

# **International Relations of the Middle East**

**JST 3930(29481), INR 4931**

**Instructor:** Dr. Or Arthur Honig ([ohonig@ufl.edu](mailto:ohonig@ufl.edu) , [orhonig@yahoo.com](mailto:orhonig@yahoo.com))

MWF | Period 8 (3:00 PM – 3:50 PM).

Office Hours & location: Walker Hall, room 200E, Periods 1&2 (8:00-9:30 am)

## **Course Description**

Want to understand the Middle East? We will explore five main issues: 1) The role of extra-regional powers in stabilising or exacerbating the region; 2) the factors determining the success and failures of different Middle Eastern countries to gain regional dominance; 3) factors determining the success of regional actors, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia, in courting the alliance of extra-regional powers; 4) the degree to which religion and other identity-related issues (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) shape regional dynamics; 5) the role of fundamentalist Islam in shaping the region and preventing conflict resolution. No background knowledge is required.

## **Course goals**

Notably, the goal of this course is not just to give the students a better understanding of the dynamics and forces shaping the region (especially the unique ones which make it different from other regions) but also to learn how to ask interesting theoretical questions when learning history. Hence, you will acquire the skill to think theoretically about the history of this complex region, as well as to think critically about the IR and CP theories we currently have. Since many political science theories were derived from the Western experience, they often do not fit well with the behaviour of actors and processes in this particular region. This

creates room for both theory-testing and for theorising. Needless to stress, this is not a humanities course, but a social science one. This means that many questions that are of interest to historians are of less interest to us in this course.

The Middle East has been the subject of heated academic and policy debates. Studies regarding it can be highly politicised. This is why you should be cautious when reading different interpretations on the web. We will learn the relevant historical tools for analysing texts and evaluating sources.

After completing this course, students will be able to:

- Understand the dynamics in the region and the forces shaping them.
- Assess the contribution and value of historical texts, which means situating the historical work within the relevant historical debates, and being able to judge the empirical basis for the claims made based on the credibility and quality of the sources used.
- Use historical data for the purpose of both testing and developing political science models.
- Analyse new developments as they take place by identifying the forces shaping the dynamics in the Middle East.
- Learn how to present and generate a class debate.

### **Course requirements and grading:**

20% -- active participation. This component of the grade might include homework tasks. As a general rule, I would like you to read those items with a star next to them. I will also ask students to begin class by sharing what they have read, what they found interesting or puzzling. If you read items beyond the obligatory ones (or watch relevant videos) you will get extra participation points.

30% -- a 15-25 minute presentation on a topic related to the Middle East (to be chosen either from the list of topics or approved by me). These will be presented by students based on their choice of dates, though most probably towards the second half of the semester. Instructions are uploaded to canvas.

45% -- an oral exam (to be held during class time and office hours in the last two to three weeks).

5% -- a short multiple choice exam (to be held on the last class before the beginning of the oral exams).

### **The course outline (by weeks)**

#### **1. An introduction + The collapse of the Ottoman empire and the formation of the boundaries in the Middle East**

Topics covered: background on the Middle East (a bit on the development of Islam, Christianity and Judaism), background on the birth of the Zionist movement, the First World War and its war-time diplomacy, the boundaries created. We will pay special attention to the two winners of this period -- the Zionist movement and the Hashemite family (future monarchs of Iraq and Trans-Jordan), and to the British attempt to make use of these two actors in its dealings with the French.

Main questions: Why did the Ottoman Empire decide to join the war rather than remain neutral? Why have the British been blamed for causing the Arab-Israeli conflict and to what extent are such claims justified? What were the main considerations behind the shaping of the different boundary lines? What are the main factors behind the Balfour declaration and what can they teach us about diplomacy of national liberation movements? What elements do we see in this war-time diplomacy that we also see in other cases of war-time diplomacy from other periods and also in other times in the history of the Middle East? Why did Britain decide to keep the promises made during WWI (especially to the Zionists)? What are the generic IR lessons that we can draw from this episode? Would history have been different without Chaim Weizmann? What role did he play?

\*Michael J. Cohen, “Centenary of the Balfour Declaration,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017).

\* Eugene Rogan, “The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System” in *International Relations of the Middle East* (Ed. Louise Fawcett), 1-43

Fred Lawson, *Constructing International Relations in the Arab World* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), ch. 1, 2, 4 and conclusion.

Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 5-22 (chap 1).

Additional readings:

James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), skim.

Jehuda Reinharz and Motti Golani, Chaim Weizmann: A Biography (Chicago UP, 2024), chapter 2.

Ian S. Lustick. “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective,” *International Organization*, vol. 51 (1997), pp. 653-683.

David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1990), pp. 493-567.

Benjamin Miller, “Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity,” *Security Studies*, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2006), pp. 658 – 705.

Efraim Karsh, *The Tail that Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 9-30; or alternatively, Karsh *Islamic Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), chapter 8.

Albert Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), ch. 18 (p. 303) The emergence of nationalism.

Highly recommended videos

A. Jonathan Schneer, “The Balfour Declaration,” WGBH Forum

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxqJyjuNjd8>

B. Eugene Rogan: “The First World War in the Middle East” University of Oklahoma

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyKqjFD9TU&t=426s>

C. Gabriel Matzkin, Abigail Jacobson and Eugene Rogan “From Constantinople to San Remo,” Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem), 2017.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SchqyJ14TVw>

D. Martin Kramer, “Sykes-Picot: An Obstacle to the Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOB2Vp6DbPw>

## **2. The inter-war years: the French and British Mandates and the 1948 first Arab-Israeli war**

**The main events covered include:** (1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the British mandate period: the leadership and institutionalisation on both sides, the various Palestinian riots (1921 Nebi Musa, the 1929 Wailing Wall riots, the 1936-9 Arab revolt), the role and motivations of the Jerusalem Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the fluctuations in the British policy towards the Jews and the Arabs, mostly in the form of different white papers.

(2) the Zionist anti-British struggle – the Zionist underground movement, the illegal immigration and Zionist propaganda and global diplomacy (especially its influence over the White House), the American-British disagreements over Palestine (and the Zionist role in exacerbating them) and finally the two diplomatic successes (the UN assembly vote on UNSCOP partition proposal, the recognition of Israel by many states including the US in the immediate aftermath of declaration of independence).

(3) The mandates in the different other Arab countries (not Palestine): the Egyptian struggle for independence, the attraction to Fascism (the Rashid Ali Al-Kilani revolt), the Westernization and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the British influence over Jordan as an entity and its progress to statehood (institutionalisation).

(4) The 1948 war: this war had two parts: the so-called “civil war” (Nov 1947-May 48) and the confrontation against the invasion by the four Arab states, the states’ role in the first stage (Qawuqji’s volunteer army), the extent of Palestinians’ displacement and its causes, the Israeli strategy and the question of war aims.

**The main questions:** (1) the causes for the Arab riots and their impact on the Jewish attitudes and doctrines for attaining security.(2) How can we explain the success of the Zionist national liberation movement in attaining independence? Did the Zionist armed struggle make much difference? Would another form of struggle have been more strategic? Who deserves a greater share of credit – the right wing groups or the left-wing ones? (3) Why did the so-called liberal moment in the Middle East end so fast (the decline of the constitutional monarchies etc.)? (4) Why did the different Arab countries decide to go to war against the newly born State of ISrael and what IR theories does this shed light on? Why and how did the Jews win both the so-called civil-war in mandatory Palestine and in the inter-state fighting stage? How can we explain the (limited?) extent of the Israeli attempt to expel Arab inhabitants of Palestine?

\*Michael Eppel, “The Arab States and the 1948 War in Palestine: The Socio-Political Struggles, the Compelling Nationalist Discourse and the Regional Context of Involvement,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48:1 (2012), pp. 1-31.

\*David Tal (2005) “The Historiography of the 1948 War in Palestine: The Missing Dimension,” *Journal of Israeli History*, 24:2, 183-202.

\*David Tal, "The Forgotten War: The Jewish-Palestinian Strife in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948." *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, no. 3-4, (Spring/Summer 2000), pp. 3-21.

\*Or Arthur Honig, "The Whisper in the Leader's Ear: How Do Foreign Policy Advisers Perform their Job?" *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 221-241.

Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), 88-258.

Michael Eppel, *The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), skim.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, pp. 31-48.

Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge UP, 2008), chapters 4-8, 10. skim.

Michael Eppel, "The Iraqi Domestic Scene and its Bearing on the Palestine Issue 1947", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 24, (1990), pp. 51-73.

Michael Eppel, "Syria and Iraqi-Syrian Relations During the 1948 War in Palestine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, (1996), pp. 74-91.

Shaiel Ben-Ephraim and Or Honig, "Sitting on the Volcano: Lynching Attacks in the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict," in Michael J. Pfeifer (ed.), *Global Lynching and Collective Violence: Past and Present* (The University of Illinois Press, 2017), 185-222.

Amikam Nachmani, "Generals at Bay in Post-War Palestine (and We Have Only Ourselves to Blame)," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, (December 1983), pp. 66-83.

Alexander Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 156-257.

Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood*, (Boston : Beacon Press, 2006). Chapter 2

On Hajj Amin al Husseini see, Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939 - 1948* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), ch. 8, pp. 231 - 248 (“The Mufti, Palestinian Politics, and Efforts at Socio - Political Unity of Arab Society”).

Benny Morris, *1948: a history of the first Arab - Israeli war* (New Haven [Conn.] : Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 2 – "The UN Steps In."

### **3. The rise of Nasserism and its repercussions (1948-1958)**

**The main events/developments covered in this period include:** the failed post-war Arab-Israeli negotiations, the American and British diplomatic initiatives (the Baghdad pact and the Alpha plan), the Israeli attempt to find a great power patron, the Ben-Gurion—Sharett rivalry and disagreement re/retaliations raids, the Israeli covert action mishap in Egypt, the rise of Pan-Arabism and of Nasserism, Nasser’s confrontation with the MB and his rise to prominence inside Egypt, the Israeli struggle against the Fedayeen and the road to the 1956 war, the American response to the Suez Campaign, the 1958 formation of the UAR, the British and American attempts to shore up the pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Lebanon (including Israel’s role in that joint Anglo-American effort).

**Main questions:** What doomed the post-war negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours and did they ever have a chance of success? Why did Israel fail to find great power allies during this period (at least until JFK)? How did Nasser’s Egypt ascend to relative dominance in the 1950’s? Why did Sharett’s premiership end so quickly? How did Nasser play off the Americans and the soviets against each other? Why did the British and



Americans fail to predict that he would turn to the Soviets for arms? Was the Israeli decision to join the British-French invasion in the 1956 Suez campaign a wise decision? What are some of the characteristics of the Israeli decision-making process that led to this decision? Do you think that Nasser was driven by ideological beliefs or by the desire to hoard power? Can we say that Washington's decision to abandon its traditional/natural allies (Britain and France) and sacrifice Israel was naïve? What are the main similarities and differences between Eisenhower's courting of Nasser and Obama's courting of Iran? Why did the Egyptian support for Fedayeen terror attacks stop after 1956? re/Syria and Iran – how can we explain the chronic instability in Syria?

\*Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Ben-Gurion to Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24 (1988), 330-356.

\* David Tal, "Weapons without influence: British arms supply policy and the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, 1945–55," *Journal of imperial and Commonwealth history*, vol. 34, no. 3 (2006), pp. 369-388.

Lior Sternfeld, "Iran Days" in Egypt: Mosaddeq's Visit to Cairo in 1951," *British Journal for Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2016),

Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken*, skim through.

Moshe Maoz, *Israel and Syria* (New York: Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 16-61

Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.) *A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958* (London: IB Tauris, 2002), chapters 5-6.

Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1-25

Peter Sluglett, "The Pan Arab Movement and the Influence of Cairo and Moscow," in Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), *A Revolutionary Year: the Middle East in 1958* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), pp. 209-220.

Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Apr., 1958), pp. 408-429.

Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War, 1958-1970* (New York: 1971), pp. 1-137.

Douglas Little, "The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords," in Melvin Leffler and Odd Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 2, Crises and Détente* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter 15.

Further readings:

Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), chapter 2.

Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism*, chapter 9.

Adeed Dawisha, *Egypt and the Arab World* (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 9-62.

Fred Halliday, "The Middle East, the Great Powers and the Cold War," in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.) *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 6-26.

Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds.) *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), ch. 7-9.

Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," *International Organization* Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), 369-395.

On the internal Syrian fights from independence and until Asad's rise to power see Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, skim through.

*On the processes that led to the 1956 Suez Campaign:*

Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, chapter 6.

Ian Black, "Secrets and lies at the heart of Britain's Middle Eastern folly" *The Guardian*, 11 July, 2006

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/11/egypt.past>

*Shimon Peres: The Biography*, by Michael Bar-Zohar, New York: Random House, 2007  
Chapters 11-12 "Suez" and "Secret Meeting at Severs" pp. 132-154

Avi Shlaim, "The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot" *International Affairs*, 73:3(1997), 509-530.

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Protocol%20of%20Sevres%201956%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20War%20Plot.html>

*On the US response to the Suez Campaign and its aftermath see:*

Michael Oren, "The Second War of Independence" *Azure Winter*, 5676\2007 pp 41-48

[http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/1117Az27\\_currents\\_.pdf](http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/1117Az27_currents_.pdf)

Michael Doran's Ike's Gamble, skim through.

Recommended Videos:

1. BBC, "The Other Side of Suez"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCc1hD8SGeA>

2. Ike's Gamble: two videos worth watching of Michael Doran:

at the Windsor Institute <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nq14PQLnE1c>>

At the Hoover Institute < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJewbbAZT5s>>

3. BBC and PBS, "The Fifty Years War" – the relevant part

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3rXQQ0PgCU>

4. **The challenges that Nasser is facing until the outbreak of the June 1967 war (1958-1967)**

**The main events covered:** the success of the FLN in Algeria, the dissolution of the UAR, the political upheaval in Iraq, the civil war in Yemen, the policies of JFK and LBJ towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Nasser in particular, Nasser's difficulty to manage the Arab system

and particularly the 1964-67 Israeli-Syrian escalation, the rise of the Neo-Baath in Syria, the evolution of the Israeli political system, the flawed military thinking prior to the war, Eshkol's crisis management during May 1967, civil-military relations both in Egypt and Israel in the lead up to and during the crisis itself, the emergence of the Fatah, the conduct of the War itself and Dayan's role, the rise of the Baath in Iraq.

**The main questions:** How can we explain the success of the FLN? What were the forces that caused the decline of Nasserism and how did Israel participate in defeating this ideological movement, even before the 1967 war? What were some of the unintended consequences of different actors' steps that led to the war's outbreak? Why did it take the Eshkol government several days before launching the preemptive strike (hint: excessively banking on Washington)? Is the outbreak of the June 1967 war consistent more with Offensive or Defensive Realism? What can the outbreak of the war teach us about civil-military relations and policy formulation in authoritarian regimes (in reference to Egyptian belligerent)? In terms of crisis management, what are similarities and differences between JFK in the Cuban Missile Crisis and Eshkol in the May 1967 crisis? How did Nasserism as a phenomenon/ideology cause the June 1967 war? How can we explain the decisive outcome of the war? What factor did the Israeli nuclear development play in triggering the June 1967 War?

\* Janice G. Stein, "Inadvertent War and Miscalculated Escalation: The Arab Israeli War of 1967," in Alexander Geroge (ed.) *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

\*Michael Oren, *Six Days of War* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 33-169.

\*Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), chapter 3.

\*Ami Gluska, *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 74-120, 160-179. Instead it is also possible to read his article in MERIA.

Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: the Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 104-141.

Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), chapter 4.

Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen* (Verso, 2012), chapter 2.

Further readings (more detailed diplomatic and military accounts):

Richard Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 36-122.

George Gawrych, *The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (London: Greenwood press, 2000), pp. 1-38.

Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend*, skim.

Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble* (Princeton UP), skim.

## **5. The interwar years and the outbreak of the October 1973 war (1967-1973)**

The main events: the rise of the Palestinian question in Arab politics, internationalization of Palestinian terrorism, the processes leading to the war of attrition and to the October 1973 war, the covert and/or indirect dialogue between Israel and Nasser, the peacemaking of the Eshkol and Golda Meir governments, the establishment of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit condominium in the West Bank, the political realignments in the Arab world, the military and

diplomatic moves during the October 1973 war itself (e.g., Sadat's betrayal), the rise to power of both Asad and Sadat.

**The main questions:** what were the implications of the 1967 defeat on the political culture, on Nasserism, Palestinian nationalism and political Islam? What kind of soul-searching took place and what were the lessons that the defeated parties drew, as well as those who relied on them? What were the correct and wrong lessons that Israel drew from the victory in 1967? What caused the collapse of the Israeli deterrence and why did the Israelis fail to see the weakness of their deterrence? What were the calculations of the Egyptians when they launched the War of Attrition and later the October 1973 war? What factors allowed Egypt to improve so well its fighting in the October war as compared to the June 1967 war? What can the intelligence surprise in this case teach us about the surprise attacks in general? What does the October 1973 war teach us about limited wars? What were the main factors determining the military developments and outcomes of the 1973 war? Was there an Israeli missed opportunity to make peace with Sadat prior to the October 1973 war?

#### (1) The Arab states' post-defeat policies

\* Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), chapter 5.

\*Or Honig and Ariel Reichard, "Realism or Radicalism: Explaining Autocratic Rulers' Strategic Choices following Military Defeats in the Middle East," *Journal of Middle East and Africa*, vol. 6, no. 2 (July 2015), pp. 125-146.

Risa Brooks, "An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's (in)Effectiveness in the 1967 and 1973 Arab - Israeli Wars" *Security Studies*, 15, no. 3 (July - September 2006): 396 - 430.

#### (2) The failure of Israeli deterrence

\*Janice Gross Stein (1985), "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 34-59.

\*Janice Gross Stein (1985), "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in *Psychology and Deterrence*, pp. 60-88.

Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, Chapter 4.

(3) War termination and the end of the 1973 war

\* Janice Gross Stein, “The Termination of the October War: A Reappraisal,” in *Nissan Oren* (ed.), *Termination of Wars* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press).

Avi Kober. “Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8.1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 20-48.

\* Janice Gross Stein, “War Termination and Conflict Reduction or, How Wars Should End,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1975), pp. 1–27.

(4) The Israeli security concept and the Intelligence failure

Or Honig, “Surprise Attacks – Are they Inevitable?” *Security Studies*, (2008).

## **6. The transformation of the system in the 1970s (the age of Wataniyya and the Fedayeen) until the Iranian revolution (September 1970-1979)**

**The main events:** (1) regional and global implications of the 1973 war (OPEC etc.), (2) the civil wars in Jordan (“Black September”) in Lebanon, in Iraq, in South Sudan and the Israeli intervention in those civil wars (e.g., assistance to the Kurds, the Israeli shift from Rabin-Asad red lines agreement to the Zahle crisis); Asad’s methods for establishing hegemony in Lebanon; (3) Nixon’s twin pillar foreign policy in the Gulf and its impact on the Shah’s foreign policy; (4) Saddam’s policies following the 1975 Algier accords (5) the Israeli-Egyptian peace process under Rabin and Begin, including President Ford’s threat of Reassessment of the Israel-US relations; (6) Israel’s continued struggle against Palestinian terrorism (Plane hijackings, Antebbe etc.); (7) Jordan’s peace process with Israel and the challenges for the informal Israel Israeli-Jordanian condominium over the West Bank.

**Some questions:** what were the main lessons that the Israeli policy community and the public more generally drew from the October 1973 mishap? What explains the difficulty of the Rabin government to make peace both with Egypt and with Jordan? Can realism account for Saddam’s behavior during the 1970s? What were the factors driving the Palestinians to internationalize their armed struggle? What forces/factors/people pushed for the emergence of the OPEC cartel? How can we explain the success of Asad in taking over Lebanon? How did Asad respond to the Israeli-Egyptian peace process? Why did it take so long for the

Hashemite monarchy to confront the Palestinian Fedayeen and what does it tell us about the Middle East? Should we infer general lessons from the behavior of the Palestinian groups in Jordan about insurgents' behavior?

\*William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd edition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 98-176.

\*William Quandt, *Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy: a Staff Paper* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 1-42.

Kirsten Schulze, Israeli and Maronite nationalisms: is a minority alliance natural? In: Schulze, Kirsten E. and Stokes, Martin and Campbell, Colm, (eds.) *Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East* (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 158-170.

Moshe Maoz, *Syria and Israel* (Oxford UP, 1995), chapters 7-8.

Ziv Rubinowitz, "Blue and White 'Black September': Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970," *The International History Review*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2010), pp. 687 -706.

Nigel Ashton, "Pulling the Strings: King Hussein's Role during the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan," *The International History Review*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2006), pp. 94 -118.

Joseph Nevo, "September 1970 in Jordan: A Civil War?" *Civil Wars*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2008), pp. 217 -230.

Hudson, Michael C. "The Palestinian factor in the Lebanese civil war." *The Middle East journal* 32.3 (1978): 261-278

Ido Yahel and Or Honig, "The Father's Success and the Son's Failure: Explaining the Growth of Lebanon's Resistance to Syria's Invisible Occupation," *Digest of Middle East Studies*, vol.

On the Nixon/Carter-Shah relations see Efraim Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), chapter 4; Alvandi, Roham (2012)

Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf," *Diplomatic history*, 36 (2). pp. 337-372.



## Recommended videos

1. relevant section in BBC/PBS Fifty Years War
2. Al-Jazeera's documentary PLO – History of a Revolution, the episode “Black September (Al-Jazeera is a very problematic source but gives a good feel for the atmosphere and the emotions on the Arab side thanks to the interviews)

## **7. The Long and Bloody Decade – from the 1979 Iranian Revolution until the 1991 Gulf War**

**The major developments covered include:** 1. the outbreak of the Iranian revolution and the Israeli and American surprise and reactions to this major watershed (including Israeli moves towards and threat perceptions of Saddam's Iraq during and after the Iran-Iraq war and the embassy hostage crisis), the American cozying up with Saddam and “Iran-gate;” 2. The 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon (logic and unintended consequences such as the rise of Hezbollah) including the Israeli disappointments and the withdrawal and the implications for the Israeli-Syrian relations; 3. Developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena: the Regan peace plan, the so-called peace process in the Israel-Jordan-PLO triangle, the outbreak of the Intifada in November 1987, Jordan's decision to disengage from the West Bank, the emergence of Hamas. Of course it helps to think about the different inter-linkages between all these events. (4) How Mubarak and Asad consolidated their rule (the Hama massacre, the causes for the assassination of Sadat and its lessons).

**The main questions:** What was Saddam's mistake when he decided to launch the attack? Why did the Iraqi invasion turn into such a long war? Was the 1982 Israel invasion a success? How was it perceived by the Israeli public and why? What were the main mistakes of Israel in the war? What attributes of Israeli decision-making contributed to this mistake?

Who seemed like the greater enemy to Israel in the 1980s – revolutionary Iran or Saddam’s Iraq?

What were the Israeli mistakes that led to the Intifada (or at least to the failure to anticipate it) and could it have been further delayed/avoided altogether? What were the Israeli difficulties in withdrawing from Lebanon?

(1) The Iran-Iraq War

For a good overview of Iranian foreign policy see Michael Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran: a history of the Islamic republic* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).

\*Efraim Karsh, “Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: the Iran-Iraq War Revisited,” *International Affairs* vol. 64 (1988), 83-95.

\*Ronen Bergman, *The Secret War with Iran* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 40-130.

Sharam Chubin, Iran and the war: from stalemate to ceasefire. In E. Karsh (Ed.), *The Iran-Iraq war: Impact and implications* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), pp. 13–25.

Gregory Gause, *International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, Chapter 3.

Avner Yaniv, “Israel Faces Iraq: the Politics of Confrontation,” In *Iraq’s Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.

Gregory Gause, “Iraq’s decisions to go to war, 1980 and 1990,” *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 56, (2002), pp. 47–70.

Lawrence Rubin, *Islam in Balance*, skim.

David Walker, “An agonizing death”: 1980s U.S. policy on Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War,” *Journal of Middle East and Africa* (2017).

Joseph Alpher, *Periphery*, skim.

(2) The Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian triangle

Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall, 1983), pp. 117-142

\*Schulze, Kirsten E. (1996) "Perceptions and misperceptions: influences on Israeli intelligence estimates during the 1982 Lebanon War," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, XVI (1). 134-152.

For a good journalistic read review of events Thomas Friedman, *Between Beirut and Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1995 ), skim.

\*Moshe Maoz, *Israel and Syria* (Oxford UP), chapter 8.

Ma'oz, Moshe and Avner Yaniv, *Syria Under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security* (Oxford UP, 1990), skim.

Yair Evron, *Israel's Intervention in Lebanon* (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press), skim.

(3) The Palestinian arena

Ian Lustick, "writing the Intifada: collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics*, 45/4 (1993).

Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon & Schuster), skim.

**8. The Post-Cold War decade – the age of American hegemony during the Clinton years: from the 1991 Gulf War and until 9/11**

This decade is characterised by the Arab states' fears from the new age of American hegemony and the Israeli attempt to exploit the inherent opportunities. Even though the Cold War ended only with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, American supremacy became most evident in the 1991 Gulf War. The major developments in this period include: 1. the rising power of political Islam in the form of militant Jihadi opposition groups (alongside the MB, and sometimes also radicalising the MB as in the Palestinian case) and the rise of the Mukhabarat states (police states); 2. The Israeli shift to peace and the Oslo peace process (Egypt's role, Jordan's fears, the problematic Palestinian state-building, and finally the various factors behind the collapse of the peace process); 3. The Israeli-Syrian relations (the peace process which ultimately failed alongside low-level conflict); 4. Iran's policies under Rafsanjani and Khatami, including its meddling in the Levant and the nascent dialogue with the US. 5. The US-Saddam relationship: the miscalculation that led to war, the American obsession with Saddam and Saddam's post-defeat successful attempts to survive.

**Main questions:** What was the Israeli peace strategy (tactics employed, different logics) and how the different Arab actors reacted to them to get for themselves the best bargain possible? What prompted the different Arab leaders to open peace dialogue with Israel and how they coped with their domestic publics? How can we explain the focus of the US on Iraq rather than Iran? Why did Rabin change his mind and open peace with the PLO? Why did the peace process eventually fail on both the Syrian and the Palestinian tracks? Why did normalization did not occur between Israel and Jordan and Egypt notwithstanding the Israeli attempts to solve the Palestinian issue?

1. The rise of Islamic opposition groups

\*Joel Migdal, *Shifting Sands* (NY: Columbia UP, 2014), chapters 6, 8-9. Available electronically at Duke Library.

## 2. The Oslo peace process

\*Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006) 201-284.

Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 9.

Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine* (NY: Verso Press, 2009), chapters 15-16.

## 3. The Israeli-Syrian relations

Moshe Maoz, *Syria and Israel* (Oxford UP, 1995), chapter on the peace process.

\*Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace* (Princeton UP, 2004), chapters 2-4.

4. Iran's policies under Rafsanjani and Khatami, including its meddling in the Levant and the nascent dialogue with the US.

David Menashri, "Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict," *Israel Affairs*, vol.12, no. 1 (2006) pp. 107 -122.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, chapter 6

5. The 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent difficulty to maintain the Dual Containment regime

\*Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, "Calculation and Miscalculation in Baghdad." In

*International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91*, edited by Dan Keohane and

Alex Danchev. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1994, pp. 23-57

Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad." In *Iraq's Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Gregory Gause, International Relations of the Gulf, Chapter 4.

Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows, chapter 1.

### **9. The Global Campaigns against Terror (from 9/11 until the 2011 Eruption of the Arab Spring upheavals)**

Main topics: (1) The various causes for the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and for the Israeli response to it; (2) Ariel Sharon's strategy and tactical innovations to neutralize the strategy of Arafat, and simultaneously address the American attempts to deescalate the conflict; (3) the various American mistakes that led to the Iraq War Quagmire (including the success in Afghanistan, the Israel Lobby claim, the intelligence mistakes etc.); (4) Syria's dangerous game under Bashar al-Asad (helping Sunni Salafis slip into Iraq to attack US servicemen, building a nuclear reactor, but also making peace overtures to Israel) and the American and Israeli responses to this game (as well as Turkey's role in shaping Syria's behavior); (5) the American failure in nation-building in Iraq; (6) the joint American-Israeli struggle against Iran; (7) the impact of the Bush doctrine in the Middle East – the attempts by various Arab state to be on the right side (Qaddafi's return from the Cold, Jordanian and Egyptian attempts to placate the democratization agenda); (8) the increasing power of Hamas and Hezbollah – the fluctuations in Hezbollah's political fortunes (the Cedar revolution vs. the 2008 takeover of West Beirut), the establishment of the Hamas regime in Gaza.

**Some questions:** why was President Bush not being stopped domestically? What factors determined the extent of the American leash given to Israel to fight against the Palestinian Authority? Why did PM Sharon reject Syria's peace feelers? Why was the cedar revolution initially so successful? Why was Hezbollah eventually able to take over Lebanon? How and to what extent did President Bush's policy lead to the Arab spring uprising?

Leverett, Flynt. *Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire* (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

\*Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 10.

Graham Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 2, (Winter 2003), pp. 21-40.

Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 2003).

Ahron Bregman, *Elusive Peace* (Penguin Books), skim.

Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (Oxford UP), chapter 4 (pp.185-244).

Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* (Winter 2005/06)

Assaf Moghaddam, "Diplomacy and Force in the 2000 Crisis: An Examination of Israeli Crisis Management Strategies," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA) 5.1 (March 2001)

Or Honig and Joshua Arsenault, "Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Rise to Regional Influence," *Digest of Middle East Studies*.

Highly Recommended videos:

Ahron Bregman "Elusive Peace" PBS/BBC.

## **10. The Arab Spring and the rise of Iran (2008-until today)**

Topics include: (1) the causes for the eruption of the uprisings and for their success (including the unwillingness of the armies to defend the regimes, the American willingness to abandon allied rulers); (2) the Syrian civil war, the strategies of different actors towards the Syrian civil war (Russian intervention vs. American non-intervention), Asad's survival strategies, and the comparison between this civil war and the Libyan one; (3) the rise of Iran and the response by the Sunni countries; (4) Obama's dialogue and deal with Iran and Netanyahu's reaction

**The main questions:** how can the problem of Iran's rationality be assessed and would that have resolved the Netanyahu-Obama disagreement?

Essentially, how can we explain the success of some authoritarian regimes to hold on to power (mainly the monarchies but not only, as is evident by Asad's survival)?

(1) The causes for the eruption of the Arab Spring and Israel's new strategic environment (perception vs. reality)

\*James Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings* (Oxford UP, 2015), chapters 1-4.

\*Asher Susser, "Israel's Place in a Changing Regional Order (1948–2013)," *Israel Studies*, vol. 19 no. 2 (2014)

(2) The Syrian Civil War

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, chapters 8-9.

(3) The rise of Iran and other causes for realignments between the regional actors during the Arab Spring

Gregory Gause, "Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New Middle East Cold War," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (July 2017), pp. 672-675.

Curtis Ryan, "The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria," *Middle East Report* Vol. 42 (2012)

André Bank, and Morten Valbjorn, "Bringing the Arab Regional Level Back In- Jordan in the New Arab Cold War" *Middle East Critique*, 19:3 (2010), 303-331.



Nabeel Khoury, "The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising," *Middle East Policy Council* 20:2 (Summer 2013) <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-cold-war-revisited-regional-impact-arab-uprising?print>

Gregory Gause, *Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War* (Washington DC: Brookings Doha Analysis Paper, No.11, 2014). Available online at: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-sectarianism-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/>

(4) Obama's approach to the Middle East, his dialogue with Iran and Israel's reaction

\* Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 11.

Ofira Seliktar, "Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality: The "Eye of the Beholder" Problem," *Journal of Middle East and Africa*, vol. (2012)

Thomas Juneau, "A realist foreign policy for Canada in the Middle East," *International Journal* (2017).

\*Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (Oxford UP), chapters 5-6 (pp. 245-366).

Recommended videos:

1. Gregory Gause, "The New Middle East Cold War" on April 11, 2016, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmtVzvGqJp0>

2. Eugene Rogan, "The Past and Future of the Arabs," Tangier Global Forum <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzWDLCb2XLk>
3. Frontline, "The Rise of ISIS"

### **11. Israel's small wars, its counter-terror policies, and the development its counter-terror doctrines**

**Topics covered:** understanding Hamas and Hezbollah, getting to better understand the Israeli security services and strategic culture, Israeli deterrence against terrorism, mutual adaptation of Israel and the terrorist groups over time and the general evolution of the Israeli CT

doctrine, the Israeli failures in the political and diplomatic aspects related to asymmetric warfare, the strategic decisions of the Fatah during the al-Aqsa intifada.

**Main Questions:** How is Hamas different from the rest of the MB movement and from Hezbollah? How did the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas affect the chances of establishing deterrence towards them? In what ways and why did the Israelis perform so badly during the Second Lebanon War? Who blindly emulates more and who is more careful to adapt its methods to the strategic circumstances – the state (Israel) or the insurgent groups? Why has the mutual Israel-Hezbollah deterrence been far more stable since the Second Lebanon War (2006) than the one existing with Hamas ever since it took over the Gaza Strip?

(1) The development of Israel's military doctrine

\*Itamar Rabinovich and Itai Brun, *Israel Facing a New Middle East* (Hoover Institution Press, 2017), chapters 2-3.

(2) The Second Lebanon War (Israel and Hezbollah)

\*Or Honig, "The End of Israeli Military Restraint: As Restraint Fails, Jerusalem Reverts to A Policy of Deterrence," *Middle East Quarterly* – Vol. XIV: No. 1 (Winter 2007).

Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), skim.

Elli Lieberman, *Reconceptualizing Deterrence* (London: Routledge, 2012), the long chapter on Hezbollah

Avi Kober, "The Second Lebanon War – Why the Poor Performance?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol!!!

Jean-Loup Samaan, "The Dahya Concept and Israeli Military Posture vis-à-vis Hezbollah Since 2006," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. no (), pp.

Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: the story of the party of God from revolution to institutionalization* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), skim.

(4) Israeli counter-terrorism in historical perspective

\*Samy Cohen, *Israel's Asymmetric Wars* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), chapters 1, 4-8.

Or Arthur Honig, "Coercing Weak Regimes to Stop Supporting Terrorism: How and When It Can Be Done," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2013), pp. 245-260.

Or Honig, *Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2007).

Schulze, Kirsten E. (2010) *Israeli crisis decision-making: the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon wars*. In: Kurkinen, Heidi, (ed.) *Strategic decision-making in crisis and war*. Series 2: Research Reports (42). National Defence University Finland, Helsinki.

**12. Religion and state, political Islam, Islamic movements and Jihadist groups, the increasing sectarianism in the region, Islamist thinkers**

**Topics covered include:** the nexus between religion and politics in general, the Muslim Brotherhood, the relationships between the traditional (non-salafist) Ulama (clerics) in the Sunni world and the regime, the failure of the secular national regimes to generate secular national identity (Wataniyya) as an alternative to Islam and in attempt to homogenize their societies, the Sunni-Shiite sectarianism and its growth since the American invasion into Iraq, the official Islam in the Gulf monarchies and the implication for processes of social modernization and democratization; the impact of the Sunni Salafi Jihadist groups on the political culture.

**Main questions:** What were the main alternatives to political Islam and why did they lose? How did the different secular nationalist regimes (e.g., the Baath in Iraq) try to cement a new Watani identity? What role does Islam serve in the domestic politics in the Middle East and how does Islamic doctrine and changes in the religious realm change the international politics of the region? What is unique about Hamas compared to the other Islamic movements? Why did the various Western intelligence agencies fail to foresee 9/11?

\*Gause, *International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, Chapter 5.

\*Peter Mandaville, "Islam and International Relations in the Middle East: From Umma to Nation State", in Louise Fawcett (ed.) *International Relations of the Middle East* (), pp.170-187.

Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard UP)

Mary Anne Weaver, "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *The Atlantic*, July/August 2006

Michael Robbins and Lawrence Rubin, "The Rise of Official Islam in Jordan,"

*Politics, Religion, and Ideology*, Vol.14, Issue 1 (Winter 2013).

Lawrence Rubin, "Islamic political activism among Israel's Negev Bedouin population" the *British Journal of Middle East Studies*.

Fouad Ajami, "The end of pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, vol.57 iss:2 (1978).

Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96,"

*International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-31.

Amatzia Baram, *Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003* (Woodrow Wilson Press), skim.

### **13. Zooming into the Israel-Palestinian conflict**

Topics covered include: (1) the internationalization of Palestinian terrorism (2) the Israeli occupation & its management dilemmas (2) the soft power and propaganda narratives of both sides; (3) factors determining the Palestinian behavior/strategy (4) the demise of the “Jordanian/Palestinian” Territories (5) the growth of political Islam in the occupied territories; (6) the factors causing the intractability of the conflict.

**Main questions:** What caused the Labor Party to believe in the Jordanian option for so many years? What pushed security centered realist minded Rabin to pursue the Oslo peace process? Why did Rabin make progress in the peace process despite lack of PA counter-terror measures? What factors allow so much intervention/meddling by other actors in the region in the Palestinian polity/national movement, and has this declined or not over time?

How did the split nature of the Palestinian national movement (mostly between Hamas and Fatah) affect both the behavior of the Palestinian actors and the effectiveness of various Israeli strategies? How did Yasir Arafat make himself synonymous with the Palestinian struggle, which became

the sacred cause of the Arabs.

\*Pearlman W. 2009. “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” *International Security* 13 (3): 79-109.

\*Itamar Rabinovich, “The Palestinian Issue: Changing Israeli Perspectives in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aaron Klieman (eds) *Global Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 121-136.

Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), chapters 7-11.

\*Stacie E. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 18-57, 115-206.

\*Ron Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 1-133, 153-179.

Shlomo Gazit, *The Carrot and the Stick* (Washington, DC: B'nai B'rith Books, 1995).

Tuastad, D., " Hamas-PLO Relations Before and After the Arab Spring," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 20 (2013), pp. 86–98.

**14. How Middle East authoritarian regimes survive and how they design their foreign policies (including use of propaganda and unique attributes of intelligence)**

Topics covered: the different coercive tools and the regimes' choices between them (militias, army or secret police), transitions between types of autocratic regimes,

Roger Owen, *The rise and fall of Arab presidents for life* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard UP, 2012), skim.

\*James Quinlivan, "Coups-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security*, Volume 24, Number 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131-165

Owen L. Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat* (London: Routledge, 2010), skim.

