their people—so it is no surprise that Israel would choose to exploit as much as they can from these sources, even if located in politically contentious land.

The inequity of allocation is seriously misaligned to the point where “Israeli statistics show that 1.1 million Palestinians in the West Bank received only one-third the quantity of water per capita provided to the 110,000 Israeli settlers there... Palestinians [in the Gaza Strip] have access to only 25 percent of the freshwater supply.”⁸ This division is simply unacceptable—a disparity of this magnitude is felt within not only all sectors of the Palestinian economy but also in the most rudimentary sense of what is needed for human survival. Even worse, it has been shown that since 1994 that , “Israel has been consuming its natural water resources at fifteen

³ Amnesty International, *Troubled Waters - Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water*, 27 October 2009: 3.

⁴ Isaac, Jad, and Jan Selby. "The Palestinian Water Crisis: Status, Projections and Potential for Resolution." *Natural Resources Forum, UN 20.1* (1996): 17.

⁵ *Ibid*

⁶ *Ibid*: 36.

⁷ Schlütter, Birgit. "Water Rights in the West Bank and in Gaza." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 18.3 (2005): 621-22

⁸ Bellisari, Anna. "Public Health and the Water Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23.2 (1994): 53-4.

percent above the resources' natural replenishment rate.⁹ There is simply not enough water to sustain even the basic aspects of a society (jobs, health, agriculture) in Palestine, yet Israeli extraction is not only unevenly distributed, but done in such an extreme manner that soon both sides may suffer the same consequences. The effects of this have been felt in the West Bank for years: their increasing rate of poverty directly linked to a lessening agricultural yield of olives, a crucial industry for the Palestinian people, which in turn often devastates families and may possibly lead to health problems¹⁰. As public health faces a grave regression to pre-development levels, the Gaza Strip's 800,000 citizens are now facing severe malnutrition from a "chronic lack of drinking fluids in a hot, dry climate [which predisposes the] population to weakness, lethargy, neurological symptoms, and mild kidney dysfunction or even kidney failure."¹¹ In fact, there have even been causal links associated with the physical strain of enduring days without water (out of necessity) on the rise in Palestinian women developing arthritis before their 40's¹². The bodily toll that this lack of distribution produces has the potential of catalyzing the collapse of the Palestinian people; with 25% of the total water supply being divided amongst some two million people, this blatant disregard for the occupied population's health shows the far reaching consequences the Palestinian water crisis.

The disintegrating standard of life for Palestinians is not solely from a lack of water but compounded by what appears to be *in* the water itself. Much of the water that is divided up and distributed to the people of both Gaza and the West Bank has proven to be unfit for human consumption. Over the past few years, "the water quality in the Territories has deteriorated and continues to do so due to insufficient sewage treatment, increasing salinization, and pollution," which has become an unaddressed, structural problem¹³. The previous two explanations for the Palestinian Water Crisis have directly influenced the development of this third, and possibly most damaging, aspect. Water in Palestine shows a dramatic increase in salinity level, where certain wells of Israeli pumped water has reached levels (of more than 600 mg/l)¹⁴. Saline content this high is unfit for agricultural use and when consumed by humans or animals may lead to tragic, avoidable, detrimental health conditions.¹⁵ This level of saline is noticeably absent from Israeli projections of quality and analyses of water content. In fact, this disparity has long been considered suspect as the provision of "fresh water currently guaranteed by tanker carriages from the Israeli water company Merkorot... is often of an inferior quality and does not meet international health standards."¹⁶ In the Gaza Strip, "the community fluorosis index was four times higher than the safe level... the United Nations reported that water from half of the wells is unfit for human consumption," meaning that not only have Gaza's natural water sources been compromised, but so has the supposedly humanitarian response by Israel in giving out rations¹⁷.

This highly polluted cocktail of heavy metals, nitrate, fluoride, fuel, and microbial pollutants is not a matter to be taken at all lightly—the toxicological nature of these

⁹ Silverbrand, Ian J. "The History and Potential Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict." *Stanford Journal of International Law* 44.2 (2008): 221.

¹⁰ Boast, 2

¹¹ *Ibid* 55

¹² *Ibid*

¹³ Schlutter, 625

¹⁴ Palestine. Palestinian Water Authority. Water Resources Directorate. *2015 Water Resources Status Summary Report /Gaza Strip*. N.p.: n.p., n.d.

¹⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁶ Schlutter 632

¹⁷ Bellisari 56

contaminants is devastating, manifesting its presence through cancers, brain damage, rising infant mortality rates, and stillbirths and miscarriages¹⁸. Children appear to be in the gravest peril because their still-developing immune system are unprepared for the barrage of chemicals in their water supply—these toxins are saturated in the mother’s breast milk and this infection-malnutrition interaction from birth is distressing¹⁹. In one study, it was found that sixty-one percent of children living in the Gaza Strip were “infected with intestinal parasites²⁰.” This brutal reality, reminiscent of a pre-developed nation, is seen not just in the battered remnants of the Gaza Strip, but has revealed itself in the more progressive, industrial West Bank: over the past decade the rate of diarrhea amongst children under the age of five “has increased to 17.1%...[showing] that the restriction of clean water directly relates to a rise in potential disease in the West Bank²¹.” Since Merkorot saves the best extracted water for Israel, and the Palestinian state remains unable to structure and maintain a filtration of wastewater system, the allocated fluids are in no way cleaner than having the water pulled straight from the Jordan River—an action that is prohibited for Palestinian citizens without Israeli oversight. The recursive Catch-22 that occurs here is demoralizing, where people are subject to the will of their occupier for water but are still doomed by the polluted rations. The Palestinian Water Crisis has, in many ways become a trade-off of unhealthy outcomes—face dehydration in the ‘now,’ or suffer neurological, fatal disorders and diseases in the future.

Israel is, undoubtedly, a modern nation with Western backing and a liberal ideology at its heart. With this unique sphere of influence in the admittedly volatile Middle East, Israel is often given the benefit of a doubt in the way the state decidedly handles its issues of security and self-preservation, especially when it comes to the central issue of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As such, there have been many defenders who seek to justify Israel’s response to Palestinians who also qualify a distancing between The Palestinian Water Crisis and Israeli neglect or actions. Specifically, the series of treaties known as the “Oslo Agreements” are often cited in defense of Israel’s ability to empathize and commiserate with those lands they have occupied. Signed in 1994 and 1995, respectively, the two Oslo Agreements sought to “provide the Palestinians with additional water for domestic purposes (28 million m³/yr) and guaranteed that all measures will be taken to ‘prevent any harm to water resources including those utilized by the other side,’” while also continuing to allow Israel to use Palestinian sources of water²².

On the surface, it may appear as if this agreement, in fact *any* agreement, may prove to be a step in the right direction, the sad reality is that these two treaties are essentially ignored to the point of farce. Very little has changed with their ratification, and things on the ground, especially in the Gaza Strip, have devolved into worse situations than before. Gazan annual rechargeable water potential has been projected at around 65 million m³ yet “over 100 million m³ are extracted annually from the Gaza Strip aquifers, causing groundwater levels to drop by an average of 15-20m per year,” which in turn catalyzes intrusion of saline water into the supply.²³ Furthermore, after the 2000 onset of the Second Intifada, “the Israeli army has intensified the destruction of water infrastructure and confiscation of water sources in the West Bank and Gaza,” which also

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ *Ibid* 62

²⁰ Silverbrand, 226

²¹ *Ibid*

²² El-Fadel, M., R. Quba'a, N. El-Hougeiri, Z. Hashisho, and D. Jamali. "The Israeli Palestinian Mountain Aquifer: A Case Study in Ground Water Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Education* 30 (2001): 50.

²³ Issac and Selby, 20

serves to benefit Israel's economy by essentially forcing Palestinians to buy more water from desalination plants.²⁴ Scholarly critiques seem to support the Israeli response of water shortages as being a hopeful, peace-inducing trend, are simply focusing on the *theoretical* aspects of the Oslo Agreements without paying much attention to the concrete *reality* of what is occurring in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Article 54, Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention prohibits attacks and discrimination on “drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population...or any other motive²⁵.” The “water wars” being fought are a direct affront to the Palestinian people of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and serve to strengthen the perpetual struggles of dependence on Israel that has come to characterize the region since the late 1940s. The Palestinian Water Crisis has diminished the possibility of establishing a sovereign and autonomous Palestine that may one day be able to serve its people independent of Israeli influence. This colonization by Israel has, instead, instated a recursive struggle that has transcended traditional warfare and takes the form of structural devastation. The Jordan River, a point of contention between the two groups has become ecologically damaged to the point of unusable. Filtration systems to clean the contaminated river source are under unethical attacks and confiscation; the devastatingly unequal allotment of clean water has raised disease rates whereas Israel saves the cleanest water for themselves. Israel is considered to be the one beacon of light in the Middle East—labeled “the region’s only democracy” and “the United States greatest ally” but this sort of rhetoric is damaging to the reality of what actually occurs in the area. The Palestinian Water Crisis has become the unaddressed humanitarian crisis of our time, where Israel, a colonizer country problematically renowned for its ethics and liberalism, is imposing internationally condemned tactics on Palestine and its water supply. Unless the relationships between the two countries are to change, and Palestine becomes able to hold some autonomy and capacity in providing for its people free from Israeli intervention, this crisis will certainly prove to be the great destabilizer both regionally and internationally for eras to come.

²⁴ Silverbrand, 223

²⁵ "Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." *International Review of the Red Cross* 26.254 (1986): 279.

Middle East Conflict: Effects on Everyone

In a world of increasing chaos the Middle East seems to continue to be in the middle of it all. Waves of revolutions, or civil wars, have spawned there in the last decade in what can be attributed as the intent of the foreign policy of states internal and external to the region. Syria has become the center of gravity for the various interests and spheres of influence colliding in the Middle East with great powers like the United States and Russia involved next to regional powers like Israel and Iran. From these powers concentrating in the Middle East every corner of the world is touched by the chaos emanating from the region. In this section of the review the spawn of these revolutions in the last decade, the Arab Spring, is examined in the ways it affected the Middle East and abroad.



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Authors In this Section

PAYAL MAJMUNDAR

Payal Majmundar is a second year, Political Science and International Studies double major seeking a certificate in International Relations. She has interned for the United States Senate and the Florida House of Representatives to address concerns of constituents and expand her knowledge on the legislative process. Currently, she serves as a Bob Graham Student Fellow, State Editor for Florida Political Review, a member of Student Government, and a competitive member of the UF Mock Trial Team with past experience in philanthropy through Gators March for Babies. After graduation, Payal hopes to attend law school and continue her involvement in public policy through servant leadership.

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Global Politics

By Payal Majmundar

The turmoil in the Middle East has created new horrors throughout the world as the threat of ISIS becomes the worst nightmare for democratic nations. This crisis was foreshadowed during the Arab-Israeli conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish populations. The conflict arose due to the struggle over land by the Christians and Druze, Muslims, and Jews. A civil war broke out in 1947 and the first Arab-Israeli war began one year later in 1948. Following this war, the land of former Palestine was divided into Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. As a consequence of this war from 1947-1949, over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees and were displaced in Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab nations. Syria being one of the leading countries harboring over 400,000 Palestinian refugees, this crisis has inflicted limitations on the nation's progress and is now impacting modern global politics.¹

Since 1948, the Arab-Israeli conflict has continued into the 21st century and has contributed to the rise of the Arab Spring in attempts to overthrow corrupt and authoritarian governments that emerged during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The rise of the Arab Spring that began with the Tunisian revolution in January 2011 made its journey to Syria as it escalated into a global political and human rights issue. The crisis began in mid-March of 2011, when residents of the small town Dara protested in the streets against the government's use of torture on students who had spray painted anti-government graffiti on the walls of a school on February 16, 2011. The anti-government graffiti had sparked a violent chain reaction that caused Syria to be at the forefront of global politics. This peaceful protest spread to other parts of Syria as protesters then demanded government and political reforms such as freedom of expression. In April 2011, the Syrian government sent tanks and opened fire on protesters that were unarmed. After these attacks, protesters began to arm themselves for self-defense purposes against their own government. This escalated armed conflict into the current civil war and had been influenced by the revolutions of the Arab Spring as the Arab Spring inspired protesters to form their own regime.²

As the Syrian Civil War continues to heighten, this conflict has coerced displacement of its citizens on a daily basis and has transformed into a global issue. These Syrian citizens have fled and continue to flee to neighboring countries in Europe to seek refuge. Currently, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey are holding more refugees than Europe. Despite these countries maintenance on keeping an open-door policy to seek humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, the situation leads to insecurity and dispersion. Refugees are vulnerable to exploitation by neighboring countries as they are subjected to limited public goods, labor, and education. Problems encountered after refugees have fled Syria serve as a legal and moral challenge for international NGOs and other nations to provide humanitarian assistance.³ Time is ticking for the governments of Middle Eastern nations, European nations, and the United States as they face the challenge to propose solutions for the security and incorporation of Syrian refugees.

¹ Asser, Martin. "Obstacles to Arab-Israeli peace: Palestinian refugees." *BBC News*. BBC, 02 Sept. 2010. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

² "The graffiti kids: How an act of teenage rebellion sparked the Syrian war." *The Globe and Mail*. N.p., 02 Dec. 2016. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

³ "Towards Solutions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis." *Brookings*. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

The Syrian refugee crisis is being seen as the international community's failure to effectively respond to the situation as the responsibility lies upon the international community rather than host nations. This is perhaps one of the greatest challenges currently facing the United Nations as they struggle to seek funding for humanitarian assistance and financially aid nations hosting Syrian refugees.⁴ Besides the global issue of overflow of refugees, a new issue had emerged in the midst of the Syrian Civil War - the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS. ISIS captured the world's attention in June 2014 when the militant group began to move towards Baghdad, Iraq with the threat to exterminate the country's ethnic and religious minorities. Prior to making its global debut, ISIS joined Syria's rebellion against the government and President Bashar Al-Assad. With ISIS's support for Syrian rebellion, the group expanded into Syria from Iraq with hopes of taking over Syria. The infiltration of ISIS makes the challenge of overflow of refugees even greater because it permits easy transportation of ISIS into other nations across the world.

The European Union has suffered domestic effects from the global issue of Syrian refugees. Because of the ability for European Union citizens to move freely within participating nations, border security is relatively weak across those 28 nations. Despite efforts to strengthen border patrol and overall security, nations are willing to advocate against tighter laws in order to allow mass immigrations of refugees. The major fear that arose from the 2015 Paris bombings in Europe is that the weaknesses of border security will pave the way for ISIS and other terrorist groups to enter the continent. More so than in any other global region, the issue of refugees and ISIS is magnified in Europe as they face difficulties in identifying and locating such extremists because similar to the United States, the European Union lacks the information and ability to confidently screen Syrian refugees seeking asylum. "Extremists are crossing borders more quickly than the information needed to stop them."⁵ With the November 13, 2015 attacks on Paris, Beirut, and Baghdad, ISIS has taken full responsibility. At least one terrorist from ISIS responsible for the Paris bombings is said to have entered Europe through refugee flows. This shows ISIS had been infiltrating refugee routes in Germany, Turkey, Lebanon, Hungary, Italy, etc.⁶

Jihadists are aware of the relative ease in travelling within the European Union undetected. Specifically, one terrorist named Hayat Boumeddiene, managed to escape the French police, drove to Spain, and flew to Turkey without any difficulty.⁷ A majority of refugees that have entered Europe since 2011 are unregistered. Nations are having difficulty implementing a systematic way to screen these refugees, thus further creating weaknesses in European security.⁸ The European Union's lack of information on these specific terrorist groups combined with their weak border security are the primary reasons that make Europe a prime target for the expansion of ISIS.

Europe is not the only region of the world hurting from this strong impact of the Arab Spring. The United States has also been at the forefront for facing such difficulties in safeguarding refugees that seek asylum. The Obama administration had a target of 110,000

⁴ Kirişci, Kemal. "Why 100,000s of Syrian refugees are fleeing to Europe | Brookings Institution." *Brookings*. Brookings, 16 Aug. 2016. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

⁵ "Syrian Refugee Flows: Security Risks and Counterterrorism Challenges." *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. Homeland Security Committee, Nov. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

refugee admissions in fiscal year of 2017;⁹ however, this poses major concerns for the Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and the National Security Agency. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security found “Islamist terrorists are determined to infiltrate refugee flows to enter the West - and appear to have already done so in Europe.”¹⁰ Historically, the United States has opened borders for refugee resettlement; however, with the involvement of ISIS in the Syrian conflict, Homeland Security lacks the information needed to identify any potential terrorist connections with Syrian refugees. “It is difficult both to confirm that Syrian asylum-seekers are who they claim to be and to determine they do not have ties to terrorist groups. Recently, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services official Matthew Emrich disclosed that the government does not have access to any database in Syria that could be used to check the backgrounds of incoming refugees against criminal and terrorist records.”¹¹ Due to the fear of another 9/11 combined with the lack of confidence in information and screening, domestic and international public policies in the United States, has largely been impacted by the Syrian conflict which roots lie in the Arab Spring.

The European Union and the United States are creating domestic and international policies in favor of Syrian refugees with the strong belief that the overthrow of Syrian President Assad will foster democracy. On the other hand, Russia supports President Assad. Ties of alliance between Russia and Syria date back to the 1970s when Russia began to supply Syria with lucrative arms and Syria now serves as a Russian military base.¹² The revolutions of the Arab Spring served as attempts for overthrowing authoritarian regimes, inspired by Western values. With the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as the superpowers of the world after World War II these two superpowers maintained opposite ideals. Competition between the two superpowers is still relevant in global politics today. This is evident in the Syrian and ISIS conflicts. Despite long term ties with Syria, Mr. Putin will not “retreat under American pressure, which is the one thing he cannot do,” claims George Mirsky, a Russian economist.¹³ After meeting with former President Obama at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, Mr. Putin has made it clear to the world that Russia is imperative and essential in solving global issues, particularly with Syria and ISIS. After seeing the horrors of the Arab Spring, Russia’s international policies and relations in the Middle East have been influenced by this ongoing conflict through their support of President Assad.

Since the uprisings of the Arab Spring and the ongoing climax of the Syrian Civil War, the most powerful nations in the world have been facing the alarming effects of the refugee crisis and expansion of ISIS. Turmoil continues in other Middle Eastern nations; however, the Syrian Civil War and ISIS are at the forefront of global issues. The European Union, United States, and Russia all have the daunting task to find a solution which strongly impacts each nation’s domestic and international policies as these nations have to decide how they’re going to support Syria, provide humanitarian assistance, and protect domestic borders from terrorist groups. The United Nations is limited in power to provide assistance to Syria. A simple solution to Syria’s authoritarian government would be to prosecute the government for war crimes; however, the

⁹ Connor, Phillip, and Jens Manuel Krogstad. "U.S. on track to reach Obama administration's goal of resettling 110,000 refugees this year." *Pew Research Center*. N.p., 20 Jan. 2017. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "Why Russia is an ally of Assad." *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 30 Sept. 2015. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

¹³ Ibid.

United Nations does not have the jurisdiction to prosecute the Syrian government. Syria is not a member of the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court under the United Nations. Starting on February 23, 2017, the United Nations has called the Syrian government to Geneva to reach negotiations. These negotiations will be facilitated by the Security Council 2254, focusing on a new Syrian constitution and governance.¹⁴ In the interest of protecting human rights, the United Nations has called for an end to all violence and restitution for all victims.¹⁵ Despite the efforts of the United Nations, the Arab Spring has influenced international politics and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

¹⁴ "Syria." *UN News Center*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

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European Union: The Grand Ole' Institution

In the past decade, International Relations literature has examined the argument that the liberal international order, established by the United States after the end of World War II, is being eroded as the US unipolarity weakens. China and other revisionist non-democratic states are gaining relative power at the expense of traditional Western powers. Responding to the unsettling developments in Ukraine, European Union(EU) member-states have decided to further pool their sovereignty in all aspects of policy, including defence and foreign policy. The success of the EU will have large implications for the liberal international order. Revisionist powers stand to gain a lot from the EU project failing. Understanding the EU enlargement and integration decisions is therefore crucial to policymakers and academics involved in US and EU Grand Strategy. In this section, the authors examine the EU's integration efforts in energy as a response to Russia's actions in Ukraine as well as the EU's method of enlargement in Cyprus. The EU's role in the liberal international order depends on its internal economic, military, and soft power. As the EU reduces its energy dependence on Russia, EU energy integration efforts can potentially greatly reduce Russian influence. On the other hand, the EU's enlargement to a politically and ethnically divided Cyprus may cause future problems among member-states in pursuit of a collective response if conflict breaks out on the island. These authors' insightful research facilitates greater understanding of EU enlargement and integration in the context of an eroding liberal international order.



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Authors In this Section

ADAM CLARK

Adam Clark is a third year here at UF double majoring in Political Science and Spanish. He participated in the Junior Fellows program during the 2017 fall semester, serves as the Director of Community Service for Tau Sigma NHS, and currently competes with the UF Trial Team, the LitiGators.

RICHARD RAUSED

Ricardo Rauseo is a Venezuelan senior student graduating in the upcoming term. He is currently majoring in Anthropology and International Studies and is completing a certificate in International Relations. Interested in the European Union, he plans on earning a master's degree in European Union Studies. He studied abroad at SciencesPo, France's premier social science university, and now serves as Senator for Student Government at the University of Florida.

Powering Supranationalism: Why Energy Union, Why Now?

By Adam Clark



Introduction: What is the EEU?

In the aftermath of World War II, the state actors of Europe sought unity and support as they moved into an era of reconstruction. Given the horror that the world (and especially the European continent) had just been subjected to, it is little surprise that the first attempts at integration following this cataclysmic fighting were manifested as policies and institution-based solutions designed to prevent countries from warring with one another. In the aftermath of the war, European states believed that in order to prevent warfare, raw materials that facilitated war would have to be limited and energy (and access to it) would have to be monitored on a level beyond traditional Westphalian sovereignty.

It was not until the Treaty of Paris (1951-1952), however, that a binding document called for the establishment of a supranational body unlike before it. The resulting organization, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was essentially the earliest institution from which the European Community was to grow. The High Authority¹ was one of the governing bodies created in this transformation, and it set the mold for what European Supranationalism would become. Composed of leaders and members who were tasked with representing the general interests of the Community, the Authority was fully absorbed by the European Council in 2002.² The European Union (EU) as we know it today sprouted from these earliest seeds of European cohesion in the wake of one of the darkest conflicts in recorded history. Today, Europe revisits

¹ The High Authority is the first technically supranational body ever observed in history. This institution, separate from governments and responsible to the Common Assembly, set the supranational precedent for the EU.

² Asli Baysal, "Nation State in Crisis History and Theories of Integration," 30-Aug-2017, EUS3930/POS4931 European Union in Crisis.

the challenges of the past as Member States grapple for control of energy and endeavor to keep energy markets stable, but new dynamics and objectives have evolved as the geopolitical landscape has changed. Now that the European Community has decades of experience under its belt, why the sudden push for energy integration? Why have calls for the creation of a European Energy Union (EEU) only gotten loud recently? More importantly, what *is* the Energy Union, what does it mean, and what will it become?

If one were to ask ten random leaders or state actors what the Energy Union is and what it means, there will likely be ten drastically different answers; some may not even give the notion serious consideration. What can be generally agreed upon is that the EEU is supposed to be a framework of energy policy and infrastructure, a new autonomous body responsible for energy security, sustainability, and development on the supranational level. According to the Commission website as of this writing, the “energy union will help boost the EU’s economy, its security and its commitment to fight climate change,”³ which is a far cry from the lackluster response that early mentions of an energy union received. Before addressing the significance of how it is framed today, however, is important to first understand the context of how and when the idea of a European Energy Union was birthed. Former European Parliament President, Jerzy Buzek of Poland and former European Commission President, Jacques Delors of France stood together in calling for a ‘European Energy Community,’ that call came in 2011,⁴ and garnered little serious attention with most viewing it as political posturing. This was only compounded by the fact that their call for energy unification came directly on the heels of 2009’s Third Energy Package, one of the most comprehensive energy-based policy packages that the EU has produced to date.⁵ In light of this new legislation, the Community at the time had little incentive to push for a new institutional body or further regulation. Yet just a few years later in 2014, Donald Tusk (Buzek’s fellow Polack, current Prime Minister of Poland and President of the European Council) took a hardline stance on the future of European energy consolidation in his semi-controversial article titled “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehold.” The title alone turned heads, and the body of text called for the supranationalization of European energy policies and for a “single European body” tasked first and foremost with restructuring how Europeans purchase Russian gas and oil. In Tusk’s own words: “It is time to strengthen the community in the field of energy. Now that new technologies allow it, and old challenges demand it, we can hardly afford not to.”⁶ There are, of course, separate determinants that motivated these leaders to call for energy integration, but Tusk’s statement on a potential European Energy Union did not fall on deaf ears—it spurred intra-EU discourse. In only three years and with effective Energy Package legislation still in place, the European world was suddenly ready for a new body to address European energy. This paper addresses why while examining some of those “old challenges” Tusk discussed, as well as some new ones.

The dependent variable in question is the (now nascent) establishment of a new European body with budding regulatory authority: the European Energy Union. While the Energy Union

³ European Council and the Council of the European Union, “Energy union for Europe”, (November, 2017), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-union/#>.

⁴ Ole Gunnar Austvik, “The EU Energy Union, Energy Security and Russian Gas,” (MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2015), 9-11.

⁵ European Commission, Special Topics on Energy, “Market legislation priorities”, (2009), <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation>.

⁶ Donald Tusk, *Financial Times*, “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehold”, (2014).

does not yet exist as its own body, guidelines were officially put to paper in 2015. The ‘energy union package’ relies on prior energy framework and the Three Pillars of European energy.⁷ The independent variables at play are the Russian gas-oil monopoly in the context of their aggression (divided into two separate sections, and using the Crimean annexation as a case study) and the inherent need to pursue renewable and alternative energy sources (i.e. climate change itself as a driving variable). The timing of this rejuvenated support for further energy integration is no accident, and a combination of crises (past, present, and forthcoming) have provided the necessary impetus for the creation of this new body that will power Europe and its supranational ambitions for decades to come.

A Red Antagonist


It is hardly any secret that Russia has long been the EU’s instigator. The immediate post-Cold War period featured a warming of Eu-Russia relations, but tensions would soon rise. Despite global optimism that Russia would become a democracy like its European neighbors, the actions taken by Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, dismantled the checks on the Russian presidency, corrupted the office, and weakened global optimism about Russia’s future.⁸ Vladimir Putin’s second ascension to presidential power in 2012 marked the beginning of a new era for Russia, the EU and the world at large. Today, Putin habitually pursues a foreign policy that further damages EU-Russia relations through violating the sovereignty of former Soviet states and non-compliance with EU economic and diplomatic sanctions. Since the Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the EU ‘punishes’ Russia with economic sanctions placed on Russian individuals, corporations and goods. However, the EU’s economic sanctions are not particularly successful, because Russia values its ability to keep Ukraine in turmoil more than the economic effects of the sanctions. Likewise, Putin understands that the EU has no (or is unwilling to use) hard power to reinforce their diplomatic penalties. One may ask why this is the case, because after all, if the EU is unable to use hard power to curb Russian antics, why not become more diplomatically austere? Should the EU not impose multilateral sanctions so harsh that Russia has no choice but acquiesce?

Putting aside for the moment Russia’s military superiority to the EU, one must recognize just how complex EU-Russian relations truly are, and how Putin now leverages EU policy and elite decision-making just by virtue of their codependence. To speak more precisely, theirs is a codependent relationship figuratively and literally built upon vast reserves of oil and natural gas. Putin uses these raw resources to exploit weaknesses in the European economic system and European infrastructure, but how is he able to do this?

⁷ These Three Pillars are (1) a framework strategy detailing the goals and concrete steps for the energy union (2) EU's vision for the Paris global climate agreement (3) a plan to achieve the target of 10% electricity interconnection by 2020. More available at www.concilium.europa.eu.

⁸ Yeltsin used loopholes in the Russian Constitution to circumvent minority/ethnic groups and to consolidate his own power. He more or less erased the Russian system of judicial review. For more, see: Gordon B. Smith, University of South Carolina “Russian Exceptionalism? Putin’s Assertion of Sovereignty at Home and Abroad”, (2000), 2-20.

The big picture of Russian energy influence can be seen in the statistics. A few noteworthy numbers among a sea of data indicate that (as of summer 2016) Europe still receives over 1/3 of its imported crude oil and gas from Russia, and upwards 85% of all European oil and gas comes from non-European states and companies. The graph above (courtesy of Transport & Energy⁹) displays these surprisingly high figures. With more than a third of the European population relying on Russian fuels, Putin can sidestep or—outright ignore—European



sanctions. Russia's ability to defy the wishes of the EU and other outside countries has unique direct and indirect consequences, the bulk of which make it appealing for the EU to sanction Russia. However, it is impossible for Europe to mobilize against Russian aggressions or transgressions (the case of Ukraine and Crimea will illustrate this point).

While comparatively weak to a military response, economic sanctions against Russia do still have a remarkable impact. It is imperative to note that more than two-thirds of the ultimate demand for the abovementioned fuel sources lies in the public and private European transportation sectors. In essence, this means that about 20% of Europe would quite literally be at a standstill without the Russia's steady supply.¹⁰ So while sanctions do hurt Russia economically, with such a heavy reliance on oil and gas imports from Russia, there is only so much that the Union can do if they wish to remain on amicable terms with Putin and avoid hurting themselves—and for now, they do. Member States and the Eurozone economy as a whole are liable to experience economic blowback in the wake of harsher sanctions; under the current sanctions regime, the consequences are already evident. As of 2015, their sanctions on Russia had cost the EU over 100 billion euro, and today the figure is closer to 125 billion.¹¹ The

⁹ Transport & Energy (T&E) is a nongovernmental organization based in Brussels. They provide independent reports and commission independent studies of environmental policies and ramifications, largely focusing on Europe and Asia. For more, see www.transportandenvironment.org.

¹⁰ *Energy Post*, epNews, "Europe increasingly dependent on oil imports, above all from Russia", (15-July-2016), <http://energypost.eu/europe-increasingly-dependent-oil-imports-russia/>.

¹¹ Julian Hinz, Austrian Institute of Economic Research, *WIFO*, "Collateral Damage: The Impact of the Russia Sanctions on Sanctioning Countries' Exports", (2016).

sanctions not only harm gross revenues, but they put many jobs at risk too, with over 450,000 German jobs, more than 300,000 Polish jobs, and upwards of 200,000 Italian jobs all at stake.¹²

Member States are not equally at risk either, which make those in less-vulnerable positions less likely to be concerned with moving towards energy solidarity (and vice versa for those in very vulnerable positions).¹³ While the larger EU countries so stand to lose economically, arguably the most at-risk Member States (in terms of pure vulnerability to Russian volatility) are the ‘Visegrad’¹⁴ countries. These states have a dangerously high dependence on Russia as their single-pipeline crude oil supplier and a dangerously low diversification of energy sources.¹⁵ Greece also has little diversification and is deeply invested in Russia as an oil and gas provider, but is debatably positioned more precariously than the Visegrad states as a result of importing nearly 40% of its oil from Iraq. Dedicating a huge portion of a nation’s trade to importations from unstable countries simply adds up to a greater possibility for severe and irremediable external shocks, be they political, economic, military, or all three. When Russia is a state’s *most* reliable source of fuels, it is safe to say that state is in a perilous position.

As it stands, Europe needs Russian energy to continue growing economically. The bedrock of the Eurozone economy has become Russian resources. Economically, there is more at risk than ever before, and short-term monetary consequences have already begun to materialize in the form of individual states’ lost revenues. The European Union is disconcertingly undiversified and far too reliant on gas and oil from Russia, and this puts tremendous pressure on elite actors to appease Russia while attempting to ‘discipline’ Putin. An autonomous, self-sufficient body such as a European Energy Union would alleviate much of this pressure and allow the EU to pursue diversified fuel sources and alternative fuel sources while reducing European vulnerability to the generally unpredictable nature of Russian trade, fuel, and political maneuvering. The time will come when the EU must steadfastly deny Russia any leeway, when the Community must stand up to Putin and show solidarity in the face of aggression. Members of the Union know this, because in some ways, that time has already come and gone. Reducing dependency on foreign gas and oil while increasing European productive capabilities will make situations like the Russian military invasion of Crimea much less likely in the first place, and responding to such a situation will no longer seem like a grand balancing act.

¹² Oliver Fritz, Austrian Institute of Economic Research, *WIFO*, “Russia’s and the EU’s Sanctions: Economic and Trade Effects, Compliance and the Way Forward”, (2017).

¹³ While it may certainly be argued that elite actors are also driven by more normative values (i.e. what is best for the environment, what is most “fair” for all states involved, etc.), this passage is presupposing the purely self-interested viewpoint. Normative/moral motivating factors will be further examined in the section on alternative energies.

¹⁴ The ‘Visegrad’ states are Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. They are extremely reliant on Russian fuel imports (*Energy Post*).

¹⁵ As of this year, six EU member states still rely on only a *single* supplier for crude oil and gas; the majority of those states use essentially no alternative fuel sources (<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-union/#>).

The Price of Dependency: Crimean Annexation

If leaders were intrigued by the idea of a European Energy Union prior to the Ukraine crisis, then by the time Crimea was subjected to a ‘gunpoint referendum’¹⁶ they were fully on board. The feeling of helplessness that was shared by many leaders in the EU underscored just how much of a handicap European dependence on Russian fuel truly is.

In the wake of Euromaidan and former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich’s self-imposed exile to Russia, Putin saw his opportunity to encroach upon the so-called “near abroad”. Russian military forces invaded the Crimean peninsula in early 2014 and forced a Crimean referendum on Ukrainian secession by the middle of March. This is a particularly salient example of Putin’s “power grabs” that were previously alluded to. Russia may actually see the Ukraine, and specifically Crimea, as sovereign Russian territory to which they have a right, or Putin may know it is a completely unfounded and illegitimate scheme; either way, it does not matter insofar as Russia likes Europe to be on uneven footing and they have a resource monopoly that will keep the EU from consequential retaliation. The Russian decision to annex Crimea was met with swift economic sanctions on Russia, but as mentioned previously, these sanctions put a strain on European coffers too. Putin is in the unique position of knowing that sanctions are only sustainable to the EU for so long, while at the same time quite literally controlling the flow of gas and oil to EU Member States. This is a pressure point he has no trouble taking advantage of.

To force citizen compliance during the military takeover of Crimea, Putin temporarily ceased the flow of pipeline oil to Ukraine.¹⁷ This caused several freezing deaths and became a small crisis in and of itself; for many Europeans, it was reminiscent of larger scale flow obstruction five years earlier. In 2009, due to supposed transit issues in Ukraine. Referring again to Austvik, “Russia claimed Ukraine was not paying for...gas, and that it diverted to itself gas intended to be exported to the EU. In January 2009, as many as 18 EU countries lost their Russian supplies because of the transit problems in Ukraine.”¹⁸ Many more people died in this diversion of fuel than did in 2014, but the Crimean cutoff came as a stark reminder that European lives and lives of those reliant on Russia are very much at the mercy of the Kremlin. The ongoing situation in Crimea highlights the necessity for what many actors and elites are already advocating: a unified body that can generate European energy independent of volatile, oil-rich states like Russia. Because Russia is Europe’s fuel hegemon, the EU cannot intervene regionally even if there are strong moral, legal, and political rationales for intervention.

This fuel-induced paralysis emphasizes the importance of making a shift away from Russian (and other foreign) imports. Leaders like Donald Tusk understand the danger and limits that can arise from being very dependent on Russia for its energy. The Crimean annexation served as a catalyst for the outpouring of national support for a new European Energy Union. The included timeline enumerates some significant dates and events, supplemented with dates of EU/US sanctions imposed on Russia. The call for energy unification began to resonate in the weeks and months after the Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. the European Council

¹⁶ In February and March of 2014, the Russian military held a referendum in Crimea in which 95.5% of those who voted opted to leave Ukraine and join Russia. The EU and the USA both rejected this referendum and question its legitimacy in light of probable coercion. *DeVolkskrant*, “Teruglezen: Feest op de Krim na eerste uitslagen referendum”, (2014).

¹⁷ Austvik, “The EU Energy Union, Energy Security and Russian Gas,” (2015).

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

had quickly prioritized the European Energy Union on its list of projects and objectives for the Union.¹⁹



Because the EU is unable to coerce Russia to comply with its demands, and because Putin could potentially cause a massive economic downturn in the EU, Member States are rendered more or less diplomatically impotent. The Energy Union paves a path out of this quagmire and prevents the EU from being handicapped in the future. The immediate objective of the EEU will be to set a stern tone with the Kremlin and Gazprom,²⁰ through stripping “bilateral agreements...of any secret and market-distorting clauses.”²¹ It becomes increasingly evident that European vulnerability to Russian whims is at the forefront of Council President Tusk’s mind: ...mechanisms guaranteeing solidarity among member states should be strengthened in case energy supplies are again cut off, as they were in the cold winter of 2009 when Russia’s previous dispute with Ukraine stopped gas flowing to a number of EU nations. Europe must be safe in the knowledge that its gas supply is assured, its storage facilities are sufficient and its gas networks are uninterrupted.²²

Solidarity, security, independence, and a responsibility to better manage the earth and its resources; these are all elements that are pointed to by advocates for the EEU and which will likely be addressed by the EEU in the not-so-distant future. The 2014 Crimean infringement and the outrage and panic that it caused came at a critical moment and in the context of an already unstable and unpredictable energy market. When combined with the uncertain future of the environment, the birth of the Energy Union may as well have been predestined.


¹⁹ European Council and the Council of the European Union, “Energy union for Europe”, (November, 2017), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-union/#>.

²⁰ Gazprom is a Russian state gas and oil company responsible for the majority of Russian fuel imported into EU Member States. For more on Gazprom, see: Rawi E. Abdelal, Sogomon Tarontsi and Alexander Jorov, “Gazprom (A): Energy and Strategy in Russian History”, Harvard Business School Case 709-008, August 2008. (Revised July 2009.)

²¹ Donald Tusk, *Financial Times*, “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehold”, (2014).

²² *Ibid.*

A Cleaner Future



Source: Eurostat Energy Balances (2015); ICCT (2014) 'Upstream Emissions of Fossil Fuel Feedstocks for Transport Fuels Consume in the European Union'

Note(s): CO₂ intensity of oil production is based on average values by region for 2010


Climate change is a self-created existential threat to humankind. Sixteen of the seventeen warmest years in recorded history have occurred since 2001 and the trend only maintains. Ice sheets are vanishing, snow cover is receding, and global sea levels have risen eight inches in the past few decades.²³ If one were somehow able to look at the energy infrastructure as well as the short- and long-term energy plans of the EU in a political and historical vacuum—removed from Russian aggression, U.S. competitiveness, poor diversification of fuel sources, etc.—it would still be one of the most important policy areas one could possibly analyze. This is due to the fact that climate change is intensifying at rates that are beyond alarming, and adapting our energy to a dying planet is the only way we may find a cure. For this reason, one of the most deeply rooted foundational points for the Energy Union is the development and pursuit of alternative and renewable energy sources. With landmark documents like the Kyoto Protocol and, more recently, the Paris Climate Accords (which is now ratified by every country except for the United States) in place, discussions of renewable energy development are at the head of the table. It holds political advantages too; if Europe can become less reliant on oil and gas and expand to more and more renewable, internally generated energy sources, their complicated relationship

²³ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, *Global Climate Change*, "Vital Signs of the Planet", (November 2017), <https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/>.

with Russia will be greatly untangled. Consider the following data from the website of the European Council: “75% of EU housing is energy inefficient. 94% of transport relies on oil products, of which 90% are imported. Wholesale electricity and gas prices are respectively over 30% and 100% higher than in the US.”²⁴ If the EU manages to sculpt an Energy Union that aggressively pursues alternative fuel sources and implements them whenever and wherever possible, not only will the cost of energy decrease, but so too will the carbon footprint of the EU as well as the overall level of European vulnerability. The following graph illustrates the carbon impact of the EU-Russia energy relationship.²⁵

A few examples of alternative energies that are currently receiving attention in the context of the EEU debate are solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and nuclear energy, to name a few. Of course, not all countries are equally skilled or motivated to produce regular, useful renewable energy, and some lack the capacity to technologically expand much beyond oil and natural gasses. What happens when an energy mandate or regulation is passed down that economically harmful or downright unfeasible to a Member State? This is where the Energy Union may really shine.

In light of today’s formidable need for more renewables, many countries (like Germany, Norway, Sweden) have prioritized the expansion of their renewable and alternative energy



²⁴ Some of the most recent statistics on energy usage available at www.consilium.europa.eu.

²⁵ Transport & Environment, “A Study on Oil Dependency in the EU”, (July 2016), https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2016_07_Study_EU_oil_dependency.pdf.

sectors. Under the Energy Union, states that are capable of producing and expanding their renewable sources and states that are capable of substantial diversification are encouraged to do so. States that lack that capability are not penalized, but rather assisted under the new European energy-sharing policies (which have yet to be effectively updated, but in the future likely will be). The following chart from Eurostat demonstrates the latest trends in renewable energy consumption and points to a future rife with alternative energy sources.²⁶

Conclusions

Why Energy Union? Why now? The European Union has a profound need to foster its own independence; this is to guarantee lessened vulnerability to unforeseen externalities, an increase in solidarity and deepened integration among Member States, and to reduce the specter of global warming the best that they can. Under this set of conditions, and with just enough pressure from their Russian neighbors, the majority of European elite actors agree that a European Energy Union is a vital first step in addressing and adapting to today's climate, both literally and geopolitically.

Energy, obviously, is the basis of an economy and of a nation-state. Becoming unified on the foundational resources of their nations will allow the EU-28 to focus on other areas of integration. The spillover effect from fuel and energy solidarity will likely be nothing short of outstanding, with changes and deeper assimilation to be facilitated in economic, environmental, and normative arenas as well.

²⁶ Eurostat, "Renewable energy statistics", (June 12017).
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics.

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Popular or national sovereignty? – Biased prioritization in the EU

By Ricardo Rauseo

Unofficially, what it is now known as the European Union has abided by a set of values and principles that hold together the core of Europe. Words like democracy, the rule-of-law, and the protection of human rights come into mind and are taken for granted in this unique polity and single market. But do all values have the same weight under the EU officials' eyes, or do certain circumstances prioritize certain beliefs? In this paper, two different crises are compared, distant in time, yet alike in nature: Cyprus's accession to the European Union in terms of its disinterest for unification of the island, and the most contemporary example, Catalonia's cry for independence and European Union's stance on an integrated nation. The examination and analysis reveals the basic dimensions of the response by the European Union to these two crises and as an unexpected consequence, exemplifies the nature of the EU's strength as a global actor and their problem-solving abilities. It is not in the scope of this investigation to analyze the reasons behind Catalanian officials or Greek Cypriots to vote for independence or remain separated, respectively. As stated before, the European Union and its response to each event is the main focus of this argument.

Although not completely the same, both cases present similarities when it comes to context and the European Union's response. The two are regionalist movements that seek to break away or remain seceded from a nation or state and in both cases the EU has shown a rather "passive" leadership to crisis management. On the contrary, the "majoritarian actor" favors separation in the Cyprus case, while it is the one calling for unity and the maintenance of territorial integrity in the Spain. Cyprus does not have the same geographical or political weight that a country like Spain has.

Review of EU Actorness

This research created the question of the European Union's capabilities and effectiveness as an actor in the global stage. Robert Dover argued that during the Bosnian Civil War, "the EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches" (Dover, 2005). Hill's framework states that the EU can be regarded as a state-like actor or an intergovernmental organization. In the latter, there would be a floor to discuss and "formulate common responses to the crisis in the Balkans" (Dover, 2005). If this is the case, no Member State rose as a leader to solve the Yugoslavian Crisis, and therefore the EU was perceived to have little to no credibility to act effectively. In terms of the Cyprus and Catalanian case, the EU has remained indifferent in both cases, even though it has had different reasons to justify this disinterest. In Cyprus, the European Union favored the will of the people, and not the "state's democracy" of the island as a whole. In Catalonia's case, the "popular democracy" was called upon by the head of the Generalitat de Catalunya, yet remained unheard because the EU favored the sovereignty of an indivisible Spain.

Before talking about its capacities, it is important to be aware that the Union's actions are shaped by their global image. As mentioned by Amelia Hadfield, the EU suffers a "reputational damage" as a result of their negative responses to the crisis (Hadfield, 2016). Because of the European Union's youthfulness, it is still trying to define itself and figure out how to perform in the global system, "external images of the EU operate as a 'reality check' for the EU's own vision of its role as an international leader and its status as a recognized power in an increasingly

multipolar world” (Hadfield, 2016). These characteristics according to Chaban and Holland rely on four factors: positive expectations, alterations in the identity of other parties, negative attitudes, and active rejection. Their perceptions of other actors like the United States, Russia and China have influenced the decision making of EU officials. In these crises, their passivity is performative; due to the fact that to act can trigger detrimental consequences, not to act seems like the better option. Remaining indifferent gives the EU the ability to demonstrate that it is not an “imperial” intervenor, which seems for some in the international system to be much less aggravating than interventionist; for others it is interpreted as complicit.

A Review of EU Values and Enforcement Mechanisms to Protect Internal Values

The European Union has no legal tool to deal with uncooperative or unreliable states, therefore, their actions are tied to avoiding situations in which states, or in this case, regions, might not comply with core values of the European Union. These values encompassed in the Treaty of Lisbon, indicate that “The Union is founded on the ...respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (European Union, 2007). Ironically, it was only until the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 when a “penalty” was created against those who did not adhere to these values. Article 7, by taking away voting rights, worked to deter any rejection of EU values from occurring in member-states. So far never used and feared to be applied for lack of effective means, it has just encouraged the idea that the EU’s legal framework and political capabilities were only meant for “best case scenarios”, such as, a Europe without a migration crisis, without an unstable East, without the Russian threat to European security, without dissenting nations, without rising nationalism.

The European Union defines democracy as a value that “encompasses civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” (European Union, 2016). The EU is adamant in “protecting the universal nature of human rights when this are questioned on grounds of cultural” (European Union, 2016) or, here stressed: “political differences”. They are engaged in promoting and protecting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law worldwide” (European Union, 2016). In this explanation, there is an emphasis on human rights, specifically, regarding the importance of the rule of law and protection of minority rights. Regardless of their political affiliations, the democracy of the people, and more specifically, European citizens, is hereby protected by the Union. Moreover, Anthony Coughlan states, rather implicitly, that the EU “stands for the self-determination of nations” first proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution, and now a basic principle of international law in the United Nations Charter. The EU asserts “the right of those nations that wish it to have their independence, sovereignty and a Nation State of their own” (Coughlan), this is all in hopes that they will have an equal voice internationally and vis-a-vis other nations (Coughlan). The author further specifies that these statements do not “urge people of other nations to assert their right to self-determination” but that the European Union respects their wish and will “show solidarity with them if they decide” to do so (Coughlan). The EU contradictorily supports both popular sovereignty and the integrity of sovereign states’ borders, despite possible changes in popular will to change borders. Essentially, there is an inherent conflict between these two European Union principles. Though implicit, the idea of democracy is flawed because it favors both individual people and a community as a whole, the popular and the national sovereignty.

Cyprus: The EU Prioritizes Popular Sovereignty

In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was founded. With the excuse of enforcing the “13th Amendments” proposed by Archbishop Makarios, the “Bloody Christmas” of 1963 marked the death of two Turkish Cypriots on the hands of the police. This led to the Turkish Cypriots stepping down from government, marking the start of decades of violence on the island. Only until 1974, when the Turkish army intervened, that the possibility of a united Cyprus arose, a possibility that gained support in 1983 with the proclamation of independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) (Suvarierol, 2003). In 2004, the country which everyone except Turkey recognizes as the “Republic of Cyprus”, became a European Union Member State. Though controversial, the process of accession meant that the northern part of the island would be exempt from EU legislation, official use of the Euro, and the Schengen area; yet for purposes of seats in the Parliament, they were and are considered as a whole. Dubiously, the EU did not and has not yet used their power for unification of the region under the pretext that the Annan Plan. A UN proposal to do so failed; therefore, they justify their inaction under a veil of protecting democracy and legitimacy for “both sides”. In 2002, the Annan plan was first presented in the United Nations. After plenty of revisions, the final proposal of 2004 encouraged the creation of the “United Cyprus Republic”, led by the two parties involved, acting together through a federal government. A bicameral legislature: a senate and a chamber of deputies, would work under the same constitution. Essentially, the plan would eliminate the extended military intervention on the island, Greek Cypriots would return to their homes along with compensations and Turkish Cypriots would be able to enjoy the same rights as every other European Union citizen. It would also give them a single voice in the Union by sharing a Turkish Cypriot Commissioner and a Greek Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs (Neophytou, 2006).

Spain: The EU Prioritizes National Sovereignty Over Popular Will

On the other side of the Mediterranean, the King of Aragón, in the 15th century marries the Princess of Castilla, uniting two kingdoms. The ethnic and language barriers between what later became the Spanish Nation have been highly contested ever since and have historically sparked many regionalist movements in Catalonia. In October of 2017, not too far from the Cypriot coast; Carles Puigdemont, head of the Generalitat de Catalunya, called for a referendum of independence in the region. Highly disputed by the Spanish government, being called illegitimate and leading to hundreds of injuries from protests, this contemporary event has received little attention from the European Union. The ideas of encouraging unity and reiterating the importance of sovereignty have not been addressed by the EU. This has been classified as the “biggest crisis for a generation” (Badcock, 2017), threatening to cause disruption in already fragile institution.

The European Union’s response was a call for dialogue and integrity. Donald Tusk, the European Council President tweeted “For EU nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutor,”...urging the Spanish central government to favor “force of argument, not argument of force.” (Boffey, 2017). Then again, Puigdemont, among other leaders in Catalonia, did call for a dialogue with Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy that was denied (Carvajal, 2017). Jean Claude Juncker, the Commission President asserted that the European Union should not interfere in the debate between Spain and Catalonia, and that the EU does not need more fractures in the Union (El Pais, 2017). Antonio Tajani went out to say that the police used excessive force against protestants, and regards the matter as a constitutional issue since the independence is contrary to

the rule of law, the legality of Catalonia's autonomy and the Spanish constitution (El Pais, 2017). The European Union then, is distancing itself from the issue under the pretext that it is Spain that needs to find a solution. By doing so, their inaction does not actively antagonize either of the actors. Yet discursively they show an even more troubling flaw, their powerlessness in conflict resolution and lack of a strong arm in their own community. Namely, how Catalonia's independence is supposed to violate two specific articles from the Spanish Constitution. Article 1.2 states that "National sovereignty is vested in the Spanish people, from whom emanate the powers of the State" (Spanish Constitution, 1987) and, Article 2 that talks about the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all" (Spanish Constitution, 1987).

In Cyprus' case, the European Union took a completely different stance. Why did the EU not use its power for unification in the Annan Plan, a UN proposal? The European Union became an important reason why the Greek rejected the plan. "Having safeguarded their accession as the Republic of Cyprus, the EU gave them no motive to contribute to a solution before accession." (Euroactiv, 2015). Furthermore, Tassos Papadoupoulos, by then president of the Republic of Cyprus, called on his constituents to reject the Annan Plan: "...should our people reject the plan by their vote, [...] the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal member of the European Union [...] Greek-Cypriot people, the consequences of 'yes' are much more severe; I call you to reject the Annan Plan" (Kyris, 2012). Additionally, "The EU provided no strategic incentives to the Greek Cypriot side to pursue reunification afterwards". Their justification for these two approaches were that they were protecting democracy and legitimacy for "both sides", again, demonstrating how they prioritized the popular democracy over the sovereign state of the island.

Since then, membership has only fueled the Greek Cypriots position in the global stage (Tocci, 2002). Both against Turkey through the UN, and against the Turkish Cypriots in terms of unification, the Republic of Cyprus has EU's weight on their side, reinforcing their independence as an actor. Because of this, even with the European Union efforts aiding the development of the Turkish Cypriot Community in preparation of the implementation of the EU law since 2004, the Greek Cypriots still remain indifferent to a resolution, therefore, these attempts have been ineffective. More recently, Juncker said in his State of the Union Speech in September 2016 that "we need to get this done. Now...Europe is a driving force that can help bring about the unification of Cyprus" (Maurice, 2016). Is this going to elicit any change in the island?

In terms of enlargement the EU prides itself in the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of rules that determine if a country is eligible to apply for membership. Helen Sjusen concludes on her work on "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy" that the main reason behind European Union's drive to enlarge is not based on utility or rights but on identity. This is what makes the Turkish case so intriguing. French Prime Minister Alain Juppé stated that West Europe had almost a moral responsibility with Central and Eastern Europeans because they belong to that entity. With Turkey it is different: "Rather than a natural part of the European family, Turkey is described as an important partner of Europe" (Sjusen, 2003) sometimes grouped and discussed under the same realm as Israel and Morocco (Sjusen, 2003). As seen in the long and strenuous process of Turkish accession to the Union, the reason for Turkish enlargement is not because it needs to "return to Europe" nor that the European Union owes anything to it, but because it is strategic to do so (Sjusen, 2003). It all comes down to a problem of identity, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has faced dislike from the EU

since they could not find cohesiveness between their “European values” and the “Turkish” character, a “kinship-based duty”.

Interests, Biases, and Crises: Explaining the EU’s Inconsistency

The question remaining then is: why did the EU prioritize democratic sovereignty for the Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus referendum for unification and Spanish national sovereignty in the Catalan referendum for independence? Overall, this can be analyzed with a three-dimensional approach, based primarily on interests, biases and the crises. Although, it is important to acknowledge two things: the crisis in Catalunya is ongoing and actors and their discourses may change, the literature regarding the Cyprus case mostly argues that the EU’s decision was not intentional (opposite to this argument) and that it was rather an underestimation of its power to encourage unity among Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Essentially “the EU overestimated the economic “carrots” provided to the Turkish Cypriots” and they “downplayed their security related concerns related to the positions in a potential bi-communal state.” (Bahcheli, 2006.)

The EU’s stance in Cyprus can be framed in terms of their interest because of the ongoing fear of being considered a hegemonic power; again, that constant struggle between the EU being a supranational or an intergovernmental entity. The issue on the island became extremely politicized and the EU wanted to avoid a crisis with member-state Greece, which could have been displeased by an unsatisfactory Cypriot unification plan. At that time, the European Union put much less weight on integration; because the Eastern wave of enlargement, would “bring back” all those states to Europe, which had been separated from its European community since WWII (Sjursen, 2003). Eastern Enlargement caused a great deal of internal concern and dampened any more proactiveness on the part of the EU. Finally, addressing the inherent biases of the Union; given that Turkey is not and has little to no possibility of becoming a member of the conglomerated states, promoting the unification to include Turkish Cypriots as European citizens was not exactly cheered in Brussels.

Ironically, Catalonia’s case follows a rather similar vein. Currently, the European Union values integration much more than enlargement given the current political climate both abroad and between Member States; this has only been exacerbated by the current crises, with Iran, Ukraine and its own future on the line; as well as Brexit, the migrant and the Eurozone crisis, the EU has no space or time for another rupture. Just as Con Coughlin said: “To have another wealthy European region bidding adios to Brussels would be yet another bitter blow to the EU’s own long-term chances of survival” (Coughlin, 2017). Lastly-the biases-the EU favors national sovereignty in Spain because of the Spanish investment in the Union, being one of the major supporters of further integration. One explanation lies on their “slavish devotion to the EU’s cause” (The National, 2017).

Conclusions

The European Union has only been able to grow and develop itself under political pressures both abroad and within itself. Its core, as Robert Dahl has pointed out, has required a shift to the “grander scale of transnational governments” (Dahl, 1994). It has had to invent concepts never conceived of through a traditional perspective of the nation state functioning. Though talking about the democratic deficit, he brings something interesting to conversation that has never been heard of. Maybe the answer to the question of accomplishing a transnational “state” lies in unfamiliar procedures or institutions never heard of in Academia. Most likely yes,

that the Union has been able to encounter these legal instruments and political strategies in dealing with conflict and setbacks is another question still not answered by scholars.

Were the Catalanian and Cypriot crises handled correctly by the EU? Ironically, there is no complete answer for any of these cases. As said before, it depends on the way the European Union is regarded, what is expected of it, and what is it capable of. If looked at as a supranational state, yes; it should have definitely intervened in both crises by acting as a mediator for the Catalanian and Spanish government and by using their political incentives and normative power to unify Cyprus. If this is not the case, and the European Union should remain an intergovernmental and regulatory state, the EU did well in leaving these disputes as constitutional issues. The real question to answer is, will its inaction both as an actor in the global stage and within the Member States achieve the demise of the European project? The EU started with the goal of achieving lasting peace in Europe, if this dream falls to the hands of nationalist populism and the rising regionalism experienced in the last years, the “Old Continent” will soon cease to be a beacon of hope and instead will turn into an example of how intergovernmental institutions are doomed to remain as utopian ideals.

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Superpower Relations: New Dynamics

Premature calls have been made that have attempted to herald a hegemonic shift that would change the existing world order. These calls, however, are not completely unfounded. With the U.S. continuously challenged by its Russian and Chinese adversaries and newly-industrializing countries leveraging their economic power to find seats at the negotiating table, the decline of American influence seems as if it were imminent. Although, the “rise of the rest,” as coined by declinists, has not yet materialized and the U.S. maintains its foothold as a global superpower, with its strong economy, unrivaled military capacity, and promising opportunity for foreign investment solidifying such a position. The question of a new world order still remains and has been debated more fervently in recent days, especially due to the new U.S. administration’s flirtations with isolationist policies and its rather unilateral agenda. Is the U.S. willing and able to continue its role as a global hegemon? If not, which state or states will prove to be viable challengers?



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Authors In this Section

HAILEY BECKER

Hailey Becker received two B.A.'s in International Studies and Political Science along with a minor in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida (UF). She is from Fort Lauderdale, Florida but is also a citizen of Peru. During her time at UF, she worked on several Florida State Senate campaigns and the Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Hailey is currently a Federal Legislative Affairs Intern at the nonpartisan policy institute, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, where she helps monitor current legislation and its effect on median and low-income people. She is passionate about immigrant's rights, the effects of globalization and women's role in politics.

DOV LEVIN

Dov Levin is a second year political science major from Boca Raton, Florida. Interested in international politics from a young age, Dov writes about the current geopolitical climate and political phenomena taking shape throughout the world. Having spent much time following and studying in the 2016 presidential election in particular, he is uniquely informed on the effects of the current administration taking shape domestically as well as internationally. Law school is his plan upon completion of his undergraduate years, and his career intention is to practice law. Dov also serves as the Mock Trial Chairman for the Pre-Legal Honor Society. Outside of the classroom and while not writing, he enjoys the beach, playing cards, being with friends and keeping active.

The Politics of EU and NATO Foreign Policy: The Russia-Ukraine Crisis

By Hailey Becker

Abstract

The Russia-Ukraine crisis¹ is an ongoing battle between power and security, that despite years of endeavored negotiations and ceasefires, remains unresolved. The crisis's effects have been felt throughout the world as international bodies, like the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have made attempts to appease the situation but have been unsuccessful in reaching a permanent solution. In an effort to understand what approaches have been made, how they were decided upon, and why they have not been successful, this paper analyzes the differing methods employed by the EU and NATO in their response to the prevalent Russia-Ukraine crisis. Additionally, the paper seeks to answer why neither agency has implemented a viable resolution in the past three years, how they decided on those approaches, and what a possible solution would look like. To answer these questions, I will be looking at both international bodies, respectively, at the supranational² level to identify how the agendas of both respective agents led to differing strategies employed and ultimately a failure to resolve the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Introduction/Background of Crisis

Historian Anna Reid ironically reveals that “*Ukraina* is literally translated as ‘on the edge’ or ‘borderland’...” (2015, pg. 1). This uncanny translation accurately depicts Ukraine’s unstable past and contentious relationship with Russia. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has had years in the making; it is the result of decades of political debate, clashing identities, and oscillation between East and West.³ While some argue that the history of the conflict goes back to Ukraine’s time as part of the Soviet Union, when it became a transit country for Russia’s gas exportation (Skalamera, 2015); others insist that the crisis stemmed from Western hegemony through NATO’s enlargement and the EU’s expansion towards eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014). Each of those arguments is well-founded and the crisis can be seen as a consequence of both, but more importantly, the remnants of the USSR and Western influence embedded a cognitive dissonance in ‘Ukrainian’ identity that divided the population and fueled the crisis. The crisis began in November 2013 when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich halted a trade agreement with the EU, which had popular support from the Ukrainian citizens in the western part of the country, and vowed to work with Russia (Reid, 2015).⁴ This event caused massive protests in Ukraine’s capital, Kiev, which were met with violence, shifts in government, and chaos. The crisis further escalated in February 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and sent troops to eastern Ukraine (Reid, 2015). Since then, hundreds have died, Ukraine’s government has switched more than three times, ceasefires and truces have fallen through, and no solution proposed by either the EU or NATO has managed to succeed.

This paper aims to illustrate that the EU and NATO have not found a viable solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict because of their differing organizational structures, varying member

¹ From here on out, any use of ‘the conflict’ or ‘the crisis’ refers to the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

² In this case, by supranational I mean focusing on the main committees within the EU and NATO that are directly in charge of foreign policy-making and have jurisdiction beyond the scope of the national government of the member countries.

³ East, referring to Russia’s influence, and West, alluding more to the European Union’s pull.

⁴ A full timeline of the event in the crisis can be found at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275>.

nations, and contrasting interests that have caused them to approach the precarious situation with conflicting motives and ultimately separate goals; this paper tests this argument by explaining, interpreting, and evaluating the EU's and NATO's previous strategies and policies within the scope of the last three years to suggest more effective ones. By examining the EU and NATO through economic, political, and security lenses,⁵ I will address (1) the recent background of the agents and of the issue, (2) motives and stakes of each actor, (3) previous policies employed to address the issue, (4) why those strategies have failed, and (5) feasible solutions for the future. Albeit many scholars, such as Michael Rühle and Margriet Drent, have constructed theories to understand the complexity of the Russia-Ukraine situation and the nature of EU-NATO relations, and have proposed suggested remedies, this specific argument using the framework or case study of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has not been made previously. Looking at the shortcomings of EU and NATO policies and how the policies are produced, specifically within the Russia-Ukraine case, is imperative because these powerful global actors influence foreign policy decisions throughout the world and thus, the politics behind their decision-making should be understood by the public.

Additionally, the conventional wisdom believes international bodies should be accountable and effective in their resolutions; thus, understanding why their previous policies towards the crisis have failed helps us understand how they can be more effective policy decision-makers in the future. Take for example, the recent shooting down of Malaysian airline flight in July 2014, which shows the relevance of this issue. This civilian flight, that was shot down by pro-separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, became a huge controversy in the ensuing months. Furthermore, it reflected the urgent need for NATO and the EU to address and appease the Russia-Ukraine conflict as it continues to pose a threat for innocent people (Pifer & Thoburn, 2014). Many scholars have noted this concern, "...the ability of irredentist nationalists backed by great powers to threaten the peace of Europe has once again become apparent. The shooting down of MH17 also suggests that others from outside the immediate zone of conflict can and will become casualties" (Monash University, 2014). The EU and NATO's respective policies to be examined have been perpetually weak due to their conflicting interests behind their foreign policy decisions.

Brief History of Agents

The European Union was established post-World War II as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to ensure mutual economic dependency through the member states in order to avoid the outbreak of another European war. The EU has (arguably)⁶ evolved and grown into a supranational organization of 28 members.⁷ Its main committees formally responsible for foreign policy matters are the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Foreign and Security Defense Policy (CSDP)⁸, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Political and Security Council (PSC), and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

⁵ I will be looking at both agents' economic, political, and security concerns in the Russia-Ukraine conflict to help explain their strategies beyond simple speculation.

⁶ Many argue at times that the EU should be considered more intergovernmental rather than supranational.

⁷ The current 28 members of the EU are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia (European Commission, 2015).

⁸ CSDP officially became part of the CFSP in 2009 under the Treaty of Lisbon (Genderen & Legrand, 2016).

Policy⁹. These committees make the aspects of executing global decisions a lengthy one filled with bureaucratic ‘red tape’ (Genderen & Legrand, 2016).

On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established prior to the ECSC to warrant increased military cooperation between the member states and eventually attain a robust collective defense strategy towards the rising Soviet Union (NATO, 2012). Similar to the EU, NATO has expanded over the course of the last 68 years and now has 28 member nations.¹⁰ NATO’s main bodies accountable for foreign policy decisions are the NATO Foreign Ministers, the International Staff, the International Military Staff, and several ad-hoc committees that are established when a specific issue arises (NATO, 2016).¹¹ The lack of consistent structures when dealing with foreign affairs makes it increasingly difficult for NATO to execute policies and plans.

The EU and NATO vary in their purposes for being created. The EU was created in an attempt at economic ties and peace through diplomacy, while NATO was constructed to ensure military protection and stability, yet they are expected to work together. Oftentimes they work together to deal with world crises, like the Russia-Ukraine conflict this paper analyzes. While NATO and the EU have mutual member nations¹², they do not have all the same member states, making working together a complex task. The overlap in some members but not others complicates their ability to co-operate and has further deterred them from establishing a permanent solution for the Ukrainian conflict.

Behind the Agenda(s) & Strategies

The differing organizational structures and bureaucratic procedures¹³ of NATO and the EU are the first major reasons the actors have had difficulty in agreeing upon a solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the past three years. The second reason their strategies have fallen short of success can be seen in the contrasting motives and stakes that each agent possesses. Both the EU and NATO have separate, yet at times, similar interests that composed their agendas when responding to a crisis. In “Case of Ukraine and Interests of the Major Players”, Crina Soroiu claims that the varied interests of these key players act as embedded limitations to reaching a solution (2014). These interests can be divided into three spheres, economic, political, and security. In light of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the EU and NATO differ mostly in the political realm, but do share similarities in their economic and security-related concerns. These shared or separate qualms also serve to explain why the EU and NATO chose divergent strategies that ultimately failed because they were tailored to their own respective interests, rather than on compromising their approaches to best resolve the crisis.

⁹ The European Parliament (EP) is informally involved and active in the entire process of the EU’s foreign policy, albeit they don’t have the formal power over foreign affairs that the CFSP/CSDP has (Genderen & Legrand, 2016).

¹⁰ The current members of the NATO are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, and Croatia (NATO).

¹¹ The specific actors within NATO that make foreign policy decisions vary based on the situation or issue. For more information on NATO’s structure visit <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm#OA>.

¹² The 22 overlapping members that EU and NATO share are Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia.

¹³ Refers to NATO’s and EU’s adverse committees that I spoke of earlier, like the EU’s CFSP and NATO’s Foreign Ministers, that were created to handle foreign policy matters. The bureaucratic procedures refer to the differing methods those committees use to create options or solutions that their organization can enact.

Through an economical lens, both actors have common interests of protecting the economies of their member states and securing many nations' reliance on Russia for gas. The EU's reliance on Russia's gas is significant, as 29% of member states' oil was imported from Russia in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016). This factor, for example, led the EU several times to employ forceful sanctions, freezing of assets, and travel bans on Russia because many of its members hesitated to use harsher tactics in fear that their economies would suffer or their petroleum supply would be cut off. (Timeline - EU Restrictive Measures...). During the following months after the annexation of Crimea, the EU slowly responded to its best interests by implementing economic and trade sanctions incrementally, and deciding to "suspend bilateral talks" with Russia in the meantime (Timeline - EU Restrictive Measures...).¹⁴ The European Union's response to the events of the crisis reflect it's economic concerns that withheld it from responding with the necessary force needed to solve the crisis, and instead caused it to take a 'tip-toe' approach in response to Russia's violations.

Additionally, Soroiu (2014) states that the EU's choice for soft power approaches, like the various economic sanctions it imposed on Russia, has more to do with the "unequal military capabilities of member states and the lack of consensus on the definition of defense within the organization" (pg. 119). In addition to this argument, scholar Morena Skalamera in "The Ukraine Crisis: The Neglected Gas Factor" points out that while the EU is generally successful in using soft power to deter crises and appease conflicts, this time its complex foreign policy process and interests disabled the EU's usual strategies from working (2015). She further describes that, "...while the EU is better positioned in terms of soft power, its inherent structural deficiencies have prevented the EU, thus far, from deploying consistent and tangible influence abroad" (Skalamera, 2015).

Similarly, NATO took a soft power stance on the issue since many of its members – especially the 22 belonging to both agencies – felt strongly about guarding their economies from any extra effects the approaches would have. Thus, following the annexation of Crimea and the official escalation in the crisis, NATO responded strategically to its interests as well, by "endorsing additional measures to bolster Ukraine's self-defense capability" on June 25, 2014, and deciding to "suspend all practical military and civilian cooperation with Russia" on March 31, 2014 (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2016). Their similar responses to the crisis after the Crimea incident reveals their shared concerns, in this instance, over their members' economies.

While the EU and NATO had similar motives in an economic sense, politically, their responses to the Russia-Ukraine crisis varied due to their diverging interests. In the political realm, the actors' antagonistic strategies were based more on the struggle for power and influence in the sphere. In "NATO and the Ukraine Crisis", Michael Rühle (2015, pg. 81) claims that many people believed that the crisis would be NATO's 'comeback', a means to rise as a major presence in European affairs again. I argue that while this political theory may not hold merit, the perception of it may have influenced the way NATO responded to the crisis. Additionally, the vast political interests that NATO had, induced their decision to not respond militarily because they assessed that the costs were too high since The Ukraine is not a member of either agency, and NATO believed that Russia's military was still underdeveloped (Rühle, 2015, 81-82).

On the other hand, politically, the EU was more interested in allying with Ukraine and encouraging its development as a democracy, leading them to work directly with Ukraine – without NATO's involvement – by ratifying the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on June 27, 2014 (Lironi, 2015, pg. 4). The EU's reasoning for this action stemmed from its motivation to have a

¹⁴ A specific layout of day-to-day meetings, agreements, and actions taken by the EU's foreign policy actors can be found at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>.

stable neighbor and political buffer from Russia's ideology. Policy Officer, Elisa Lironi, further confirms this notion by pointing out that since the onset of the crisis, "the EU has strengthened its relations with Ukraine, condemned Russia's behavior in the annexation of Crimea... However, it has been unable to push Russia to withdraw its troops from eastern Ukraine and to completely respect the ceasefire, nor to negotiate a stable long-term solution for the country and the region" (2015, pg. 1). This reveals how the actor behaved according to its interests when responding to the crisis and thus inhibiting its ability to show legitimacy as a foreign policy actor.

Security-wise, NATO's and the EU's concerns align somewhat. While both bodies wanted to de-escalate the situation and appease the violence on both ends, their biggest difference lies in the United States' substantial influence as a major contributing member to NATO's defense budget, causing them to have significant sway in NATO's agenda towards the crisis. Their shared troubles factor in through the lacking consensus amongst each of the organizations' members, in part, explaining the difficulty they have had in cooperating to resolve the conflict. For example, in "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe*", authors Paul Belkin, Derek Mix, and Steven Woehrel (2014) suggest that NATO's inability to resolve the Russia-Ukraine crisis comes from internal division between the members: "...within Europe, some allies have emphasized the need for territorial defense capabilities, while others have stressed the importance of more flexible, rapidly deployable units and civilian-military crisis management operations" (pg. 284). Similarly, Rühle states that it has been difficult for NATO to implement a working solution because the agency is torn between protecting its members from Russia while also wanting to build some level of rapport or civility with them (2015, pg. 80). These divisions help explain to the public the stakes at hand for major foreign policy actors and why the politics behind any decision they make most likely reflects their motives, rather than their character.

Additionally, the European Union's apprehensions regarding security mirror NATO's in the divisive nature of the organization. Their concern for the security of the member states in the East compelled the EU to struggle in composing effective strategies as they attempted to balance internal divisiveness and a mix of governance. In "From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis of EU Governance: Regulatory Failure, Redistributive Conflict and Eurosceptic Publics*", scholar Tanja Börzel (2016) mentions, "Some even argue that the EU has not only failed to provide solutions but that is actually part of the problem undermining the capacity of its Member States to effectively and democratically govern their markets and societies in the 21st century" (pg. 8). She further criticizes that the EU, as a foreign policy actor, shows relative weakness in handling crises because of its combination of national and supranational governance (2016). The overlap in governance and internal flaws of the EU have contributed to the various interests at play, which in turn, made it problematic for the EU to propose solutions that were less entailed to its members' interests and more focused on the threats the conflict posed. This behind-the-scenes layout of the politics involved in the EU's and NATO's making of foreign policy lays the foundation to explore the reasons their respective strategies failed to resolve the conflict.

Evaluation of Strategies

The EU and NATO's alternate organizational structures, varying interests and oftentimes conflicting agendas help to explain their difficulty in resolving the Ukraine crisis years after its commencement. At first glance, when examining the strategies NATO used, its initial responses were in line with an expectation of reacting with aggressive policies and hard power because of NATO's predetermined nature. For example, in 2014, NATO's airborne warning and control system increased their surveillance over Ukraine and eastern countries like Romania and Poland

(Belkin et al., pg. 285) despite their ‘softer’¹⁵ approaches taken later on. They also contemplated more upfront policies (Belkin et al., 2014, pg. 285-86), such as expanding the deployment of naval and ground forces over the Baltic States, but the fluctuations in NATO’s policies was again due to the division amongst member-states’ interests discussed earlier - leading to failure. NATO’s struggle to maintain its hard power approach was also for geopolitical reasons. Belkin et al. (2014, pg. 286) argue that allies in Eastern and Central Europe supported stronger military policies as they were more exposed to the violence caused because of the conflict, but other allies “cautioned against a “militarization” of NATO’s relations with Russia” fearing the consequences of any rash military actions. Therefore, while NATO’s original reactions to the crisis were more aggressive, as the conflict developed, the actor’s policies transformed to reflect member-states’ objectives.

Additionally, the EU originally responded to the crisis by using a diplomatic approach (Lironi, 2015, pg. 4), for example, adopting the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in June 2014, which was a symbolic use of soft power to support Ukraine politically and economically, without directly threatening Russia militarily for its actions. Initially, the EU considered a soft approach (Reid, 2015, pg. 293) because of its members’ reliance on Russian gas and trade. This weak response to the crisis set the tone for its future strategies, which albeit became stronger, but were not sufficient to be effective solutions. The EU’s reactive nature to the situation deterred it from being in control and thus made its policies less successful. Towards the beginning of the crisis the EU did not opt for a proactive approach, but instead reacted to Russia and Ukraine’s escalated actions. The Council of the EU and the European Council adopted over thirty restrictive measures since early 2014 which called for imposing sanctions, expanding bans on travel and imported goods, cancelling any bilateral summit talks, etc. (Timeline – Restrictive Measures...). Eventually with time passing and no real change in the situation, the policies adapted to address the costs at stake for the parties involved. Thus, like NATO, the EU’s shift in strategy is also attributed to its members’ adverse motives and lack of initiative. While these initial strategies reflect the international agents’ respective characters, the unfolding of agendas and events that proceeded after the crisis reinforces the theory that the differing motives and stakes of the actors influenced their strategies towards the conflict; therefore, causing the conflict to remain unresolved.

Prior to looking into the EU and NATO’s respective motives, it was hypothesized that each actor would have responded to the crisis in alignment with its ‘character’ and pre-disposed missions for being created; that is, the EU employing diplomatic strategies, avoiding military action, and using soft power to approach the conflict while conversely NATO would use aggressive militaristic policies and more of a hard power-focused strategy. While this is not an entirely wrong perspective, when one takes into account each of the agent’s motives and capabilities, some of the research proves otherwise. For example, scholar Michael Rühle (2015) argues that NATO’s agenda appropriately explains its response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict by tailoring its approach as a strategic one catering to the agent’s own security-related interests.

Contrary to my initial belief, Rühle (2015, pg. 82) claims that NATO’s response to the crisis was “low-key”, rather than confrontational, because the risks of attacking or invading were not worth the costs of officially labelling Russia as a threat and enemy, and thus, completely shutting the door on a diplomatic solution. This finding suggests that while I expected the EU and NATO to react differently to foreign affair matters because of their structure and member-nations, the nature of their respective interests actually has more weight in determining their foreign policy decisions, rather than the character of each organization. In the Russia-Ukraine case, NATO’s cost-analysis led it to enact the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) at the Wales Summit; unlike the EU, who stuck with economic sanctions and perpetual negotiations to broker a ceasefire. While the RAP

¹⁵ Referring to less militaristic strategies.

reads as a military plan, it is actually more of a preventative plan,¹⁶ further proving this paper's argument that EU's and NATO's respective policies have continuously failed to resolve the crisis because their approaches were more focused on their own interests and capabilities, instead of strategically working together to implement a sustainable solution.

Solutions for EU and NATO & the Russia-Ukraine Crisis or Repetitive Cycles?¹⁷

Many scholars have proposed a multitude of future solutions to deal with the infamous Russia-Ukraine crisis. Scholars Laura Van Metre, Viola Gienger, and Kathleen Kuehast (2015) in "The Ukraine-Russia Conflict Signals and Scenarios for the Broader Region", suggest that international organizations should provide an abundance of support through cultural, political, and economic means. Such support for Ukraine could involve trade incentives, technological support, pushing of Western values, and military aid (Van Metre et al., 2015, pg. 366-67). Some scholars suggest that member nations ween off their dependency on Russia for gas (Skalamera, 2015); whereas, others propose offering Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) through NATO (Rühle, 2015), or paving the way to integrate Ukraine into the EU (Lironi, 2015). But through the proposal of future solutions for the crisis, author Reid makes an excellent case in that future solutions, again, will only go so far as to reflect the interests of the parties involved, as I have depicted with NATO's and the EU's respective agendas. Reid (2015) states, "But even if we care about Ukraine only in so far as it affects our own security, there are good arguments for standing by the country. The stronger, richer and better-governed Ukraine is, the more resistant it will be to Russian aggression, and the greater will be its ability to come to the help of neighbours if Putin launches vandalistic sorties elsewhere" (pg. 294).

On the other hand, NATO and the EU have been attempting to work together since the early 1990s in the hopes of preparing for the effective management of crisis operations, creating a unified defense, and easing their ability to cooperate. Through their differences and battle to remain relevant, their agendas and goals have oftentimes conflicted, as we have seen in the case of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Many scholars have composed theories and proposed remedies for NATO and the EU's future in crisis management. For instance, author Nicole Koenig (2010) in "The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management?" cautiously proposes future scenarios for the EU and NATO to work together on future crises. Such cases include, the EU "revert[ing] to its original status as a civilian power" (Koenig, 2010, pg. 20-22) and NATO alone taking over the security realm, or combining the two agents' capabilities and structure to form one unit. At the same time though, many scholars are skeptical of the EU's and NATO's ability to work together when the lines of their responsibilities and characters are increasingly blurred, and the actors are progressively focused on their own agendas when addressing crises. Margriet Drent (2015), author of "EU-NATO Relations in Crisis Management Operations: The Practice of Informality", interestingly proposes that the overlapping features of the EU and NATO and their sometimes common goals ironically lead to an inability to collaborate in producing effective foreign policy. She also determines that crisis management, such as the one we have addressed, often exacerbates the relationship between the two actors and questions their overlapping jurisdiction (2015). The

¹⁶ The RAP calls for "Assurance Measures" and "Adaptive Measures" that vaguely outline NATO's reforms such as, "Enhancing the NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it more responsive and capable" (NATO's Readiness Action Plan, 2014, pg.1).

¹⁷ A timeline of strategies employed by both the EU and NATO post-Minsk Protocol and up to November 2016 can be found at <http://ukraine.csis.org/#0>.

Russia-Ukraine crisis embodies these theories, revealing the difficulty the EU and NATO have had in composing strategies and cooperating on their approaches to resolve the conflict.

The problem with these suggested solutions are that they do not take into account the collaboration between the EU and NATO, and the costs associated with the strategies proposed to resolve the crisis. Rühle and Soroiu (2015; 2014) point out some of the inherent consequences these strategies have had, leading them to be ineffective. For example, Rühle discusses the lack of funds and personnel needed to enact NATO's RAP plan (2015), while Soroiu delineates the issue of rising hostility and threatening Russia's sphere of influence in the region by having the EU and/or NATO intervene militarily (2014). While agreeing with some of the strategies proposed, it is more likely a combination of hard and soft policies, along with a consensus by both the EU and NATO to commit to implementing the policies for the future of the crisis, that will be the best steps moving forward.

Although a detailed proposal of suggestions is outside the scope of this paper, it is rather imperative to acknowledge why the previous strategies or policies employed have failed. In "Ukraine and the Minsk II Agreement: On a Frozen Path to Peace?", author Naja Bentzen (2016, pg. 1-2) appropriately explains why the crisis is far from resolved, even after the passing and extending of the Minsk II Agreement¹⁸ in February 2015, which called for the latest ceasefire and withdrawal of weapons after a violation of the Minsk Protocol.^{19 20} Bentzen's argument supports the one made here because she states that each ceasefire has been followed by continuous fighting, another ceasefire, and then temporary relief (2016). This cycle shows the lack of successful efforts by both the EU and NATO in working together to manage the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Additionally, Bentzen (2016) claims that while the conflict may not significantly escalate in the future, it is a disaster that is being overlooked, "Several unresolved issues will continue to pose challenges to the fulfilment of Minsk II in 2016. The death toll has now surpassed 9,000, and Russia continues to supply the rebels with ammunition, weaponry and fighters...At the same time, the practical consequences of the conflict are tangible in the rebel-held areas, where a humanitarian crisis is unfolding" (pg. 1). This further explains the ineffectiveness of the policies NATO and the EU have used because of the politics behind their foreign policy-making. It also proves the urgency in resolving this ongoing conflict to address the violence and humanitarian concerns at the core of the crisis.

Conclusion

While some argue that the EU and NATO have become interchangeable in their roles, and others may claim the Ukrainian crisis is resolved, this paper delineates that this may not be the case based on how we have seen the actors' contrasting motives and agendas at stake in this crisis. This has hindered them from cooperating to establish a functional and permanent solution. Dr. Hanna Ojanen (2002) in "Theories at a Loss? EU-NATO Fusion and the "Low Politicisation" of Security and Defence in European Integration" largely argues that, "At times, it would even seem as if the organisations would swap identities: NATO would become a political organisation, while the EU would become a military one. The new overlap implied that there was a need to find rules

¹⁸ A full outline of the measures the Minsk II Agreement calls for can be found at <http://www.elysee.fr/assets/Uploads/Package-of-Measures-for-the-Implementation-of-the-Minsk-Agreements.pdf>.

¹⁹ The components delineated in the Minsk Protocol can be found at <http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/27596-protocolon-the-results-of-consultations-of-the-trilateral-contact-group-minsk-05092014>.

²⁰ The first drafted ceasefire was the Minsk Protocol on September 5, 2014 but it was never implemented because the measures were violated and violence continued throughout 2015; thus, Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany brokered the Minsk II Agreement in February 2015 and later on extended it into 2016 (Bentzen, 2016, pg. 1-3).

and roles, if not altogether a real division of labour between the organisations in crisis management” (pg. 13). Ojanen brings up a valid query that supports the argument made here because the analyzed case study of the Russia-Ukraine conflict proves that the EU and NATO have not been successful in resolving the issue because their ‘characters’ as organizations have changed, and their motives and interests have become more important than their identities in crafting foreign policy decisions.

The EU’s and NATO’s strategies have acted more as a ‘band-aid’ to the crisis instead of a permanent solution. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen highlights the significance of the ongoing conflict and was quoted in 2014 saying that the Russia-Ukraine crisis was “the most serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall” (Belkin et al., pg. 284), yet unfortunately two years later, both international organizations have failed in fully addressing it.

There are many new questions to be addressed in the near future, which the literature does not attend to. For example, do NATO and the EU manage crises as their original roles for creation intended or do they respond based on their members’ needs and motives? In order to answer such a question, one would need to look beyond the case study of the Russia-Ukraine crisis at many other crises that both the EU and NATO have been active in. Additionally, are intergovernmental organizations, like NATO and the EU, effective in handling global crises? Again, in order to establish some sort of answer, future research needs to consider the roles each actor has played in past crises and what kind of impact they may have had on the outcomes of those situations. Such gaps in the literature should guide the direction of forthcoming research and further delve into the politics behind the making of foreign policy, which has proven to be a significant aspect in global crises.

While those types of questions were not covered here, this paper has explored the politics behind EU and NATO foreign policy-making through the case of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. It has determined that the motives and interests of both actors, rather than the nature of the organizations, had more influence on the approaches taken towards the conflict. It further concluded that their organizational make-up, procedures, and overlapping members combined with their separate agendas concerning the crisis, ultimately explains how and why the EU and NATO chose their respective strategies. This paper addressed some of the EU’s and NATO’s respective economic, political, and security motives that led them to choose their divergent strategies ranging from a use of hard and soft power. Ultimately, this paper included an evaluation of the international agents’ enacted policies towards the Russia-Ukraine crisis, an explanation of their failure to cooperate in their approaches, and a suggestion of proposed solutions as a combination of strategies that should be cultivated and executed by having the EU and NATO work together to resolve this prevalent issue.

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One Year in: How the US-China Relationship is Evolving under President Trump

By Dav Levin

“I love China. People say I don’t like China; no—I love them! But their leaders are much smarter than our leaders.” President Trump delivered these words during his speech announcing his run for the presidency back in the summer of 2015. These words reflect an attitude that Mr. Trump has long expressed towards China, namely that the Chinese are taking advantage of the United States in the international arena as it relates to trade and diplomacy. Mr. Trump’s election last year marked a new chapter in the history of the relations between the U.S. and China. Much has happened between January 20th, 2017 and the end of the year. These events call for an in-depth analysis—and a placement in historical context—of the latest developments in the bilateral relationship between the two most powerful countries in the world.

Historical Contextualization: US-China Relations

First, it is necessary to provide a brief historical overview of the modern U.S.-China relationship, so that this latest chapter can be looked at in light of previous developments. Between the end of World War II—during which the two nations worked cooperatively—and 1972, the U.S. and China had no formal diplomatic relations. This was a result of the communist takeover in China, which resulted in proxy confrontations in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In the late 60’s and early 70’s, relations began to warm as both nations had a shared concern over the rising power of the U.S.S.R. At the time, President Nixon believed it in the interests of the United States to restore a working relationship with the People’s Republic of China, and in 1972 he became the first U.S. President to visit the communist nation. Since then, the two nations have grown ever closer economically. They comprise the two largest economies in the world; have one of the largest trade relationships in the world; and their respective economic policies shape the global economy. On foreign policy matters, however, the two nations did not and continue to not see eye to eye. The Tiananmen Square violence of 1989, in which the Chinese government violently repressed politically motivated protests, was a flashpoint in the United States’ continued condemnation of Chinese human rights violations. China, a nuclear power, does not share the same concern the U.S. does over global nuclear proliferation. And China sees the U.S. as trying to contain its growing military and economic power.

Early under President Obama’s tenure, the two nations seemed to coordinate on a number of fronts. Representatives from each country met in 2009 to discuss responses to the global financial markets and strategies to jointly combat global warming (USC US-China Institute, 2009). In 2013, the U.S. and China reached a consensus to impose more stringent sanction on North Korea. Over two days in June 2013, President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for what Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye called "the most important meeting between an American president and a Chinese leader in 40 years, since Nixon and Mao" (Sanger, 2013). However, the Chinese were wary over the Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” a defense and economic strategy that involved placing more troops in friendly Asian countries and deepening economic ties with countries that surround China. The Chinese see this as a part of an American containment policy over its expanding power. In recent years, the threat of conflict has loomed larger, with China swiftly building military islands in the South China Sea. Some experts believe the U.S. and China are on a collision course and hurtling towards armed conflict. Graham Allison, of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, writes about this buildup of tension in his book, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?*

The focal points of the U.S.-China relationship today are the currency manipulation practices of China, and by extension trade policies, and the dangerous quandary over North Korea's expanding nuclear capability. The U.S. and China are not and have never truly been staunch enemies; however, neither side harbors a high level of trust for the other. Entering office, President Trump, after the bluster and hyperbole expected out of campaign rhetoric, now had to face the realities of dealing with China—widely considered America's counterpart in a bipolar international order.

Waltzian First-Image Analysis

In order to understand the current dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship, an individual level of analysis is instrumental and required (Waltz, 1959). In other words, examining the personal qualities of the leaders involved sheds light onto the dynamics of the relationship. Mr. Trump has long touted himself as a negotiator. At the least, he brands himself as one. The President often emphasizes that he believes in the power of negotiation. International relations, especially between adversarial powers, can be viewed through the lens of negotiations as well. President Trump's relationship with China got off to an uncertain start when, during his transition, on December 2nd, 2016, he took a call from the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Tsai Ing-wen. This was the first official contact with Taiwan by a U.S. president (or president-elect) in decades, and was highly antagonistic towards China, as China holds that Taiwan is not its own independent nation but a part of China. China responded with a diplomatic protest, and the Communist Party published its displeasure with Trump's gesture. The President had this to say: "I fully understand the 'one China' policy [position that acknowledges Taiwan as a part of China], but I don't know why we have to be bound by a 'one China' policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade" (Brunnstrom, 2016). The key word in this statement is the word 'deal.' The President stated in as many words that China would have to make certain concessions in order to gain the United States' respect for the 'one China' policy, and these could be in areas such as trade, North Korea, or a multitude of matters that require negotiation. This incident represents a level of public negotiation seldom seen before in the history of the U.S.-China relationship, and to the Chinese leaders, it suggested a shift from the poised, quietly pragmatic style of Mr. Trump's predecessors to a more brash style of negotiating. Whether this pivot is effective, time will tell.

The most pressing issue President Trump faced upon assuming the presidency was the North Korean Problem. North Korea is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and consistently threatens the United States. As of now, the rogue communist nation is getting increasingly close to nuclear capability. Senator Lindsey Graham, as quoted in an article in *The Atlantic*, relayed that one of President Trump's first decisions after entering office was whether to adopt a policy of denying North Korea the capacity for nuclear weapons or to contain that capacity by assuring the North Koreans that they would be destroyed if they attempted to use their weapons against the United States (Friedman, 2017). Trump, after deliberations with his national security team, decided on the policy of denial.

Trump has stated in the past that he would attempt to persuade China into reigning in North Korea. On the campaign trail, he argued, "China has ... total control over North Korea. And China should solve that problem. And if they don't solve the problem, we should make trade very difficult for China" (Campbell, 2016). In this quote, Trump expresses his thought process in that he believes that the U.S. should negotiate with China and strike a deal in which they use their influence with North Korea to curb their nuclear program. The fact is that China does have

considerable leverage over North Korea. 80% of North Korean oil comes from China. Coal is North Korea's main export, most of which is exported to China. In 2014, 86% of North Korea's exports were to China, and 88% of its imports were from China. China is the only country with which it shares air, rail and financial links (Brown, 2017). Evidently, Trump has remained adamant on attempting to persuade China to take measures to make it harder for North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. This includes persuading China to curtail its energy shipments, in the form of oil and coal, to its neighbor. He has expressed publicly his continued beseeching of China to use their power to influence North Korea, stating, in the Chinese capital no less, "We call on every responsible nation, including China and Russia, to demand that the North Korean Regime end its nuclear weapons and its missile programs..." (Reuters, 2017). There has been circumstantial evidence that this strategy, to some extent, may be effective. On February 9, 2017, Trump and President Xi spoke on the phone to discuss the North Korean problem. On February 12, 2017, North Korea fired a ballistic missile in its first missile launch in over a year. Then, on February 19, 2017, China announced that they will halt and turn back all coal shipments from North Korea for the rest of 2017. While it would be unwise to look too much into such a coincidental timeline of events (the rejection of the coal was in line with a previous UN sanction on coal quotas), it is hard to ignore that the Trump administration has seemingly gotten more of a public response, if anything, out of China with regards to North Korea than in years past. Cheng Li, director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution, said that China is stepping up the pressure. "China's propaganda machine changed dramatically. A few months ago, you began to see more criticism of North Korea's missile program. Unofficially, commentators have talked about regime change. Previously, you couldn't write about that" (Greenberg, 2017). Trump has kept up his version of pressure on China in the form of public statements via tweets, tweeting in April 2017, "North Korea is looking for trouble. If China decides to help, that would be great. If not, we will solve the problem without them! U.S.A."

Trump's quote about making trade "very difficult for China" should they fail to help slow North Korea's nuclear program reflects his particular worldview in which most problems boil down to a negotiation, and that seemingly unrelated elements can be tethered to each other or made conditional on one another in order to reach a wider deal. In the quote above, for example, Trump ties a successful trade deal with China to the degree to which they help the U.S. keep North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. "I explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!" – President Trump's Twitter account. Another difference between Trump and his predecessors is the degree to which he outlines his thinking and strategy. Granted, he does not reveal all. But his use of Twitter to make public statements that drive news cycles has an intended effect. By making such statements on ongoing negotiations, he is able to drive international news cycles and ensure that the essence of his sentiment and position is transmitted not only to a domestic audience, but more importantly, to the Chinese. And apparently, the Chinese have played along with the President's style of showmanship and headline-grabbing stunts and statements. For Trump's state visit to China in November 2017, dubbed a "state visit-plus" by China's ambassador to the U.S., he became the first U.S. President to be given a dinner inside the Forbidden City. Along with other ostentatious displays meant to flatter the President, or boost his ego, China is placing much higher importance on visuals and headlines than in years past, in effect playing the President's game. While in Beijing, Trump showed Xi a video of his granddaughter singing and reciting poems in Mandarin—a gesture widely seen as form of flattery and a respect and admiration for the Chinese people. The two men thus far are taking

great care to develop a working and amicable personal relationship—at least in public. On Xi, Trump said, “I like him a lot. I consider him a friend. He considers me a friend.” During Trump’s visit, Xi stated that U.S.-China relations are “at a new historic starting point.”

It is important to examine Chinese President Xi Jinping as well. Xi has recently ascended to great power in China. Having been elected to another five year term by the Chinese Communist Party with no political challengers on the horizon, he is at maximal power. At the 19th Party Congress in October, Xi laid out his vision for a new era for China. He declared that China will be taking a more prominent role in international affairs and in securing Chinese interests abroad. Furthermore, he declared the continuation of China’s policy of enhancing the influence and power of developing nations, and that China would be taking the lead on important global issues, such as climate change. Xi sees himself as the leader under whom the Chinese people will become strong (Haenle, 2017). Xi’s cemented power status gives him, and by extension China, a very powerful hand in the negotiations with the United States. Xi will be very unwilling to be seen as capitulating to any of Trump’s demands, over North Korea, or for that matter, any issue. To do so would undermine his desired image both domestically and globally. Without much to gain on the international scene as it relates to disrupting the status quo on the Korean peninsula or anywhere else, the Trump administration is in a difficult spot. Despite the best of intentions for a win-win deal or the best offers at the negotiating table, if Xi senses he has more to lose than gain, a deal of any sort will be hard to come by.

As it relates to the two countries’ economic relationship, so far Trump is keeping cool on his bombastic rhetoric on the campaign trail, in which he declared that he would label China a currency manipulator. China artificially devalues their currency for a number of reasons. Primarily, they engage in this policy to give themselves an edge in their economic interactions with other countries, particularly the United States. They devalue their currency by buying U.S. government debt. In China, rather than allow the free market to set the exchange rates, they continuously print Chinese money and inject them into their markets, lowering their value while buying up U.S. dollars in the form of government debt, thus increasing the demand for the U.S. dollar. This practice exacerbates the trade imbalance the United States has with China by making Chinese exports cheaper and imports more expensive, which is why China has a positive balance of trade with most of the countries it trades with. This policy ultimately greatly helps China in its growth as a world superpower, and as an economic superpower as now the 2nd largest economy in the world and the highest exporting country in the world. It also particularly targets the United States, ensuring that the balance of trade stays negative and upholding the U.S.’s debt to China, which is now over \$1 trillion and ensures that it is harder for the American dollar to lose value, thus making the United States’ exports more expensive. In 2016, the U.S. had a \$347 billion trade deficit with China (Amadeo, 2017). While Trump has remained relatively quiet publicly about economic actions against China, in August the administration announced that it would open an investigation into Chinese economic practices. “The investigation will seek to determine whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce” (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2017). Though it hasn’t been used since before the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, if found warranted, the United States could impose tariffs on Chinese goods in order to open up the market for American goods, or even prohibit certain access to the U.S. market. This represents a significant step towards turning up the pressure on Chinese tactics

that harm U.S. economic interests. While earlier in the year it seemed the President was himself offering a concession to the Chinese, namely going soft on their subversive economic practices, now getting China to fully go after North Korea has justified a change in strategy on the part of the U.S. Back in April Trump tweeted, “Why would I call China a currency manipulator when they are working with us on the North Korean Problem? We will see what happens!” Here again the President seemingly draws attention to the fact that he will refrain from labeling China economic cheaters on the world stage if they fall in line with his wish for them to help solve the North Korean problem. Now, as it looks like China has not sufficiently stepped up to apply pressure on the North Koreans, President Trump may be using this investigation as a new negotiating tool, likely to pressure the Chinese to go after North Korea more forcefully.

Conclusion

Overall, it has been a momentous year for U.S.-China relations. In an unstable and increasingly volatile world (President Trump ordered missile strikes on Syria while seated next to President Xi on his visit to Florida), bilateral relations between the world’s two superpowers were expected to be difficult.

There was also the additional factor of a new, unpredictable leader for the United States. As a product of fate, both leaders, rising to power at the same point in time, see themselves as instrumental figures in their respective nation’s history, future, and legacy. After this first year, it is evident that many challenges lie ahead. The future quality and nature of the relationship the two countries will have is yet to be determined. So far though, the two leaders seem to hold a certain level of respect for one another, which can lead to promising developments. Mr. Trump has certainly proven to be a different kind of leader than Mr. Obama, or for that matter, any of his predecessors. In the meantime, suffice it to say that, albeit slowly and contentiously, some progress is being made on issues of dispute between the two countries. Over the remainder of their terms, if President Trump and President Xi can evolve to work together more closely and positively, this will prove a significant step forward in global stability, progress, and peace.

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