

International Relations of the Middle East

JST 3930(29481), INR 4931

Instructor: Dr. Or Arthur Honig (ohonig@ufl.edu , orhonig@yahoo.com)

M, W, F 12:50PM-1:40PM.

Office Hours & location: Walker Hall, room 200E, Periods 1&2 (8:00-9:30 am)

Course Description

Want to understand the Middle East? We will explore six main issues: 1) The role of extra-regional powers in stabilising or exacerbating the region; 2) the factors determining the success and failures of different Middle Eastern countries to gain regional dominance; 3) factors determining the success of regional actors, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia, in courting the alliance of extra-regional powers; 4) the degree to which religion and other identity-related issues (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) shape regional dynamics; 5) the role of fundamentalist Islam in shaping the region and preventing conflict resolution; 6) why don't we see liberalism, capitalism or democracy flourishing in most of the region and what are the implications of that for the regional dynamics. No background knowledge is required.

Course goals

Notably, the goal of this course is not just to give the students a better understanding of the dynamics and forces shaping the region (especially the unique ones which make it different from other regions) but also to learn how to ask interesting theoretical questions when learning history. Hence, you will acquire the skill to think theoretically about the history of this complex region, as well as to think critically about the IR and CP theories we currently have. Since many political science theories were derived from the Western experience, they

often do not fit well with the behaviour of actors and processes in this particular region. This creates room for both theory-testing and for theorising. Needless to stress, this is not a humanities course, but a social science one. This means that many questions that are of interest to historians are of less interest to us in this course.

The Middle East has been the subject of heated academic and policy debates. Studies regarding it can be highly politicised. This is why you should be cautious when reading different interpretations on the web. We will learn the relevant historical tools for analysing texts and evaluating sources.

After completing this course, students will be able to:

- Be familiar with the key theoretical questions and concepts that illuminate the study of regional dynamics.
- Understand the dynamics in the Middle East region and the forces shaping them.
- Assess the contribution and value of historical texts, which means situating the historical work within the relevant historical debates, and being able to judge the empirical basis for the claims made based on the credibility and quality of the sources used.
- Use historical data for the purpose of both testing and developing political science models.
- Analyse new developments as they take place by identifying the forces shaping the dynamics in the Middle East.
- Learn how to present and generate a class debate.

Course requirements and grading:

20% -- active participation. This component of the grade might include homework tasks. As a general rule, I would like you to read those items with a star next to them. I will also ask

students to begin class by sharing what they have read, what they found interesting or puzzling. If you read items beyond the obligatory ones (or watch relevant videos) you will get extra participation points.

30% -- a 15-25 minute presentation on a topic related to the Middle East (to be chosen either from the list of topics or approved by me). These will be presented by students based on their choice of dates, though most probably towards the second half of the semester. Instructions are uploaded to canvas.

45% -- an oral exam (to be held during class time and office hours in the last two to three weeks).

5% -- a short multiple choice exam (to be held on the last class before the beginning of the oral exams).

Grade scale:

87–89 = B+ 77–79 = C+ 67–69 = D+ below 60 = E

93–100 = A 83–86 = B 73–76 = C 63–66 = D

90–92 = A- 80–82 = B- 70–72 = C- 60–62 = D

Grading Criteria is as follows:

- A-range – 90s -- Excels – Full command and facility with material with the ability to place it within larger historical/literary context and to make arguments based upon it.
- B-range – 80s – Good – Solid understanding of material but without complete facility or ability to make arguments based on it.

- C-range – 70s -- Fair – Some understanding of major themes, lack of command with detail, or some understanding of detail but lack of contextual understanding.
- D-range – 60s -- Poor – Enough factual understanding to pass, but little to no contextual clarity.
- F-range – Fails – Lack of university level quality.

For the grading policies of the University of Florida in general, follow this link:

<https://catalog.ufl.edu/UGRD/academic-regulations/grades-grading-policies/> (Links to an external site.)

Class Policies

Attendance:

Attendance is mandatory. You *are* expected to participate on days during which we have discussion.
Be in class on time.

Electronics:

I discourage the use of unnecessary electronics in the classroom. Let's unplug for a few hours and focus on the texts in front of us and the people in the room. The majority of the readings will be provided in .pdf format. I would prefer for all note taking to be done by hand. If you must have a computer for some reason, it should only be used for readings.

Academic Honesty:

The University of Florida Student Honor Code is located at this link:

<http://www.dso.ufl.edu/sccr/honorcodes/honorcode.php> (Links to an external site.).

UF students are bound by The Honor Pledge which states, "We, the members of the University of Florida community, pledge to hold ourselves and our peers to the highest standards of honor and

integrity by abiding by the Honor Code. On all work submitted for credit by students at the University of Florida, the following pledge is either required or implied: “On my honor, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid in doing this assignment.” The Honor Code (<http://www.dso.ufl.edu/sccr/process/student-conduct-honorcode/>) specifies a number of behaviors that are in violation of this code and the possible sanctions. Furthermore, you are obligated to report any condition that facilitates academic misconduct to appropriate personnel. If you have any questions or concerns, please consult with the instructor.

Plagiarism will not be tolerated!

Students with Disabilities:

Students with disabilities requesting accommodations should first register with the Disability Resource Center (352-392-8565, www.dso.ufl.edu/drc/) by providing appropriate documentation. Once registered, students will receive an accommodation letter which must be presented to the instructor when requesting accommodation. Students with disabilities should follow this procedure as early as possible in the semester.

Course Evaluations:

Students in this class are participating in the pilot evaluation of the new course evaluation system called GatorEvals. The new evaluation system is designed to be more informative to instructors so that teaching effectiveness is enhanced and to be more seamlessly linked to UF’s CANVAS learning management system. Students can complete their evaluations through the email they receive from GatorEvals, in their Canvas course menu under GatorEvals.

Recordings:

As in all courses, unauthorised recording and unauthorised sharing of recorded materials is prohibited.

Academic Resources:

E-learning technical support, 352-392-4357 (select option 2) or e-mail to Learningsupport@ufl.edu.

<https://lss.at.ufl.edu/help.shtml>.

Teaching Center, Broward Hall, 392-2010 or 392-6420. General study skills and tutoring.

<http://teachingcenter.ufl.edu/> (Links to an external site.)

Writing Studio, 302 Tigert Hall, 846-1138. Help brainstorming, formatting, and writing papers.

<http://writing.ufl.edu/writing-studio/>

Software Use

All faculty, staff, and students of the University are required and expected to obey the laws and legal agreements governing software use. Failure to do so can lead to monetary damages and/or criminal penalties for the individual violator. Because such violations are also against University policies and rules, disciplinary action will be taken as appropriate. We, the members of the University of Florida community, pledge to uphold ourselves and our peers to the highest standards of honesty and integrity.

Student Privacy

There are federal laws protecting your privacy with regards to grades earned in courses and on individual assignments: For more information, please see:

<http://registrar.ufl.edu/catalog0910/policies/regulationferpa.html>

Required Textbooks: None. All required textbooks will be uploaded to canvas, and the relevant books will be placed in the reserve section of Library West.

1. An introduction + Relevant theoretical questions for the course

My approach for studying this area (this is a political science/IR course and less a diplomatic history course). The goal during this first week is to introduce students to some of the main questions that scholars of IR look at when they study this region. We will see how some scholars tried to answer these questions. I will also emphasize that this course looks at the Middle East through an Israel entered lens.

These questions include: What is a region? Are regions fundamentally different from each other? How is regional dominance different from empire or hegemony or unipolarity? Why do some states seek regional dominance? When and how do some regional actors succeed in that endeavour? What determines the balance of influence between extra-regional powers and local powers? What do we mean when we say that the Middle East is unstable? What causes the recurrence of wars or proliferation of WMDs in one region (the Middle East for example) versus another (Europe for instance)?

Ian Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 653-683.

Gregory Gause, "'Hegemony' Compared: Great Britain and the United States in the Middle East," *Security Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3(June 2019):1-23.

Or Honig and Joshua Arsenault, "Explaining Who Succeeds in the Competition for Regional Dominance in the Contemporary Middle East." *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter 2020 (Winter 2020), pp. 30-47.

Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010), Introduction.

2. Learning by looking at the maps

Topics: the relative size and populations of each country, the natural resources of each country, the geopolitical importance of each country, the demographics of each major country, a general discussion of the place of the Middle East in world politics and how great powers look at Israel. Finally, we will have a short discussion of the “resource curse” in the Arab world and the “industry curse” in Israel.

Question: what are the American basic strategic goals towards the region and how may Israel be an asset or liability for attaining them? Why did the state of Israel become an economic and military regional power despite having far fewer resources than some other countries? If you were Israel’s Prime Minister how would you best defend the country -- by investing most in an air force, a navy or a missile corps?

3. A very short historical background until the early 19th century

Topics: the birth and development of the three monotheistic religions, the Jewish revolts and Hadrian’s curse, Yochanan Ben Zakai (the destruction of both the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem in 586 BCE and 70 CE respectively) and Judaism until the advent of Zionism (the creation of the “new Jew”), the birth of Islam and Christianity, the crusaders and Saladin, the different Islamic empires, the place of the land we know today as Israel/Palestine in the Ottoman empire and in the consciousness of Jews and Muslims.

Jerusalem, where it all began: Morgan Freeman and Yoram Hazony Talk about God:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWB_Zdl-xbA

Adam Silverstein, *Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford UP, 2010), skim.

Alan Dowty, *Arabs and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: Two Worlds Collide* (Indiana University Press, 2019), skim.

Gudrun Krämer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel* (Princeton University Press, 2011), skim.

Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century", reprinted in: Ilan Pappé (ed.), *The Israel/Palestine Question* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 41-51

Question: why were there very few Jews in Palestine until the late 19th century? What is the Zionist claim and what is the Palestinian claim and who do you think is right? How did the Ottoman history of Palestine contribute to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, if at all? Is it possible for the state of Israel to keep religion tamed given the explosive potential of increasing Jewish connection to the Temple Mount?

Class exercise: understanding the claims made by both Palestinians and Zionist Jews regarding the claims to the land and the origins of the conflict:

The Palestinian narrative: <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/akSqW3oi3xE>

The Zionist narrative: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=10154116236078717>

4. The decline of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of Zionism

Pre-Zionism and Zionism in Europe and the Ottoman empire in the 19th century

Topics covered: 1. the empowerment of Jews in the early to mid nineteenth century (Nathan Rothschild, Baron Maurice Hirsch, and the proto-Zionist Baron Moses Montefiore); 2. The emergence of Zionism as a political movement (also what is Zionism? What does it mean to be a Zionist in the Jewish diaspora or among non-Jews? Are we seeing a decline of Zionism

in Israel today?). 3. The first and second Jewish waves of immigration (1882-1903, 1904-14);
4. The emergence of the Arab national movement in the Ottoman empire.

Questions: What was the impetus for the emergence of Zionism? Why do some minorities wake up one day and decide to become a nation, while others don't or give up on independence that they had? What were or have been some alternatives to Zionism? Why was Zionism so extremely unpopular among Jews from its beginning and until the mid twentieth century? How did the first Zionist thinkers think about the issue of the Arab inhabitants of the land? How did they propose to address this matter?

Class exercise: Reading excerpts from Herzl's *Altneuland* and comparing them to Ataturk's Nukuk (the great speech). Can we distinguish between different types of nationalist ideologies (at least at the stage of nation formation) and if so what was different about Zionism in its early days?

Readings:

Emmanuel Navon, *The Star and the Scepter: A Diplomatic History of Israel* (University of Nebraska Press, 2020), chapters 5-6.

Martin Van Crevelled, *The Land of Blood and Honey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), pp. 1-33.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors: Arab and Jews in Palestine and Israel* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2017), chapter 2.

Wistrich, Robert, 'Theodor Herzl: Zionist Icon, Myth-Maker and Social Utopian,' in Wistrich, Robert, and Ohana, David, (Eds.), *The Shaping of Israeli Identity: Myth, Memory and Trauma*, (London; Routledge, 2013).

5. The First World War and the post-war settlement: the formation of the boundaries and the mandate system

We will be talking in this class about two diplomatic processes. First, the war time diplomacy (the British war-time promises): the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (1915) the Sykes Picot Sazanov agreement (1916) and finally the Balfour declaration (Nov 1917). Second, the post-war settlement which dismembered the Ottoman empire, shaped the boundaries and created the mandate system through the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) on behalf of the League of Nations. This post-war diplomatic activity included the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, the San Remo conference, the Cairo conference (taking away transjordan from Mandatory Palestine), and finally the treaty of Lausanne. Some historians believe that Weizmann played an outsized role both in terms of his contacts with the Hashemites and his influence in Britain, while others completely disagree.

Questions: who or what is responsible for the great Zionist achievements during this period? If the Zionist Jews were so powerful how is it that they could not save European Jewry twenty years later? What are some structural factors that explain these achievements? Do you agree with David Fromkin and Benny Miller (the state-to-Nation imbalance thesis about regional instability) that the imperial powers caused the Arab Israeli conflict? Why did Britain decide to keep the promises made during WWI (especially to the Zionists)? What are the generic IR lessons that we can draw from this episode? Finally, there are three clear winners in this period -- the British, the Zionist movement and the Hashemite family (who became the monarchs of Iraq and Trans-Jordan and initially also the Hejaz), and many other losers (France, the Kurds, the local Arab families of Jerusalem and perhaps even Turkey).

How can we explain this diplomatic outcome? Did the Zionists have a diplomatic advantage over the others?

Class exercise: A comparison between the open letter of Churchill to the Jews worldwide and the Obama Cairo speech to the Muslims worldwide.

Winston Churchill - "Zionism vs Bolshevism; struggle for the soul of the Jewish People"

1920. And the Obama Cairo Speech: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning>

Readings:

Navon, *The Star and the Scepter*, chapter 7.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*,

Martin Kramer, "Was the Balfour Declaration a Colonial Document?" Mosaic Magazine, October 29, 2020. <https://mosaicmagazine.com/observation/israel-zionism/2020/10/was-the-balfour-declaration-a-colonial-document/>

Martin Kramer, "The Balfour Declaration and the Jewish threat that made Britain honor it," October 31, 2019. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/the_balfour_declaration_and_the_jewish_threat_that_made_britain_honor_it_mosaic.pdf

Michael J. Cohen, "Centenary of the Balfour Declaration," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017).

Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and the Jews* (New York: Henry Bolt, 2008), chapters 1-6 (and especially chapter 4).

Jehuda Reinharz and Motti Golani, *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (Chicago UP, 2024), chapter 2.

David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1990), pp. 493-567.

Gutwein Danny, "The Politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Limits of Zionist British Cooperation," *Journal of Israeli History*, 35 2 (2016).

Renton, James, "Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918," *Historical Journal*, 50, 3 (2007).

Watts, Martin. "Britain, Zionism, and the Jewish Legion." *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 19, 4 (2020):

Additional readings:

David Charlwood, 'The Impact of the Dardanelles Campaign on British Policy Towards the Arabs: How Gallipoli Shaped the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence', *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, 42, 2 (2015).

Lewis, Geoffrey, *Balfour and Weizmann: the Zionist, the Zealot and the Emergence of Israel*, (London; Continuum Press, 2009).

Schneer, Jonathan, *The Balfour Declaration: the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London; Bloomsbury, 2011).

Stein, Kenneth, 'The Jewish National Fund: Land Purchase Methods and Priorities, 1924-1939,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 20, 2 (1984).

Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs* (Basic Books, 2009), chapter 6.

Eugene Rogan, "The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System" in *International Relations of the Middle East* (Ed. Louise Fawcett), 1-43

Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 5-22 (chap 1).

James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), skim.

Benjamin Miller, “Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity,” *Security Studies*, vol. 15, no. 4 (October 2006), pp. 658 – 705.

Efraim Karsh, *The Tail that Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 9-30; or alternatively, Karsh *Islamic Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2006), chapter 8.

Albert Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), ch. 18 (p. 303) The emergence of nationalism.

Highly recommended videos

A. Jonathan Schneer, “The Balfour Declaration,” WGBH Forum

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxqJyjuNjd8>

B. Gabriel Matzkin, Abigail Jacobson and Eugene Rogan “From Constantinople to San Remo,” Van Leer Institute (Jerusalem), 2017.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SchqyJl4TVw>

C. Martin Kramer, “Sykes-Picot: An Obstacle to the Jewish State,” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOB2Vp6DbPw>

6. The British mandate period until the end of WWII (1921-May 1945)

The period of the British mandate in Palestine can really be divided into five main periods: 1. from the beginning of the mandate in 1921 until the Wailing Wall riots of 1929; 2. from the end of the 1929 riots until the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936; 3. The Arab revolt from 1936 until 1939; 4. the period of the Second World War (from its outbreak in September 1939 until its end in May 1945, but especially until Menachem Begin declared the revolt in February 1944); 5. And finally the post-war period (or to be exact from the final stages of the

Second World War after the IZL declared its anti-British revolt) until the UN partition resolution in November 1947. We will cover the fifth sub-period in the following class.

Questions: The Zionists had three diplomatic victories during this period (the 1921 Cairo conference & the appointment of Herbert Samuel, the 1931 MacDonald Letter, and finally the 1937 Peel commission report) and two clear diplomatic defeats (the 1939 white paper and Bevin's policy of keeping in place the 1939 white paper after the war). Indeed, the fluctuations in the British policy towards the Jews and the Arabs took mostly the form of different white papers. Why were the Zionists able to win diplomatically for (only) so long? Why did the Palestinian violence not lead to a lasting change in British policy before the eve of the Second World War in late 1939? What were the main causes for Palestinian violence during the mandate period? What Lessons can you learn from the 1929 riots, which may be applied to the Israeli Palestinian conflict today? What explains the relative resilience of the Yishuv during this period? Why did Ben Gurion and the Zionist leadership fail to create a Jewish majority during the mandate period?

Class exercise: Discussing Churchill's testimony to the Peel Commission of inquiry (going against Wilsonianism). Who do you agree with as the best blueprint for global governance of the issue of self determination -- Wilson's liberal idea or Churchill's conservative idea?

Readings:

General pieces to read about the whole mandate period

Gavish Dov, *A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate*, (London; Routledge, 2005).

Wagner, Steven, *Statecraft by Stealth: Secret Intelligence and British Rule in Palestine*, (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 2017).

Anita Shapira, *Land and Power* (Stanford UP, 1999), skim.

Tom Segev, *One Palestine Complete* (2000), skim.

The period until the Wailing Wall Riots, 1920-1929

This is known as the quiet period. There was very little Jewish immigration. The Zionist leadership believed that they could buy time until the local Arab population tried to use force to expel or kill them (and that at any event the British would protect them). However, the 1929 events (the Wailing Wall/Al-Buraq riots) showed the Zionist leaders that they were deluding themselves. Hajj Amin al-Husseini came to prominence for the first time as the radical and most prominent leader of the Palestinians.

Readings:

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), chapter 6.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors* (NY: Grove Press, 2017), chapter 3.

Shaiel Ben-Ephraim and Or Honig, "Sitting on the Volcano: Lynching Attacks in the Zionist-Palestinian Conflict," in Michael J. Pfeifer (ed.), *Global Lynching and Collective Violence: Past and Present* (The University of Illinois Press, 2017), 185-222.

Hillel Cohen, *1929: Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Brandeis University Press, Waltham, Mass., 2015), Skim.

Cohen, Michael J., 'Was the Balfour Declaration at Risk in 1923? Zionism and British Imperialism,' *Journal of Israeli History*, 29, 1 (2010).

Stein, Kenneth W., 'The Jewish National Fund: Land Purchase Methods and Priorities, 1924-1939,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 20, 2 (1984).

Townshend, Charles, 'Going to the Wall: The Failure of British Rule in Palestine, 1928-1931,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 30, 2 (2002).

The period between the 1929 riots and the outbreak of the 1936 Arab rebellion

This subperiod saw the following events: The cancellation of the Passfield White Paper (through the MacDonalds Letter), the Jewish immigration from Germany, Austria and Poland, the beginning of Jewish industry and lots of capitalism, the rise to prominence of the Muti al-Husseini.

Taggar, Yehuda, *The Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine: Arab Politics, 1930-1937* (New York; Garland, 1986).

Elpeleg, Zvi, *The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem: Haj Amin al-Husseini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement* (London; Frank Cass, 1993).

Radai, Itamar, 'The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class Under the British Mandate, 1920-39', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 51, 3 (2016).

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), ch. 7

The period of the Arab rebellion

This period saw the following events: the outbreak of the 1936 Arab revolt, the expulsion of the main Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the harsh repression of the Palestinians by the British, the Jewish restraint (Havlagah), the 1937 Peel Commission, the establishment of the Special Nights Squads by Orde Wingate.

Matthew Hughes, 'The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39,' *English Historical Review*, 124, 507 (2009).

Chazan, Meir, 'The Dispute in Mapai over "Self-Restraint" and "Purity of Arms" during the Arab Revolt,' *Jewish Social Studies*, 15, 3 (2009).

Hughes, Matthew, 'Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish Collaboration and the Special Night Squads in Palestine during the Arab Revolt, 1938-39,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43, 4 (2015).

Norris, Jacob, 'Repression and Rebellion: Britain's Response to the Arab Revolt in Palestine of 1936-39,' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 36 (2008).

Yigal Eyal, "The Arab Revolt, 1936-1939: A Turning Point in the Struggle over Palestine," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict: a guide to Israeli military history* (Praeger, 2004), chapter 1.

Navon, *The Star and the Scepter*, chapter 8.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors* (NY: Grove Press, 2017), chapters 4-5.

Aaron S., Klieman, 'The Divisiveness of Palestine: Foreign Office Versus Colonial Office on the Issue of Partition, 1937,' *The Historical Journal*, 22, 2 (1979).

Oren Kessler, *Palestine 1936: The Great Revolt and the Roots of the Middle East Conflict* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023), skim.

Also Watch an interview with Oren Kessler with JBS:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AfiNSu9T8>

Hillel Kuuler, "75 years after his death, why Orde Wingate remains a hero in Israel," *March* 23, 2019. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/75-years-after-his-death-why-orde-wingate-remains-a-hero-in-israel/>

Fraser, T.G., 'A Crisis of Leadership: Weizmann and the Zionist Reaction to the Peel Commission's Proposals, 1937-8,' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23 (1988).

The period of the Second World War in mandatory Palestine

Cohen, Michael J., 'Appeasement in the Middle East: The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939,' *Historical Journal*, 16, 3 (1973).

Gabriel Sheffer, "Appeasement and the Problem of Palestine," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (May, 1980), pp. 377-399

Tom Segev, *A State at Any Cost* (Apollo Books, 2019), chapters 12-14.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, chapter 6.

Matthias Kuntzel, *Nazis, Islamic Antisemitism and the Middle East. The Arab War against Israel and the Aftershocks of World War II* (Routledge 2024), skim.

Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (Yale University Press, 2009), skim.

Leslie Stein, *The Hope Fulfilled* (Pareger, 2003), ch. 8.

Cohen, Michael J., *Palestine, Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945*, (New York; Holmes and Meier, 1978).

Renee Wildangel, 'More Than the Mufti: Other Arab-Palestinian Voices on Nazi Germany, 1933-1945, and their Post-War Narrations,' in Gershoni, Israel, (ed.), *Arab Responses to Fascism and Nazism: Attraction and Repulsion*, (Austin; University of Texas Press, 2014).

Penkower, *Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939-1945*, (London; Monty, Frank Cass, 2002).

Herf, Jeffrey, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2009).

Mallman, K.-M. *Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine*, (New York; Enigma and Cuppers, M., Books, 2010).

Nevo, Joseph, 'Al-Hajj Amin and the British in World War II,' *Middle Eastern Studies*, 20, 1 (1984).

Ronald Zweig, "The Palestine Problem in the Context of Colonial Policy on the Eve of the Second World War," in Cohen, Michael and Kolinsky, Martin (eds.), *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-39*, (London; Macmillan, 1992).

Jones, Clive (2012). "Good Friends in Low Places? The British Secret Intelligence Service and the Jewish Agency 1939-1945." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48(3), 413-428.

7. The immediate post-war years until the UN Assembly partition vote (May 1945- November 1947)

This period began when Menachem Begin called for the uprising in February 1944. These are the years of the Zionist armed struggle and diplomatic struggle against the British mandate. During these years of anti-British struggle we also see a warming of relations between the Zionist movement and the US, the Soviet Union as well as France. We will talk about the Zionist underground movements, the United Resistance Movement, the illegal immigration and Zionist propaganda and global diplomacy (especially its influence over the White House), the American-British disagreements over Palestine (and the Zionist role in exacerbating them) and finally the two diplomatic successes (the UN assembly vote on UNSCOP partition proposal, the recognition of Israel by many states including the US in the immediate aftermath of declaration of independence).

Questions: Why were the Zionist factions able to unite in their anti-colonial struggle unlike many other factions in other anti-Colonial struggles? How can we explain the success of the Zionist national liberation movement in attaining diplomatic support for independence? Who were the main political elements that supported Zionism and why? Are they different from those supporting Zionism today? Did the Zionist armed struggle make much difference? Would another form of struggle have been more strategic? Who deserves a greater share of credit – the right wing groups or the left-wing ones? Why did Ben Gurion shift away from armed struggle towards propaganda and illegal immigration? Was that the blueprint of success? What factors allowed the Zionist national movements to make this strategic shift better than the Palestinian national liberation movement? Why did the Palestinians both fail against Zionism diplomatically? Why did they reject the UNSCOP partition proposal in order

to achieve statehood? Was it a rational move? Why was there no real soul searching after these failures? Was it a strategic mistake on the part of the British government to fight tooth and nail against the Jewish illegal immigration? Why did they act that way? Finally some historians (Jeffrey Herf) argue that had the French prosecuted Hajj Amin al-Husseini for war crimes instead of releasing him to return to the Middle East, the war could have been averted. Do you agree? Why did the French act that way? Had the IZL succeeded in its plots of killing

Class exercise: trying to explain the votes for or against the partition plan in UNSCOP and later in the UN General Assembly. How is the UN different today than it was back in 1947? In what ways have things improved or deteriorated? Why did the Zionist succeed in these cases but failed in others?

Jeffrey Herf, *Israel's Moment* (Cambridge UP, 2022), chapter 3-8, but especially chapter 4. Ben Dror, Ilad, 'The Success of the Zionist Strategy vis-à-vis UNSCOP,' *Israel Affairs*, 20, 1 (2014).

Cesarani, David, *Major Farran's Hat: Murder, Scandal, and Britain's Secret War Against Jewish Terrorism, 1945-1948*, (London; William Heineman, 2009). For an excellent review of this book see, <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/856/print/>

Aaron S. Klieman, , 'The Resolution of Conflicts Through Territorial Partition: the Palestine Experience,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22 (1980).

Charters, David, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47* (London; Macmillan, 1989).

Golani, Motti, *Palestine Between Politics and Terror, 1945–1947* (Waltham, MA; Brandeis University Press, 2013).

Amitzur Ilan, “Withdrawal Without Recommendations”: Britain’s Decision to Relinquish the Palestine Mandate, 1947,” in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim (eds.), *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel* (London; Frank Cass, 1982).

Martin Jones, *Failure in Palestine: British and United States Policy After the Second World War* (London; Bloomsbury, 2016).

Miller, Rory, *Divided against Zion: Anti-Zionist Opposition in Britain to a Jewish state in Palestine, 1945-1948* (London; Frank Cass, 2000).

Rose, Norman, *A Senseless, Squalid War: Voices From Palestine, 1945-1948* (London; Bodely Head, 2009).

Ravndal, Ellen Jenny, ‘Exit Britain: British Withdrawal From the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947–1948,’ *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 21, 3 (2010).

Calder Walton, “British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British National Security Immediately after the Second World War,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 23, 4 (2008)

Amikam Nachmani, “Generals at Bay in Post-War Palestine (and We Have Only Ourselves to Blame),” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, (December 1983), pp. 66-83.

Ido Yahel, “The ability to unite: the Jewish resistance movement in Mandatory Palestine,”

Shlomo Avineri, “Self-Determination and Israel’s Declaration of Independence,” in

Alan Baker (ed.,) *Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy* (Jerusalem

Center for Public Affairs, 2011), 35-44. <https://jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/israels-rights-full-study.pdf>

Orzeck, Reecia, “The Jewish Agency’s Case before the UNSCOP: Image and Discourse,” *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 63–64 (2015).

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2015. “‘Who Kills Shall Be Killed’: Another Perspective on the Assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo.” *The Journal of North African Studies* 20 (2): 172–86.

Yitzhak, Ronen, 'Politics and Ideology: Lord Moyne, Palestine and Zionism 1939–1944,' *Britain and the World* 10, 2 (2017).

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapter 7.

8. The 1947-1948 Arab-Israeli War

This war had two parts: 1. the so-called “civil war” (from the partition resolution on November 29, 1947 until the declaration of independence on May 14, 1948); and 2. the confrontation against the invasion by the five Arab states (Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon) which lasted until the the 1949 Armistice Agreements which were signed at different times with each of the Arab countries (Syria was the last to sign the armistice agreement and did so on July 20, 1949). These armistice talks demarcated the Green Line, which separated Arab-controlled territory (i.e., the Jordanian-annexed West Bank and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip) from Israel.

The 1948 war is theoretically fascinating in several ways: First, it was the first test to the UN and it failed miserably to impose a solution (the partition resolution) in order to stop the bloodshed; second, we have very few cases in history of whole societies simply collapsing in face of a military offensive by a not too powerful enemy and even escaping/being expelled en masse without too much effort (e.g., psychological warfare); Third, we have here a society that generated genuine military power during war itself (from a militia to an army); fourth, we have here a coalition of states as one of the belligerent sides whose members backstab and betray each other in the worse possible way; fifth, we have here a failure of pre-war negotiations in which the would be defeated party (the Arab states) was not completely optimistic about the chances of winning; Sixth, we have here an instance of a limited ethnic cleansing (20 percent of the Arabs who left the country according to most mainstream

historians) that results in many of the members of the enemy ethnic group remaining in the country; seventh, we have here a case of the victim country producing an extremely accurate picture of the looming threat (assessing that the Arab states will attack); eighth, we have here a civil war in which multiple actors intervene militarily in an indirect manner (the Qawuqji Arab Liberation Army); ninth, it is one of the few cases in history of a newly born weak state attacking the armed forces of an empire (Israel shooting down British spitfire planes); tenth, the phenomenon of foreign volunteers was quite extensive even though there were not global ideologies fighting each other (unlike the Spanish civil war).

Questions: Why did the Palestinian society not show greater resilience? How did Israel shape its strategy and determine its war aims? Why did Israel launch Operation Dalet? Why did the Arab states send Qawuqji's volunteer army? Why did Jordan defect from the Arab coalition and more generally why was the coordination and cooperation so limited? Why did President Truman decide to go against the experts and recognize the Jewish state? Why and how did the Jews win both the so-called civil-war in mandatory Palestine and in the inter-state fighting stage? How can we explain the (limited?) extent of the Israeli attempt to expel Arab inhabitants of Palestine? What inhibiting or contributing factors were at play here? Why did the five Arab states decide to attack? One glaring fact about the war is that the Jordanian army fought better than the rest of the Arab armies. Why do you think that was the case? How did Israel create an effective military force so fast? In what ways did the Second World War help shape the 1948 war? Why did Ben Gurion shift to an offensive strategy in the civil war stage only when he did?

Class discussion: What can you learn from these clips about the stories of Jewish American volunteers to the 1948 war? (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpEznGB062A&t=1s> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODZpBXja3Lg> ;

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELYtq0aDVbw> ;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JAi-n_MY9F8).

Readings:

Yoav Gelber, *Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press).

Shlomo Ben Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006), chapter 2.

Benny Morris. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 1-36 (background only), 37-74, 375-420.

David Tal (2005) "The Historiography of the 1948 War in Palestine: The Missing Dimension," *Journal of Israeli History*, 24:2, 183-202.

David Tal, "The Forgotten War: The Jewish-Palestinian Strife in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948." *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, no. 3-4, (Spring/Summer 2000), pp. 3-21.

Recommended readings:

Michael Eppel, "The Arab States and the 1948 War in Palestine: The Socio-Political Struggles, the Compelling Nationalist Discourse and the Regional Context of Involvement," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48:1 (2012), pp. 1-31.

Or Arthur Honig, "The Whisper in the Leader's Ear: How Do Foreign Policy Advisers Perform their Job?" *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 221-241.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, pp. 31-48.

Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, 2nd edition (Cambridge UP, 2008), chapters 4-8, 10. skim.

Michael Eppel, "The Iraqi Domestic Scene and its Bearing on the Palestine Issue 1947", *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 24, (1990), pp. 51-73.

Michael Eppel, "Syria and Iraqi-Syrian Relations During the 1948 War in Palestine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, (1996), pp. 74-91.

Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood*, (Boston : Beacon Press, 2006). Chapter 2

Bickerton, Ian J. "President Truman's Recognition of Israel," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 58 (1968), pp. 173-189; 192-259.

Shlaim, Avi, 'The Debate About 1948,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27, 3 (1995)

Parsons, Leila, 'Soldiering for Arab Nationalism: Fawzi al-Qawuqji in Palestine,' *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 36 (2007).

https://www.mcgill.ca/islamicstudies/files/islamicstudies/parsons.soldiering_for_arab_nationalism.pdf

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapter 7

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2024. "The Formation of the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) for the 1948 Palestine War." *Israel Affairs* 30 (6): 1323–36.

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2021. "Unwritten Treaty: The Historical Background to Jordanian–Israeli Relations, 1921–1951." *Middle Eastern Studies* 57 (3): 416–28.

Yoav Gelber, "The Israeli-Arab War of 1948: History versus Narratives," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, Chapter 2.

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2015. "British Military Supplies to Jordan during the 1948 War: How the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty Was Put to the Test." *Middle East Critique* 24 (4): 345–54.

Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure”, in: Rogan and Shlaim (eds.) *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 12-36

9. The post-war years and road to the October 1956

Suez campaign

This period is fascinating since Israel’s leadership has to make decisions about a lot of crucial issues: how much concessions to offer for the sake of peace with the Arab neighbors, Israel’s new post-war global orientation (neutrality in the Cold war? Tilting towards the Soviets? What to do to gain Western allies?), the security doctrine, the new post-war population dispersion, the degree of welfare and more generally the butter versus guns dilemma. Britain and France had to come to terms with their downfall and Suez was their “Grozny” moment of rude awakening.

The main events/developments covered in this period include: the failed post-war Arab-Israeli negotiations, the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan and the coups in Syria and Egypt, the American and British diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and tie the Arabs to the West in the Cold War (the Baghdad pact and the Alpha plan), Ben Gurion’s attempt to find a great power patron (which is not the Soviet Union), the Ben-Gurion—Sharett rivalry and disagreement re/retaliations raids, the Israeli covert action mishap in Egypt in an attempt to keep the British presence in Egypt, and finally Dayan and Peres’s decision to persuade Ben Gurion to go to war together with France and Britain in order to put an end to the fedayeen problem, get armaments and get access to nuclear

knowledge and equipment. We will also discuss Israel's adoption of all kinds of British governance institutions.

Questions: During these years the so-called "liberal moment" in the Middle East ended, except in Israel. Why was Israel so different even though the British control of the country was actually shorter than in other countries such as Egypt or Sudan? Why did Israel adopt more British qualities than the neighbors around it? Why does Israel remember the British mandate period in such a favorable light compared to other countries that fought against colonialism? We saw that the Palestinians that were expelled/escaped as a result of the 1948 war were absorbed to varying degrees by all Arab countries, except for Egypt. Why did Egypt take a different approach, keeping them in the Gaza Strip? Why did Ben Gurion respond so harshly towards the Fedayyen? Why did Ben Gurion choose a national security doctrine that relies on deterrence and preventive wars rather than on defense? Why did talks between Israel and Jordan not lead to a peace agreement? Why did the Jews of Arab countries leave their countries to come to Israel? How much ideology played a role and how much did other factors such as their governments' policies? Why did the Arab governments play a role in this exodus of Jews? What does Israel's decision to join the Suez campaign teach us about International relations?

Class exercises:

1. Reading the speech of Shimon Peres at the Chatham House and trying to understand the source for the Israeli admiration of Britain.
2. Israel was one the few post-Colonial countries that succeeded economically. Why is that the case?
3. Why do we see a huge mausoleum for Ataturk in Turkey, and not for Ben Gurion in Israel?

The hut of Ben Gurion -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJkGE2nyp_c

Readings:

David Tal, "Israel's Armistice Wars, 1949-1956" in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, Chapter 3.

Sheffer, Gabriel, Moshe Sharrett: *Biography of a Political Moderate* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1996).

Motti Golani, "The Sinai War, 1956: Three Partners, Three Wars," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, Chapter 4.

Rabinovich, Itamar. "The Suez-Sinai Campaign: The Regional Dimension, " in S. Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh (eds.), *The Suez-Sinai Crisis, 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (Columbia University Press), pp. 162-171

*Or Honig and Joshua Arsenault, "The Anglophile Nation? The British Legacy in Israel," *Israel Studies*, 26.3 (Fall, 2021), pp. 103-121.

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2010. "The Assassination of King Abdallah: The First Political Assassination in Jordan: Did It Truly Threaten the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?" *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21 (1): 68–86.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapters 8-9.

Martin Bunton, *The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 64-69 .

James Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A History*, 4th edition (Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 175-207.

Uri Bialer, "The Iranian Connection in Israel's Foreign Policy - 1948-1951," *Middle East Journal* 39 (2), 1985, pp. 292-315.

Morris, Benny (1993) *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War*. Oxford University Press,

David Tal, "The Road to the 1956 War," *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28 (1996), pp. 59-81

Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal. "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign," *Security Studies* 11 (2), 2001, pp. 1-49.

10. The decade of Nasserism and Pan-Arabism & the June 1967 war (1956-67)

We will include here everything from the moment that Israel withdrew from Sinai in 1957 with guarantees from the US and the UN, until the end of the June 1967 war with the conquest of the Golan Heights. This is also known in Israel as the quiet decade since there was not any major war and even the fedayeen guerilla and terror attacks subsided. The period can be roughly divided into three subperiods:

1. 1956-1963: the premiership of Ben Gurion. This period saw no wars, and only limited Arab guerilla and terror activity. Tensions were also limited.
2. 1963-67: the premiership of Eshkol and the escalation to the May 1967 crisis.
3. May-June 1967: The May 1967 crisis and the war itself. Eshkol is being politically challenged due to the escalation of Egypt and the growing regional isolation of the country. Israel launches a preemptive war.

The main events covered: Israel's role in the 1958 crisis, the formation and dissolution of the UAR, the civil war in Yemen and Israel's intervention in it, the policies of JFK and LBJ towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Nasser in particular, Nasser's difficulty to manage the Arab system and particularly the 1964-67 Israeli-Syrian escalation, the covert and/or indirect

dialogue between Israel and Nasser, the rise of the Neo-Baath in Syria, the evolution of the Israeli political system once Ben Gurion leave MAPAI, the flawed Israeli strategic (though not military) thinking prior to the June 1967 war, Eshkol's crisis management during May 1967, civil-military relations both in Egypt and Israel in the lead up to and during the crisis itself, the emergence of the Fatah, the conduct of the War itself and Dayan's role, and finally the success of the FLN in Algeria and its impact on the Palestinian national movement.

The main questions: How can we explain the success of the FLN and should the Palestinian do the same against Israel to get full independence? What were the forces that caused the decline of Nasserism and how did Israel participate in defeating this ideological movement, even before the 1967 war? What were some of the unintended consequences of different actors' steps that led to the 1967 war's outbreak? Why did it take the Eshkol government several days before launching the preemptive strike (hint: excessively banking on Washington)? Is the outbreak of the June 1967 war consistent more with Offensive or Defensive Realism? What can the outbreak of the war teach us about civil-military relations and policy formulation in authoritarian regimes (in reference to Egypt)? In terms of crisis management, what are similarities and differences between JFK in the Cuban Missile Crisis and Eshkol in the May 1967 crisis? How did Nasserism as a phenomenon/ideology cause the June 1967 war? How can we explain the decisive outcome of the war? What factor did Israel's nuclear development play in triggering the June 1967 War? Could Nasser have coped with the challenges that he was facing in a way that would not have led to war?

Events during the the Ben Gurion premiership

Michael Bar-Zohar, "Ben-Gurion and the Policy of the Periphery, 1958: Analysis" in Itamar Rabinovitch and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, 1948- Present*, Waltham, MA, Brandeis University Press, 2007, pp. 191-197.

Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend*, skim.

Yogev Elbaz, "Beyond the Periphery: Israel's Intervention in the Yemen Civil War in the 1960s," *Israel Studies*, no. 27:1 (Spring 2022), pp. 84-107.

David Tal, "Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan. 2001), pp. 142-158.

Avi Shlaim, "Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1999 27(2): 177-192

Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble* (Princeton UP), skim.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapter 10.

Schonmann, Noa. 2017. "Fortitude at Stake: The Accidental Crisis in American–Israeli Relations, August 1958." *Israel Affairs* 23 (4): 626–49.

Gadi Heiman. "Diverging Goals: The French and Israeli Pursuit of the Bomb, 1958- 1962," *Israel Studies* 15 (2), 2010, pp. 104-126

Matteo Gerlini. "Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel's Development of Nuclear Capability," *Cold War History* 10 (2), 2010, pp. 143-161.

The escalation to war

Bar-Joseph, Uri (1996). "Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 31(3), 547-566.

* Janice G. Stein, "Inadvertent War and Miscalculated Escalation: The Arab Israeli War of 1967," in Alexander Gero (ed.) *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

*Michael Oren, *Six Days of War* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 33-169.

*Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), chapter 3.

*Ami Gluska, *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 74-120, 160-179. Instead it is also possible to read his article in MERIA.

Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: the Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 104-141.

Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), chapter 4.

Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen* (Verso, 2012), chapter 2.

Further readings (more detailed diplomatic and military accounts):

Richard Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 36-122.

George Gawrych, *The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (London: Greenwood press, 2000), pp. 1-38.

Shlomo Aronson. "David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Struggle over Dimona: A Prologue to the Six-Day War and its (Un)Anticipated Results," *Israel Affairs* 15 (2), 2009, pp. 114-134.

Ami Gluska, "The War over the Water" during the 1960s," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 5

The May-June 1967 crisis and the June 1967 war

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. See: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/summary>

Yossi Goldstein, 'The Six Day War: The War that No One Wanted', *Israel Affairs*, 24:5 (2018), p.

Mordechai Bar-On, 'The Generals' "Revolt": Civil–Military Relations in Israel on the Eve of the Six Day War', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 48:1 (2012), pp. 33–50;

Ami Gluska, *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963–1967* (London: Routledge, 2007).

On the question of the enduring impact of the 1967 war see: Martin Kramer, *The War on Error: Israel, Islam and the Middle East* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction publishers, 2016), chapter 12 (“1967 and memory”)

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2024. “War in the Air: Israel and Jordan in the Dogfight.” *Defence Studies* 24 (3): 365–79.

Ian Black, *Enemies and Neighbors*, Chapter 11.

Michael Oren, “The Six-Day War” in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 6.

11. The interwar period: 1967-73

The main events: the rise of the Palestinian question in Arab politics, Israel’s policy towards the War of attrition on both fronts, the termination of the war of attrition, the internationalization of Palestinian terrorism, the processes leading to the October 1973 war, the peacemaking of the Eshkol and Golda Meir governments, the establishment of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit condominium in the West Bank, the political realignments in the Arab world, the military and diplomatic moves during the October 1973 war itself (e.g., Sadat’s betrayal), the rise to power of both Asad and Sadat, the impact of the 1967 Euphoria on both policy and politics and even identity and Israel’s international standing, the Agranat Commission of Inquiry.

The main questions: What were the implications of Israel’s victory in the 1967 war both internally and externally? What were the correct and wrong lessons that Israel drew from the victory in 1967? What were the implications of the 1967 Arab defeat on the political culture, on Nasserism, Palestinian nationalism and political Islam? What kind of soul-searching took

place and what were the lessons that the defeated parties drew, as well as those who relied on them? What caused the collapse of the Israeli deterrence with the onset of the war of attrition and why did the Israelis fail to see the weakness of their deterrence? What were the calculations of the Egyptians when they launched the War of Attrition and later the October 1973 war? What factors allowed Egypt to improve so well its fighting in the October war as compared to the June 1967 war? What can the intelligence surprise in this case teach us about surprise attacks in general? What does the October 1973 war teach us about limited wars? What were the main factors determining the military developments and outcomes of the 1973 war? Was there an Israeli missed opportunity to make peace with Sadat prior to the October 1973 war? Why has the war of attrition been forgotten in Israel's collective memory?

(1) Israel and the Arab states' post-war (post-victory and post-defeat) policies, including the war of attrition

Avi Raz. "The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967". *Diplomatic History* 37 (1), 2013, pp. 85-108

Shlomo Avineri "The Renewed Debate Over Partition: The Effects of the Six Day War on Israeli Politics and Israel's International Status" INSS Special Issue.

<https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Shlomo-Avineri.pdf>

"The Khartoum resolutions". In Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.), *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present*. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2008.

Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), chapter 5.

Or Honig and Ariel Reichard, "Realism or Radicalism: Explaining Autocratic Rulers' Strategic Choices following Military Defeats in the Middle East," *Journal of Middle East and Africa*, vol. 6, no. 2 (July 2015), pp. 125-146.

Dan Schueftan, "The Israeli-Egyptian "War of Attrition," 1969-1970," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 7

Yogev Elbaz : "An unknown crossroads: Israel, the Palestinians and the Christians in Lebanon (1968–1970)," *Middle Eastern Studies* (Mar 2025), pp. 1-12.

Yehuda Blanga, "The Russians are Coming, the Russians are Coming': American Management of the Crisis Associated with Ending the October 1973 War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 49/4 (2013), 563-589

(2) The failure of Israeli deterrence in both 1968 and 1973

*Janice Gross Stein (1985), "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 34-59.

*Janice Gross Stein (1985), "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in *Psychology and Deterrence*, pp. 60-88.

Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb*, Chapter 4.

(3) The 1973 war, War termination and the end of the 1973 war

Risa Brooks, "An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's (in)Effectiveness in the 1967 and 1973 Arab - Israeli Wars" *Security Studies*, 15, no. 3 (July - September 2006): 396 - 430.

Janice Gross Stein, "The Termination of the October War: A Reappraisal," in *Nissan Oren* (ed.), *Termination of Wars* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press).

Avi Kober. "Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8.1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 20-48.

Janice Gross Stein, "War Termination and Conflict Reduction or, How Wars Should End," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1975), pp. 1–27.

Uri Bar-Joseph. "Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure". *Journal of Contemporary History* 41 (3), 2006, pp. 545- 556.

Boaz Vanetik and Zaki Shalom. "The White House Middle East Policy in 1973 as a Catalyst for the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War," *Israel Studies* 16 (1), 2011, pp. 53-78.

Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* (Free Press, 1990), Chapter 5 ("Failure to Anticipate: Israel Defense Forces on the Suez Front and the Golan Heights, 1973").

Shmuel Tzabag . "The End of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt: Continuity versus Change in Israeli Positions on the Cease-Fire Issue." *Israel Affairs* (2007) 13 (1): 141–63.

(4) The Israeli security concept and the Intelligence failure in October 1973

Or Honig, "Surprise Attacks – Are they Inevitable?" *Security Studies*, (2008).

(5) The Palestinian question during this period

Ruth Lapidot, "The Misleading Interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)." *Jewish Political Studies Review* 23, no. 3/4 (2011): 7–17.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41575856>.

Or Honig and Ido Yahel, "Israel–PLO: From National Liberation to Deterrence Stability" in Elli Lieberman (ed.) *Deterring Terrorism: A New Model for Conflict Management* (Routledge, January 2019).

Yitzhak, Ronen. 2017. "From Cooperation to Normalization? Jordan–Israel Relations since 1967." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (4): 559–75.

(6) Israel's growing intervention in Arab domestic affairs (The Jordanian and Iraqi Kurdish cases)

Abramson, Scott. 2018. "A Historical Inquiry into Early Kurdish-Israeli Contacts: The Antecedents of an Alliance." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 9 (4): 379–99.

Ziv Rubinovitz. "Blue and White 'Black September': Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970," *International History Review* 32 (4), 2010, pp. 687-706.

Class exercise on the nuclear issue: groups assignments – you are a team of advisers of President Nixon. What are the pros and cons of allowing Israel to keep an active nuclear program? What kind of arrangements would you have with Israel regarding the bomb or the nuclear policy?

12. The short 1970s: from the end of the 1973 war until the Camp David Accords (September 1978)

We are talking here really about several events which are all related to two major developments: the consequences of the Yom Kippur war and the American retrenchment due to the Vietnam war. This period saw two Israeli Prime Ministers -- Yitzhak Rabin and Mencahem Begin -- who were each inexperienced in their own ways. We will see how well each one handled his challenges, and assess the pros and cons of each. One key difference between them is that Begin made much greater progress in the Arab Israeli peace process. Another difference has to do with Israel's policy towards the civil war in Lebanon.

Major events include: the Israeli attempt to prevent Syria and Egypt from gaining strategic achievements that would endanger Israel, the regional dominance of the Shah, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, the Israeli-Jordanian peace process, the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq and Israel's assistance to it, the civil war in Lebanon and Israel's interventions, finally the

Palestinian internationalization of their armed struggle together with their growing acceptance at the world stage (Arafat's speech at the UN). We will try to pull all the strings together and show the underlying factors behind all of these events.

Some questions: what were the main lessons that the Israeli policy community and the public more generally drew from the October 1973 mishap? What explains the difficulty of the Rabin government to make peace both with Egypt and with Jordan? why was it Menachem Begin and his right wing Likud party that made the peace with Egypt rather than the Labour party under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin? Can realism account for Saddam's behavior during the 1970s? What were the factors driving the Palestinians to internationalize their armed struggle? How can we explain the success of Asad in taking over Lebanon? How did Asad respond to the Israeli-Egyptian peace process?

Readings:

Shlomo Avineri, "Rabin's Strategy: understanding security and the limits of power," in Alan Johnson et al (eds.) *The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin* (London and Jerusalem: BICOM, 2015), pp. 25-28.

Ehud Eiran and Scott Lasensky, "Hidden Caravans in the Arava: The Clandestine Meetings of King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin," *Israel Studies Review* 39.3, 2024, pp. 1-16

Martin Kramer, (2025). "Arafat's UN Moment: Gun and Olive Branch Revisited." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 16(1), 1-14.

Moshe Elad. "The Birth of the Core Issues: The West Bank and East Jerusalem under Israeli Administration 1967-76 (part 1)". *Israel Affairs* 18 (4), 2012, pp. 577-595

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. *Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982: in search of legitimacy for peace*. (SUNY Press, 1994), skim.

Kenneth W. Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, And The Quest For Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York: Routledge, 1999).

Martin Kramer, *The War on Error: Israel, Islam and the Middle East* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction publishers, 2016), chapter 13 (“Sadat and Begin: The Peacemakers”)

Kirsten Schulze, *Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (MacMillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998) chapters 3-6.

Moshe Maoz, *Syria and Israel* (Oxford UP, 1995), chapters 7-8.

Hudson, Michael C. "The Palestinian factor in the Lebanese civil war." *The Middle East journal* 32.3 (1978): 261-278

Ido Yahel and Or Honig, “The Father's Success and the Son's Failure: Explaining the Growth of Lebanon's Resistance to Syria's Invisible Occupation,” *Digest of Middle East Studies*, vol.

On the Nixon/Carter-Shah relations see Efraim Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), chapter 4; Alvandi, Roham (2012)

Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf,” *Diplomatic history*, 36 (2). pp. 337-372.

13. The long 1980s – from the Iranian revolution until the 1991 Gulf War

This is the decade in which we see the ascendance of political Islam in the region (and the birth of global jihad). Major events in this respect include: the landing of Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran in February 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (which

lasted until the “mujahideen’s victory” in 1989), the November-December 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca and its huge impact on Saudi foreign policy, the October 1981 assassination of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat, The Hama uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in February 1982, The Israeli invasion into Lebanon and the birth of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the birth of Hamas in December 1987 during the Intifada, the polarization of the Israeli political system as a result of the Intifada.

The Anglo-American response to these events has been to support all actors who are anti-Iranian (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Jordanian monarchy) and especially anti-Soviet (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Mujahideen). Their policy included being harsh towards the Soviet puppet -- Hafiz al-Asad in Syria. Israel was still oblivious to the Islamist threat and still mostly concerned with secular champions of Pan-Arabism (Iraq’s Saddam, Syria’s Asad, the PLO). Hence, it supported at times both Iran and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood group based on which Hamas will emerge. One of the most fascinating aspects of this period is the Israeli struggle against its old enemies (the PLO, Iraq and Pan-Arabism) while not paying sufficient attention to the growing Islamist threats (Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah) and even wasting opportunities to weaken them.

Questions: Why did Israel underestimate political Islam even after Islamists killed Anwar Sadat? What was the Israeli policy in face of the Iran Iraq war? What were the advantages and disadvantages of each Israeli Prime Minister (Begin, Peres and Shamir)? Why was Israel caught by surprise by Jordan’s decision to disengage from the West Bank? Why was Israel surprised by the outbreak of the Intifada? What was Saddam’s mistake when he decided to launch the attack? Why did the Iraqi invasion turn into such a long war? Was the 1982 Israel invasion a success? How was it perceived by the Israeli public and why? What were the main mistakes of Israel in the war? What were the Israeli mistakes that led to the Intifada (or at

least to the failure to anticipate it) and could it have been further delayed/avoided altogether?

What were the Israeli difficulties in withdrawing from Lebanon? Some would say that the first Intifada was a clear Palestinian victory. What did the Palestinians do right?

Readings:

Kirsten Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*, chapters 7-9.

Schleifer, Abdullah, 'The Life and Thought of 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam,' *Islamic Quarterly*, 23, 2 (1979).

Arie Arnon. "Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967-2007," *Middle East Journal* 61 (4), 2007, pp. 573- 595

Shai Feldman. "The Bombing of Osiraq – Revisited". *International Security* 7 (2), 1982, pp. 114-142.

Eyal Zisser, "The 1982 "Peace for Galilee" War: Looking Back in Anger—Between an Option of a War and a War of No Option," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 10.

Reuven Aharoni, "The Palestinian Intifada, 1987-1991" in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 11.

Salim Tamari, "What the Uprising Means", in: Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (eds.), *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), pp. 127-135.

Efraim Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: the Iran-Iraq War Revisited," *International Affairs* vol. 64 (1988), 83-95.

Ronen Bergman, *The Secret War with Iran* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 40-130.

Sharam Chubin, *Iran and the war: from stalemate to ceasefire*. In E. Karsh (Ed.), *The Iran-Iraq war: Impact and implications* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), pp. 13–25.

Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall, 1983), pp. 117-142

Schulze, Kirsten E. (1996) "Perceptions and misperceptions: influences on Israeli intelligence estimates during the 1982 Lebanon War," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, XVI (1). 134-152.

For a good journalistic read review of events Thomas Friedman, *Between Beirut and Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1995), skim.

Moshe Maoz, *Israel and Syria* (Oxford UP), chapter 8.

Ma'oz, Moshe and Avner Yaniv, *Syria Under Asad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security* (Oxford UP, 1990), skim.

Yair Evron, *Israel's Intervention in Lebanon* (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press), skim.

Ian Lustick, "writing the Intifada: collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics*, 45/4 (1993).

Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon & Schuster), skim.

14. The 1990s: Pax Americana and Arab-Israeli peacemaking

This stage begins with the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and ends with the moment that Ariel Sharon became the Prime Minister of Israel (Feb. 2001), which signalled the complete end of the Oslo peace process and arguably the beginning of the GWOT. We will analyze how the end of the Cold War and the American victory in the Gulf War impacted the Middle East and the strategic interactions between Israel and its neighbors. Israel tried hard to make peace with both Jordan, Syria and the PLO. The US under Clinton was extremely committed to seeing success in this area. The Arab states were interested in

this outcome, but somewhat less than Israeli leftwing governments or the US. In the end, the enemies of regional peace had the upper hand, or at least some leaders got cold feet.

Militarily speaking, Iran intensified its proxy attacks against Israel, and Hezbollah and Hamas became more professional and ferocious in their attacks. The US and Israel were surprised by their lethality, resilience and strategic thinking. We will discuss the mistakes made by the US and Israel, and the sources for these groups' effectiveness. Lastly, this is the beginning of globalization in the Middle East. The region begins to face the growing trends of globalization and priorities of the public and sometimes of the regimes as well begin slowly to change.

Questions: The PLO and its supporters lost their safe haven on three occasions: in Jordan (September 1970) in Beirut (August 1982) and finally in Kuwait (1991). What can we learn from that? What were the calculations behind Bush's decision to push for the Madrid conference, behind Rabin's and Arafat's decision to pursue peace, behind Hamas' and Iran's decisions to intensify their anti-Iranian attacks? Why did the US obsess so much about Saddam Hussein during this period and what was the Israeli attitude on the Iraqi issue? How can we explain the focus of the US on Iraq rather than Iran? Why did the US and Israel fail to anticipate the rise of global jihad? Why did the Arab regimes fear Israel's growing economic strength? Why did normalization of relations not occur between Israel and Jordan and Egypt notwithstanding the Israeli attempts to solve the Palestinian issue? What is the importance of Arab civil society for such Arab-Israeli normalization of relations?

Readings:

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Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace* (Oxford UP, 2006) 201-284.

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Avi Shlaim, *Israel and Palestine* (NY: Verso Press, 2009), chapters 15-16.

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Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace* (Princeton UP, 2004), chapters 2-4.

David Menashri, "Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict," *Israel Affairs*, vol.12, no. 1 (2006) pp. 107 -122.

Karsh, *The Tail Wags the Dog*, chapter 6

Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, "Calculation and Miscalculation in Baghdad." In *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91*, edited by Dan Keohane and Alex Danchev. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1994, pp. 23-57

Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad." In *Iraq's Road to War*, edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Gregory Gause, *International Relations of the Gulf*, Chapter 4.

Efraim Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, chapter 1.

Avraham Sela. "Politics, Identity And Peacemaking: The Arab Discourse On Peace With Israel In The 1990s," *Israel Studies* 10, No. 2 (2005), pp. 15-71.

Ido Zelkovitz, . 2014. "A Paradise Lost? The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Community in Kuwait." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50 (1): 86–99.

Daniel Pipes, "Two Cheers for Dual Containment," United States Senate, March 2, 1995

Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Hebron Massacre and the Problems of Intelligence," in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *A Restless Mind* (Routledge, 1996), chapter 6.

Matthew Levitt, *Negotiating under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), skim.

Eran Lerman, "The Grim Wahhabi Face behind the Veil: Reassessing the Saudi Role in World Affairs," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 18:1-2 (Spring 2006).

<https://jcpa.org/article/eran-lerman-on-hatreds-kingdom-how-saudi-arabia-supports-the-new-global-terrorism-by-dore-gold-and-sleeping-with-the-devil-how-washington-sold-our-soul-for-saudi-crude-by-robert-baer/>

Dore Gold, *Hatred's kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Regnery Pub., 2003)

Janice Gross Stein. "The Turning Point: From Management to Resolution in the Arab-Israel Conflict," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 4 (2), 1999.

Jonathan Rynhold. "The US and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Conflict Management versus Conflict Resolution," In Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Inbar (eds.). *US-Israeli Relations in a New Era: Issues and Challenges after 9/11*. Routledge, London, 2009, pp. 140-157.

Radwan Ziadeh. "Do Images Change through Negotiations? – The Syrian-Israeli Experience". In Alfred Wittstock (ed.). *The World Facing Israel – Israel Facing the World*. Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2011, pp. 63-78.

Jerome Slater. "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001". *International Security* 27 (1), 2002, pp. 79-106.

On the Camp David Summit, July 2000

Myron J. Aronoff. "Camp David Rashomon: Contested Interpretations of the Israel/Palestine Peace Process," *Political Studies Quarterly* 124 (1), 2009, pp. 143-167.

Arie M. Kacowicz. "Rashomon in Jerusalem: Mapping the Israeli Negotiators' Positions on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2001," *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2), 2005, pp. 252-273.

Class exercise: 1. Reading the Nobel prize lectures of Rabin and Arafat. What can you learn from these lectures? 2. Do you agree with Herzog or with Wilf? Michael Herzog and Einat Wilf "Symposium," in Alan Johnson et al (eds.) *The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin* (London and Jerusalem: BICOM, 2015), pp. 20-27.

15. The decade of the GWOT (a growing American intervention in the region) (9/11-2009)

This period actually begins before 9/11 with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada which quickly adopts some Islamist characteristics. In some ways it foreshadows 9/11. Arguably, even though Netanyahu and Obama came to power roughly at the same time (March and January 2009 respectively), the real crisis in the relations only began when Obama abandoned Mubarak (Netanyahu and Obama saw eye to eye on Syria). This is why we will keep the Obama-Netanyahu fights for next class. We will also not cover the Arab Spring in this class. Instead the class ends with the Olmert-Bush duo (just before Obama and Netanyahu came to power).

Main topics: (1) The various causes for the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and for the Israeli response to it; (2) Ariel Sharon's strategy and tactical innovations to neutralize the strategy of Arafat, and simultaneously address the American attempts to deescalate the conflict prematurely in his view; (3) the various American mistakes that led to the Iraq War Quagmire (including the success in Afghanistan, the Israel Lobby claim, the intelligence mistakes etc.); (4) Syria's dangerous game under Bashar al-Asad (helping Sunni Salafis slip into Iraq to attack US servicemen, building a nuclear reactor, but also making peace overtures to Israel) and the American and Israeli responses to this game (as well as Turkey's role in shaping Syria's behavior); (5) the American failure in nation-building in Iraq; (6) the joint American-Israeli struggle against Iran; (7) the impact of the Bush doctrine in the Middle East – the attempts by various Arab state to be on the right side (Qaddafi's return from the Cold, Jordanian and Egyptian attempts to placate the democratization agenda); (8) the increasing power of Hamas and Hezbollah – the fluctuations in Hezbollah's political fortunes (the Cedar

revolution vs. the 2008 takeover of West Beirut), the establishment of the Hamas regime in Gaza.

Some questions: Why did the Israeli public vote for Sharon? Why did Arafat's strategy in the Al-Aqsa Intifada fail? Why was President Bush not being stopped domestically from going into Iraq? Was the "Israel Lobby" a major factor behind the American invasion as professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt Claim? What factors determined the extent of the American leash given to Israel to fight against the Palestinian Authority? Why did PM Sharon reject Syria's peace feelers? Why was the cedar revolution initially so successful? Why was Hezbollah eventually able to take over Lebanon? How and to what extent did President Bush's policy lead to the Arab spring uprising? Why did Israel win the Al-Aqsa Intifada and what role did the two leaders (Sharon and Arafat) play in leading to this outcome? Why did Israel perform so badly during the Second Lebanon war? Why did Olmert's talks with both Syria and the PA fail? Why did it take so long for both the US and Israel to discover the Syrian nuclear reactor program and why did the US and Israel took different approaches for tackling this issue?

Readings:

Leverett, Flynt. *Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire* (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* (Winter 2005/06)

The Al-Aqsa Intifada and the unilateral disengagement

Jones, Clive (2003). "One Size Fits All: Israel, Intelligence and the Al-Aqsa Intifada." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26(4), 271-286.

*Dennis Ross, *Doomed to Succeed* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2015), chapter 10.

Graham Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 2, (Winter 2003), pp. 21-40.

Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 2003).

Ahron Bregman, *Elusive Peace* (Penguin Books), skim.

Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (Oxford UP), chapter 4 (pp.185-244).

Assaf Moghaddam, "Diplomacy and Force in the 2000 Crisis: An Examination of Israeli Crisis Management Strategies," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA) 5.1 (March 2001)

Or Honig and Joshua Arsenault, "Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Rise to Regional Influence," *Digest of Middle East Studies*.

Shaul Shay, "Ebb and Flow" versus "The al-Aqsu Intifadah": The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2000-2003," in Mordechai Bar-On (ed.) *A never-ending conflict*, chapter 12.

Bunton, *The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, 91-105.

Benny Morris, 'The 2005 Time 100: Ariel Sharon', *Time* (18 April 2005)

Thomas Mitchell, 'Sharon Was No De Gaulle', *+972 Magazine* (20 January 2014), <https://www.972mag.com/sharon-was-no-de-gaulle/>.

The Second Lebanon War

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Russell Glenn, *All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War* (RAND, 2013) <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG708-1.html>

The first Gaza war (Cast Lead)

Benjamin S. Lambeth. "Israel's War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation," *International Security* 37 (2), 2012, pp. 81-118. Benjamin S. Lambeth.

"Learning from Lebanon: Airpower and Strategy in Israel's 2006 War against Hezbollah," *Naval War College Review* 65 (3), 2012, pp. 83- 105.

Evan Braden Montgomery and Stacie L. Pettyjohn. "Democratization, Instability and War: Israel's 2006 Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah," *Security Studies* 19 (3), 2010, pp. 521-554.

Sharon, Olmert and the peace process

Eliot Abrams, *Tested By Zion* (Cambridge UP), skim.

On why the Olmert-Abbas peace negotiations failed and what can be done about it: Shlomo Avineri, "Needed: a paradigm shift in the 'Middle East Peace Process,'" *Fathom* (Spring 2013)

<https://fathomjournal.org/needed-a-paradigm-shift-in-the-middle-east-peace-process/>

16. The decade of American withdrawal from the Middle East from the Arab Spring to (2009-2023)

The most notable phenomenon in this period is the Arab spring and the successful ascendance of Iran to the position of regional dominance (as it took advantage of the Arab Spring to advance its influence). We are also talking here about a long period in which we mostly have a conservative and slightly populist right-wing Israeli Prime Minister (Benjamin Netanyahu) and left-wing progressive American Presidents who seek to push for peace with the Palestinians as a key American priority (Obama, Biden). Other phenomena include: the rise of ISIS, the survival of the Asad regime, the JCPOA deal with Iran, and finally the Abraham Accords.

Questions: Was the clash between them inevitable? What is the Netanyahu doctrine in the Middle East? Why did Israel not try to undermine the Hamas regime in Gaza and the Asad family rule in Syria? What role did the Trump factor play in pushing Netanyahu to be more confrontational with Obama and Biden? More interestingly, we see a 180 degrees shift in the attitude of Benjamin Netanyahu towards the Obama administration -- in the beginning of his term Netanyahu is very cautious towards Obama, he tried to placate him, find channels of communication to him for quiet understandings and even delivered the two-state solution at Bar Ilan University, whereas as time went on he became much more openly confrontational. Why did Netanyahu make such a change?

Some additional questions: There have been other several actors that tried to gain regional dominance in the Middle East in the past (Hajj Amin al-Husseini, King Abdullah of Jordan, Iraq's Nuri Said, Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, Saddam Hussein, Asad to a limited extent), but so far there have been only two actors who successfully gained regional dominance: Nasser's Egypt and Khamenei's revolutionary Iran. Why did only they make it to the top? How did American and Israeli moves/mistakes contribute to this outcome? And last but not least -- what role did Israeli and American moves play in the downfall of both of these quasi empires? To better understand how both Israel and the US were thinking it is perhaps worth considering who gained regional dominance in other regions (especially Europe) and how. How can the question of Iran's rationality be assessed and would that have resolved the Netanyahu-Obama disagreement? How can we explain the success of some authoritarian regimes to hold on to power (mainly the monarchies but not only, as is evident by Asad's survival) in contrast to those that fell from power?

Class discussion – How much does ideology (American progressivism) play a role in causing tensions in US-Israel relations? Can we explain things from a structural perspective or a psychological perspective much better? Watch: Netanyahu at War, PBS:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W-xxpXzAC0>

Readings:

Israel's policy towards the Hamas regime in Gaza

Shmuel Tzabag, 2013. "Operation Pillar of Defense: Lessons for Modern Warfare." *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 7 (3): 79–93.

Or Honig and Ido Yahel, "Elimination or Threat Management? Explaining the Variation in Israel's Policies towards Terrorist Semi-states," *Terrorism & Political Violence*, vol. 32, no. 5 (2020), pp. 901-920.

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and Israel's responses

James Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings* (Oxford UP, 2015), chapters 1-4.

Asher Susser, "Israel's Place in a Changing Regional Order (1948–2013)," *Israel Studies*, vol. 19 no. 2 (2014)

Clive Jones and Beverly Milton Edwards, "Missing the 'devils' We Knew? Israel and Political Islam amid the Arab Awakening." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 89, no. 2 (2013): 399–415.

Daniel Byman. "Israel's Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring". *Washington Quarterly* 34 (3), 2011, pp. 123-136.

Yoel Guzansky. "Tacit Allies: Israel and the Arab Gulf States," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* V: 1, 2011, pp. 9-17.

Tami Amanda Jacoby. "Israel's Relations with Egypt and Turkey during the Arab Spring: Weathering the Storm," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 7 (2), 2013, pp. 29-42.

Gregory Gause, "Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New Middle East Cold War," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (July 2017), pp. 672-675.

Israel's relations with Obama and Biden

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Thomas Juneau, "A realist foreign policy for Canada in the Middle East," *International Journal* (2017).

Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure* (Oxford UP), chapters 5-6 (pp. 245-366).

17. The October 7, 2023 Hamas invasion and the Gaza

War

This class focuses only on explaining October 7th and the few days that followed that day of the Hamas invasion into the Western Negev (and its temporary de-facto occupation of the Western Negev region). During these days Israel decided to launch a full-scale ground invasion into Gaza, there were some deals for releasing Israeli hostages that Hamas wanted to

get rid off (fragile young children, old women) and most importantly Israel and Hezbollah began a very limited war. Other Iranian proxies came to the assistance of Hamas but not to the extent that Sinwar and Deif had envisioned. There was very high Palestinian support for October 7th and the Palestinian Authority refused to condemn the action. The Arab reactions were more nuanced.

Understanding any surprise attack requires tracing its three dimensions: the growing motivation and capability of the attacker, the under-investment of the victim in relevant defenses, and finally the victim's intelligence failure to provide an early warning (both tactically and strategically about general intentions to mount an attack). We will cover all three dimensions and also ask ourselves whether the Yom Kippur war surprise attack decreased at all the chances of another surprise attack like October 7th happening.

Questions: Are surprise attacks inevitable? What were the processes that led to October 7th? Can Israel Still Rely on Its Intelligence after the October 7th Hamas Attack? What are the pros and cons of the possible directions for Intelligence reforms? Why Did Israel Not Take Defense More Seriously Prior to the October 7th Hamas Attack? Was Israel surprised more on October 7th than on Yom Kippur? Why did Sinwar order the attack? What was he expecting would happen? Why did Netanyahu and Biden fail to seriously consider the possibility that Hamas would try to sabotage the US-sponsored Saudi-Israeli normalization talks? Why did not Netanyahu invest more in defensive layers when he was okaying the transfer of Qatari money to Hamas? What can we learn from this? Should Israel continue relying on Intelligence (early warning) as a major component of its national security doctrine? What mistakes did Israel make in the Gaza war? Should it have attacked Hezbollah first? What is Israel doing wrong that causes many Western countries to stop supporting it

and threaten recognizing a Palestinian state (at least in August 2025)? Can Israel act differently to persuade its critics that there is no genocide in Gaza?

Readings:

The surprise attack and its causes

Amatzia Baram, “Behind Israel’s momentous failure” GIS Report, October 20, 2023.

<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/behind-israels-momentous-failure/>

Lawrence Freedman, “ Hamas Attacks Israel: Why Now and What Next?” Comment is Freed blog, Oct. 8, 2023. <https://samf.substack.com/p/hamas-attacks-israel>

Lawrence Freedman, “Israel/Gaza: Retrospect and Prospect” Comment is Freed, January 7, 2024. <https://samf.substack.com/p/israelgaza-retrospect-and-prospect>

Lawrence Freedman, “Inside Israel’s intelligence fiasco,” The New Statesman, 18 October, 2023. <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2023/10/inside-israels-intelligence-fiasco>

Janice Stein, “Bringing Politics Back In: The Neglected Explanation of the Oct. 7 Surprise Attack,” Texas National Security Review, Vol 7, Iss 4 (Fall 2024), 73-93. <https://tnsr.org/2024/10/bringing-politics-back-in-the-neglected-explanation-of-the-oct-7-surprise-attack/>

Jeffrey Goldberg, “Sinwar’s March of Folly” The Atlantic, June 23, 2025.

Keren Yarhi-Milo and Timothy Naftali, “The Lessons Israel Failed to Learn From the Yom Kippur War Gathering the right intelligence isn’t always enough” The Atlantic, October 13, 2023.

The Palestinians’ response to the attack

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<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/poll-shows-palestinians-back-oct-7-attack-israel-support-hamas-rises-2023-12-14/>

MEMRI, <https://www.memri.org/tv/palestinians-gaza-west-bank-celebrate-october-seven-massacre-hand-out-sweets-fire-guns>

Implications for future Israeli defense doctrine

Yoav Gelber, “Israel’s Revised National Security Doctrine Must Include Border Defense,”

The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, February 2024. <https://jstribune.com/gelber-israels-revised-national-security-doctrine-must-include-border-defense/>

Efram Inbar and Mebachem Bachrach, “The Perils of Containment/Restraint in ISrael’s

National Security Behavior” JISS Memo

https://jiss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/CONTAINMENT_EN.pdf

On the Gaza war itself

Kobi Michael, “ Hamas’ Strategy of Suspension and Attrition.” Institute for National Security Studies, INSS Insights, 2024. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57194>.

“An Interview with British Army officer Major Andrew Fox,” Triggernometry

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dN2WGZZG-x0>

“Israel’s Strategic Objectives and the Future of Warfare” The Truth of the Matter, CSIS (An interview with Professor Eliot A. Cohen) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbudv14dtJo>

18. The Regional and International dimensions of the Gaza war

We will discuss how the war and Israel's retaliation in particular has changed the Middle East so far. Indeed, we still have to see whether Iran can rebound from the major hits that it suffered -- Hezbollah losing its de-facto ruling status in Lebanon, Asad falling from power, and even the Iranian Iraqi militias distancing themselves from the Axis of Resistance. We will also address the erosion in Israel's position throughout the world.

Key Questions: who were the winners and losers of the whole Gaza war so far? Did Netanyahu manage it well? Why were Israel and the US surprised by the sudden fall of the Asad regime? Why did Israel change its policy of not providing direct military assistance to other beleaguered minorities in the region (a policy which had been in place since the fiasco of the first Lebanon War)? Why are the Houthis the last part of the Axis of resistance that keeps shooting at Israel? Why was Iraq the first element to withdraw from the war with Israel? Why did Nasrallah not stop shooting at Israel and declare a ceasefire even after the Mossad's pagers' operation? What was he thinking? Could Israel have prevented the takeover of Syria by the Sunni rebels? Why has the war lasted so long? Why did students from the best universities in the US adopt uncritically the Hamas narrative? Why did Mossad brag about the pagers' operation rather than keeping it quiet and not reveal methods? Why did not Iran instruct its proxies to limit their fight with Israel instead of being dragged by Hamas? Why did Biden fail to stop the Gaza war?

Class discussion: Former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta referred to the Pagers' operation as terrorism. Why did he take that position? How should have Israel acted differently if at all given this criticism? Should Israel help the Druze or instead try to improve relations with al-Julani?

Readings:

Chuck Freilich, "The War in Gaza Postponed the Emerging US-Israel Crisis, but Intensified It." Institute for National Security Studies, 2024. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep57936>.

Ashleigh Fields, “Ex-CIA chief: Pager blasts in Lebanon are ‘terrorism’ The Hill, 09/23/24.

Amatzia Baram, “One Year After October 7: Iran and Israel on the Brink After Iran’s

Second Strong Strike on Israel,” GIS Reports, October 7, 2024.

<https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/one-year-after-october-7-iran-and-israel-on-the-brink>

Guy Laron, “An Unexpected Gift: Israel and the Fall of the Assad Regime,” Woodrow

Wilson Center, January 14, 2025. [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/unexpected-](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/unexpected-gift-israel-and-fall-assad-regime)

[gift-israel-and-fall-assad-regime](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/unexpected-gift-israel-and-fall-assad-regime)

19. The Iranian nuclear question -- regime change and the race to the bomb

There has been a huge debate inside Israel between Mossad Chief Meir Dagan and Netanyahu over what the optimal policy towards Iran should be? Similarly, there was a heated public debate between Netanyahu and Obama on this matter. Netanyahu won the debate thanks to Trump who walked out of the JCPOA and later gave Israel the green light to attack (and ordered the US to participate too). But has Israel really adopted the right policies towards Iran? Was it the right decision to encourage Trump to leave the JCPOA? What are the pros and cons of each approach?

An interview with former Mossad director Meir Dagan on Sixty Minutes:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qi6YDTC0Rb4>

We will also address the question of the variation in the approach of different world powers to Israel’s use of military force for counterproliferation purposes. Israel conducted overt military attacks against the nuclear reactors of its enemies on three occasions: in June 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osiraq, on September 6, 2007 against the Syrian

nuclear reactor in Deir a Zur and finally against the Iranian nuclear reactors in June 2025. In each of these three cases, Israel managed to surprise its adversaries and in each of them there was no deterioration to wide-scale war afterwards. Why were the victims surprised each time? Why did the victim not retaliate harshly each time? And why did the responses of the great powers vary so much between the different cases? Finally, what can prior Israeli attacks teach us about the likelihood of success?

For the British condensation of Israel's bombing in Osiraq see Azriel Bermant, *Margaret Thatcher and the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2017), chapter 4.

Finally we will address the fact that Israel is not a member of the NPT and did not suffer sanctions to become one. Yet, the attitudes varied significantly between different US presidents. What explains the variations between them?

Additional readings:

Ofira Seliktar, "Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality: The "Eye of the Beholder" Problem," *The Journal of Middle East and Africa*, vol. (2012)

Shmuel Bar, "Can Cold War Deterrence Apply to a Nuclear Iran?" *Strategic Perspectives*, no. 7 (2011). https://jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/cold_war_deterrence_nuclear_iran.pdf

Shmuel Bar, "The Danger of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast Iran is Only the Beginning of the Nuclear Problem," February 1, 2013. Hoover Institution.
<https://www.hoover.org/research/danger-poly-nuclear-mideast>

20. The technological-scientific backwardness of the Arab

Middle East and the scientific-technological success of Israel

We will address issues such as Israel's high ranking in AI intensity, the "resource curse" versus the "industry curse" in Israel and the OPEC countries. We will generally try to understand why Israel has been so different from its neighbors in terms of science and

technology. Does Israel's prominence as a weapons exporter give it leverage in the region?

How did Israel get to the top and is it investing correctly to ensure its security?

How Israel Rules the World of Cyber Security, Vice News.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ca-C3voZwpM>

SIPRI Handbooks, Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024.

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf

Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle* (2009), skim.

Dan Senor and Saul Singer, *The Genius of Israel: The Surprising Resilience of a Divided Nation in a Turbulent World* (2023), skim.

Niall Ferguson, *Civilization*, BBC, episode 2.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPkxx0mjH7s&t=2s>

21. The radical ideological movements in the region and their attitudes towards Israel

It is well known that radical Islam targets Israel. But has it been the movement's number one target or the US? What determines when Israel will be targeted? Palestinian ultra-nationalism and Iranian Khomeinism have also been targeting Israel. Lastly, Pan-Arabism was the initial ideology that put Israel at the cross-hairs. How did all of these ideologies connect with Western ideologies? What lessons can Israel draw from the past about how best to confront these ideological forces? Which regional ideologies were actually beneficial to Israel? Is Israel a liability or an asset in the fight over the heart of minds of the Muslim world?

Readings:

Martin Kramer, "The Israeli-Islamist War," Middle East Policy Occasional Papers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2006), pp. 8-10.

https://scholar.harvard.edu/sites/scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/israel_islamist_war.pdf

Martin Kramer, *The War on Error: Israel, Islam and the Middle East* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction publishers, 2016), chapter 17.

Martin Kramer, " Hamas Didn't Need to Learn Violence from Frantz Fanon," Mosaic Magazine, July 29, 2025. <https://ideas.tikvah.org/mosaic/essays/responses/hamas-didn-t-need-to-learn-violence-from-frantz-fanon>

Flores, Alexander. "The Arabs as Nazis? Some Reflections on "Islamofascism" and Arab Anti-Semitism," *Die Welt des Islams*. 52 (3/4)

Matthias Küntzel: "October 7th and the Shoah" ISCA Indiana University.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rq7w9hFOFGw&t=5s>

22. How to best address the Israeli Palestinian conflict

How can we make sure that the "two state solution" actually becomes a solution and not a blueprint for menacing Israel even further? Some say that the Palestinian society given their identity in liberating the whole of Palestine would try to take advantage of any newly acquired sovereign control over additional territories to launch wars of attrition against Israel. They argue that October 7th proved that the Palestinians have not and will not change anytime soon (they will not use any new territory for state-building & economic growth but instead for building rockets and other means of warfare) and that there is no way to ensure the demilitarization of a future independent Palestinian state, or even provide an early warning from an attack. Is there room for optimism? What are some alternatives to the

traditional attempts to focus on finding the right diplomatic arrangement? What should be some preconditions for the creation of an independent Palestinian state?

Martin Indyk, “A Trusteeship for Palestine?” *Foreign Affairs*, (May 2003) *Foreign Affairs* 82(3).

Gal Luft, “The Mirage of a Demilitarized Palestine,” *Middle East Quarterly* (Summer 2001)

Volume 8: Number 3. <https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/the-mirage-of-a-demilitarized-palestine>

23. The prevalence & intensity of Civil wars in the Middle East

Why are some countries experiencing much longer and much bloodier civil wars than other countries? Is Israel likely to experience a civil war? What are the barriers for the eruption of civil wars? Do civil wars always invite foreign military interventions?

Most scholars believe that Israel is not likely to experience a civil war. For an Arab analysis of Israel being on the verge of a civil war see

Emad Moussa, “The curse of the eighth decade: Is Israel 'fated' for civil war?” May 22, 2025.

<https://www.newarab.com/opinion/curse-eighth-decade-israel-fated-civil-war>

24. The Israeli “periphery doctrine” and support for insurgent ethnic minorities

On three occasions in its history, Israel turned to actors in the periphery of its enemies in order to threaten them, undermine them, distract them, and otherwise show strength. First, it did so against the Nasserist and Pan-Arab core enemies from the late 1950s and until the mid

1970s. Second, it did so against the PLO which threatened to take over Jordan and Lebanon. And third and most recently, it did so against the Islamist core (Iran and Erdogan's Turkey) by aligning with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Cyprus and Greece. What are some differences between each attempt? How quickly did Israel go into each adventure? How much was each one strategically beneficial?

Joseph Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), chapters 1-2.

Yoel Guzansky, "Israel's Periphery Doctrine 2.0: The Mediterranean Plus." *Mediterranean Politics* (2014) vol. 19 (1): 99–116.

Rob Geist Pinfold & Joel Peters (2019). "The limits of Israel's periphery doctrine: Lessons from the Caucasus and Central Asia," *Mediterranean Politics*, 26(1), 25–49.