

POS 4931 Civil-Military Relations in Unconsolidated Democracies

Class Meeting Time: Tuesday 1:55 to 2:45 PM and
Thursday 1:55 PM to 3:50 PM
Class Venue: 101 Anderson Hall

Professor: Sebastian Elischer
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Office Hours: Monday 3 PM to 5:30 PM
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Seminar Description

The subordination of military forces to democratic civilian rule occupies a central space in comparative politics and can be seen as one of the oldest problems of human governance. Whether and how a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of physical coercion, and ensures their loyalty both to the particular government in power is essential to democratic governance. Civilian control of the military is of concern in established democracies such as the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom or France but even more so in the many nascent democracies of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Arab world. Governments of these not yet consolidated democracies must ensure that the military - often the previous holder of power - will not attempt a coup or otherwise defy their effective power to govern. In many of these countries the military remains deeply involved in politics often through informal channels.

The focus of the class is on civil-military relations in nascent or not yet consolidated democracies. It discusses the key concepts of civil-military scholarship and applies these concepts to a diverse set of empirical cases from across the globe including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Mali, Pakistan or India. At the heart of the seminar are the following questions: a) What does the concept of civilian democratic control actually entail? b) What are the major challenges in ensuring the democratic control of the armed forces? c) Which factors cause the military to overthrow democratically elected governments? d) What are the long-term political and economic consequences of military rule?

Requirements, Assignments and Grading

Students must read the assigned material for each week and come to class prepared. I expect students to attend all classes and participate in class discussions. If you cannot make it to class please let me know prior to the class which you cannot attend. If this is not possible please contact me as soon as you can.

In order to get full credits students have to pass several assignments. All students have to give a class presentation (either alone or as part of a group) on a topic we discuss in class. The presentation accounts for 10% of your final grade. In week 5 (on September 25) there will be a mid-term. The mid-term accounts for 20% of your final grade and covers the concepts and issues we discuss during the first four weeks. During the course of the semester there will be two unannounced short quizzes (multiple-choice). Each quiz accounts for 10% of your final grade. At the end of the semester students have to hand in a final research paper (10 pages

without the bibliography and cover page) in which they apply some of the key concepts of civil-military relations to a set of countries (comparative study) or any particular country (individual case study). By week 8 all students must submit an outline of their final paper to me electronically. All students must discuss their final paper with me during my office hours from week 8 onwards. During the last week of class all students are invited to discuss their final paper in class in order to get some constructive feedback from their peers. The final research paper accounts for 50% of your grade.

Grading scale

A	91 or above	B	81-84
A-	88-90	B-	78-80
B+	85-87	C+	75-77

Policies on Persons with Disabilities

Students requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. It will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see me during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.

Policy on Cheating and Plagerism

All students should observe the University of Florida's standards of academic honesty. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, he/she will automatically fail the course and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs and to the Department Chair and Graduate Coordinator for possible dismissal from the program. Acts of plagiarism include:

- Turning in a paper or another assignment that was written by someone else (i.e., by another student, by a research service, or downloaded off the Internet);
- Copying, verbatim, a sentence or paragraph of text from the work of another author without properly acknowledging the source through a commonly accepted citation style and using quotation marks;
- Paraphrasing (i.e., restating in your own words) text written by someone else without citing that author;
- Using a unique idea or concept, which you discovered in a specific reading, without citing that work.

Policy on Late Assignments

I understand that sometimes there are reasons why an assignment cannot be handed in on time. If you see such a situation emerging please contact me ahead of time to discuss the issue with me. This MUST happen prior to the deadline of the assignment. In any case: Whatever happens, please do get in touch with me!

Class Calendar

Please note that any of the sessions may be subject to change!

Week 1, August 25 and 27: Getting Started

Organizational meeting, getting to know each other, expectations and assignments, introduction of open source databases, discussion of syllabus, (very) short introduction of some of the key concepts and topics of civil-military relations.

Week 2, September 2: Getting Concepts Right: Democratization and Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces I

There is no class on September 4 due to the American Political Science Association annual conference.

We discuss basic definitions of democracy and review the so-called “third wave of democratization”. We examine the differences between a democratic transition and a democratic consolidation.

Samuel Huntington (1991). *The Third Wave of Democracy*. USA: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 231-252.

Schedler, Andreas (1998): What is Democratic Consolidation? *Journal of Democracy* 9 (2): 91-107.

Week 3, September 8 and 10, Getting Concepts Right: Democratization and Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces II

What does democratic control of the armed forces mean in practice? Why should ordinary citizens care about the role of the armed forces?

Kohn, Richard (1997). How Democracies Control the Military. *Journal of Democracy* 8 (4): 140-153.

Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul W Chambers and Siegfried Wolf (2011). Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies. *European Political Science* 10: 137-145.

Week 4, September 15 and 17: Classical Readings on Military Professionalism

We examine highly influential studies on civil-military relations in the United States. Although these texts were written decades ago, they continue to shape the thinking behind the role of the military in new democracies.

Huntington, Samuel (1957): *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Belknap. (details to be announced)

Janowitz, Morris (1960): *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe: Free Press. (details to be announced)

Feaver, Peter D. (1996): The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control. *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (2): 149-178.

Week 5, September 22 and 24: Democratic Control of the Military in Practice

On September 24 there will be a mid-term exam covering all topics we discussed in week 1 to week 4!!!!!!

A majority of nations has at some point experienced military rule. We look at the statistical evidence and examine in which regions of the world coups have occurred most frequently.

Nordlinger, Eric (1977). *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Halls, Chapter 3.

Powell, Jonathan and Thyne, Clayton (2011). Global Instance of Coups from 1950 to 2010. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2): 249-259.

Luttwak, Edward (1979). *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1 and Appendix B.

“The Civil-Military Industrial Complex.” Speech by President Dwight Eisenhower.

Week 6, September 29 and October 1: The Causes behind Military Coups: Theoretical Considerations

We examine why the armed forces overthrow democratically elected regimes and the factors that are conducive to military coups.

Perlmutter, Amos (1969). The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army. *Comparative Politics* 1 (3): 382-404.

Wiking, Staffan (1983). *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power*. Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, pp.16-67.

Thompson, William (1975). Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup. *Comparative Politics* 7 (4): 459-487.

Week 7, October 6 and 8: Coups and Their Causes. Empirical Evidence from Across the World

Building on last week's class we examine a few countries which have experienced military coups in greater detail.

Please read two of the following

Benin: Decalo, Samuel (1990). *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*. USA: Yale University Press, pp.89-132.

Thailand: Connors, Michael and Kevin Hewison (2008). Thailand and the “good coup”. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38 (1): 1-10.

Turkey: Lombardi, Ben (1997). Turkey-The Return of the Reluctant Generals? *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (2): 191-215.

Week 8, October 13 and 15: The Military as Pillar of Autocratic Rule

Many autocratic governments are led by civilian rulers. These regimes often rely on the military in order to remain in power. We examine some prominent cases.

Cook, Steven (2007). *Ruling but Not Governing. The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey*. USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, Chapter 1, 2 and 6.

Lee Huang, Robert (2013). Re-thinking Myanmar's Political Regime: Military Rule in Myanmar and Implications for Current Reforms. *Contemporary Politics* 19 (3): 247-261.

Week 9, October 20 and 22: The Challenges of Rebuilding Democratic Civilian Rule

In the last 25 years many former military dictatorships underwent democratic transitions. The removal of the armed forces from power is a challenging task for incoming democratic governments. We analyze some of these challenges.

Aguero, Felipe (1998): Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America. *Mershon International Studies Review* 42(2): 383-404.

Hunter, Wendy (1998). Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile. *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (2): 295-317.

Finer, Samuel (1985): The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power. *Third World Quarterly* 7 (1): 16-30.

Week 10, October 27 and 29: Successful Democratization and its Effect on Civil-Military Relations

The re-establishment of democratic rule after military dictatorship is challenging but not impossible. We discuss the effect of democratization on civil-military relations in countries where democratization has been successful.

Clark, John (2007): The Decline of the African Military Coup. *Journal of Democracy* 18 (3): 141-155.

Lehoucq, Fabrice and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2014). Breaking Out of the Coup Trap Political Competition and Military Coups in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (8): 1105-1129.

Week 11, November 3 and 5: Institutional Reform of the Armed Forces

Many new democracies have put in place institutional oversight mechanisms in order to establish democratic control of the armed forces. We examine some of these reforms and their implications.

Chambers, Paul (2013). *Unruly Boots: Military Power and Security Sector Reform Efforts in Thailand*. Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Hunter, Wendy (1998). Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile. *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (2): 295-317.

Week 12, November 3 and 5: International Interventions in Favor of Democratic Civilian Rule

Major Western powers have invested considerable time and effort in stabilizing democratic rule after the breakdown of military rule. We discuss some prominent cases and the extent to which Western attempts to build democratic rule have been successful.

The assigned reading is still to be announced.

Week 13: November 10 and 12: When Coups Lead to Democratization

A prominent assumption in the literature is that military coups lead to military dictatorship and thus to autocratic rule. Most recent research, however, argues that coups increasingly lead to democratization. The implications of military coups, therefore, might be considerably more nuanced than assumed previously.

Thyne, Clayton and Jonathan Powell (2014). Coup d'Etat or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008. *Foreign Policy Analysis* (forthcoming).

Marinov Nikolay and Hein Goemans (2013). Coups and Democracy. *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (4): 799-825.

Week 14: November 17: The Arab Spring and the Role of Arab Armies in Facilitating Democracy

Please note that there is no class on November 19 due to the annual meeting of the African Studies Association

The Arab Spring has changed the global geostrategic landscape to a considerable extent. We examine then role of Arab armies in facilitating and in avoiding democratic rule.

Lutterbeck, Derek (2013). Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations. *Armed Forces & Society* 39 (1): 28-52.

Nepstad, Sharon (2013): Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 337-349.

Week 15: November 24 and 26: The Army as Informal Vetoplayer

Armies remain powerful political actors even in countries in which democratic rule has been re-established and which are on the path to democratic consolidation. This week we take a closer look at Latin America and discuss to what extent the military is still a powerful informal vetoplayer.

Pion-Berlin, David (2010): Informal Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. Why Politicians and Soldiers Choose Unofficial Venues. *Armed Forces & Society* 36: 526-544.

Pion-Berlin, David and Trinkunas, Harold (2010): Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crisis in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 42 (4): 395-411.

Week 16: December 1 and 3: Discussion of Research Papers in Class

Everyone is invited to present and discuss their ideas for the final research paper. This is the change to get feedback from your peers.