

The Israeli Palestinian Conflict in Comparative Perspective

JST 3930(25359), INR 4931 (26707)

Instructor: Dr. Or Arthur Honig (ohonig@ufl.edu , orhonig@yahoo.com)

Tuesday, period 4 (10:40-11:30), Thursday Periods 4-5 (10:40-12:35).

Office Hours & location: Walker Hall, room 210, Tuesday and Thursday Periods 1&2
(8:00-9:30 am)

It is well known that intra-state conflicts have been much bloodier than inter-state conflicts ever since the end of the Second World War. What drives ethnic intra-state conflicts? Why do we sometimes see the belligerent sides shifting between violence and negotiations? Why do some conflicts cause more bloodshed than others? Why are some conflicts harder to resolve? What are the strategies that different actors on each side employ to promote their strategic or domestic political goals? As you can tell from these questions, we will study in this course not just the forces shaping the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but also compare this uniquely intractable conflict to other modern ethno-religious conflicts. We will explore the weight of factors associated with the structure of the conflict, as well as factors rooted in the international environment.

This course is unique compared to standard courses on the Israeli Palestinian conflict in four main ways. First, we will not only go over political developments in the conflict, but also try to explore the moves in the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism, intelligence, propaganda, subversion and economics of both sides. After all, different victories of either side stem from an advantage in one of these arenas. Second, we will be examining the impacts of the conflict on both sides (their societies, their economies, their political systems)

as well as explore the externalization of the conflict (to Jews and Muslims abroad). In this context we will examine the impact of the conflict on the relevant diasporas (or ethnic kin groups in the Palestinian case), as well as on actors that are not party to the conflict at all. Third, we will give a lot of attention to actors trying to intervene in the conflict -- their motivations, the factors shaping their attitude and different policies over time, their toolkits, and finally their success in gaining strategic advantage from intervening as well as the impact on conflict resolution/escalation. Fourth, we will engage in comparison with other intra-state conflicts, military occupations and decolonization struggles. Fifth, we will definitely not make the mistake of ignoring strategic context -- after all, the Israeli Palestinian conflict is embedded in several other regional and international conflicts (some of which are geo-political, and others more ideological). These global and regional conflicts include: the Arab-Israeli inter-state conflict, the Cold War (and later in the post-Cold War era the conflict between the radical global left and the Conservative right), the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Westernizing regimes of the Middle East, and finally the Iranian struggle to gain regional dominance.

Course goals

The goal of this course is not just to give the students a better understanding of the factors shaping the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but also to learn how to compare this conflict to other conflicts. Hence, you will acquire the skill to think theoretically about the different dimensions of this intractable conflict, as well as to think critically about the models we currently have for explaining intra-state conflicts.

After completing this course, students will be able to:

- Understand the dynamics of strategic interactions between Israel and the Palestinians (or to be precise between different elements inside each camp).
- Assess the effectiveness of different conflict management or conflict resolution policies under different circumstances.
- Use historical data for the purpose of both testing and developing these models.
- Learn how to present and generate a class debate.

Course requirements and grading:

20% -- active participation. This component of the grade might include homework tasks. As a general rule, I would like you to read those items with a star next to them. I will also ask students to begin class by sharing what they have read, what they found interesting or puzzling. If you read items beyond the obligatory ones (or watch relevant videos) you will get extra participation points.

30% -- a 15-25 minute presentation on a topic related to the Israeli Palestinian conflict (to be chosen either from the list of topics or approved by me). These will be presented by students based on their choice of dates, though most probably towards the second half of the semester. Instructions are uploaded to canvas.

45% -- an oral exam (to be held during class time and office hours in the last two to three weeks). Make-up exams must be approved by the instructor beforehand, or justified afterward by providing appropriate documentation (medical, etc.).

5% -- a short multiple choice exam (to be held in the last class before the beginning of the oral exams).

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Grade scale:

87–89 = B+ 77–79 = C+ 67–69 = D+ below 60 = E

93–100 = A 83–86 = B 73–76 = C 63–66 = D

90–92 = A- 80–82 = B- 70–72 = C- 60–62 = D

Grading Criteria is as follows:

- A-range – 90s -- Excels – Full command and facility with material with the ability to place it within larger historical/literary context and to make arguments based upon it.
- B-range – 80s – Good – Solid understanding of material but without complete facility or ability to make arguments based on it.
- C-range – 70s -- Fair – Some understanding of major themes, lack of command with detail, or some understanding of detail but lack of contextual understanding.
- D-range – 60s -- Poor – Enough factual understanding to pass, but little to no contextual clarity.
- F-range – Fails – Lack of university level quality.

For the grading policies of the University of Florida in general, follow this link:

[https://catalog.ufl.edu/UGRD/academic-regulations/grades-grading-policies/ \(Links to an external site.\)](https://catalog.ufl.edu/UGRD/academic-regulations/grades-grading-policies/)

Class Policies

Attendance:

Attendance is mandatory. You *are* expected to participate on days during which we have discussion.

Be in class on time.

Electronics:

I discourage the use of unnecessary electronics in the classroom. Let's unplug for a few hours and focus on the texts in front of us and the people in the room. The majority of the readings will be provided in .pdf format. I would prefer for all note taking to be done by hand. If you must have a computer for some reason, it should only be used for readings.

Academic Honesty:

The University of Florida Student Honor Code is located at this link:

<http://www.dso.ufl.edu/sccr/honorcodes/honorcode.php> (Links to an external site.).

UF students are bound by The Honor Pledge which states, "We, the members of the University of Florida community, pledge to hold ourselves and our peers to the highest standards of honor and integrity by abiding by the Honor Code. On all work submitted for credit by students at the University of Florida, the following pledge is either required or implied: "On my honor, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid in doing this assignment." The Honor Code (<http://www.dso.ufl.edu/sccr/process/student-conduct-honorcode/>) specifies a number of behaviors that are in violation of this code and the possible sanctions. Furthermore, you are obligated to report any condition that facilitates academic misconduct to appropriate personnel. If you have any questions or concerns, please consult with the instructor.

Plagiarism will not be tolerated!**Students with Disabilities:**

Students with disabilities requesting accommodations should first register with the Disability Resource Center (352-392-8565, www.dso.ufl.edu/drc/) by providing appropriate documentation. Once registered, students will receive an accommodation letter which must be presented to the instructor when requesting accommodation. Students with disabilities should follow this procedure as early as possible in the semester.

Course Evaluations:

Students in this class are participating in the pilot evaluation of the new course evaluation system called GatorEvals. The new evaluation system is designed to be more informative to instructors so that teaching effectiveness is enhanced and to be more seamlessly linked to UF's CANVAS learning management system. Students can complete their evaluations through the email they receive from GatorEvals, in their Canvas course menu under GatorEvals.

Recordings:

As in all courses, unauthorised recording and unauthorised sharing of recorded materials is prohibited.

Academic Resources:

E-learning technical support, 352-392-4357 (select option 2) or e-mail to Learningsupport@ufl.edu.
<https://lss.at.ufl.edu/help.shtml>.

Teaching Center, Broward Hall, 392-2010 or 392-6420. General study skills and tutoring.

<http://teachingcenter.ufl.edu/> ([Links to an external site.](#))

Writing Studio, 302 Tigert Hall, 846-1138. Help brainstorming, formatting, and writing papers.

<http://writing.ufl.edu/writing-studio/>

Software Use

All faculty, staff, and students of the University are required and expected to obey the laws and legal agreements governing software use. Failure to do so can lead to monetary damages and/or criminal penalties for the individual violator. Because such violations are also against University policies and rules, disciplinary action will be taken as appropriate. We, the members of the University of Florida

community, pledge to uphold ourselves and our peers to the highest standards of honesty and integrity.

Student Privacy

There are federal laws protecting your privacy with regards to grades earned in courses and on individual assignments: For more information, please see:

<http://registrar.ufl.edu/catalog0910/policies/regulationferpa.html>

Required Textbooks: None. All required textbooks will be uploaded to canvas, and the relevant books will be placed in the reserve section of Library West. I do recommend reading the following textbooks:

Asaf Siniver (ed.) *Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Routledge, 2022).

Martin Bunton, *The Israeli Palestinian Conflict, A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford UP).

Dov Waxman, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford UP, 2019).

Alan Dowty, *Israel/Palestine, third edition* (Polity Press, 2012).

The course outline

The course is divided into five main parts. The first part will lay down the main theoretical questions and concepts which currently exist in the ethnic conflicts literature. The second part will provide the students with a basic understanding of the geography, demographics and nature of the relevant actors today in the three ethnic conflicts which the course focuses on: the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Northern Ireland conflict, and the end of Apartheid in South Africa. It is essentially a short introduction to the nature of the actors which are involved in the conflicts and their interests. The third part will provide the necessary

historical background to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. We will cover in a very concise way the history of the conflict from its very beginnings until today.

The fourth part of the course is really the main bulk of the course. We will explore the three different conflicts, but especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from a variety of dimensions and consider the validity of the theoretical literature about them. We will try to see whether the strategic interaction that took place between Israel and the Palestinians fits the existing models, how this conflict sheds light on debates in the literature, and lastly we will compare the policies of each of the parties to the conflict to similarly situated partners to other conflicts. The fifth and final part of the course consists of the students' presentations.

Part I: theoretical concepts and insights in the ethnic conflict literature

The course examines closely ethnic civil wars or intra-state conflicts with an ethno-religious dimension. This is why we will first situate this type of conflict in the family of intra-state conflicts. Then, we will go over some basic concepts. As we shall see throughout the course, many theoretical angles, phenomena and questions have not yet been thoroughly examined. A close look at the few cases examined throughout this course will help shed light on them. The course pulls together different strands of theoretical literature that shed light both on the role of agency (what strategies they choose to adopt, how reliable are they) as well as structural factors, and also both on factors that have to do with the nature of the actors as well as the characteristics of the conflict.

The negotiations and conflict resolution/peace studies literature

William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions,” In Janice G. Stein (ed.) *Getting to the Table* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989)

Marieke Kleiboer, "Review: Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 109-116.

On the legitimacy of the spokesperson for each side see, William Zartman, "The Negotiation Process in the Middle East," In Steven Spiegel (ed.) *The Arab-Israeli search for Peace* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992),

The trust literature (rational choice and the political psychology critics)

Ilai Alon and Daniel Bar-Tal (eds.), *The Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian Case and Beyond* (Springer, 2013), chapters 1-2.

Deborah Welch Larson, "Trust and missed opportunities in international relations," *Political Psychology* 18/3 (1997), pp. 701-734

The rational choice literature: trust, signalling, bargaining and Commitment problem

Erin Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment* (Cornell University Press, 2007), introduction and chapter 1.

Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, vol. 51 (1997), pp. 335-364.

Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), chapters 1-80.

The structural realist models

Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.

103-124. Also available as a journal article: Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.

Identity based explanation for conflicts perpetuation/resolution

Ron Hassner, "The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/7).

Freely available at: http://www.waronsacredgrounds.com/uploads/Path_to_Intractability.pdf

Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Cornell UP, 1993), chapter 1.

Amos Oz, *How to Cure a Fanatic* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), skim.

Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, "Historical Acknowledgment as an Early Conflict Negotiation Strategy: A Feasibility Study of Israel/Palestine." *Negotiation Journal*, Spring 2021 37(2), 163-191.

Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, "From Taboo to the Negotiable: The Israeli New Historians and the Changing Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem," *Perspectives on Politics*, 2007, 5 (2): 241-258.

Theories about composite actors and diasporas in conflict situations

Wendy Pearlman, "A Composite-Actor Approach to Conflict Behavior," in Adria Lawrence and Erica Chenoweth, eds., *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-state Actors in Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), pp. 197-219.

Wendy Pearlman, “Political unity is the precondition for effective strategy,” in Jamie Stern-Weiner, ed. *Moment of Truth: Tackling Israel-Palestine’s Toughest Questions* (New York: Or Books, 2018), pp. 147-150.

Yossi Shain, “The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution,” *SAIS Review*, Volume 22, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2002, pp. 115-144

Yossi Shain and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Peace as a three-level game: The role of diasporas in conflict resolution” in Thomas Ambrosio (ed.), *Ethnic identity groups and US foreign policy* (Praeger, 2002), 169-197

Part II: Some background and basic facts about the relevant actors and the current situation

A. Conflict 1: The Israelis, the Palestinians and the Jordanians

We are talking here about the following parties to the conflict: four governments (Israel, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Hamas), and several communities on each side. Their involvement in the conflict varies. On the Jewish Zionist side we are talking about Jews inside Israel and in the diaspora. The Jewish citizens of Israel include several subgroups, with one of them (the ultra-Orthodox) being non-Zionist. On the Palestinian side we are talking about six different communities in the following locations: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Israel, Jordan, the rest of the Arab world and finally the rest of the world (mainly Western countries). We will go over the Arab minority in Israel and explain what determines their degree of Zionism or Palestinian identity and their degree of desire/willingness to take part in the conflict. We will also cover the political structure of Israel and the Palestinian authority and the legalities of the Israeli occupation regime.

Asher Susser, *Jordan, Palestine, and the Politics of Collective Identity* (Lynne Rener, 2024), chapters 5-10.

Luisa Gandolfo, *Palestinians in Jordan* (Bloomsbury, 2012), skim.

Tilde Rosmer, *The Islamic Movement in Israel* (University of Texas Press, 2022), chapter 1,2, 4 and 6.

Hillel Frisch, *Israel's Security and Its Arab Citizens* (Cambridge UP, 2011), Chapters 1-4, 9.

Wendy Pearlman, “Palestinian Nationalism,” in Asaf Siniver (ed.) *Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 59-74.

Joel Peters and David Newman (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Routledge, 2013), Chapters 18-23.

Samy Smooha, “The Jewish Ethnic Divide and Ethnic Politics in Israel,” (ch. 29) in Reuven Chazan (ed.) *Israeli Politics and Society* (Oxford UP), pp. 499-514.

Clive Jones, *Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989-92: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East* (Routledge, 2013).

Anita Shapira, “Political History of Israel,” in Reuven Hazan et al (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society* (OUP, 2021), chapter 4 (73-88).

Watch interview with Lucy Aharish with Free Press:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LJcd7wHlCE&t=2589s>

Watch an interview with Tilde Rosmer about the Islamic movement of Israel:

<https://cghi.ucla.edu/israel/article/254984>

B. Conflict 2: the Northern Ireland and South African conflicts

Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction, 2nd Edition (Oxford UP, 2020), skim.

Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford UP, 2014), skim.

Part III: A Concise (though Not Too Short) Historical Background of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

We will try in this historical survey to put the conflict in context. We can identify five main stages in the Israeli Palestinian conflict: (1) the pre-conflict stage during which the Jewish Yishuv was born, (2) the British Mandate period, (3) the ascendance of Pan-Arabism (until the 1967 war), (4) the Palestinian ascendance stage (until the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war), and finally (5) the period of attempted Iranian regional takeover.

Stage 1: The Pre-conflict period

This period covers everything before the beginning of the British mandate (during which the conflict and competition actually erupted). It is during this period that the Zionists establish a foothold in the region of Palestine/Eretz Israel.

Topics covered: 1. the empowerment of Jews in the early to mid nineteenth century (Nathan Rothschild, Baron Maurice Hirsch, and the proto-Zionist Baron Moses Montefiore); 2. The emergence of Zionism as a political movement (also what is Zionism? What does it mean to be a Zionist in the Jewish diaspora or among non-Jews? Are we seeing a decline of Zionism in Israel today?). 3. The first and second Jewish waves of immigration (1882-1903, 1904-14); 4. The emergence of the Arab national movement in the Ottoman empire; 5. The First World War and the various British war-time promises, the Zionist-Hashemite diplomacy and the role of Chaim Weizmann more generally, and the post-war commitments of the League of Nations.

*Emmanuel Navon, *The Star and Scepter* (Univ of Nebraska Press, 2022), chapters 5-7.

*Michael J. Cohen, “Centenary of the Balfour Declaration,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017).

Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs* (Basic Books, 2009), chapter 6.

Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and the Jews* (New York: Henry Holt, 2008), chapters 1-6 (and especially chapter 4).

Eugene Rogan, “The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System” in *International Relations of the Middle East* (Ed. Louise Fawcett), 1-43

Fred Lawson, *Constructing International Relations in the Arab World* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), ch. 1,2, 4 and conclusion.

Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 5-22 (chap 1).

Additional readings:

James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), skim.

Jehuda Reinhartz and Motti Golani, *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (Chicago UP, 2024), chapter 2.

Ian S. Lustick. “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective,” *International Organization*, vol. 51 (1997), pp. 653-683.

David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1990), pp. 493-567.

Benjamin Miller, “Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity,” *Security Studies*, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2006), pp. 658 – 705.

Efraim Karsh, *The Tail that Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 9-30; or alternatively, Karsh *Islamic Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), chapter 8.

Albert Hourani, A history of the Arab peoples (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), ch. 18 (p. 303) The emergence of nationalism.

Highly recommended videos

A. Jonathan Schneer, “The Balfour Declaration,” WGBH Forum

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxqJyjuNjd8>

B. Eugene Rogan: “The First World War in the Middle East” University of Oklahoma

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyKoqjFD9TU&t=426s>

C. Gabriel Matzkin, Abigail Jacobson and Eugene Rogan “From Constantinople to San Remo,” Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem), 2017.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SchqyJ14TVw>

D. Martin Kramer, “Sykes-Picot: An Obstacle to the Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOB2Vp6DbPw>

Stage 2: The period of the British mandate and the 1948 War

The British mandate period may be neatly divided into five main periods: 1. from 1920 until the Wailing Wall riots of 1929, 2. from 1929 until the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, 3. the period of the Second World War (especially until Menachem Begin declared the revolt in 1944), 4. from the final stages of the Second World War until the UN partition resolution in November 1947, 5. The 1948 war and its immediate ramifications.

Recommended reading:

For a general review, with a good analysis of Zionist-Israeli dilemmas during both the Mandate period and the 1948 war read Shlomo Ben Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006), chapter 2.

Anita Shapira, *Land and Power* (Stanford UP, 1999), skim.

Tom Segev, *One Palestine Complete* (2000), skim.

The lead up to the wailing Wall Riots (1920-1929)

This is known as the quiet period. There was very little Jewish immigration. The Zionist leadership believed that they could buy time until the local Arab population tried to use force to expel or kill them (and that at any event the British would protect them). However, the 1929 events (the Wailing Wall/Al-Buraq riots) showed the Zionist leaders that they were deluding themselves. Hajj Amin al-Husseini came to prominence for the first time as the radical and most prominent leader of the Palestinians.

Questions: What Lessons can you learn from the 1929 riots, which may be applied to the Israeli Palestinian conflict today? Is there any lesson for why the October 7th attack came as a surprise for Israel?

Readings:

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), chapter 6.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors* (NY: Grove Press, 2017), chapter 3.

Shaiel Ben-Ephraim and Or Honig, “Sitting on the Volcano: Lynching Attacks in the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict,” in Michael J. Pfeifer (ed.), *Global Lynching and Collective Violence: Past and Present* (The University of Illinois Press, 2017), 185-222.

Hillel Cohen, *1929: Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Brandeis University Press, Waltham, Mass., 2015), Skim.

Period 2: 1929-1939

This subperiod saw the following events: The cancellation of the Passfield White Paper (through the MacDonalds Letter), the Jewish immigration from Germany, Austria and Poland, the outbreak of the 1936 Arab revolt, the expulsion of the main Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the harsh repression of the Palestinians by the British, the Jewish restraint (Havlagah), the 1937 Peel Commission, the establishment of the Special Nights Squads by Orde Wingate.

The best book on the Arab rebellion is

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors* (NY: Grove Press, 2017), chapters 4-5.

Oren Kessler, *Palestine 1936: The Great Revolt and the Roots of the Middle East Conflict*

(Rowman & Littlefield, 2023), skim.

Also Watch an interview with Oren Kessler with JBS:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AfiNSu9T8>

Hillel Kuuler, "75 years after his death, why Orde Wingate remains a hero in Israel," March 23, 2019.

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/75-years-after-his-death-why-orde-wingate-remains-a-hero-in-israel/>

Flores, Alexander. "The Arabs as Nazis? Some Reflections on "Islamofascism" and Arab Anti-Semitism," *Die Welt des Islams*. **52** (3/4)

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), ch. 7

Period 3: The Second World War

Tom Segev, *A State at Any Cost* (Apollo Books, 2019), chapters 12-14.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 6.

Matthias Kuntzel, *Nazis, Islamic Antisemitism and the Middle East. The Arab War against Israel and the Aftershocks of World War II* (Routledge 2024), skim.

Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (Yale University Press, 2009), skim.

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), ch. 8.

The anti-British struggle (1945-47)

I am including in this section also the American support for the establishment of Israel since it was the Zionist movement which aligned with President Truman to push the British out of mandatory Palestine and to scuttle the idea of a single independent Palestine with an Arab

majority. The UN also played an important role in supporting the Zionist cause and in calling for the partition of Palestine. Major events include: the illegal immigration, the Zionist underground movements' fight against the British, the visit by UNSCOP and the Exodus ship affair. We will explore the causes and impact of the American-British disagreements over Palestine (and the Zionist role in exacerbating them).

Some questions: Why did the Zionist leadership (especially David Ben Gurion) choose propaganda over armed conflict? Should all the national liberation movements adopt this method for gaining independence? To what extent did anti-British violence play a role in securing Israeli independence from British rule? Why did the Palestinian Arabs lose the diplomatic game which preceded the 1948 war? A comparison to other insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: What explains the relative restraint of the Zionist insurgency (not attacking British civilians)? Why could Ben Gurion impose his authority and effectively bring the Haganah underground to halt the armed struggle (something that Arafat could never accomplish)? The British counterinsurgency -- what explains the British restraint? Why didn't they match their level of violence to that employed by the Zionist insurgents, like they have done in so many places? Why did the British

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 7.

Bruce Hoffman, "The bombing of The King David Hotel, July 1946," 31/3 (2020), pp. 594-611.

Amikam Nachmani, "Generals at Bay in Post-War Palestine (and We Have Only Ourselves to Blame)," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, (December 1983), pp. 66-83.

Andrew Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance* (Georgetown UP, 2017), ch. 3.

James Vaughan, A book review of David Cesarani, Major Farran's Hat,

<https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/856/print/>

Leslie Stein, The Hope Fulfilled (Pareger, 2003), ch. 9.

Amikam Nachmani, "Generals at Bay in Post-War Palestine (and We Have Only Ourselves to Blame)," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, (December 1983), pp. 66-83.

Or Arthur Honig, "The Whisper in the Leader's Ear: How Do Foreign Policy Advisers Perform their Job?" *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 221-241.

The 1948 War

The 1948 war: this war had two parts: the so-called "civil war" between Arabs and Jews in mandatory Palestine, including Qawuqji's volunteer army (Nov 1947-May 48) and the confrontation against the invading armies of the four Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon to a limited degree). We will cover the following topics: the extent of Palestinians' displacement and its causes, the Israeli operations and strategy and the question of war aims, the secret key for the success of the Zionists, the secret Israeli Jordanian cooperation, why the US foreign policy establishment made a completely wrong estimate, the importance of narratives regarding 1948, the trauma of these events, and finally the nexus between History, historiography and memory.

Some key questions: Why did the different Arab countries decide to go to war against the newly born State of Israel and what IR theories does this shed light on? Why and how did the Jews win both the so-called civil-war in mandatory Palestine and in the inter-state fighting stage? How can we explain the (limited?) extent of the Israeli attempt to expel Arab inhabitants of Palestine? What factors account for the partial Israeli victory in this war?

(Notably, only the Egyptian army was completely removed from areas allocated to Israel in the UN partition plan, while both Syria and Jordan successfully retained some areas). Who is most responsible for the 700,000 Palestinian refugees? Could this have been averted somehow?

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 7.

Benny Morris, 1948: a history of the first Arab - Israeli war (New Haven [Conn.] : Yale University Press, 2008), skim.

For the impact of the 1948 war and other developments in mandatory Palestine on the neighboring Arab countries see, Rogan, *The Arabs*, chapter 9.

*David Tal (2005) "The Historiography of the 1948 War in Palestine: The Missing Dimension," *Journal of Israeli History*, 24:2, 183-202.

*David Tal, "The Forgotten War: The Jewish-Palestinian Strife in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948." *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, no. 3-4, (Spring/Summer 2000), pp. 3-21.

Michael Eppel, "The Arab States and the 1948 War in Palestine: The Socio-Political Struggles, the Compelling Nationalist Discourse and the Regional Context of Involvement," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48:1 (2012), pp. 1-31.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, pp. 31-48.

Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, 2nd edition (Cambridge UP, 2008), chapters 4-8, 10. skim.

Michael Eppel, "The Iraqi Domestic Scene and its Bearing on the Palestine Issue 1947", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 24, (1990), pp. 51-73.

Michael Eppel, "Syria and Iraqi-Syrian Relations During the 1948 War in Palestine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, (1996), pp. 74-91.

Alexander Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 156-257.

Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood , (Boston : Beacon Press, 2006). Chapter 2

On Hajj Amin al Husseini see, Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939 - 1948 (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), ch. 8, pp. 231 - 248 ("The Mufti, Palestinian Politics, and Efforts at Socio - Political Unity of Arab Society").

Benny Morris, 1948: a history of the first Arab - Israeli war (New Haven [Conn.] : Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 2 – "The UN Steps In."

The security dilemma and its relevance for explaining the extent of ethnic cleansing:

*Barry Posen. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael Brown (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 103-124. Also available as a journal article: Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.

Stage 3: The period of the Arab Israeli conflict (1949-67)

During this period the Palestinians stopped becoming a real international actor, and therefore they tried to use violence in order to become more relevant. Until 1967 they failed to determine the regional and international agenda. Even in the regional arena, Pan-Arabism meant that someone else (not the Palestinians) will lead the Arab world in defeating Israel.

Moreover, Pan-Arabism meant that the solution for the Palestine problem would have to wait until

This whole period is really divided into three sub-periods: from the establishment of Israel until the 1956 Suez campaign (1949-56), from the end of the Suez campaign until the radical forces of the Baath take over in Syria and Iraq (1957-1963), and the lead up to the 1967 war (1964-67).

Fighting the Fedayeen and the diplomatic initiatives to return the refugees to their homes (1949-1956)

The main Israeli problem in this period was that of the Palestinian incursions and Israeli retaliation raids. Another major event in this period is the assassination of King Abdullah by a Palestinian who was sent by Egypt, a development which put an end to the peace talks.

Readings:

Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben-Gurion and Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 1988 24(3): 330-356.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 8.

Class exercise: reading and discussing the eulogy of IDF COS Moshe Dayan for Roi Rotenberg (April, 1956).

<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/moshe-dayan-s-eulogy-for-roi-rutenberg-april-19-1956>

Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, *The Palestinian People*, 2nd edition (Harvard UP, 2003), chapter 7.

From the end of the Suez campaign until the radical forces of the Baath take over in Syria and Iraq (1957-1963)

This is considered a stable period. The Palestinian factor is largely forgotten and marginalized by all major regional actors. What were the factors behind this stability? Why were the Palestinians unable to disrupt the quiet understandings between Ben Gurion and Nasser? Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 9.

Elli Lieberman, *Reconceptualizing Deterrence* (Routledge, 2018), chapter 2.

The lead up to the 1967 war

Scholars often talk about border skirmishes that led to war due to Nasser's image concerns. Yet, what went on behind the scenes? Who allowed for Palestinian guerilla and terror actions to take place and why? What was the role of the Palestinians in leading to the June 1967 war? Given that a war did not serve the interests of either the Egyptians or the Israelis, why could not they stop it? What explains the success of the FATAH in triggering the escalation that led to war? To what extent were the Palestinians or the Palestinian issue were

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 10.

Yaakov Bar Siman Tov, *Linkage Politics in the Middle East: Syria Between Domestic and External Conflict, 1961-1970* (Westview Press, 1983), skim.

Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan* (Allen Lane, 2007), chapters 10-11.

Meir Amit, "Secret Contacts for Peace: A Lost Opportunity," in (Routledge, 2003), chapter 16.

Wendy Pearlman, "The Palestinian National Movement" in Wm Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The 1967 Arab Israeli War* (Oxford UP, 2012), chapter 5.

Stage 4: The period of the Palestinian ascendancy (1968-2005)

This period saw two Intifadas, Arafat was categorized as a peacemaker and then re-recategorized as an arch-terrorist, the PLO was pushed out from both Jordan and later

Lebanon. Israel even tried to eliminate the group in Tunisia. This period ends with the Gaza Disengagement plan. The Palestinian issue worries states in the region less than before only as the Iranian threat looms large. Significantly, we see that as different Arab countries are trying to scale back their commitment to the Palestinian cause, the Palestinians try to use violence to return to relevance, both in this period and in the next.

The sub-periods of this stage include:

1. The “civil wars” in which the PLO tries to take over different Arab countries & territories (the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan and finally Lebanon), while Israel assists the local ruling ethnic groups/political elements in these areas (1967-1985).
2. The marginalization of the Palestinians and the eruption of the first Intifada (1985-1990).
3. The Oslo peace Process -- from the Madrid peace conference in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War until the failed Camp David summit (1991-December 2000)
4. The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Israeli unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip (2000-2004)

The PLO’s attempts to take over states/territories in the region, and Israeli attempts to counter that (1967-85)

This is the most complex and least understood and least studied subperiod in Israeli history. This period presents the height of Israeli intervention in the internal Arab affairs. This is done mainly in an attempt to prevent the PLO from taking over different territories (something which is viewed by many Israelis as a severe danger to Israeli security and even ideological goals). Indeed, even the decision to forge the Israeli Egyptian peace agreement before

invading Lebanon to deal a harsh blow to the PLO partly reflected the Israeli fear of generating a regional war (a calculation that invading a small Arab country and acting against the PLO would trigger a military response from the Arab states).

There are three main topics that we will address here: 1. The Israeli attempts to fight against the attempted PLO takeovers; 2. The Palestinian international terrorism and the Israeli counter-terrorism efforts; 3. The Palestinian diplomatic successes in the age of petrodollars (the oil prices only went down in 1986).

Some questions: what were the successes and failures of the Israeli campaign against the PLO throughout this period? What were the mistakes that Israel made and which prevented it from achieving maximum success? Would it have been possible at all to eliminate the PLO as a political force, and would it have led to Israeli-Palestinian peace or to a negative outcome eventually?

Readings:

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapters 12-15.

Ronen Bergman, *Rise and Kill First* (Random House, 2018), chapters 7-18.

Ziv Rubinowitz, “Blue and White ‘Black September’: Israel’s Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970,” *The International History Review*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2010), pp. 687 -706.

Nigel Ashton, “Pulling the Strings: King Hussein’s Role during the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan,” *The International History Review*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2006), pp. 94 -118.

Joseph Nevo, “September 1970 in Jordan: A Civil War?” *Civil Wars*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2008), pp. 217 -230.

Emile Sahliyeh, “The West Bank Pragmatic Elite”, *J. of Palestine Studies*, 15:4 (1986), 34-45.

Hudson, Michael C. "The Palestinian factor in the Lebanese civil war." *The Middle East journal* 32.3 (1978): 261-278

Shlomo Ben Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace*, chapter 7.

Bruce Hoffman, “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?” *Foreign Policy*, No. 115 (Summer, 1999), pp. 62-76.

Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia UP), chapter 3.

Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Spies Against Armageddon* (NY: Levant Books, 2012), chapters 14-15.

Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, “Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon,” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall, 1983), pp. 117-142.

Wendy Pearlman, “The Palestinian national movement and the 1967 War,” in Wm Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 126-148.

The marginalization of the Palestinians and the eruption of the first Intifada (1985-1991)

We will address four main topics: 1. the failure of the “Jordanian option” (1985-87) including the Jordanian decision to completely disconnect from the West Bank and give up on its goal of one day retrieving that territory; 2. The outbreak of the Intifada and the policies of Arafat to keep the leadership in his hands; 3. The rise of Hamas; 4. Western intolerance towards Palestinian terrorism.

Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Behind the Uprising* (GreenwoodPress, 1989), chapters 11-16.

Ian Lustick, “Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories,” *World Politics*, 45/4 (1993).

Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon & Schuster), skim.

Barry Rubin, "Iraq and the PLO: Brother's Keepers, Losers Weepers," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Iraq's Road to War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), chapter 9.
Beverly Milton Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas* (2024), chapters 4.

Ian Lustick, "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993) pp. 560-594.

Does the theoretical literature about the causes for the growing demands for independence and even for the outbreak of popular insurgency against the occupying government explain well the outbreak of the first Intifada?

Ted R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 1968), pp. 1104-124

The Oslo peace process and the nineties (1991-2001)

The Oslo peace process is really divided into three parts depending on the Israeli party in power: it was first the Labour party headed by Rabin and Peres (1992-96), then the Labour party under Barak again. The Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out during Barak's tenure. Was it inevitable? Who was to blame? Should the peace process with the Palestinians have been managed differently? Why did Rabin pursue this process with Arafat? Why did he not stop it when Hamas terrorism began?

*Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006) 201-284.

Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 9-10.

Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine* (NY: Verso Press, 2009), chapters 15-16.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapters 18-21.

Beverly Milton Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas* (2024), chapters 5.

Nathan Brown, *Palestinian Politics After Oslo Accords* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2003), pp. 1-18, 94-137, 191-243.

The Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005)

In this section we are also going to study carefully the Gaza Disengagement plan.

Mia Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119 (Spring 2004): 61–88;

Graham Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 2, (Winter 2003), pp. 21-40.

Jeremy Pressman, “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 2003).

<http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/220/448>

Ahron Bregman, *Elusive Peace* (Penguin Books), skim.

Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (Oxford UP), chapter 4 (pp.185-244).

Beverly Milton Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas* (2024), chapters 6.

Eliot Abrams, *Tested By Zion* (Cambridge UP), skim. Or listen to his numerous lectures on the Bush administration’s handling of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Jeremy Pressman, “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 2003).

On the al-Aqsa Intifada: BBC/PBS “Elusive Peace”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEHqDG1EVHQ&t=5475s>

Stage 5: The period of attempted Iranian regional takeover (2006 until today)

By the 21st century many Arab states have given up on the idea of assisting Palestinian radicalism despite its huge appeal. They had many economic problems and had to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, both Egypt as well as most North African Arab states became much more inward oriented and sought to tame Palestinian nationalism or alternatively have nothing to do with the hot potato of the Palestinian plight. Moreover, these states were becoming much more concerned with the rising regional power -- Iran, which benefited enormously from the American decision to remove the gatekeeper to the weak Arab world, Saddam Hussein. The Arab Spring and policies of President Obama further allowed Iran to extend its influence in the region in general and in the Israeli Palestinian conflict in particular. This period is divided into three sub periods: the premiership of Ehud Olmert, the premiership of Netanyahu until the October 7th Hamas attack, and finally the war that followed the October 7th attack.

2006-2009 The Ehud Olmert years: the last Israeli attempt to genuinely make peace

Ian Black, Enemies and Neighbors, chapter 24.

Ehud Olmert, Searching for Peace: A Memoir of Israel (Brookings Institution Press, 2022), chapter 10.

Also Watch this interview with Olmert:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ-NfMxTO1s>

2009-2023: The years of seeming mutual deterrence

During these years Hamas built up its force in a way that allowed it to perform the attack of October 7th. It seemed like the situation of two mini Palestinian statelets was very stable. It

was definitely politically convenient for Netanyahu and Qatar. There were rounds of violence but they in actuality failed to generate a decisive outcome and an image of Israeli deterrence. Israel was in a deep slumber about the Hamas threat.

Major topics include: the pressure by Obama on Netanyahu to freeze settlements, the Gilad Shalit and the rise to power of Yahya Sinwar (and the sidelining of Ismail Haniyah), the impact of the Arab spring on the Palestinians, the growing influence of both Qatar and Iran over the Hamas regime in Gaza, the growing corruption and weakening of the PLO-based Palestinian Authority.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapters 25-26.

On the Netanyahu vs Obama feud: “Netanyahu At War” PBS:

<https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-netanyahu-war/>

October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the war that followed

Milton Edward and Farell, *Hamas*, chapter 15.

Keren Yarhi-Milo and Tim Naftali, “The Lessons Israel Failed to Learn From the Yom Kippur War: Gathering the right intelligence isn’t always enough,” The Atlantic, October 13, 2023

Edward Luttwak, “Israel’s Intelligence Failure,” Tablet, October 8, 2023.

Washington Post & Frontline, “Failure at the Fence”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWoP3EZM6A0>

Part IV: the Different Dimensions of the conflict

1. Israeli settlements and settlers

Some questions: what led 60,000 American Jews to become settlers? Are settlements an obstacle for peace? If so, what factors or variables make it more or less of an obstacle? Are

they serving Israel's national interest at all? Trying to defend both the anti and pro-settlements positions as a class exercise. What are the flaws of the different arguments?

Readings:

Sara Hirschhorn, City on a Hilltop: American Jews and the Israeli Settler Movement (Harvard University Press, 2017), skim.

Watch two clips of Vox: "Israeli settlements Explained, Part I & II.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0uLbeQlwjw>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6L9mS9ti6o>

2. Identifying the best strategy/solution for reducing the intensity of the Israeli Palestinian conflict

There has been a long lasting debate between the Israeli right and the Israeli left about which is the best way to reduce the intensity of the conflict in the Middle East. The Israeli left has argued that addressing the emotional I-P conflict will resolve the other conflicts in the region and that resolving this conflict is a necessary condition for normalization of relations between Israel and the other countries. In sharp contrast, the Israeli right has argued that the best way to resolve the conflict is to first resolve other conflicts in the region. Which strategy makes more sense? Additionally, How can we make sure that the "two state solution" actually becomes a solution and not a blueprint for menacing Israel even further? Some say that the Palestinian society given their identity in liberating the whole of Palestine would try to take advantage of any newly acquired sovereign control over additional territories to launch wars of attrition against Israel. They argue that October 7th proved that the Palestinians have not and will not change anytime soon (they will not use any new territory for state-building & economic growth but instead for building rockets and other means of warfare) and that there is no way to ensure the demilitarization of a future independent Palestinian state, or even

provide an early warning from an attack. Is there room for optimism? What are some alternatives to the traditional attempts to focus on finding the right diplomatic arrangement? What should be some preconditions for the creation of an independent Palestinian state? Martin Indyk, “A Trusteeship for Palestine?” Foreign Affairs, (May 2003) Foreign Affairs 82(3).

Gal Luft, “The Mirage of a Demilitarized Palestine,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2001) Volume 8: Number 3.

<https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/the-mirage-of-a-demilitarized-palestine>

Class exercise: reading and discussing Zeev Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall Essay:

<https://en.jabotinsky.org/media/9747/the-iron-wall.pdf>

3. Explaining the phenomenon of attachment to territory

Why do Israelis feel overall greater attachment to the Golan heights than to either the Sinai or the West Bank and Gaza?

*Ron Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,” *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/7).

Freely available at: http://www.waronsacredgrounds.com/uploads/Path_to_Intractability.pdf

*“Time and the Intractability of Territorial Disputes,” correspondence with Stacie Goddard and Jeremy Pressman, *International Security*, Vol.32, No.3 (Winter 2007-8) 191-201.

Freely available at: http://www.waronsacredgrounds.com/uploads/IS_Correspondence.pdf

4. Issue indivisibility (sacred places) -- how to resolve this thorny issue?

Should governments let religious clerics manage the talks between them as suggested by Ron Hassner?

*Stacie E. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 18-57, 115-206.

*Ron Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 1-133, 153-179 .

*Monica Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 1-33, 64-86, 127-148.

5. Terrorism as a formative experience for societies and leaders

It is often said that Arafat did not make the transition from a guerilla leader to state-builder. Can terrorists make this transition? Israel's experience is very different: the leaders of IZL and LEHI (Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir) became Prime Ministers who were less revisionist in world affairs than Arafat. How can we explain the difference? Was Thatcher's approach heavily influenced by the murder of Airey Neave and Lord Mountbatten early in her tenure? How do the British and Israeli experiences compare?

Watch: Margaret Thatcher and the IRA, BBC.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eANVHPiWzmY>

Readings: TBD

6. Israel's optimal use or misuse of targeted assassinations

We will first go over the main history of Israel's use of assassinations, and then try to answer the main questions. I deliberately assigned readings which are critical of Israel's use of assassinations (including a very old article of mine, which I am not sure I still agree with) in order for us to discuss whether we agree with them or not.

Some key questions: when this tool should be used and what should it not be used? Why did Israel find this tool so attractive? Why did other nations facing terrorism not use this tool (at least until 9/11)? Why do most countries not kill the leaders of other countries? In hindsight, what were some disadvantages or unexpected advantages in using this tool?

Or Honig, "Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 6 (June 2007), pp. 563 - 577

Ronen Bergman, *Rise and Kill First* (NY: Random House, 2018), Skim.

Also watch this interview with Dr. Bergman: "Inside the Mossad: Ronen Bergman in Conversation with David Sanger" The 92nd Street.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIEp6iPwosA>

7. Questions of espionage (recruitment and detection of spies)

A. Regarding the question of recruitment, we will watch in class parts of the movie "Son of Hamas" and focus on the Shin Bet handler Gonen Ben Yitzhak, and the agent who was recruited, Mosab Hassan Yousef. We will compare this to the Egyptian spy working for the Mossad Ashraf Marwan, and Glenn Shriver working for the Chinese intelligence service.

You can also read the book: Hassan Yousef, Mosab (2010), *Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices (First ed.)*. Carol Stream, Illinois: Tyndale Momentum House.

Uri Bar Joseph, *The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel* (New York: HarperCollins, 2016), skim.

Game of Pawns (the story of Glenn Shriver):

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8xIUNK4JHQ&t=15s>

Some key questions: what were the motivations of the spy in each case? What are some key differences between the agencies in terms of their recruiting style?

B. How do countries respond to instances of intelligence penetrations by the enemy?

When and why do countries/regimes try to double the spies they caught rather than kill suspects for instance?

Watch: Vice, “Palestinians Spying For Israel Risk Execution By Hamas”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QW2DLxrihg8&t=37s>

Watch a short clip on Garbo for understanding countries that made the decision to double spies. [Garbo: Most important double agent of all time?](#)

8. Hostage taking by terrorist groups and the Israeli policy response

TBD

9. Deterrence against terror groups

Shmuel Bar, “God, Nations, and Deterrence: The Impact of Religion on Deterrence,” in Keith B. Payne (ed.) *Understanding Deterrence* (Routledge, 2013), chapter 2.

Elli Lieberman, *Deterring Terrorism: A Model for Strategic Deterrence* (Routledge, 2019), chapters 1, 2, 3 and 7.

Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists: What Israel has learned,” Hoover institution June 2, 2008.

<https://www.hoover.org/research/deterring-terrorists>

10. Questions of military occupation

One goal of occupation authorities is to prevent an insurgency which would divert attention and resources from other security threats. Another goal is to minimise any enemy insurgent activity once it has broken out. Obviously democracies are restrained and cannot rely on deterrence or stick alone to prevent an insurgency or to nip it in the bud. Why do some occupation governments succeed in preventing or minimising insurgent activity, while others fail to do that? What can the Israeli experience teach us? Why did Israel fail to anticipate

some of the insurgencies and was totally surprised by them? In what ways was the Israeli occupation policy suboptimal and what factors made it so?

We will especially examine closely the following four cases: the British occupation of mandatory Palestine, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and finally the American occupation of Iraq.

Shlomo Gazit, *The Carrot and the Stick* (Washington, DC: B'nai B'rith Books, 1995).

Samy Cohen, Israel's Asymmetric Wars (The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy) 2010th Edition.

Ahron Bregman, Cursed Victory: Israel and the Occupied Territories: A History (New York: Pegasus Books).

Theodore McLauchlin and Wendy Pearlman and “Out-group conflict, in-group unity? Exploring the effect of repression on movement fragmentation” (with), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, no. 1 (February 2012), pp. 41-66.

11. Questions of propaganda and public diplomacy

The relevant cases: The Mavi Marmara flotilla to protest the siege over Gaza (2010), and the ship Exodus (1947).

Some questions: How important is it to win in the fight over global hearts and minds? Can Israel ever win in the sphere of public diplomacy given the media's adherence to the Aggressor-victim narrative? Was Israel's response to the Mavi Marmara a Suboptimal policy response? How would you respond differently if you were Israel's decision-maker? Why do people around the world not willing to believe the evidence of a Pallywood industry? On the Exodus ship affair, see Aviva Halamish, *The Exodus affair : Holocaust survivors and the struggle for Palestine* (Vallentine Mitchell and Co Ltd, 1998), skim.

On the Mavi Marmara flotilla watch: BBC panorama, “Death in the Mediterranean”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsLHEfy8KEw>

On Pallywood, according to Professor Richard Landes (Boston U) Watch: “Pallywood:

According to Palestinian Sources” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evuSR2hEQ-Q>

12. The difficulties of exercising restraint in face of strategic provocations

Israel exercised restraint in face of major provocations or highly provocative terror attacks during several periods in its history: the premiership of Moshe Shrett (1953-55), the premiership of Yitzhak Shamir during the first Gulf War (1991), the Premiership of Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-4), and finally the premiership of Netanyahu during his second tenure onwards (2009-).

Some key questions: what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with exercising restraint, especially for a small country like ISrael? what are the difficulties for a country to exercise restraint? Which countries failed to exercise restraint in history and why? What measures can be taken to improve the ability of a country to exercise restraint without compromising one’s deterrent image?

*Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Ben-Gurion to Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 24 (1988), 330-356.

David A. Welch, “The Politics and Psychology of Restraint: Israeli Decision-Making in the Gulf War,” *International Journal*, 47/2 (Spring 1992).

Or Honig, “The End of Israeli Military Restraint: As Restraint Fails, Jerusalem Reverts to A Policy of Deterrence,” *Middle East Quarterly* – Vol. XIV: No. 1 (Winter 2007).

Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), skim.

13. The choice of tactics by the ethnic insurgent group & what determines the level of violence?

a. The rational choice perspective

*Mia Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 119, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 61-88.

Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 108–138.

b. Social Identity theory

*Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, “Palestinian suicide bombing revisited: A critique of the outbidding thesis,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 123, Number 3, (Fall 2008), pp. 485-500.

c. Ideological explanations for the restraining of the armed struggle

Jeff Goodwin (2007), “The Struggle Made Me a Non-Racialist’: Why There Was So Little Terrorism in the Antiapartheid Struggle,” *Mobilization*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 193-203.

d. Processes of radicalization in the fighting ethnic community

*Yagil Henkin, “From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 25 no. 1 (2006).

For further reading:

Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” In Walter Reich (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 161-191

William Thomson, “The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict: Insurgent Grievance and Leadership in the First Chechen War and the Tajik Civil War,” *Small Wars Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 9 (September 16, 201). This is an online Journal.

<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-process-of-islamic-radicalization-in-intra-state-conflict>

E. what factors determined the PLO’s strategies of violence throughout the years?

* Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” *International Security* 33.3 (2008): 79-109

Yezid Sayigh, “The Politics of Palestinian Exile,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (1987), pp. 28 – 66.

14. The behaviour of guerilla groups towards their own civilians

*Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: the Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge University Press. 2007), pp.

Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” *Rationality and Society* (1999) 11:243-285.

Regarding the Palestinian, South African and Irish cases, TBD.

15. When is terrorism effective for the purpose of national liberation? What determines the frequency of terrorism if not strategic effectiveness?

*Max Abrahms “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), 42-78.

*Bruce Hoffman, “The Rationality of Terrorism and Other Forms of Political Violence,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May 2011), pp. 258-272.

*Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006), pp. 3-76

Bruce Hoffman, *Anonymous Soldiers*, skim.

Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” *International Security*, 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 79-109.

16. Is territorial partition always the best solution? Could there have been/will there ever be another viable solution in the Israeli Palestinian conflict?

We see several democratic countries where indigenous ethnic groups happily live with each other: Hungary, Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, post-Apartheid South Africa. Can a one state solution therefore be viable for Israel-Palestine (“Isratin”)? Do things have to end like they did in Rhodesia?

It is important to mention that many academic scholars believe that confederation or even federalism may provide an optimal solution to the

*Chaim D. Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 120-156.

*Alexander B. Downes, “The Holy Land Divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars,” *Security Studies*, vol.10 (2001), pp. 58-116.

*Arend Lijphart, (1969) “Consociational Democracy,” *World Politics* 21(2): 207-225.

*Ian Lustick, Dan Miodownik, and R. Eidelson. “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?” *The American Political Science Review* 98:2 (May 2004):209-229.

Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 1, (January/February 1997), pp. 22-34.

Nicholas Sambanis, and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “What’s in a line? Is partition a solution to civil war?” *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 82-118.

17. Peacekeeping and nation building and their relevance to the Palestinian arena

A. peacekeeping

*Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 269-92.

Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 1, 2, 3, 6, 7.

Do the peacekeeping forces in the Israeli context help so much to reduce the intensity of the Israeli Palestinian and Israeli Hezbollah conflicts?

b. Nation building (is the Palestinian Authority a failed state?)

*Roland Paris, *At War’s End* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), intro, chaps. 1,2,10,11.

*Charles Call (ed.) *Building States to build Peace* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), articles by: Charles Call, William Reno, Katia Papagianni, Rex Brynen.

Charles Call, "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State,'" *Third World Quarterly* 29(8) (2008): 1491-1507.

Marina Ottaway, "Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruction in Africa," in William Zartman (ed.) *Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority* (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 235-248.

Martin Indyk, "A Trusteeship for Palestine," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003

18. Is Trust the real factor determining the timing of negotiations with an occupied insurgent group?

Peter Krause, *Rebel Power Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win* (Cornell UP, 2017), chapters 1-2.

David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO* (Routledge, 1996), Skim.

19. The importance of the regional environment

Some pundits argue that one reason why the Israeli Palestinian conflict was not resolved unlike the Northern Ireland conflict is the regional setting: the formation and deepening of the EU reduced or at least deemphasized the importance of sovereignty in the Irish context. Moreover, there were few who could effectively intervene in the case of the Irish conflict (the intervention by Qaddafi was far less important and consequential than that of revolutionary Iran). How important is the regional setting? How can we measure it?

Readings: TBD

20. The importance of intervention by the international Community

*Edward N. Luttwak, “Give war a chance,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36-44.

Edward Luttwak, “The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention,” in Chester A. Crocker (ed.) *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001) pp. 265-273.

21. The impact of globalisation on the conflict

Amnon Aran, *Israel's Foreign Policy Towards the PLO: the Impact of Globalization* (Sussex UP, 2009), skim.

22. The role of the Israel Lobby

The International Relations scholars Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer have argued that the US permits Israeli settlements buildup mainly due to the influence of the Israel Lobby. What can we learn from their argument? Is it consistent with realism? Does history support their argument that the US carte blanche stemmed from Israeli influence and not purely American national interests?

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby* (Farrar Straus & Goroux, 2007), chapter 7.

23. Settlers' violence and Israeli right wing violence more generally

Ehud Eiran and Peter Krause, Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30.4, 2018, pp. 637-657

Part V: Students presentations

Try to be as theoretical as possible when making the presentation. Let the facts shed light on important questions. It is great to come up with a theoretical argument if possible about what drives things and what we can learn from this conflict which is applicable for dealing with other conflicts. The list below offers optional topics but you can definitely choose to present on any topic that you are passionate about, as long as you get my approval first.

List of topics includes:

1. The prison experience and its impact on inmates -- a comparison between several conflicts.
2. The battles inside academia over the Palestinian issue
3. American mediation -- lessons from the past
4. The Palestinian economy
5. The rise and fall of the peace relations with Jordan
6. The role of Egypt in the peace process
7. The policies of different Gulf states towards the conflict
8. The role of the EU and European countries more generally in the conflict
9. Civil society in the Palestinian Authority
10. A comparison between the Irish conflict and the I-P conflict -- what are some parallels and some differences
11. A comparison of peacemaking leaders
12. The soviet support for the PLO (mainly the KGB).
13. The influence of Jihadist ideologies and practices on Hamas
14. The Palestinian security services
15. Corruption in the Palestinian Authority
16. The chances for democratization in Palestine

17. Track Two dialogues and unofficial diplomacy -- comparing the I-P case to other cases
18. Jerusalem and its complexities
19. The Jewish diaspora -- the impact on the conflict on them and their impact on the conflict
20. Turkey's involvement in the conflict
21. American society and the different groups' political attitudes regarding the I-P conflict
22. The Palestinian question and the rise of the right in ISrael
23. The Israeli Palestinian cooperation in the field of medicine
24. China, Russia and their policies towards the I-P conflict
25. India, Japan and their policies towards the I-P conflict
26. Cuba and South Africa their policies towards the I-P conflict
27. British policies towards the conflict after the end of the British mandate
28. Jewish support for the Israeli side in the 1948 war
29. The emigration of Christians from the occupied Palestinian territories
30. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (a comparison to other cases)

