

Israel and the World

INR4931/JST3930

M,W,F | Period 3 (9:35 AM - 10:25 AM)

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Office Hours and office location: TBD

Course description

Israel is very often at the centre of world attention. It gets more headlines, and more policy attention from different states and bodies than any other actor which is not an adversarial great power. It is also the USA's best ally in the vast area between NATO countries and Japan. Given these facts, this course seeks to explain Israel's evolving relationship with various states and intergovernmental bodies around the world. We will explore the strategic, economic, political and ideological factors shaping the attitudes of different countries and bodies. We will also explore factors determining those Israeli diplomatic choices which affected the country's standing in the world. These diplomatic relations have been vital for the small state of Israel given its need for both arms and legitimacy to act militarily, as well as its need for commerce to survive economically and prosper. Finally, we will also explore relations between the independent actors in the Israeli society and economy with others abroad. No background knowledge is required.

The scope of the course

The title of the course is very broad and it is deliberately the case since I am open to covering every possible aspect of the relationship (hostile or friendly) between Israel and the rest of the

world. This is not just a course about diplomatic history. Indeed, it is important to clarify several things about the scope of this course:

1. We are not just focusing on diplomatic relations between governments, but instead try to cover the variety of different kinds of interactions taking place between societies and economies. This may therefore include topics like: the degree to which Israeli migrants successfully integrated in the US, the involvement of European humanitarian and political NGOs in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the reasons for the success of Israelis in generating more unicorns per capita than any other nation, the standing of Israeli celebrities and novelists in the world (and the admiration of Israelis of certain global celebrities rather than others), the influence of the Jewish diaspora and other religious groups on the perceptions of Israel, the portrayals of Israel by the world media and in movies and novels, the Israeli soft power and image branding abroad.
2. We are not just seeking to understand (a) mutual impacts -- what actor A does to Actor B, or in other words the impact of actions by actor A on some actor B (e.g., the role of Israeli hi-tech in the global economy, the role of Israel as a weapons supplier on various conflicts or regimes or on its standing in the world, its role in training other countries in the field of modern agriculture or counter-terrorism), but also (b) the formation of mutual perceptions (which includes the extent of admiration or hatred of Israel, the reputation or image that Israel has) due to a variety of factors, as well as (c) the extent to which the models presented by Israel or other nations serve as a source of inspiration for the other. Hence, a great topic for discussion is what can Israel learn from Japan? We will pay special attention to the actors inside Israel who diffuse ideas emanating from the rest of the world inside the domestic political, social and economic systems.

3. We will engage in comparisons. We will therefore ask for instance how the standing of Israel by the international community compares with the policies towards other countries in the same category.
4. The normative dimension of policy towards Israel by the international community or the West is significant (“Israel is treated unfairly/too favourably”) only in two regards: a. It allows us to examine how different political elements in the world view the treatment of Israel (namely, learning about perceptions); b. Pointing to possible puzzles that have to be explained (but only if we find clear evidence in support of such statements). We do not seek to resolve such debates or engage in policy advocacy one way or another. We focus on explaining the world as it is, not trying to describe how it should optimally be according to our conception of fairness and morality. This is not a course in international law, ethics or polemics.
5. The temporal dimension will obviously be of great importance since Israel of the late forties is very different from Israel of today.
6. This course is not trying to understand the causes and management of wars. We are not interested here in military interactions or policies. We will also not cover Israeli occupation policies or its diplomatic positions in the Arab Israeli conflict. We will also not be interested in explaining direct military blows between Israel and its usual set of adversaries. We will cover the Arab-Israeli conflict only to the extent that doing so helps us to understand how Israel interacts with the world. This does not mean that we will not talk about diplomacy between actors in the Middle East. We will definitely cover the relationships (or other non-military interactions) that did exist between Israel and the different states in the region.

7. We will be open to using any kind of discipline that helps shed light on Israel's relations with the rest of the world (e.g., IR theories about diplomatic relations, Business literature on global branding, media/communication studies literature on)

Course requirements and Grading

Each student must do five main things:

- Write a policy paper (3-5 pages) for the government on the optimal policy towards a country or an international body (either of a certain country or body towards Israel or vice versa). This can be substituted with an interview with an Israeli Prime Minister or Foreign Minister (or any other relevant major Israeli figure/other figure presenting his policy towards ISrael and the calculations behind it) or an op-ed that has a policy implication (see a separate document for instructions). Deadline: Nov. 27. Worth: **10%**
- Write an analytical research paper (at least 4-5 pages) which does one of the following: 1. compares Israel's diplomatic history at any point in time and towards whichever country or body to the history of another country; 2. Compares one period or episode in Israel's diplomatic history to another; 3. Uses a concept or a model for explaining Israel's diplomatic relations at a certain point in time; 4. Resolves a historical debate among historians or pundits about why things happened the way they did. 5. Judged the wisdom of Deadline: the last day of actual classes (just before the oral exams). Worth: **25%**
- Deliver a 10-15 minutes oral presentation which analyses Israel's relationship with any one particular country. Dates: the second part of the semester. Worth: **30%**

- Take the multiple choice knowledge exam. Date: the last day of actual classes (just before the oral exams). Worth: **5%**
- Take the oral exam on the whole material covered throughout the course, including the students' oral presentations. Date: the last two weeks of the semester. Worth: **30%**

Course goals

Notably, the goal of this course is not just to give students a better understanding of the forces shaping Israel's relations with the rest of the world (its international standing), but also to be able to analyse interactions between countries through a variety of angles and perspectives.

After completing this course, students will be able to:

- Understand the forces shaping Israel's relations with the rest of the world and know Israel's diplomatic history.
- Use a variety of sources to shed light on different aspects of relations between states, societies and/or economies.
- Analyse new developments in the international relations of Israel as they take place by identifying the forces shaping them.
- Learn how to present and generate a class debate.
- Learn how to write a policy paper as well as an analytical research paper.

The outline of the classes and readings

The bulk of the course (namely, before the last two weeks which are dedicated for the oral exams) is divided into three main parts. The first part tries to understand what is Israel and

what is the world in order to better appreciate what each one can offer the other, what they need from each other and how they can influence each other. Understanding the full potential of relationships allows us to see two main things: 1. Why relationships at times did not reach their full potential (in other words, to what extent was the Arab-Israeli conflict of importance in this regard); and 2. How Israel managed to improve its integration into the world economy despite all the political hurdles by taking the right economic steps.

The second part of the course goes over the essential diplomatic history of Israel (the early Zionist struggle for statehood, the Arab Israeli conflict, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Israeli Iranian conflict), with an emphasis at any point in time given to the relevant international actors that influenced Israel's fortunes or its policy in a major way. We will not be able to cover for each period all the different actors which interacted with Israel and how they shaped their policies, but only focus on those that had a big influence on the trajectory of the Arab-Israeli/ Israeli-Palestinian/ Iranian-Israeli conflict. Thus this is an attempt to cover just enough of the main strategic events in the Middle East in order to lay the basis for understanding variations in the policies of world actors towards Israel over time.

The third part of the course consists of a series of cases. We will dive into each case, which means that we will obviously not be able to cover all the topics which are presented below. For those who are doing the presentations: please consider the readings I assigned in this section for some of the countries or topics as merely a recommendation. You can definitely choose to rely on your own reading materials. For the rest of the class: please read the relevant section in the Navon book for each of the countries or international bodies that we cover.

Required textbook

Emanuel Navon, *The Star and Scepter* (Nebraska UP, 2020)

Recommended textbooks (with brief summaries for Israel's relations with each and every major country):

Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed: The US-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (University of Chicago: 1985)

Joel Peters and Rob Pinfold (eds.), *Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations* (Routledge, 2021).

Colin Shindler, *Israel and the World Powers: Diplomatic Alliances and International Relations beyond the Middle East* (I.B.Tauris: 2014)

Joshua Moravchick, *Making David into Goliath* (Encounter Books, 2014)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Alfred Wittstock (ed.) *The World Facing Israel, Israel Facing the World: Images and Politics* (Berlin: Frank & Timme GmbH, 2011).

Amnon Aran, *Israeli Foreign Policy Since the End of the Cold War* (Cambridge UP, 2021)

Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956* (Cambridge UP).

Uri Bialer, *Israeli foreign policy: a people shall not dwell Alone* (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2020).

Charles D. Freilich. *Zion's Dilemma: How Israel Makes National Security Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012)

Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.) *The Cold War and the Middle East, 2nd edition* (Oxford UP, 2003).

Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and the Jews* (Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

Clive Jones and Tore T. Petersen (eds.) *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* (Oxford UP, 2013).

The actual course

The first introductory class: discussion of the syllabus, holding a quiz, some notes about sources (think tanks, relevant journals, online sources).

Part I: understanding Israel and the world separately

We seek in this section to understand Israel separately and the world separately. When analysing each one of them we seek to ask -- what are the qualities or attributes of that state or region that makes it more or less important for other states? This could refer to the global economy or the need for arms and military/intelligence training etcetera. Additionally, what about Israel makes it more likely to absorb innovations or doctrines of governance from different places abroad.

1. Analysing Israel -- a lecture or two for understanding the relevant characteristics of Israel which are conducive for generating relationships with other countries. Israel is a stable (if sometimes imperfect) democratic state of ten million inhabitants with an advanced economy, a leader in high tech, and ranked among the top two dozen nations on the UN Human Development Index.

For a general background see: Yossi Shain, *The Israeli Century* (Wicked Son, 2021), Chapter VIII: The Israeli Century.

A. The Israeli economy -- its needs and what it can offer the rest of the world: changes in the Israeli economy over time (what can Israel sell? What does Israel need from others?), the high GDP per capita, the quantum leap in overall GDP and in percentage of world economy and its causes, what can the Israeli success story teach the rest of the world? Where was it emulated?

Michel Strawczynski and Yossi Zeira, “Reducing the Relative Size of Government in Israel after 1985,” in Avi Ben-Bassat (ed.), *The Israeli Economy, 1985-1998: From Government Intervention to Market Economics*, (The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2002).

* Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *The Start Up Nation* (CFR Press, 2009), chapter 1,2, 10 and conclusion.

Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *The Israeli Genius* (Avid Reader Press, 2021),
Introduction: the Israeli Paradox.

Dan Senor “The Startup Nation at 70” Lecture --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7mmyKqGB3g>

Joseph Zeira, *The Israeli Economy* (Princeton UP, 2021), chapters 3, 4 and maybe 10.

B. The Israeli society and demographics:

Samy Smooha, “The Jewish Ethnic Divide and Ethnic Politics in Israel,” (ch. 29) in Reuven Chazan (ed.) *Israeli Politics and Society* (Oxford UP), pp. 499-514.

Clive Jones, *Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989-92: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East* (Routledge, 2013).

C. The Israeli political System

Anita Shapira, “Political History of Israel,” in Reuven Hazan et al (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society* (OUP, 2021), chapter 4 (73-88).

D. The Israeli military and arms industry

- Yaakov Amidror, “The evolution and development of the IDF” (chapter 3) and
- Isaac Ben Israel, “Security, technology and cyber warfare” (chapter 19) in Stuart Cohen and Aharon Klieman (eds.), *Routledge Handbook on Israeli Security* (Routledge, 2019).

- SIPRI trends in international arms transfers:

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf

- Class exercise: try to read the data yourself and find interesting facts (e.g., why does Israel sell more weapons than any other country in the world per capita? Perhaps with the exception of the US)

E. For a very short summary of the evolution of Israel's diplomatic standing:

Colin Shindler, "Israel's Global Perspective," (ch. 29) in Reuven Chazan (ed.) *Israeli Politics and Society* (Oxford UP), pp. 499-514.

Some questions that we will discuss include:

- The changing benefits for other countries of being friendly with Israel (location, natural gas, superb knowledge of medicine, of modern agriculture and of other technologies, intelligence sharing, military knowledge, indirect diplomatic assistance).
- The changing demographic trends inside Israel: what are the different sub-groups in Israeli society and how important are they in making Israel absorb influences as well in marketing its creed abroad?
- Global public opinion -- How does the Israeli basic story make a lot of people in the world hate Israel or not feel sympathy towards it? How and to what extent do internal divisions inside Israel make things worse? See Joshua Muravchik, *Making David Into Goliath* (Encounter, 2014), chapter 9.
- Some factors which affect the "political/diplomatic costs of having good relations with Israel, and the changes over time (the post-1967 occupation, the peace process, embargos, normalisation of relations with Arab states). With regards to the political costs we will discuss the changes in the global ideological landscape:

- Henri Stellan, What is Antizionism? (... and is it Antisemitic?): a short handbook for activists and analysts (Soesterberg, Aspekt Publishers, 2019).
- Joshua Muravchik, Making David Into Goliath (Encounter, 2014), introduction & chapters 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8.

2. Analysing the world

Our goal here is to broadly understand the characteristics of the different regions of the world (economically, politically, geopolitically). This will help us better appreciate the areas where Israel and the world either need each other (or could benefit from each other) or compete with each other or perhaps even feel antipathy towards Israel. For example, the living costs in Israel are so high that large parts of the third world cannot afford to have it as a tourist destination. It is less attractive for that purpose. Its education system is still in Hebrew and therefore it is less attractive for students. We will first understand each region, and then focus on trying to make the possible linkages between Israel and the rest of the world.

Group activity: each group will determine the main qualities of each region in the world.

Relevant questions include: GDP per capita, Human Development Index (HDI), the main industries and exports of each region, the main conflicts which require arms, the main orientations of countries (pro-Western or not), the main competing ideologies, the Muslim and Jewish diasporas, who are the regional powers (economically, militarily).

Part II: the evolution of the Arab ISraeli conflict with an emphasis on extra-regional actors (mostly great powers) and relevant regional and global actors

Stage 1 -- Theodor Herzl is looking for a great power ally, but fails to find one

We will shortly discuss the emergence of Zionism and its two main rival solutions to the plight of the Jews: changing Europe to make it more hospitable to the Jews (through greater emancipation or Socialism), and migrating to the anglo-liberal world (mainly the US). We will also discuss: the early Zionist diplomacy of Hertzl and the reasons for its failure, the efforts of Baron Morris Hirsch to settle Jews in Argentina vs. the efforts of the Rothschild family (mainly Edmund and his son James) to settle European Jews in the area of ancient Israel.

*Navon, The Star and Scepter, ch. 6.

“Herzl and His Successors” in Uri Bialer, ISraeli Foreign Policy, (in ch. 1)

Yoel Sher, “Theodor Herzl: Father of Israeli Diplomacy” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 11/2 (2017), pp. 235-244

Class exercise: going over the Basel declaration to see how the wording reflected the need to both convey a sufficiently ambitious intent and avoid angering the Ottoman empire.

Stage 2 -- Chaim Weizmann and Britain become allies (including the creation of Anglo-Jewish power during the Napoleonic wars)

We seek to answer here why Weizmann succeeded where Herzl failed -- in gaining great power support for the Zionist program. This stage begins with the Napoleonic wars in which one of the Rothschild brothers (Nathan Mayer) gains the political influence that Jews did not have in any great power until that point. Chaim Weizmann built on that Anglo-Jewish power/friendship (already referred to as “Protestant Zionism”).

This stage covers the British wartime diplomacy, and most notably the Balfour declaration until the Cairo conference (1921) during which the British minister of colonies Winston Churchill mostly kept the promise of the British government in the Balfour declaration. We will cover other events such as: the Zionist neutrality in the early stages of WWI, the support of Woodrow Wilson for Zionism, the Faisal-Weizmann agreement (January 1919), the Zionist representation in the Versailles peace conference (and their success there in comparison to the Kurds and other ethno-religious groups).

We should also consider this English-Zionist bond as a reciprocal process, and not just a result of Zionist courting. The British were looking for a local ally in order to boost their case for a connection to the land beyond the Sinai Peninsula.

Class exercise: a comparison of Churchill's open letter to the Jews (February 1920) to President's Obama's speech to

Churchill's open letter -- https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Zionism_versus_Bolshevism

Obama's Cairo Speech -- <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09>

Readings:

-- A summary of the Cairo conference: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/pre-state-israel-the-cairo-conference>

-- Lenny Ben David, Winston Churchill's Defense of the Balfour Declaration in 1921, JCPA, February 2017.

<https://jcpa.org/article/winston-churchills-defense-balfour-declaration-1921/>

-- For the claim that the Pro-British Zionist underground in the Yishuv during WWI called NILI played a major role in bringing about the Balfour declaration see, Efraim Halevy,

“Balfour 100 | ‘Mack’: Aaron Aaronsohn, the NILI intelligence network and the Balfour Declaration” Fathom. <https://fathomjournal.org/balfour-100-mack-aaron-aaronsohn-the-nili-intelligence-network-and-the-balfour-declaration/>

Richard Ned Lebow, “Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration,” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1968), pp. 501-523.

*Michael J. Cohen, “Centenary of the Balfour Declaration,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017).

* Eugene Rogan, “The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System” in *International Relations of the Middle East* (Ed. Louise Fawcett), 1-43.

Benny Morris, “Weizmann and the Arabs.” In B. Z. Kedar (Ed.), *Chaim Weizmann: Scientist, Statesman, and Architect of Science Policy* (The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2017), pp. 190-230. Ch. 9

Additional readings:

James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), skim.

Jehuda Reinharz and Motti Golani, *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (Chicago UP, 2024), chapter 2.

Efraim Karsh, *The Tail that Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 9-30; or alternatively, *Karsh Islamic Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), chapter 8.

Highly recommended videos

A. Jonathan Schneer, “The Balfour Declaration,” WGBH Forum

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxqJyjuNjd8>

B. Eugene Rogan: “The First World War in the Middle East” University of Oklahoma

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyKojFD9TU&t=426s>

C. Gabriel Matzkin, Abigail Jacobson and Eugene Rogan “From Constantinople to San Remo,” Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem), 2017.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SchqyJ14TVw>

D. Martin Kramer, “Sykes-Picot: An Obstacle to the Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOB2Vp6DbPw>

E. The ascent to power in the UK of Nathan Rotschild:

Niall Ferguson, “The Ascent of Money Episode 2: Human Bondage”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBQaQq0m5BA&t=2093s&ab_channel=NiallFerguson

Stage 3 -- The British Zionist short-lived honeymoon period during the pre-WWII mandate period (1921-1939)

This stage is really mostly about the mandate period. Usually scholars focus on the triangular relations between the British authorities, the Arabs and the Jews in mandatory Palestine. We will certainly do that. Yet, we will also try to examine the attempts of other actors to meddle, and the attempt of both the local Arabs and Jews to persuade the British to take their side.

There are some international relations aspects to the British mandate. Moreover, there was a lot of diplomacy by the Jewish Agency with other actors in the Middle East.

Questions for class discussion: why did it take so long for the Zionists to persuade the British mandate authorities to expel Hajj Amin al-Husseini? Did the superior diplomatic skills and influence of the Zionists force the Palestinians to resort to violence? Was it beneficial for them? Why did the Palestinians fail to take advantage of this period to build institutions and prepare for the final showdown when the British left?

Readings:

Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Routledge, 2008), ch. 1-2.

Peter Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire* (Nebraska UP, 2005), pp. 1-9.

Hans E. Segal, "Perceptions of US Policy in Israel's Pre-State Period: The Shaping of Anxiety," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 1988), pp. 473-489.

Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948* (Detroit: 1994), pp. 117-146.

Yoav Alon, "Friends Indeed or Accomplices in Need? The Jewish Agency, Emir Abdullah and the Shaykhs of Transjordan, 1922–39 in Clive Jones and Tore T. Petersen (eds.) *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* (Oxford UP, 2013), ch. 2 (31-48).

On the Jewish Agency's contacts with the Alawites of Syria see Mahmoud Muhareb, *The Jewish Agency and Syria during the Arab Revolt in Palestine: Secret Meetings and Negotiations* (IB Tauris, 2022).

Stage 4 -- the Yishuv and the global Zionist movement during the Second World War (1939-45)

It was during this period that the real pro-Western (and especially Pro-American) foreign policy orientation began to form in a major way. Ben Gurion watched the different countries at war, and the different powers began thinking of their needs, priorities, and the place of a Zionist state in the new postwar world order.

Topics include: the meeting of Ben Gurion and Soviet ambassador to Ivan Maisky, the long periods in which Ben Gurion spent in London and New York, the failure of the Zionists to do

anything significant to save European Jewry, the end of the British-Zionist honeymoon, the foreign policy behaviour of Hajj Amin al-Husseini.

Questions for discussion: why did the state of Israel commemorate Churchill despite the British government's inaction to stop the Holocaust? Was it the right decision? Why did the Zionists lack any influence during this period? Why did Ben Gurion encourage the Yishuv's youth to join the British army rather than the PALMACH?

Clive Jones, "Influence Without Power? Britain, the Jewish Agency and Intelligence Collaboration, 1939–45" in Tore Petersen and Clive Jones (eds.) *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies*, ch. 3.

Jeffrey Herf, "Nazi Germany's Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims During World War II and the Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings," *Central European History*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2009), pp. 709-736

Tuvia Friling, *Arrows in the Dark: David Ben-Guri-on, the Yishuv Lead-er-ship, and Res-cue Attempts Dur-ing the Holocaust* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2005). Skim.

Stage 5 -- The struggle for statehood, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli war itself (1945-49)

We will spend some time on the American-British disagreements over Palestine in the post WWII period (and the Zionist role in exacerbating them). We will then try to explain the international/diplomatic processes that led to the 1948 war (a war which actually began in November 1947 and ended in March 1949): the British decision to give up on the mandate and give it back to the UN in February 1947, the UNSCOP recommendation to partition the

country, the Israeli diplomatic victory in securing the two thirds majority support for the partition plan in the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, the Soviet and American decisions to recognize Israel once it was declared in May 1948, the admission of Israel to become a new member of the UN (May 1949).

Since this is not a class in military history we will not try to explain why Israel won in the 1948 Arab Israeli war. We will however discuss the roles of the following great powers in the decisions to allow Israel international legitimacy and military power to survive: the British, the Soviets, the Americans, and finally the French. The Portsmouth treaty between Britain and Iraq and Iraqi Prime Minister's Nuri Said's Blue book will be discussed. Finally, we will pay some attention to the Israeli wedge strategy that split the Arab fighting coalition (the two famous meetings of Golda Meir with King Abdullah). In fact, as we shall explain, the 1948 war may be seen as part of the regional balancing against the Hashemites, and Israel was not altogether in the camp of the anti-Hashemites.

Class discussion: should we be talking about a Zionist diplomatic victory or instead of a Palestinian defeat during these years? Where does the bulk of the causal power lie? What explains the cohesiveness of the Hashemite/British camp and its rival camp, and how Israel fits into this?

Class exercise: reading excerpts from the autobiography of Golda Meir regarding her meeting with King Abdullah and answering the theoretical question posed by Keren Yarhi-Milo: under what conditions, if at all, leaders will listen to their intelligence services rather than believe their own impressions from meeting foreign leaders? (for a theoretical debate See Keren Yarhi Milo, *Knowing The Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence Organizations, and Assessments of Intentions in International Relations* (Princeton, 2014).) Additionally, why did Ben Gurion send Golda Meir to Jordan and Sharett to Washington?

Readings:

Michael J. Cohen, "Truman and Palestine, 1945-1948: Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy," *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 1982), pp. 1-22.

Efraim Karsh, *Palestine Betrayed* (Yale UP, 2010), ch. 2-4.

David Tal, *War in Palestine, 1948* (Routledge, 2004), ch. 1, 7.

Andrew Mumford, *Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance* (Georgetown UP, 2017), ch. 3.

James Vaughan, A book review of David Cesarani, Major Farran's Hat,

<https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/856/print/>

*Or Arthur Honig, "The Whisper in the Leader's Ear: How Do Foreign Policy Advisers Perform their Job?" *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 221-241.

* Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), 88-258. Skim.

Michael Eppel, *The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), skim.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, pp. 31-48.

Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, 2nd edition* (Cambridge UP, 2008), chapters 4-8, 10. skim.

Michael Eppel, "The Iraqi Domestic Scene and its Bearing on the Palestine Issue 1947", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 24, (1990), pp. 51-73.

Michael Eppel, "Syria and Iraqi-Syrian Relations During the 1948 War in Palestine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, (1996), pp. 74-91.

* Amikam Nachmani, "Generals at Bay in Post-War Palestine (and We Have Only Ourselves to Blame)," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, (December 1983), pp. 66-83.

Benny Morris, 1948: a history of the first Arab - Israeli war (New Haven [Conn.] : Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 2 – "The UN Steps In."

Uri Bialer, "The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy - 1948-1951," *Middle East Journal* Vol. 39, No. 2, (1985), 292-315.

Gabriel Gorodetsky, "The Soviet Union's Role in the Creation of the State of Israel," *The Journal of Israeli History*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 4-20.

Matityahu Mintz, "Ben-Gurion and the Soviet Union's Involvement in the Effort to Establish Jewish State in Palestine," *The Journal of Israeli History*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (March 2007), pp. 67-78.

O'Connor, Derek (2017-03-07). "Spitfire vs. Spitfire: Aerial Combat in Israel's War of Independence". HistoryNet.

<https://www.historynet.com/spitfire-vs-spitfire-aerial-combat-israels-war-independence/?f>

Stage 6 -- from the 1948 war until the June 1956 war

Topics include: the Israeli decision not to pursue the apparent offers for making peace with the Arab neighbours, the end of Israeli neutrality in the Cold War and a clear persistent attempt to court the US as an ally, the attempts by the CIA to fight against the pro-Zionist elements in the domestic American political scene, the special role of James Jeus Angleton, the reparations agreement with Germany (1952), Operation Alpha and other British-American diplomatic attempts to appease angry Arab public opinion, the forging of the French-Israeli alliance, the Israeli mishap in Egypt and early contacts with Nasser, overcoming the mistrust of the British when deciding to go to the 1956 war, the American and Soviet pressures on Israel during the war.

Class discussion: were the mistaken foreign policy estimates of the American establishment that Israel would side with the Communist bloc reasonable and professional? To what extent was the estimation mistake justified? What were the sources for this mistake?

Class exercise: reading the reports of Bobby Kennedy from Israel. What can we learn from them? <https://jcpa.org/article/robert-kennedys-1948-reports-from-palestine/>

And also: Shalom Goldman, "Bobby Kennedy's admiration for Israel"
<https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/history/articles/rfk-jews>

Readings:

*Benny Morris, "The Father of the 'Special Relationship' The forgotten role of James McDonald," Commentary,

Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road not Taken* (). skim.

Zach Levey, "Anglo-Israeli strategic relations, 1952–56," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 31/4 (1995), pp. 772-802

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Ben-Gurion and Sharett: Conflict Management and Great Power Constraints in Israeli Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 1988 24(3): 330-356.

On Israel's decision of its Foreign Policy Orientation see:

Avi Shlaim, "Israel between East and West, 1948-56," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2004 36(4): 657-673.

Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948-1956*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), pp. 206-234.

Laurent Rucker, "Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet- Israeli Alliance of 1947-1969," *The Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series*.

Michel Real, "The Forgotten Alliance" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 14.

Zach Levey, "Israel's Quest for a Security Guarantee from the United States, 1954-1956," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 1995 22(1-2): 43-63.

Orna Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 34-56.

Zach Levey, "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Arms Race in the Middle East 1950-1960," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 2001 24(1): 29-48

Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 117-142.

Binyamin Pinkus, "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue: French-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949-1957," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 104-138.

Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), chapter 2.

Stage 7 -- from the 1956 war until the 1967 war

Because Nasserism was ascendant after the Suez crisis in 1956, during this period of Israel being a part of the regional and global loose coalition against Nasser. We will discuss how Israel did through the Mossad and through overt diplomacy and finally militarily. We will also discuss how Israel inadvertently ended up in the June 1967 war and what role outside actors played in this regional escalation.

Topics include: Israel's policy of the alliance of the periphery in order to tackle Nasserism, the 1958 crisis in the Middle East and Israel's assistance to the UK and the US in tackling Nasserism (including during the Yemen civil war), the deterioration in the French Israeli relationship (The peak of the French-Israeli alliance was in 1956 when Israel was willing to provide the pretext for the British and the French and in return the French gave Israel some nuclear capacity), the tensions between JFK and Ben Gurion over the Israeli nuclear program,

the escalation towards the June 1967 war: The secret talks and understandings with Nasser, the collapse of the secret dialogue with Jordan. The May 1967 crisis. And finally we will discuss the conduct of the war and the role of the great powers in shaping it (the Soviet threat and the unexpected support of Robert MacNamara)

Class discussion: how much can secret diplomacy with an adversary make a difference in International Relations (averting crises or wars)? We will examine this through the case of secret diplomacy with Jordan and Egypt in the years of escalation (1964-47). Was diplomacy really done optimally? Could it have made a difference had it been given more chances? What were the goals of the periphery doctrine? What did it mean for the balance of power between the Israeli foreign ministry and Mossad?

Noa Schonmann, "Back-Door Diplomacy: The Mistress Syndrome in Israel's Relations With Turkey, 1957-60" in Clive Jones and Tore T. Petersen (eds.) *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* (Oxford UP, 2013), ch. 5.

Jacob Abadi, "Israel and Sudan: The Saga of an Enigmatic Relationship," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, (July 1999), 19-41.

Mordechai Gazit, "The Genesis of the Us-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and The Dimona Issue," *Journal of Contemporary History* 2000 35(3): 413-422

Avi Shlaim, "Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1999 27(2): 177-192.

David Tal, "Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan. 2001), pp. 142-158.

Michael Bar-Zohar, "Ben-Gurion and the Policy of the Periphery, 1958: Analysis" in Itamar Rabinovitch and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings*

on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, 1948-Present, (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University Press, 2007).

On the joint British Israeli cooperation in Yemen see Asher Orkaby, "Israel's International Squadron and the "Never Again" Mentality," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* Volume 6/2, (2015), pp. 83-101.

Shimon Peres: The Biography, by Michael Bar-Zohar, New York: Random House, 2007 Chapters 11-12 "Suez" and "Secret Meeting at Severes" pp. 132-154

Avi Shlaim, "The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot" *International Affairs*, 73:3(1997), 509-530.

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Protocol%20of%20Sevres%201956%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20War%20Plot.html>

Danny Orbach, *Fugitives*.

On the US response to the Suez Campaign and its aftermath see:

Michael Oren, "The Second War of Independence" *Azure* Winter, 5676\2007 pp 41-48
http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/1117Az27_currents_.pdf

Michael Doran's *Ike's Gamble*, skim through.

Recommended Videos:

1. BBC, "The Other Side of Suez"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCc1hD8SGeA>

2. *Ike's Gamble*: two videos worth watching of Michael Doran:

at the Windsor Institute <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nq14PQLnE1c>>

At the Hoover Institute < <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJewbbAZT5s>>

3. BBC and PBS, "The Fifty Years War" – the relevant part

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3rXQQ0PgCU>

Stage 8 -- from the 1967 war until the October 1973 war

This stage starts from the end of the June 1967 war. It begins with a promising support of the Johnson administration and the UK's Harold Wilson for Israel to keep the occupied territories as a bargaining chip for getting peace and secure boundaries in return. The bad news was the Soviet decision to sever relations with Israel. Unlike the period that followed the 2008 Israeli military victory over Hamas, during this period Israel did NOT spend less money and resources on military readiness. It was vital for Meir to prove to the US that Israel could deter all threats. Some say that Nixon was the real father of strategic relations with Israel. We will discuss whether this is true (the nuclear deal and other agreements) and why things happened that way.

Class exercise: reading and interpreting UNSCR 242. Could a decision like that be accepted by the UNSC today?

Readings:

Yaacov Ro'i, "The Deterioration of Relations: From Support to Severance," *The Journal of Israeli History*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 21-36.

Mordechai Gazit, "Egypt And Israel: Was There A Peace Opportunity Missed In 1971?" *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1997 32(1): 97-115.

Yehuda Blanga, "Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967-1969," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March 2015), pp. 301-326.

Yehuda Blanga, "Different Perspectives: The Path that Led to the Cease-Fire ending the War of Attrition and the Deployment of Missiles at the Suez Canal," *Middle Eastern Studies* (2012) 48/2, 183-204

Yehuda Blanga, “The Butterfly Effect: The Influence of the Nixon Administration’s Preoccupation with Vietnam on Sadat’s February 1971 Proposal to Reopen the Suez Canal,” in Carmela Lutmar and Ziv Rubinovitz (eds.) *The Suez Canal: Past Lessons and Future Challenges* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023), 43-68

Yehuda Blanga, “The Russians are Coming, the Russians are Coming’: American Management of the Crisis Associated with Ending the October 1973 War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 49/4 (2013), 563-589

Stage 9: from the 1973 war until the 1979 Iranian revolution

This is a stage of Israeli weakness and isolation in global affairs. Israel is seen as weak, and thanks to the Arab oil embargo imposed by OPEC, most Western countries prefer to minimise trade with Israel. Moreover, Israel has a politically inexperienced Prime Minister (Yitzhak Rabin) who had to deal with a traumatised people and army, as well as immense pressure from Kissinger to give back parts of Sinai without getting a full peace agreement in return. Kissinger also pressures Israel to accept the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and to return the city of Quneitra which Israel conquered from Syria in the 1973 war. The so-called red lines agreement between Rabin and Assad is forged. Finally, the Soviet Union is supporting a network of left-wing terrorists that it has nurtured since 1967 (Japanese Red Army and Kozo Akamoto’s Lod Airport attack, Carlos the Jackal, the Baader Meinhof group). The French make deals with the terrorists. The Israeli response to the trauma of Yom Kippur is to forge relations with Apartheid South Africa to get more uranium, increase military R&D and generally military rearmament. The result is hyperinflation and the lost economic decade. Psychologically, Rabin seeks to lift morale up through Operation Entebbe

to rescue hostages (1976). Lastly we will discuss the impact of detente and the issue of the Zionist refuseniks in the Soviet Union.

Class exercise: Watch the interview of Moshe Dayan to Thames TV after the Schoenau ultimatum (September 28-9), days before the outbreak of the war with Egypt, Syria and Iraq on October 6. What can we learn from this incident? What are the limitations of Israel in acting as a global norm entrepreneur?

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3FE4hOfkeo&t=163s>

Readings:

*William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd edition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 98-176.

*William Quandt, *Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy: a Staff Paper* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 1-42.

Kirsten Schulze, Israeli and Maronite nationalisms: is a minority alliance natural? In: Schulze, Kirsten E. and Stokes, Martin and Campbell, Colm, (eds.) *Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East* (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 158-170.

Moshe Maoz, *Syria and Israel* (Oxford UP, 1995), chapters 7-8.

Ziv Rubinowitz, "Blue and White 'Black September': Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970," *The International History Review*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2010), pp. 687 -706.

Bruce Hoffman, "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 115 (Summer, 1999), pp. 62-76

Stage 10: the improvement in Israel's standing in the 1980s (1980-91)

Things start to change for the better for Israel in this period when four events happen: the Iranian revolution (which makes Israel the indispensable ally in the Middle East), the peace treaty with Egypt (which terminates a long conflict and the threat of conventional war and also sidelines inevitably the Palestinian issue), the Iran-Iraq war (which makes the nightmare scenario of all out war by a big coalition of Arab states even less likely), the ascendance of right-wing pro-Israel leaders in the US, UK and West Germany (Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl). Israel still faces hyperinflation and some isolation though.

Topics to be discussed: 1. the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon (logic and unintended consequences such as the rise of Hezbollah) including the Israeli withdrawal and the implications for the Israeli-Syrian relations; 2. Developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena: the Regan peace plan, the so-called peace process in the Israel-Jordan-PLO triangle, the outbreak of the Intifada in November 1987, Jordan's decision to disengage from the West Bank, the emergence of Hamas.

Class discussion: what causes people to one day rebel? What keeps the society resist armed struggle and adhere to non violence Gandhi style? Why did the Palestinians manage to do it only for some time?

Readings:

Avner Yaniv, "Israel Faces Iraq: the Politics of Confrontation," In *Iraq's Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall, 1983), pp. 117-142

*Schulze, Kirsten E. (1996) "Perceptions and misperceptions: influences on Israeli intelligence estimates during the 1982 Lebanon War," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, XVI (1). 134-152.

For a good journalistic read review of events Thomas Friedman, *Between Beirut and Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1995), skim.

*Moshe Maoz, *Israel and Syria* (Oxford UP), chapter 8.

*Ian Lustick, “Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories,” *World Politics*, 45/4 (1993).

Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon & Schuster), skim.

Stage 11: the decade of Pax Americana (1991-2001)

The optimism from the American victory was felt not just in Europe but also in Israel. After all, the victory in the 1991 Gulf War against Saddam led Assad to try to become a US ally and it was clear to all that the road to Washington went through Jerusalem. Even for the US (unlike the Israeli peace camp), Peace with the Palestinians was not seen as a necessary condition for peace with all the other Arab states.

Topics: 1. The competition between Israel and the US over Soviet Jewry; 2. The Israeli shift to peace and the Oslo peace process (Egypt’s role, Jordan’s fears, the problematic Palestinian state-building, and finally the various factors behind the collapse of the peace process); 3. The Israeli-Syrian relations (the peace process which ultimately failed alongside low-level conflict); 4. Iran’s policies under Rafsanjani and Khatami, including its meddling in the Levant and the nascent dialogue with the US, and finally the two terror attacks in Argentina. Finally 5. The 1990s was the growth period of the Israeli hi-tech industry. Growth increased, partly due to FDI, partly due to government subsidies and investments, and partly thanks to the new immigrants from the Soviet Union increasing the available high-tech workforce.

Class discussion: were the immigrant Soviet Jews a force for peacemaking or not? Why did the Oslo peace process fail? How did Israel's standing change with the strengthening of the EU (the signing of the Maastricht treaty)?

Readings:

Efraim Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, chapter 1.

*Joel Migdal, *Shifting Sands* (NY: Columbia UP, 2014), chapters 6, 8-9.

2. The Oslo peace process

*Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006) 201-284.

Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 9.

Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine* (NY: Verso Press, 2009), chapters 15-16.

3. The Israeli-Syrian relations

Moshe Maoz, *Syria and Israel* (Oxford UP, 1995), chapter on the peace process.

*Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace* (Princeton UP, 2004), chapters 2-4.

4. Iran's policies under Rafsanjani and Khatami, including its meddling in the Levant and the nascent dialogue with the US.

David Menashri, "Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict," *Israel Affairs*, vol.12, no. 1 (2006) pp. 107 -122.

Stage 12: The decade of GWOT unleashed by 9/11 (2001-14)

Israel has experienced two major wars during this period: the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2004) the second Lebanon War with Hezbollah (July 2006). Yet in order to understand how much of a leash Israel got to fight terrorism, and how its global standing was affected by these wars, we have to bear in mind the trends in the world. This long period saw a shift in the West from right wing governments that took power or stayed in power in the aftermath of 9/11 (and the series of attacks it inspired) such as George W Bush, Stephen Harper, John Howard (who all gave Israel a free pass on the Palestinian issue and greater support for counter-terrorism) to more left wing governments: Barack Obama, Justin Trudeau, Gordon Brown, Kevin Rudd. The cold war of the West against China has not started yet, and even Russia is not yet seen as a major threat (Obama “invites” them to go into Syria). This means that until the appearance of ISIS (The fall of Mosul in Iraq in June 2014) the main issue in the diplomatic agenda for Israel was the settlements and the nuclear deal with revolutionary Iran. Israel was under pressure to stop settlement activity and support the nuclear deal with Iran and in response Netanyahu acted in ways that some criticise as too controversial.

Readings:

*Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 10.

Graham Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 2, (Winter 2003), pp. 21-40.

Jeremy Pressman, “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 2003).

On the al-Aqsa Intifada: BBC/PBS “Elusive Peace”

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEHqDG1EVHQ&t=5475s>

On the Netanyahu vs Obama feud: “Netanyahu At War” PBS:

<https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-netanyahu-war/>

Stage 13: the Arab Spring and growing Iranian regional dominance (2014-24)

This stage obviously ends with the Hamas invasion of October 7th, 2023 and the regional escalation that ensues. Yet, it is a period of amazing growth and success and growing stature of Israel in the world. The Palestinian issue is sidelined due to Fatah’s inability to end the “civil war” with Hamas. The Arab spring has pushed most of the governments in Europe and the anglosphere to the right due to migration waves (Brexit, Macron, Meloni, Orban and Morawiecki, Tony Abott). The rise of ISIS illustrated the risks of speedy territorial withdrawals. It put an end to the left wing dominance in the West. Netanyahu is war averse and the Israeli economy is booming thanks to overcoming covid faster than others (an excellent public health system, rollout of vaccines). The Iranians feared President Trump. Netanyahu gets along with Putin on the issue of Syria. He believes he also gets along with the Hamas regime in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Yet, all of this seeming Israeli success proved to be very fragile given Iran’s subversive power and gains in the region (Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza). Qassem Soleimani successfully created the ring of fire before he died. The War in Ukraine pushed Biden to improve relations with the Saudis, and the fear of an Israeli-Saudi normalisation pushed Iran and Hamas to act militarily to prevent a second Abraham Accord. We will discuss Netanyahu’s regional and global strategy and other factors shaping the attitude of different countries towards Israel.

Questions for class discussion: How does American withdrawal from the Middle East affect the relations between the US and Israel? In other words, what must the US do in order to

keep Israel as an ally? Did Netanyahu act diplomatically in the way that best served Israel's security?

Class discussion: what factors in Israeli society and history allowed for the blossoming of relations between

Readings:

* Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 11.

Ofira Seliktar, "Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality: The "Eye of the Beholder" Problem," *Journal of Middle East and Africa*, vol. (2012)

Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, *Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies* (2019)

Or Honig and Ido Yahel, "Elimination or Threat Management? Explaining the Variation in Israel's Policies towards Terrorist Semi-states," *Terrorism & Political Violence*, vol. 32, no. 5 (2020), pp. 901-920.

The last part of "Netanyahu at War"

Washington Post & Frontline, "Failure at the Fence"

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWoP3EZM6A0>

Part III: the relations between Israel and the different countries and additional other topics (students' presentations)

The list of topics below is obviously only a list of suggested topics for oral presentations.

Feel free to come to me with a topic of your choosing. For each of the countries that we will discuss in class thanks to the oral presentations, please try to read the relevant section in the book of Navon -- *The Star and the Scepter* and preferably also in Colin Shindler's book *Israel and the World Powers*. This way we can make sure that you are ready for the oral exam with

regards to the country in question. If you are presenting, try to think of an interesting question (is the relationship doomed or likely to succeed? Has it fulfilled its potential and if not why? Have certain leaders been necessary for upgrading relations and if so why? Is it a natural alliance? Is it likely to become a strategic alliance or even an intimate relationship? How much did the A-I conflict actually matter?) or try to make an interesting claim. More importantly, try to be engaging with your fellow students.

The key Global powers (not in moments when they influence the trajectory of the Arab Israeli conflict or by focusing on certain aspects of the relationships)

The US

Is it a special relationship or can realist factors explain it?

Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship?" Diplomatic History, Vol. 22:2 (Spring 1998), pp. 231- 262.

Abraham Ben-Zvi, "The Dynamics of the US-Israel Special Relationship," in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon Klieman (eds.), Global Politics (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 219-235.

Factors explaining variation in the support of different US Presidents/administrations

The nature of the Intelligence relationships:

<https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/spies-like-us>

Jefferson Morley The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton (by St. Martin's Press, 2017).

How did the changing demographics in the US and socio-political upheavals over the years change the nature of the US-Israel relationship?

*Relevant chapters in books of Navon and Shindler.

The UK

At what point, if at all, the relationships become more influenced by Israel's attractiveness rather than the weight of the US? Should we be referring to more or less pro-Israeli British Prime Ministers like we do when talking about US Presidents? In other words, to what extent does ideology shape Britain's foreign policy towards Israel? What explains the Schizophrenia that characterises the British approach towards Israel (both hate and love/admiration)?

Possible readings:

Azriel Bermant, "Israel and the UK" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.) Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations (Routledge, 2024)

Azriel bermant, *Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016)

Toby Greene, *Blair, Labour and Palestine* (Bloosmbury Academic, 2013)

Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and the Jews*.

Jonathan Rynhold and Jonathan Spyer, "British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973–2004," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 34, 2007 - Issue 2 (2007), pp. 137-155

Tuvia Tenebom, *The Taming the Jew* (Gefen, 2021)

Chatham House conference commemorating sixty years to British-Israeli relations: part 1 (diplomats and foreign ministers), Part two (intelligence officials) Uzi Arad, Shmuel Bar and Richard Dearlove. Shimon Peres

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/300311israel2.pdf>

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/300311israel1.pdf>

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/300311israel3.pdf>

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/Transcript%20-%20Shimon%20Peres.pdf

Watch also Peres's Speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBE8nRpD5m8>

*Relevant chapters in books of Navon and Shindler.

The Soviet Union/the Russian Federation

Robert Freedman, "Moscow and Jerusalem: a troubled 75-year relationship" *Israel Affairs* Volume 29, (May 2023), Pp. 492-511

You can also watch: Robert Freedman's lecture in the Baltimore Council of Foreign Affairs, "Israel and Russia – A Troubled 75 – Year Relationship," June 22, 2023.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkV11ypX768>

Efraim Halevy, "Israel's grand strategy and the return of Russia as a Great Power," *Fathom* (May 2018)

<https://fathomjournal.org/israel70-israels-grand-strategy-and-the-return-of-russia-as-a-great-power/>

Guy Laron, "Israel and the Soviet Union and Daniel Rakov "Israel and Russia" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations* (Routledge, 2024)

*Relevant chapters in books of Navon and Shindler.

France

Gadi Heiman, *Franco-Israeli Relations, 1958-67* (Routledge, 2017)

Tsilla Hershko, *Israel-France Defense and Security Cooperation in the 21st Century*, *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* No. 81, Summary, January 2014. See https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/MSPS101_English-Summary.pdf

*Relevant chapters in books of Navon and Shindler.

Germany (beforehand East and West Germany)

Gisela Dachs, "Israel and Germany" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.)

Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations (Routledge, 2024)

Lorena De Vita, *Israelpolitik: German-Israeli Relations, 1949-69*. (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2020).

Jeffrey Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left,*

1967-1989 (Cambridge University Press, 2016). For a discussion of the book with the author:

<https://fathomjournal.org/1967-and-the-global-left-the-case-of-the-east-german-regime-and-the-west-german-radicals/>

Legitimation for Turning-Point Decisions in Foreign Policy: Israel vis-à-vis Germany 1952

and Egypt 1977 Author(s): Yehudit Auerbach Source: *Review of International Studies* , Oct.,

1989, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 329- 340

Shimon Stein, "Germany-Israel Relations:: Unique or Normal?" Institute for National

Security Studies (2018) INSS Insight No. 1030, March 7, 2018

Yehudit Auerbach, "Turning-Point Decisions: A Cognitive-Dissonance Analysis of Conflict

Reduction in Israel-West German Relations," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep.,

1986), pp. 533-550.

*Relevant chapters in books of Navon and Shindler.

China

Yoram Evron, "Israel and China" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.) *Routledge*

Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations (routledge, 2024)

India

Kumaraswamy, *India's Israel Policy*, (Columbia University Press, 2010)

*Relevant chapters in the books of Navon and Shindler.

The EU

Should the Israeli government have official relations with the far right nationalist parties? If so, which ones?

Gadi Heiman and Lior Herman, *Israel's Path to Europe: The Negotiations for a Preferential Agreement, 1957-1970* (Routledge). Skim.

Toby Greene, "Judeo-Christian civilizationism: Challenging common European foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian arena". *Mediterranean Politics*. (2020)

https://www.tobygreene.net/files/ugd/afdc44_7bed5184f7a741998c9d3441e108d781.pdf

*Relevant chapters in the books of Navon and Shindler.

The UN

Relations have shifted from friendship to Hostility -- why and could things have been different?

Neil Caplan, "Oum Shmoom' Revisited: Israeli Attitude Towards the UN and the Great Powers, 1948-1960," in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon Klieman (eds.), *Global Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 167-198.

Michael B. Oren, "Ambivalent Adversaries: David Ben-Gurion and Israel vs. the United Nations and Dag Hammarskjold, 1956-57", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1992), 89-127.

Israel and the Less important actors

Turkey

Galia Lindenstauss, "Israel and Turkey," in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.)

Routledge Handbook on ISrael's Foreign Relations (routledge, 2024)

Eldad Ben Aharon, "Between Ankara and Jerusalem: the Armenian Genocide as a Zero-Sum Game in Israel's Foreign Policy (1980's -2010's)", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 20, no. 5 (2018): 459-476.

Eldad Ben Aharon, "Superpower by Invitation: Late Cold War Diplomacy and Leveraging Armenian Terrorism as a Means to Rapprochement in Israeli-Turkish Relations (1980–1987)", *Cold War History* 19, no. 2 (2019): 275-293.

Eldad Ben Aharon, "The 'War on Terror' and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: Israeli-Turkish Relations and the 1980 Military Coup," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 47, no. 7 (2024): 792-815.

The Caucasus region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan)

Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld "Israel, the Caucasus and Central Asia" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on ISrael's Foreign Relations* (routledge, 2024)

The Gulf States

Yoel Guzansky, "Israel and the Gulf States" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on ISrael's Foreign Relations* (Routledge, 2024)

Poland

Joanna Dyduch, "Israel and Poland" in Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfeld (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on ISrael's Foreign Relations* (Routledge, 2024).

*Relevant chapter in Navon's book.

Japan, Korea and Singapore

Rotem Kowner, "Israel-Japan Relations: A Recent Promise that Has Yet to Materialise," (ch. 6), Guy Podoler, "Israel and the Two Koreas: Between Sentiments and Pragmatism" (ch. 7) and finally Kevjn Lim and Mattia Tomba, "Israel and Singapore: An Old-New Affinity Between Nations under Siege," (ch. 9) in Yoram Evron and Rotem Kowner (eds.), *Israel-Asia Relations in the Twenty First Century* (Routledge, 2023).

*Relevant chapter in Navon's book

Other fascinating Topics for students' presentation

1. The impact of other countries' political and social cultures on the Israeli political system and social and political cultures

Ilan Peleg and Yoav Fromer, *The Americanization of Israeli Society*

See also:

<https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjc4ox11k3>

2. Passive sponsors of terrorism (countries which create the kind of climate that encourages young people to come to Israel for the purpose of perpetrating attacks or to choose Israeli targets in their home countries).
3. Israel and the International liberal order (the international legal bodies, the humanitarian law allegedly being strictly applied to Israel etcetera)
4. Israel and the ideological movements: the global left, the global right, the Islamic world
5. Israel and the world of humanitarian or political/diplomatic NGOs. See Tuvia Tenenbom, *Catch the Jew* (Gefen, 2014).
6. The global struggle against Hezbollah, and why Israel finds it difficult to fight it. See Shirin Saeidi, "Hezbollah in Global Arena." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of*

International Studies (Oxford University Press, June 2022). See also endless posts and articles by Matthew Levitt from WINEP.

7. Israel and the Jewish world -- some policy dilemmas, obstacles etc.